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 Abstract 
 
School of International Relations 
Doctor of Philosophy 
by Sung Yong Lee 
 
This thesis examines the processes of the peace negotiations in Cambodia (1987-1993) and El 
Salvador (1989-1993) in order to address the following question: What does the interplay 
between the national factions and the external interveners in peace negotiations tell us about 
their chances of achieving their goals? By using the concept of ‘interplay,’ this study 
reinterprets the negotiation processes as the negotiating actors’ exchanges of strategic moves. 
In particular, it explores how the negotiating actors’ attitudes towards the core negotiation 
issues changed in the two cases and how the changes affected their counterparts’ negotiating 
strategies. 
There are two aspects to the findings of this thesis, one descriptive and the other explanatory. 
First, this study has investigated the characteristics of the negotiating actors’ strategies and 
the pattern of the interplay between them. As for the interveners’ strategies, this thesis finds 
that impartial third parties generally employ diplomatic intervention methods, while advocate 
states enjoy a wider range of options. In addition, national factions’ behaviour is generally 
affected by three factors: their fundamental goals, the domestic resources under their control, 
and the incentives or pressure from external interveners. It is also observed that the stronger 
the intervention becomes, the more that national factions’ provisional strategies are inclined 
to be receptive towards the intervention. Nevertheless, the national factions rarely fully 
accepted proposals that they deemed harmful to the achievement of their fundamental goals. 
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Second, based on the descriptive findings, this thesis highlights the importance of mutual 
understanding between national factions and external interveners. The case studies of 
Cambodia and El Salvador show that the effectiveness of a particular intervention depends 
not so much on the type of method employed but on the context in which it is applied. An 
intervention is more likely to be effective when it is used in a way that national factions can 
understand and is supported by the consistently strong attention of external interveners.  In 
addition, it is observed that actors’ ethnocentric perceptions on core concepts of conflict and 
negotiation as well as their lack of an effective communication capability are some of the 
common causes of the misunderstandings that arise during negotiation processes. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
  
Why are some interveners better than others at inducing the warring national factions in civil 
conflicts to consent to peace accords? This question has been explored in many academic 
studies since the end of the Cold War. However, despite the diversity in their specific ideas, 
these studies have usually paid sole attention to either the external conditions of civil wars 
(Zartman, 1997; Turner, 2004; Regan, 1996) or the methods of international intervention 
(Collier & Sambanis, 2005; Regan, 2000; Walter, 2002; Kaufmann, 1996; Le Billon & 
Nicholls, 2007) and have neglected the role of national factions – the counterparts of the 
international interveners – as central actors in the interplay within peace negotiations (see 
below for details). 
Nevertheless, the dynamics of third-party intervention can be accurately understood only 
when the behaviour of both sides in the interplay, third-party interveners and national factions, 
receive balanced attention. Thus, this thesis intends to fill this gap by examining the interplay 
between national factions and third-party interveners in civil war peace negotiations. In short, 
through a comparative case study on Cambodia and El Salvador, it contends that mutual 
understanding between both sides is one critical requirement for successful third-party 
intervention.  
The two topics explored in this thesis, civil war and third-party peace intervention, have been 
two of the most debated issues in the academic field of international security in the post-Cold 
War period. First, civil war has attracted scholars’ particular attention for the following 
reasons. Of the various types of military conflict, civil war has been by far the most common 
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
in the post-Cold War era. Civil wars account for the overwhelming majority of conflict cases: 
ninety-four per cent of the major military conflicts since the Cold War ended have been civil 
war cases (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2007: 624). While the number of inter-state wars has 
fallen significantly in this period, the total number of major civil conflicts shows no sign of 
diminishing. Even though many recent civil conflicts were ended through negotiated 
settlements, many of these have since relapsed into violence, and new conflicts occur every 
year. 
Another aspect of civil wars that attracts people’s attention is their brutality (Slim, 2008: 37-
70). Since civil war is conflict within a state, military operations are highly likely to target or 
victimise civilians. For example, many civil war leaders employ strategies that directly target 
ordinary people, such as ethnic cleansing, kidnapping, and recruiting youths as soldiers 
(Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005: 138-9). Furthermore, since the military forces 
engaged in civil war are often irregulars untrained in conventional warfare, unintended 
human rights abuses frequently occur.  
In addition, since the actors involved in civil war are many and diverse, their characteristics 
are multifaceted and complicated (Kaldor & Vashee, 1997; Kaldor, 2006: 1-14). Civil wars 
are not conflicts between sovereign states but between different factions within a state, and 
the distinctions between the actors are complex. Although identifying group members is 
relatively straightforward in ethnic or religious wars, group identity is not so clearly defined 
in most civil war cases. An added complication is that, in many instances, constituencies 
change their support for factions. Moreover, in the past few years, civil wars have become 
increasingly ‘internationalised’ (Gleditsch, 2007: 295), with the result that the traditional 
definition of civil war as something that occurs within the boundaries of a state might have to 
be re-appraised.  
 


A serious dilemma exists in relation to the previous point: there is a tension between state 
sovereignty and the principle of human rights. In modern international society, sovereignty is 
the primary exclusive right of a state, where the state is defined as ‘an aggregate of 
individuals entrusted to govern effectively and to act as an impartial arbiter of conflicts 
among the constituent parts, treating all members of the political community as legally equal 
citizens’ (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005: 87). However, in many civil wars, 
governments openly discriminate against some sections of their populace and sometimes 
even undertake military operations against particular groups. In such cases, international 
actors have to decide whether to protect people’s human rights and become involved in the 
conflict or to respect the sovereignty of the state and not intervene. 
The second topic that this thesis examines is third-party intervention. Indeed, the promotion 
of peaceful conflict resolution has become one of the most significant issues in international 
politics. Of the various forms of intervention for achieving peaceful conflict resolution, 
negotiation is the most widely accepted and most commonly employed method. However, not 
many conflicts have been brought to an end through negotiation. In fact, ‘for the period 1945-
93, there were 14 conflicts that ended via negotiations out of a total of 84, which is 17 per 
cent’ (Wallensteen, 2007: 125-6). As the scope of international intervention in peace 
negotiation has increased in the post-Cold War period, the role of international interveners, 
including states, international organisations, and sub-state actors, in peace negotiations has 
become an important issue.  
However, not all of these efforts have achieved their goals. In fact, as the number of 
interventions has increased, the number of cases of intervention failure (or partial failure) has 
also risen. Many international interventions, including the operations in Somalia, Angola 
(1991), and Liberia, failed to persuade the national leaders in those countries to abide by the 
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agreed peace accords. Moreover, although some international interventions, such as those in 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia, succeeded in producing a hiatus in the conflicts, 
their efforts at building a stable peace did not result in success. Hence, identifying the factors 
that influence peace processes and their outcomes is considered one of the most pressing 
issues in the field of international relations.  
Thus, vigorous research has been undertaken to discover the factors that determine the 
success of third-party intervention, focusing on the external conditions of conflicts and 
negotiation, the strength of interveners, negotiation strategies and the like.  Despite the 
extensive academic discourse, however, conventional studies on the role of intervention in 
peace processes have a number of common weaknesses (Darby & Mac Ginty, 2000, 2003; 
Hampson, 1996; Stedman, 2003; Walter, 2002). 
This research intends to contribute to conflict studies through the analysis of the actors’ 
interplay in civil war peace negotiation processes. Specifically, this research aim to address 
the following weaknesses in the conventional academic discourse. First, the conventional 
studies, particularly ones relying on quantitative analyses, have paid little attention to the 
negotiating actors’ behaviour and perception. Instead, the majority argue that a strong 
correlation exists between the specific conditions of the civil conflict or negotiation, such as 
(1) identity wars, (2) the human costs of the wars (deaths and displacements), (3) the duration 
of the wars, (4) the number of factions, (5) ethnic heterogeneity, (6) per-capita income and 
the overall level of economic development, and (7) the UN’s involvement, and the likelihood 
of successful peacebuilding. In addition, there are a significant number of studies seeking the 
‘specific effects of certain intervention methods’ (Collier & Sambanis, 2005; Regan, 2000; 
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Walter, 2002; Kaufmann, 1996).1 However, a surprisingly small number of studies have 
focused on how the actors in peace processes actually behave and perceive such conditions.  
Although findings in traditional studies have provided firm grounds for the existence of a 
correlation between the factors and the processes and outcomes of peace negotiations, the 
question of ‘how they are related’ remains unexplored. Put another way, the studies have 
focused on ‘what’, but not ‘why’ or ‘how.’  
In response to this failing, this actor-oriented study will reveal some of the concealed factors 
that promote successful peace negotiation. This research primarily studies the role of the 
perceptions and strategies of the parties in negotiation. In particular, this study explores when 
and how the attitude of a certain party towards critical negotiation issues changed, and what 
motivated them to change. Of course, structural conditions are important in that they provide 
basic constraining factors. However, since each party understands their negotiation conditions 
in different ways, this study contends that the circumstances surrounding the negotiation can 
differ according to the parties’ perceptions.  
Second, many previous studies that looked at the actors’ roles, have focused solely on the 
influence of interveners, neglecting the role of warring factions. Compared to the research on 
post-conflict recovery and development, which highlights the role of national or local actors 
(Richmond, 2008; Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Mac Ginty, 2008; Mac Ginty & Hamieh, 2010), 
surprisingly few studies on peace negotiation processes have examined the behaviour of 
national factions. For instance, the academic debates on the determinants of the peace 
resolutions in Cambodia have commonly treated national factions as passive recipients of the 
intervention rather than active players whose interactions affected the course of the 

1
 For example, after scrutinising various cases, Le Billon and Nicholls conclude that ‘military interventions 
appear to be a deceptive “quick-fix”’ and that ‘revenue sharing is as successful as military intervention in terms 
of implementation’ (see Le Billon & Nicholls, 2007: 629). 
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negotiations and the outcome of the peace process (Peou, 1997: 148-71; Turner, 2004: 7; 
Findley, 1995: 3; Haas, 1991).  
Part of the reason why few studies have advanced theories on the role of national actors is 
that, due to their diverse characteristics, national factions do not exhibit generalised behaviour. 
The national actors in each civil war case have unique cultural backgrounds, motives for 
taking up arms, material or non-material resources, and leadership styles. Also, since many 
intervening actors are Western, they have attracted much of the research by Western scholars. 
Moreover, many studies have tended to neglect close analysis of the national leaderships, 
regarding them as ‘a factor so obvious’ and categorising the leaders with simple criteria 
(Gormley-Heenan, 2007: 22, 28-9). In addition, many of the studies that do focus on the 
national factions’ side, particularly those seeking formal theories, simply assume that national 
factions will behave in accordance with the rationale shared by the authors, namely, that they 
will make rational decisions in response to economic and military costs and benefits (see 
Chapter 2).  
However, an analysis of third-party peace intervention that relies solely on investigating the 
external interveners’ side can reveal only partial aspects of the dynamics of the intervention; 
accordingly, it necessarily neglects the national and local factors that affect the effectiveness 
of the intervention. To fill this gap in the conventional academic discourse, this research pays 
attention to both international interveners and national factions by using the concept of 
‘interplay’. For the analysis, the cultural and historical background that has formed the basic 
perceptual characteristics of the national factions is examined in this research. In particular, 
three historical factors that strongly affect the negotiators’ perception of conflict and 
negotiation – indigenous culture, colonialism, and chronic conflicts – are analysed. In 
addition, this study employs the concept of ‘interplay’ to demonstrate the interactional 
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dynamics of actors’ strategic moves in negotiations. 
In addition to the above, this thesis makes two further contributions to the discourse. First, it 
deals with the impact of cultural issues on negotiation processes, a factor that receives 
limited attention in the academic discourse on civil conflicts. As discussed in Chapter 3, this 
research maintains that ethnocentric culture is a critical factor that affects the dynamics of 
interplay between the actors in civil conflicts. Traditional debates regarding the impact of 
culture on civil conflicts have focused on three areas. Firstly, focusing on the causes of 
conflicts, some commentators have asserted that the artificially imposed European cultures of 
the colonial periods are the root of civil conflicts and continue to have an influence during 
peace negotiations (Birmingham, 1992; Blanton, Mason & Athow, 2001; Young, 2004). 
Secondly, others stress that in peace negotiations, the interveners promote Western-style 
negotiation processes and resolutions (Kimmel, 1994; Lieberfeld, 1999; Watkins & Rosegrant, 
2002). Thirdly, in regard to peace accord implementation, it is argued that aid and support 
from external agencies and states imposes Western standards and viewpoints (Avruch & 
Black, 1991; Paris, 1997; Richmond, 2006).  However, while the first and third issues have 
been extensively studied, the influence of culture on peace negotiation processes has attracted 
limited attention, despite its importance. In this sense, this thesis aims to fill the gap that 
exists in the conventional examination of negotiation processes. 
Second, and related to the previous point, much of the research on peace processes has 
neglected contextual factors. In the same way that actors’ perceptions and attitudes contribute 
to the root causes of a conflict, their attitudes, behaviour and perceptions can have a range of 
effects on the negotiations, depending on how they combine with other factors. For example, 
Lieberfeld shows that ‘impending threats’ can encourage leaders to negotiate but can also 
make them ‘to try to prevail by force’. Moreover, dependence on third parties may lead the 
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national actors ‘to encourage/impose [a] settlement’ but may also lead them to seek selfish 
interests based on ‘extraneous issues’. In addition, a ‘leadership change’ can foster either 
‘pragmatism’ or ‘increased militancy’ (Lieberfeld, 1999: 11). The lack of attention paid to 
such contextual issues has hampered the accuracy of the analyses of previous studies. 
By implementing in-depth analysis of the peace negotiation processes in Cambodia and El 
Salvador, this thesis intends to reveal various contextual issues surrounding actors’ decision 
making, such as their historical and cultural backgrounds, the external actors’ perceptions, 
and accidental events. The case studies demonstrate that the direction that the negotiation 
takes is determined by a combination of the actors’ intentions and situational factors such as 
the timing of the negotiations, domestic events in participating countries, and the 
characteristics of representatives. 
As mentioned above, this research aims to identify and verify the most effective methods for 
achieving successful peace negotiation via an investigation of the patterns of interplay 
between the actors in civil war peace negotiations. In order to fulfil this goal, it raises the 
following key question: ‘What does the interplay between the national factions and the 
external interveners in peace negotiations tell us about their chances of achieving their goals?’ 
In order to answer this question in a more systematic way, three subordinate questions are 
posed: (1) What strategies do national and external actors use to achieve their goals? (2) 
Which intervening methods are more effective? (3) What are the major perceptual barriers to 
effective third-party intervention? 
This study adopts a qualitative research approach, with the intention of investigating the 
factors that promote successful negotiation. More specifically, a comparative case study that 
focuses on the interplay between national factions and international interveners is used to 
reveal the factors that lead the participants in a negotiation to come to respect the peace 
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process and its outcome. The peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador were selected 
as the case studies. Although they share similarities in various respects, including the 
backgrounds to the conflicts, the severity of violence, and the characteristics of the external 
interventions, their negotiations and peace process outcomes exhibit significant differences. 
They therefore provide good examples of how procedural issues can produce significantly 
different negotiation outcomes under conditions that are similar in many ways (see Chapter 3 
for details). 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 defines and 
specifies the core concepts and theories that this thesis employs. After reviewing the 
definitions of civil war, peace negotiation, third-party intervention, and interplay, it describes 
how this research modifies these concepts and how they will be utilised in the case studies. It 
also discusses the strengths and weaknesses of positivist and non-positivist discourses on 
negotiation and argues that it is necessary to adopt a number of core concepts and principles 
from both traditions in order to reveal and clarify the dynamics of the interplay between 
national factions and international interveners. This chapter also considers previous research 
on the types of intervention methods. 
Based on the conceptual and theoretical discussion in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 presents the 
research frameworks, analytical components, research methodologies, and practical issues 
related to the field research. Employing game theory, this research views peace processes as a 
‘game’ between a national faction and an external intervener. Thus, this chapter clarifies what 
constitutes an actors’ strategic move and how it should be understood. However, based on 
non-positivist discourse, this research also includes a number of cultural and perceptual 
variables that determine the actors’ moves. In addition, the chapter spells out the actor-
oriented, qualitative, and comparative nature of the study. By comparison of the peace 
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negotiation processes in Cambodia and El Salvador, this research explores the behaviour of 
negotiating actors and seeks the core elements of successful peace negotiation. Finally, it 
describes how the fieldwork, which involved a series of elite interviews in Cambodia, was 
conducted and discusses the issues of research biases, ethical considerations, and its approach 
to research subjects. 
Chapter 4 provides the background information for the case studies. This chapter consists of 
two separate sections that discuss Cambodia and El Salvador, respectively. Each section 
begins with a brief overview of the history of the conflicts and negotiations in each case. This 
is followed by a description of the major actors in the negotiation processes and an analysis 
of the relationships between the players. Finally, the long-term and short-term factors that led 
to the start of the peace negotiations are presented. 
Chapters 5 and 6 present the case studies, which reveal the interplay between actors in the 
peace negotiations. The analytical focuses of the two chapters are dissimilar in terms of the 
relationship between the actors and the perceptual barriers to successful peace negotiation. 
Chapter 5 reveals the dynamics of interplay between the national factions and impartial third 
parties in Cambodia and El Salvador. Chapter 6 focuses on the exchanges in strategic moves 
between national factions and their advocate states. Moreover, Chapter 5 shows that the 
interveners’ ethnocentric cultures prevented them from gaining a good understanding of the 
national factions, whereas Chapter 6 argues that the national factions’ limited communication 
capabilities prevented them from recognising the changes in the attitudes and intentions of 
external interveners.  
Chapter 7 integrates and confirms the findings of the case studies. The first section of this 
chapter looks at the general patterns and divergent characteristics of the interplay and 
highlights the similarities in the cases and the differences that they possess. In addition, these 
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findings present a number of theoretical implications related to the interplay in the 
negotiations, such as the two-level game in conflict resolution and the role of ethnocentric 
culture. In the following sections, two explanatory questions of ‘which intervening methods 
are more effective?’ and ‘what are the major perceptual barriers to effective third-party 
intervention?’ are investigated. 
Finally, the conclusion summarises and clarifies the findings. It reviews the discussions that 
appeared in the case studies and provides answers to the above-mentioned core questions. In 
sum, two points are highlighted. First, in observing both national factions and third-party 
interveners through the concept of ‘interplay’, a better understanding of the dynamics in 
peace negotiation processes is obtained. Second, good mutual understanding between the 
negotiating parties is a key requirement for successful third-party peace intervention. It also 
presents three practical suggestions for future third-party peace intervention: ensuring good 
communication between national factions and international interveners, providing a minimum 
security guarantee, and judging the right timing for intervention withdrawal. This chapter 
concludes with the presentation of the contributions of this research on the academic 
discourse as well as the weaknesses to be supplemented in the future. 
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Chapter 2 
Peace Negotiation and Third-Party Intervention 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Having clear and accurate ideas on the concepts, theories, and typologies is a prerequisite for 
academic research, and reviewing previous studies provides a good starting point for this. 
Therefore, this chapter first explores the conventional academic discourse on the conceptual, 
theoretical, and methodological issues that provide the foundation for the analysis of the case 
studies and for developing the central arguments of this thesis. Based on this literature review, 
it also presents how this thesis understands the concepts and how it applies the theories and 
typologies to the research framework. 
First, this chapter defines the core terms and concepts used in this thesis and the context in 
which they are used. Since the purpose of this thesis is to verify the patterns of interplay 
between mediators and warring factions in civil war peace negotiations, this chapter focuses 
on the following four concepts: civil war, peace negotiation, interplay, and third-party 
intervention. If civil war defines the circumstances in which negotiation takes place, peace 
negotiation provides the stage on which all the efforts and strategies of actors to achieve their 
goals are orchestrated. Additionally, the term interplay denotes that this research views the 
movements of actors through the conceptual lens of mutual influence. Finally, third-party 
intervention is the target of this study and sets the level of analysis. As these concepts have 
been used in a variety of ways in previous studies and there is no unanimity on their 
definitions, it is necessary to define them for the purposes of this research. 
Second, the theories of peace negotiation (or, more generally, negotiation) that are employed 
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or examined in this thesis are reviewed. This section reviews a number of major theoretical 
debates in the two traditional academic discourses on negotiation, the positivist tradition and 
non-positivist arguments, because this research relies on both schools. In short, while this 
research adopts the fundamental principles and assumptions of game theory in its analytic 
framework, it also considers the perceptual issues discussed by non-positivist groups in order 
to supplement the weakness of game theory. 
Positivist negotiation theories, which are primarily based on an assumption of the rationality 
of actors, provide for the basis for the research framework in this thesis. Drawing on these 
theories, this research understands negotiation in conceptual terms as a game played between 
actors. Thus, it is assumed that all actors decide their next strategic move by weighing their 
options against their fundamental goals.  Non-positivist ideas enable this research to escape 
from positivist theories’ restricted views on actors’ preferences, which tend to focus on 
economic interests, and positivism’s unrealistic assumption of perfect information. In 
response to these limitations, this thesis regards the role of actors’ cultural values and 
imperfect information as important factors affecting the actors’ decisions.  
Third, the ways in which previous academic debates have depicted the characteristics and 
unique features of interveners and their strategies are examined. However, since interveners 
are not uniform but have very different characteristics, motivations for intervention, and 
interests in the conflicts in which they are involved, this chapter classifies interveners into the 
following three groups in order to make the analysis clearer: national states, international 
organisations, and sub-state actors. Based on this review, this thesis will develop its own 
typology in Chapter 3.  
This chapter also reviews the discussions on the strategies that interveners employ in peace 
negotiations. Although the types of national factions and their methods of response are not 
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closely examined in the conventional discourse, its ideas on interveners nevertheless provide 
a sound conceptual basis for the categorisation of national actors. By employing two criteria 
used in previous studies to categorise the strategies – strength and forms – this chapter 
summarises the principal methods of third-party intervention. In addition, this chapter 
reviews the discourse on the role of third-parties’ impartiality and strength of intervention 
because they are important considerations in this thesis. 
 
Definition of the Core Concepts 
This section defines the four core concepts in this thesis: civil war, peace negotiation, 
interplay, and third-party intervention. For each term, the discussions on these concepts in 
previous research are first reviewed. After this, these concepts are redefined in terms of the 
way in which they are as used for the purposes of this research. Where necessary, this chapter 
also presents a number of the criteria that are used to categorise elements of the concepts. 
 
Civil War 
Most definitions in conventional studies agree that civil war is a military conflict that takes 
place within a state’s territory. Although the precise wording differs, the definitions are 
generally similar to Fearson’s: ‘a violent conflict within a country fought by organized groups 
that aim to take power at the center or in a region, or to change government policies’ (Fearson, 
2007: no pagination). However, under this broad definition, various types of conflicts can be 
categorised as civil war.2 

2
 For example, some are simple power struggles among various monarchs in a kingdom or empire (e.g. the 
Three Kingdoms war period in China (184-280 AD), the English Wars of the Roses (1455-1485 AD)), while 
others are rebellions against central authorities (e.g. the Russian Civil War (1917-1921), the Salvadoran Civil 
War (1979-1991)). In addition, whereas some are mobilised and organised by internal actors (the French 
Revolution (1789-1799), the English Civil War (1642-1651)), others are strongly influenced by external 
advocates (the Korean Civil War (1950-1953), the Vietnamese Civil War (1954-1975)). 
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Thus, in order to accomplish accurate analysis, civil wars need to be defined and categorised. 
In regard to the conditions of civil war, Small and Singer propose two distinctions that set 
civil wars apart from interstate war: the internality of the war to the territory of a sovereign 
state and the participation of the government as a combatant (Small & Singer, 1982: 210). 
Under these criteria, the conflicts among non-governmental factions in a state, such as violent 
skirmishes between local militias in Afghanistan, are not considered civil war.  
The US Army specifies five conditions for conferring civil war status upon a conflict: the 
contestants of conflicts should control territory, have a functioning government, enjoy some 
foreign recognition, have identifiable regular armed forces, and engage in major military 
operations. Although these are useful criteria, it is not clear whether all actors have to fulfil 
these requirements in order for a conflict to be considered a civil war (US Army, 1990: no 
pagination).  
As a way of coding conflicts for statistical databases, Doyle and Sambanis proposed six 
conditions that define a conflict as a civil war: ‘[it] causes more than 1,000 deaths overall, in 
at least a single year; [it] challenges the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state; [it] 
occurs within the recognized boundary of that state; [it] involves the state as a principal 
combatant; [it] includes rebels with the ability to mount organized armed opposition to the 
state; and [it] has parties concerned with the prospect of living together in the same political 
unit after the end of the war’ (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000: 783). These criteria have been 
employed and developed both by many scholars and by agencies outside academia. For 
example, Singer and Small (1982) and Licklider (1993) adopted Doyle and Sambanis’s 
conceptualisations. Regan reduced the number of casualties as a condition and defined it as 
‘armed, sustained combat between groups within state boundaries in which there are at least 
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200 fatalities’ (Regan, 1996: 338).3  
This thesis posits a somewhat broader definition of civil war: it is a type of violent conflict 
conducted mainly in a state territory and initiated by domestic factions. This definition is 
distinct from the previous research reviewed here in three regards. First, this thesis considers 
the participation of external actors one of the characteristics of civil war. Since a diverse 
range of international actors have interests in the countries involved in conflicts, it is not 
surprising that most civil wars are intervened in by external actors. Second, geographically, 
this thesis does not strictly assume that civil war needs to be conducted solely within a 
territory until the end of the conflict. In fact, many civil wars tend to be internationalised 
because borders tend to be porous. Third, this research does not use the number of casualties 
as a criterion for distinguishing types of conflicts. In many cases, definitions based on 
numerical canons cause conceptual problems.4 Since this thesis mainly applies qualitative 
methods, it will analyse and categorise the diverse characteristics of civil war under the 
somewhat broad definition given above rather than excluding conflict cases based on whether 
there is an external actor in the conflict or whether the number of deaths exceeds a certain 
number. 
 
Peace Negotiation 
Peace negotiation is a type of negotiation that aims at terminating military conflicts. Thus, 
this section first defines the meaning of negotiation in this thesis and then clarifies some of 

3
 Furthermore, these criteria were used by the US government as the basis for its denial that the conflicts that 
occurred in Iraq after the new Iraqi government had been established amounted to a civil war. Gen. Peter Pace, 
the then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained that even though there are a few bloody incidents, they 
are not considered civil war cases because the government is controlling the security (rather than joining as a 
contestant) and the numbers of victims are too low (MSNBC, 2008: no pagination). 
4
 For instance, although some people follow Doyle and Sambanis in using ‘1,000 casualties’ as a condition of 
civil war, it appears to an arbitrary decision to deem conflicts with 1,002 victims ‘wars’, but those causing  998 
deaths are merely deemed ‘conflicts’. Moreover, it is also controversial to interpret a death toll of 1,000 in China 
and the same number of casualties in Haiti as equivalent. 
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the distinctive characteristics that make peace negotiations unique. 
In general, negotiation is defined as ‘an interaction in which people try to meet their needs or 
accomplish their goals by reaching an agreement with others who are trying to get their own 
needs met’ (Mayer, 2000: 142). Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall also employ a similar 
definition saying ‘negotiation is the process whereby the parties within the conflict seek to 
settle or resolve their conflicts’ (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 29). Gulliver characterises it as ‘the 
presentation and exchange of more or less specific proposals for the terms of agreement on 
particular issues’ (Gulliver, 1979, cited in Lewicki et al, 1992: 219). Focusing on social 
bargaining, Walton and McKersie describe it more specifically as ‘the deliberate interaction 
of two or more complex social units which are attempting to define or redefine the terms of 
their interdependence’ (Walton & McKersie, 1988: 26). Regarding international aspects, 
Pfetsch defines negotiation as ‘a social process in which two or more parties interact in the 
search for an acceptable position with regard to their differences and concerning the same 
issue of conflict’ (Pfetsch, 2007: 9).  
Although these definitions highlight different aspects of negotiation, there is a general 
agreement that negotiation is a process by which compromise is reached. In addition, these 
definitions assume that negotiations have four core elements: board (set up), players 
(important actors), stakes (issues and their salience for players), and moves (strategies and 
tactics) (Starkey et al, 1999: 125-6). In short, no matter what specific forms they have, the 
actions that actors communicate to build a voluntary agreement can be defined as 
‘negotiations’. Considering these discussions, this thesis defines peace negotiation as ‘a 
strategic compromise between the actors in adversarial relations that takes place to terminate 
violent conflicts’. It limits the scope of negotiation to ‘the negotiation in violent conflicts’ to 
focus on the issues of international security.  
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This thesis applies the concepts of game theory in order to specify the characteristics of peace 
negotiation; in particular, the concepts of a competitive game and a collaborative game are 
considered.5 Although researchers use various terms to describe them6, the basic difference 
between these two types of game is the likelihood of cooperation among the negotiating 
actors. Theories of competitive games assume that the relationships among negotiators are 
based on zero-sum interests. Thus, by and large, actors do not trust the commitment and 
sincerity of their counterparts. Starkey, Boyer and Wilkenfeld described three types of games: 
positional bargaining, adversarial diplomacy, and coercive diplomacy (Starkey, Boyer, and 
Wilkenfeld, 1999: 111-3).7 All three commonly assume that the interests of two or more 
actors clash and the actors barely move from their original positions. Models for negotiations 
of this type are well developed. The ‘Chicken game’ and the ‘Prisoners’ dilemma’ are 
representative of this model.  
In collaborative negotiation, actors behave in more cooperative ways. Various theories that 
‘find ways, if not to reconcile the conflicting positions, then to meet the underlying interests, 
values or needs’ have been produced. ‘The nature of the dispute and the goals each side seeks 
to achieve’ are the determinants of the game (Deutsch, 1973: 20). When goals are tied 
together in a way that means ‘the chance of one side attaining its goal is increased by the 
other side’s attaining its goal,’ the possibility of cooperation is increased (Spangler, 2003: no 
pagination). The following are widely considered to be the elements that establish 
collaborative games: setting the issues into a wider context or redefining the parties’ interests 

5
 Here, game means the situation of interplay that is set participants. Game largely determines the set of all 
possible utility payoffs. In a game, players make efforts to maximise their utility. 
6
 Zero-sum game, bargaining approach, and adversarial negotiation are commonly used for describing the 
competitive negotiation games; whereas, non zero sum game, positive sum game, integrative negotiation are 
widely adopted as terms indicating the collaborative game. 
7
 Positional bargaining is undertaken by a negotiator who sees only one desirable outcome of negotiation. In this 
negotiation, the counterpart has to choose either to accept the deal or to go to war. Aggressive diplomacy occurs 
when the negotiators’ interests are in sharp contrast but there is little possibility of military conflict. In this case, 
aggressive methods such as economic sanctions can be used. Finally, coercive diplomacy is also adversarial but 
with no actual punishments (usually limited to diplomatic threats). 
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in such a way that they can be made compatible; sharing sovereignty or access to the 
contested resources; increasing ‘the size of the cake’; offering compensation for concessions 
or trading concessions in other areas; and managing the contested resources on a functional, 
rather than a territorial or sovereign, basis (Watkins & Rosegrant, 2002: 31; Spangler, 2003: 
no pagination).  
Negotiation in conflicts can be understood as one of the most competitive types of 
negotiation in the international arena for several reasons. First, when a war begins, actors 
believe that their contradicting interests cannot be harmonised through non-violent means. 
Second, once a war begins and causalities occur on both sides, the level of a faction’s trust 
toward its counterpart decreases dramatically. Third, even when leaders wish to negotiate, the 
rank and file are so filled with anger that they tend not to allow it. Under these circumstances, 
the actors in peace negotiations seek resolutions that can convince the warring factions to 
agree to end the war through peaceful means (for the strategies employed by actors, see 
below). In this regard, peace negotiation can be described as the negotiation for transforming 
a competitive game into a collaborative one. 
 
Interplay 
As the main interest of this research is the interplay between the actors in peace processes, a 
clear definition of what constitutes interplay is essential if the analyses in the following 
chapters are to be valid. The term ‘interplay’, which means that two or more things affect or 
react to each other, has been used in a variety of ways. In politics, the concept of interplay has 
been widely used to indicate inter-relations among various phenomena. In many studies, 
despite the difference in precise meanings, the terms ‘interplay,’ ‘interaction’ and ‘inter-
relation’ are used interchangeably.  
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Regarding the boundary of the concept, ‘interplay of institutions’ studies provide relevant 
ideas. Jungcurt defines interplay as actors’ behaviour that is intended to realise ‘desired 
changes in an institution target variable (outcome and impact level performance), as well as 
the interests, perceptions and capabilities’ (Jungcurt, 2006: 11-2). Moreover, as to the types of 
interplay, Schroeder suggests ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ interplay based on whether one 
organisation involves regimes on the same or on different levels of societal organisation 
(Schroeder, 2008: 29-70). In summary, although they emphasise different aspects interplay, 
these definitions explain interplay in terms of a series of ‘interactions’ among ‘intended 
behaviours’ of actors. 
Moreover, the three types of motive for interplay suggested by Strokke are notable: utility, 
norms and ideology. First, ‘a case where rules or programmes that are undertaken within one 
regime alter the costs or benefits of behavioural options addressed by another regime would 
exemplify utilitarian interplay’ (Keohane et al, 1993: 21-2). In utilitarian interplay, the actors 
consider cost-efficiency, externalities, and competition important. Second, normative 
interplay may be depicted as how ‘an international regime may confirm or contradict the 
norms upheld by another institution’ (Keohane et al, 1993: 21-2). In this type of interplay, the 
motive that controls the relationship is the actors’ concerns about legitimacy, not the costs 
and benefits. The third type of interplay is ideational interplay and relates to the learning 
process. ‘Thus, one regime can support the effectiveness of another by drawing political 
attention – domestically or at the international level – to the problems that are addressed by 
the recipient regime’ (Keohane et al, 1993: 21-2). The actors in this category can increase 
societal or bureaucratic concern for the problems addressed by the recipient regime and thus 
add political energy to further development and implementation of the regime. Furthermore, 
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they can increase awareness of relevant solutions to problems by stimulating policy 
innovation or the transfer of successful responses. 
As regards the aspects of interplay to be considered, Oberthur and Gehring define three levels 
of institutional interaction: ‘interaction of rules and rule-making processes (output level); 
interaction of actor-group behaviour (outcome level) and interaction of target variables 
(impact level)’ (Oberthur & Gehring, 2000, cited in Stokke, 2001: 5). 
This research defines interplay as ‘the actors’ exchange of intentional moves’ in peace 
negotiations (reflecting Jungcurt’s definitions). The interplay in peace negotiations includes 
the behaviours of actors during both the negotiation phase and the initial implementation 
phase. The types of interplay observed in the case studies in this thesis generally take the 
form of vertical interplay between national factions and external third parties with relatively 
asymmetric powers. The motives for the interplay in the case studies generally conform to the 
patterns of normative interplay and ideational interplay outlined above.   
In addition, this thesis emphasises the reciprocity of interplay, paying attention to both the 
outcome level and impact level (in Oberthur and Gehring’s terms). Although many recognise 
this, studies on peace negotiation in internal wars normally pay less attention to how these 
reciprocal dynamics affect conflict situations and instead emphasise the unilateral influence 
of international interveners vis-à-vis warring factions. Nevertheless, national actors have a 
strong effect on a negotiation process through their diverse actions, which include making 
suggestions, accepting or rejecting other parties’ suggestions, modifying suggestions, 
conducting direct negotiation, employing indirect lobbying, and the like. Thus, it is necessary 
to regard national parties in disputes as active negotiators rather than passive reflectors of 
external interveners. In this sense, Richmond points out that a peace process is subject to 
‘how a mediator is perceived by disputants’ (Richmond, 1998: 710). Bercovitch also argues 
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that ‘mediation attempts fail because the parties in conflict make different assumptions about 
the process and have different expectations regarding its outcome’ (Bercovitch, 1996: 6). 
Taking these points into account, this thesis stresses the importance of reciprocal influences 
and the outcomes of the influences on the progress of negotiations. 
 
Third-Party Intervention 
Under the most basic definition of intervention, the act of intervening in a situation, there are 
many kinds of intervention, each having different forms, actors and intentions.8 However, the 
target of this research – discovering the patterns of interplay between national factions and 
international interveners in peace processes – means that the concept of intervention needs to 
be narrowed to the efforts to achieve peaceful conflict resolutions in civil wars in the post-
Cold War period.  
Many conflict resolution studies define intervention using similar criteria. For example, 
Regan regards intervention as ‘convention-breaking military and/or economic activities in the 
internal affairs of a foreign country, targeted at the authority structures of the government 
with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition 
forces’ (Regan, 2000: 10). Starkey, Boyer and Wilkenfeld state that third-party intervention is 
‘the introduction of an external party into a negotiation when it is apparent that progress 
cannot be achieved without some form of outside involvement’ (Starkey, Boyer & Wilkenfeld, 
1999: 32). Young has a similar definition: intervention is ‘any action taken by an actor that is 

8
 For example, as a regional power, South Africa supported Namibian rebels in order to maintain its national 
economic and political interests, whereas Cuba, which had no direct interests in Africa, joined the Angolan civil 
war to support its ideological ally. In addition, the US, which has international hegemony, has intervened in 
various Latin American civil wars to reflect its global strategies. Although these states had different motives for 
intervention and applied different methods, their actions can all be classed as interventions. 
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not a direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the 
problems of the bargaining relationship and, therefore, to facilitate the termination of the 
crisis’ (Young, 1967: 34). The former Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, also defines 
intervention as action ‘to prevent conflict where we can, to put a stop to it when it has broken 
out, or – when neither of those things is possible – at least to contain it and prevent it from 
spreading’ (Annan, 1998: no pagination). Crocker, Hampson and Aall insist that the role of 
interveners is to create ‘both the plan and the momentum to carry the plan forward’, juggling 
‘a number of relationships, including [those between] the direct parties to the conflict, other 
influential individuals surrounding the conflict, his or her own host institution, and other third 
parties’, and representing ‘both a threat and a promise to all involved in the conflict’ (Crocker, 
Hampson & Aall, 1999: 61). 
In light of these definitions, this thesis defines ‘intervention’ as the military, economic and 
diplomatic efforts of external parties that aim at a pacific accommodation to a violent conflict. 
It also assumes that ‘third parties do not intervene to exacerbate or prolong the fighting’ 
(Regan, 1996: 340). This definition is distinct from conventional studies in the following 
ways. First, it is somewhat wider than others, especially Regan’s definition, in that it includes 
diplomatic measures (methodologically) and efforts to support government sides (targets) as 
parts of interventions. Second, this definition limits the meaning of intervention by focusing 
on the ‘good will’ of the intervener. By narrowing the definition, it is possible to recognise 
the effects of interveners’ strategies that aim at peaceful resolution of conflicts, one of the 
core targets of analysis.9  
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9
 For clarity, this thesis will term an influence that is not intended to achieve a balance of power ‘a meddling’ so 
as to distinguish it from an intervention. In this thesis, therefore, meddling refers to an attempt to prolong or end 
the civil war by supporting a certain party’s domination. 
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Intervention vs. Mediation  
In many peace negotiation analyses, the distinctions between different terms describing the 
external effort to contribute to the peaceful termination of violent conflicts become blurred. 
In particular, intervention and mediation, the most frequently used concepts, are used without 
clear discrimination.  
In pure definitional terms, mediation is regarded as a subcategory of intervention that is non-
directive and refrains from using coercive methods. In peace processes in civil wars, one of 
the most frequently used forms of intervention is mediation. In this sense, Lewicki (1992) 
draws a distinction between mediation and arbitration. He defines mediation as prioritising 
control of the processes rather than the results of the negotiation, whereas arbitration is 
intended to achieve a specific negotiation result.  
Kolb (1983) further divides mediatory roles into two categories: deal making and 
orchestrating. Deal making tries to produce substantive forms of compromise, while 
orchestrating places greater emphasis on the process. In orchestrating mediation, parties 
continue negotiations but use a new forum created by the mediator. Moore defines mediation 
as ‘the intervention of an acceptable, impartial, and neutral third party who has no 
authoritative decision making power to assist contending parties in voluntarily reaching their 
own mutually acceptable settlement’ (Moore, 1986: 6). Singer views it as a ‘form of third-
party assistance (that) involves an outsider to the dispute, who lacks the power to make 
decisions for the parties’ (Singer, 1990: 20). Folberg and Taylor define it ‘as an alternative to 
violence, self-help or litigation that differs from the processes of counselling, negotiation and 
arbitration’ (Folberg & Taylor, 1984: 7).  
Nevertheless, the distinction between mediation and intervention is vague in many academic 
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studies. Many simply consider mediation to ‘include the idea of a process undertaken by an 
outside party to bring or maintain peace’ (Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 1999: 7). For instance, 
Touval identifies mediators as ‘intermediaries who make suggestions pertaining to the 
substance of the conflict, and seek to influence the parties to make concessions by exerting 
pressures and offering incentives’ (Touval, 1982: 240). Mitchell states that mediation is 
‘intermediary activity […] undertaken by a third party with the primary intention of 
achieving some compromise settlement of the issues at stake between the parties, or at least 
ending disruptive conflict behaviour’ (Mitchell, 1981: 287) and argues that the roles of 
mediation are becoming wider and more complex (Mitchell, 2003: 82-4).  
Moreover, there are many definitions of intervention similar to those given for mediation. 
Burton and Dukes insist that the primary role of the third party is not to seek compromises 
but ‘to facilitate analysis so that goals and tactics, interests, values and needs, can be clarified, 
and later to help deduce possible outcomes on the basis of the analysis made’ (Burton & 
Dukes, 1990: 198). Blake and Mouton assert that the role of intervention is to ‘investigate 
and define the problem’ and to ‘approach each group separately with recommendations 
designed to provide a mutually acceptable solution’ (Blake & Mouton, 1985: 15). 
This mingling of definitions did not cause confusion until the end of the Cold War period 
since most international intervention operations were, or tried to be, neutral and impartial and 
based on the consent of conflicting parties. In fact, the definitions that have been presented in 
this chapter so far were produced during this era. However, in the post-Cold War era, more 
international actors involved in violent conflicts began to use material forces such as 
economic or military pressure (for details of the development of international peace 
intervention, see Appendix II). As third-party intervention changed and took more active 
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forms, it became important to distinguish mediation from more aggressive or partial 
intervention.10   
This thesis follows Bercovitch’s definition of mediation – a non-coercive, non-violent, 
ultimately non-binding and voluntary form of intervention (Bercovitch, 2002: 5). Specifically, 
the term ‘mediation’ is used to indicate a form of ‘non-violent intervention with no clear 
preference for its result’. It is assumed that intervention includes all types of mediation. In 
this sense, mediation is equivalent to light intervention in this thesis. 
 
Theories Related to Peace Negotiation 
This section summarises the theoretical discussions on peace negotiation in the academic 
fields (or negotiation in general) that are relevant to this thesis’s analysis. Based on these 
debates, the methodologies and framework of this research are conceptualised in Chapter 3. 
In this section, the traditional debate between positivists and non-positivists is discussed in 
two distinct sections, each of which focuses on one of the two traditions.11 Each section first 
discusses how scholars from that tradition investigate and answer the question, ‘how can 
cooperation be promoted among conflicting parties?’ In addition, a number of core theories 
adopted by this research for the purpose of analysis are elaborated. 
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10
 Although not expressed explicitly, some research does not make a clear distinction between these uses of the 
term mediation, using both interchangeably or tending to assume that mediation always employs benign 
strategies. For example, Burton and Dukes, and Mitchell did not use ‘mediation’ when referring to coercive 
intervention. Moreover, a new term of ‘mediation with muscle’ was created to identify this new type of 
intervention (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 30). 
11
 The academic discourse on negotiation is divided into two distinctive traditions: positivist and non-positivist. 
The positivist tradition points ‘to material (among other) resources, and power’ as the causes of conflicts, while 
the other group ‘highlights perception and belief’ (Avruch, 1998: 24-5). 
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Positivist Arguments 
Positivist scholars have sought to discover the universal principles or conditions for 
successful negotiations, and many of these theories, including ‘rational choice’ and ‘game 
theory’, were ‘developed furthest by economists, who found it a rigorous and thus convincing 
way to model (and “predict”) individual behaviour’ (Avruch, 1998: 75). A basic assumption 
of this tradition is that actors are rational players and that perception stems from this 
rationality.  
Conditions for Successful Negotiation 
Researchers in this field seek ways of ‘changing the bargain to a non-zero-sum game’ based 
on the assumption of actors’ rationality. Some propose methods for finding common interest 
among actors and for manipulating the game so that it becomes ‘interest-based bargaining.’ 
Fisher and Ury suggest a few effective methods to do this: ‘separate the people from the 
problem; focus on interests, not positions; invent options for mutual gain; and insist upon 
using objective criteria to judge the merits of possible solutions’ (Fisher & Ury, 1991, cited in 
Starkey et al, 1999: 115). Axelrod insists that there are three inter-related features of 
cooperative negotiation: (1) negotiations need to be sequential games, (2) the gains that actors 
expect in the forthcoming games should be sufficiently large, and (3) reciprocity should be 
guaranteed (Axelrod, 1990: 138). In more practical terms, he argues that ‘tit for tat’ might be 
the best strategy because it ‘can avoid being invaded by such a rule only if the game is likely 
to last long enough for the retaliation to counteract the temptation to defect’ (Axelrod, 1990: 
58). Wallensteen proposes seven mechanisms for achieving success in peace negotiations: 
changes of priorities, dividing the values in conflict, trade-off deals, power-sharing, leaving 
control to a minority or third force, the conflict resolution mechanism, and postponing 
controversial issues (Wallensteen, 2007: 131).  
 


Game Theory 
Since von Neumann and Morgenstern first developed a systemic model for it (von Neumann 
& Morgenstern, 1944), game theory has been one of the most widely used methodologies in 
the academic community. Although detailed elaboration is not necessary because this theory 
is so well known amongst the academic community, this section briefly describes some of its 
fundamental assumptions and some representative criticisms of them. 
Most game theories are premised upon on four fundamental assumptions: utility, rationality, 
ordered preference, and perfect information. The theories believe that actors make decisions 
in pursuit of utility maximisation. When actors are given choices, he/she chooses the one that 
best reflects his/her ordered preferences, which are regarded as completely rational. These 
theories assume that actors possess perfect information (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
2010: no pagination). 
Although some of the arguments are relevant to peace negotiations, academic studies have 
pointed out that some of the core assumptions of game theory cannot be simply applied to all 
negotiations. For instance, Harsanyi showed that there are many games in which the actors 
possess incomplete information (Harsanyi, 1995: 293). The issue of imperfect information is 
particularly significant in civil conflict negotiations. Furthermore, some critics contend that 
game theory’s assumption of rationality is mistaken (Berenice, 1969: 295-321; Turner, 2004: 
88-9). Due to various intervening factors such as social structures, cultural values, and actors’ 
personalities, it is not possible to make a genuinely rational choice in game theory’s terms 
(Hechter, 1997: no pagination). It is also evident that many decision makers in military 
conflicts do not always make rational decisions. 
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However, as game theory assumes that ‘actors can change dynamics by making particular 
moves or even breeding some of the rules that the conflict has generated’ (Wallensteen, 2007: 
32), the basic concepts of game theory are relevant to this research because it examines the 
actors’ movements and the outcomes of these movements. It should be noted that this thesis 
does not use advanced models of game theory; rather, it draws on its fundamental principles. 
Nevertheless, as the conditions of peace negotiations are significantly different from many 
assumptions of game theory, not all its principles are applicable to peace negotiations and 
must therefore be modified or discarded. Thus, its assumptions of rationality and perfect 
information are abandoned in this research, and instead, the game theory framework is 
supplemented with a number of non-positivist ideas (see below and Chapter 3 for details). 
Timing - Ripeness 
One of the most significant practical problems facing intervention is its timing. For instance, 
although early involvement in violent conflicts can reduce the number of casualties (Regan, 
2000: 93), early intervention is always easier said than done for the following reasons. The 
early stages of conflicts rarely attract the attention of international actors. In addition, early 
intervention is a risky undertaking because it raises the likelihood of the intervener being 
accused of violating a country’s national sovereignty. Moreover, early intervention sometimes 
extends the duration of conflicts by providing new sources of conflict to the warring parties. 
William Zartman’s model has dominated the discourse on timing. It presents a ‘mutually 
hurting stalemate’ as a good indicator of the ripeness for intervention to end the conflict. He 
suggests that there are three conditions that determine this ‘ripeness for resolution’: the high 
costs of the war, a balance of power, and certain domestic political institutions (Zartman, 
2003: 19-20). As to the costs of war, much research, including that of Mason and Fett, insists 
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that peaceful settlements are more likely to be achieved by lowering the benefits and 
increasing the costs of war (Mason & Fett, 1996: 546-68). Although there are many reasons 
for this, three are most commonly proposed: when the costs increase, (1) combatants’ limited 
resources run out, (2) the expected outcomes of victory become less attractive, and (3) 
domestic pressure increases.  
As regards the balance of power, scholars generally agree that when combatants clearly 
realise that a balance of power exists, they are more likely to come to the negotiation table. 
Organski emphasises the importance of this, commenting ‘no one side can achieve a great 
enough superiority to be sure that aggressive action would be crowned with success’ 
(Organski, 1968, cited in Walter, 2001: 9).  
Finally, when domestic political constraints are combined with the previous conditions, the 
chances of compromise rise. This is particularly true in democratic societies. The American 
Civil War, in which Abraham Lincoln signed a peace agreement rather than pursue complete 
victory, is a traditional example (Walter, 2001: 11). 
However, some commentators point out that the ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ should not be 
taken as a self-fulfilling condition. For instance, despite previous efforts to clarify the 
conditions for ripeness, it should be noted that ripeness is also an issue of perception. As 
Zartman himself admits, a fundamental condition of ripeness is that the actors need to 
perceive the ripeness (Zartman, 2003: 20). Furthermore, Lederach contends that ripeness is 
‘extremely weak in its predictive capacity from the standpoint of a practitioner’ and requires 
analysts or practitioners to have a ‘capacity to envision a longer-term process and recognize 
opportunities for constructive change in the midst of crisis’ (Lederach, 2003: 31-3). In this 
sense, although ripeness theories are based on the concept of rationality, the validity of these 
theories is subject to the negotiators’ perceptual limitations.  
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In addition, Rubin argues that there may be multiple moments of ripeness and interveners 
need to recognise or create chances to intervene rather than waiting for the mutual hurting 
stalemate to develop (Rubin, 1991). Moreover, studies show that the conditions are not 
relevant to cases such as the negotiations for the Oslo Accords between Israel and Palestine 
(1993) and the peace negotiation in South Africa in the mid-1980s (Rothstein, 2007: 263).    
This thesis follows the basic assumptions of Zartman’s theory in investigating the long-term 
and short-term factors that brought the national factions in the two cases to the negotiation 
table (in Chapter 4). Furthermore, the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6 show that these 
theoretical arguments on the ripe moments for negotiation are helpful in understanding the 
initial timing of a third-party intervention. When the ‘mutual hurting stalemates’ became 
evident, the external interveners in the two cases saw a good chance to initiate the peace 
negotiations. However, the cases also demonstrate that this is not necessarily the optimal 
moment for conflict resolution.  
Two-Level Game 
A two-level game is a theory that is employed in this thesis. Emphasising the domestic 
constraints on international negotiations, Robert Putnam proposes the concept of a two-level 
game. Putnam argues that a negotiator (e.g. national decision maker) bargaining with an 
external counterpart needs to engage in the negotiations with both the external counterpart 
(Level I) and its own constituencies (Level II). By using the ‘win-set’ concept,12 Putnam 
insists that although in many cases the domestic constituencies limit the variety of proposals 
that the negotiator can agree to, they sometimes strengthen the negotiator’s bargaining by 
providing sufficient pressure to convince the external actors to be more receptive to the 

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 The concept of ‘win-set’, which refers to a range of proposals that a negotiator can consider acceptable, was 
first proposed by Shepsle and Weingast (1987). 
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domestic negotiators’ position (Putnam, 1988). 
Two-level game theory is a useful research framework for analysing multiple-level 
negotiations and has therefore been widely applied in studies on negotiation since its 
introduction in the 1980s. However, the majority of these studies in the field of politics have 
dealt with trade negotiations between states or conflict disputes between organisations in 
developed countries (Mo, 1994; Paarlberg, 1997; Pahre, 1997; Lehman & McCoy, 1992). 
Research has rarely focused on two-level games during military conflicts.13  
Therefore, this thesis intends to add a relatively new issue to this research tradition by 
examining and revealing the dynamics of two-level games in peace negotiations, an element 
that has largely been ignored by previous research. Making use of Putnam’s hypothesis, this 
thesis presents some of the characteristics of the two-level games that occurred in the 
Cambodian and Salvadoran peace negotiations.  
 
Non-Positivist Discourse 
Although the above rational, realistic approaches to negotiation have prevailed in 
international relations, the other tradition, which emphasises the importance of cultural 
factors, should not be overlooked. This perspective regards negotiation as a ‘matter of 
perception and belief, of cognition and affect’ (Avruch, 1998: 27), and, therefore, ‘correctly 
assessing the other side’s goals and beliefs’ is very important in decision making (Jervis, 
1976: 44).  
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 For instance, of all the articles published in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, The Journal of Peace 
Research, and Civil Wars between 2005 and 2009, only two articles studied two-level games during military 
conflicts, both of which dealt with the Israel-Palestine issue.  
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 Conditions for Successful Negotiations 
Non-positivist theorists emphasise the critical role of culture in conflict resolution. They 
assume that cultural issues play critical roles in civil conflicts as causes, reflectors, amplifiers 
or inhibiters (Ross, 2007: 42). Firstly, cultural issues can be the causes of conflicts. In ethnic 
war, for instance, ethnic identity provides the essential motivation for violent resistance to the 
(perceived) discrimination of rival parties (Ross, 2007: 44). Secondly, cultural symbols and 
narratives are sometimes the mirror for tensions among groups. A good example is the 
religious parades in Northern Ireland, which galvanise the anger of opposing sides (Ross, 
2007: 43; Volkan, 1997). Thirdly, according to how the cultural expressions are used, they 
can be either amplifiers or inhibiters of conflicts. For example, although the parades in 
Northern Ireland are reflections of existing tensions, they may also cause subsequent tensions 
or violent reactions (Ross, 2007: 44-7). Hence, theorists in this tradition believe that 
understanding the cultural traits of actors is ‘the first step in a successful intervention’ 
(Avruch & Black, 1993, cited in Fisher, 2001: 17). 
Additionally, they maintain that it is imperative to understand how warring factions perceive 
conflicts, peace negotiation and related issues in order to promote successful negotiation 
between parties in conflict. However, since most of the literature on negotiations arises from 
the West, but many of the conflicts are non-Western, these theorists contend that this 
understanding is insufficient in most international intervention cases. 
Moreover, non-positivists contend that conflict resolution should be distinguished from 
retreat from (even if voluntary) or suspension of violent conflicts. For them, ‘[r]esolution 
aims somehow to get to the root causes of a conflict and not merely to treat its episodic or 
symptomatic manifestation, that is, a particular dispute’ (Avruch, 1998: 26). Galtung refers to 
such a resolution status as positive peace, setting it against negative peace, where the 
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resolution does not address the fundamental causes of conflict. Burton called such ‘real 
efforts’ conflict prevention, while Lederach and Maiese called it ‘conflict transformation’ 
(Lederach & Maiese, 2003: no pagination).  
Bounded Awareness 
Although there are various perceptual factors that affect the effectiveness of negotiation, this 
thesis pays special attention to the limitations in the mutual understanding of negotiators 
because of their bounded awareness. Bounded awareness describes a phenomenon where 
actors ‘do not “see” accessible and perceivable information during the decision-making 
process, while “seeing” other equally accessible and perceivable information’ (Chugh & 
Bazerman, 2005: 2; Simon, 1983: 34). Because of this bounded awareness, actors in 
negotiation tend to have limited information on ‘their opponents’ skills, preferences, and 
strategies’ (Thompson, 2006: 28), and frequently, their own goals or influences (Thomson, 
2006: 28; Gormley-Heenan, 2007: 101-2). Therefore, they fail to devise and employ the best 
strategies to achieve their goals. More specifically, Chugh and Bazerman argue that the 
actors’ bounded awareness mainly caused by the failure of obtaining key information in early 
stages of negotiation and by the failure of examining and using the information in a right way 
in later stages (2005: 3-4).  
Conventional studies have described various patterns of behaviour that result from the 
bounded awareness of actors. For instance, Gilbert and Wilson developed the concept of 
‘focalism’, which refers to the tendency of actors to pay too much attention to ‘a particular 
event (the ‘focal event’)’ and ignore other events (Gilbert & Wilson, 2000, cited in Chugh & 
Bazerman, 2005: 10), to account for actors’ bounded awareness. In addition, based on the title 
of a television show, vos Savant presented the ‘Monty Hall Game’, which showed that the 
actor has a tendency to stick to his/her first choice when he/she is given the opportunity to 
 


change their decision (vos Savant, 1990 & 1991). Tor and Bazerman proposed the ‘Acquiring 
a Company Game’, which demonstrates that the player with the most information will ignore 
the rules of the game (Tor & Bazerman, 2003, cited in Chugh & Bazerman, 2005: 19). 
In accordance with these concepts and arguments, the case studies in this thesis show that 
many of the national factions and international interveners in the peace negotiations in 
Cambodia and El Salvador perceived and interpreted other actors’ behaviour through the lens 
of their own limited perception and thus obtained very limited and incorrect information. 
Thus, their negotiation strategies did not comprehend, reflect or address other actors’ 
fundamental aims and achieved only partial success in promoting stable peace. 
The concept of bounded awareness is robust enough to replace game theory’s assumptions of 
rationality and perfect information for the purposes of this study, having sufficient power to 
explain the behaviour of most of the warring factions in the two cases studies (Chapters 5 and 
6 examine the effects of bounded awareness on the Cambodian and Salvadoran factions’ 
patterns of behaviour).  
Liberal Peace – Western Society’s Ethnocentric Values 
One of the reasons for employing the concept of bounded awareness is the significant role 
played by the negotiating actors’ ethnocentric cultures in the negotiations (see Chapter 3). 
Many previous studies also acknowledge the importance of this factor. Although various 
studies have revealed the influence of cultural values on negotiation strategies by comparing 
and contrasting different cultural communities, most studies take the form of ‘contrasting the 
cultural values of Western society14 and those of non-Western communities’ (Adair & Brett, 

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 Although ‘Western society’ is a broad concept, the term in this thesis indicates international intervening states 
and organisations relating to the two study cases, including the United States, the United Nations, France, 
Australia, and Portugal. 
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2001; Brett, Adair, Lempereur, Okumura, & Shikhirev, 1998; Cohen, 1991; Hall, 1990).  
These studies generally agree that Western societies share notions of individualism and 
egalitarianism, have low-context communication systems, and historical backgrounds that 
include modernisation and industrialisation and that the combined effects of these factors 
have a strong influence on people’s perceptions. With regard to the ideas related to peace 
negotiation, the unique approaches of Western society to the following four perceptions are 
particularly notable.    
First, in relation to the negotiation framework, the interveners’ strategies are based on the 
distinctive features of Western culture, including individualism, egalitarianism, and low-
context communications.  Individualist societies tend to have the ‘outcome-oriented’ model, 
which emphasises the importance of interests and tangible outcomes rather than ‘process 
oriented’ ones (Ting-Toomey, 1999: 210). Moreover, since Western society values individual 
control, Western people normally give negotiators ‘a great deal of latitude in reaching 
acceptable agreements’ (Kimmel, 1994: 181). Egalitarianism considers power to be transitory 
and situational, whereas in hierarchical cultures, power is long-term and general (Brett, 2001: 
17-9) Therefore, in negotiations, decisions are made based on majority voting or authoritative 
decisions rather than by certain individuals or people in certain social strata. Furthermore, 
Western society heavily relies on low-context communication, which emphasises directness 
rather than contextual or symbolic behaviour (Le Baron, 2003: no pagination). In a low-
context communication society, negotiations need to be official and scheduled, and 
communication is ‘direct and verbal’, and ‘written contracts that are exact and impersonally 
worded are binding’ (Kimmel, 1994: 180-1).  
Second, many interveners have certain standardised concepts of peace. In the post-Cold War 
era, Western-sponsored peacemaking processes have followed a somewhat formulaic path in 
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many places (Paris, 2004: 41-2; Richmond, 2006). Such processes have generally pursued 
what some scholars have called ‘liberal peace’ with its constituent elements of 
‘democratisation, the rule of law, human rights, free and globalised markets, and neo-liberal 
development’ (Richmond, 2006: 292). It also advocates Western-style electoral politics and 
technocratic approaches to ‘good’ governance. In this approach, ‘there is a bias towards using 
the state, bureaucracy and formal political processes (e.g. elections and parties) as core lenses 
for the interrogation of a proclivity towards conflict or passivity’ (Paris, 2004: 43-4; Mac 
Ginty, 2008: 146). 
Third, another factor that has affected the interplay between national factions and 
international interveners has been their different approaches to violence. The experience of 
absolutist state systems led Western societies (or more specifically, European countries) to 
promote ‘the centralization of the control of the means of violence’ to combat external threats 
and ‘non-violent internal order’ (Giddens, 1986, cited in Lizée, 1999: 20-1). The emergence 
of a bourgeoisie erected the ‘barriers to the exercise of violence’ against human rights. As a 
result, Western societies have a strong idea of the nation state’s ‘responsibility to protect the 
individual from violence’ and share the conviction that peace can be achieved by ‘the absence 
of violence’ and ‘the reduction of conflict to political processes’ (Lizée, 1999: 20-1). Thus, 
international interveners have assumed that ceasefire is a prerequisite of peace negotiation 
and an essential element that demonstrates the actors’ willingness to negotiate. 
Finally, the assumption of the ‘rationality of humankind’ is another important factor. As May 
points out, rationalism and individualism are the most basic consideration frameworks in 
European society and have limited the scope of perception (May, 1991: 288). In many cases, 
by placing too much emphasis on this assumption, interveners have failed to understand local 
people’s core motives for conflicts and negotiations. These interveners have consistently tried 
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to discover the ‘reasons’ behind an actor’s moves and have considered ‘irrational’ action as 
‘un-interpretable’ (Brett, 2000: 176). Nevertheless, many people in societies that do not use 
low-communication systems have considerable difficulty in understanding the rationality 
assumption (Schirch, 2005: 35; Brett, 2000: 178).  
Because of this limited scope, third-party interveners have tended to engage in very limited 
strategies that often fail to reflect the true interests of the national parties. For example, third 
parties have often sought to stick to rational costs and benefits assumptions based on 
economic benefits and have used Western-style formal negotiation techniques. Some scholars 
have suggested that the attainment of stable peace, the fundamental goal of intervention, has 
been thwarted by these methodologies. This aspect of negotiation is discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
ISSUES RELATED TO THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION 
This section identifies the types of actors involved in third-party intervention and the methods 
that they employ. After reviewing the various ideas that have appeared in previous studies, it 
roughly re-categorises them. First, interveners are differentiated using Kenneth Waltz’s levels 
of analysis. Waltz proposes three levels for analysing international relations: the individual, 
the state regime, and the international structure. The actors in each level are re-sorted by their 
intentions and capabilities. Second, the methods employed by interveners are roughly divided 
into two groups: light methods and heavy methods. Light methods refer to the non-coercive 
measures that are used to coax the national factions, whereas heavy methods are more direct 
and coercive. These concepts and typologies are used in developing the research framework 
in Chapter 3. Finally, the discourse on impartiality and strength, two factors that are believed 
to affect the effectiveness of third-party interventions, is reviewed.  
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Interveners 
In considering the criteria by which the interveners are categorised, three factors have been 
highlighted: enthusiasm, neutrality, and centrality of power. In other words, in many previous 
studies, external interveners were differentiated according to whether the intervener was 
partial or neutral (whether an actor has an existing interest or not), whether the actor was a 
unilateral state or a multilateral organisation, and whether the actor had the will and 
capability to use military force (Bellamy et al, 2004: 35). 
National States 
Many of the interveners are national states with a centralised power structure. Among the 
various actors, this section focuses particularly on regional hegemons, former colonial or 
ideological powers and concerned neighbours. 15 
A. Regional Hegemons 
Actors in this category intervene in civil wars in neighbouring states ‘in order to press their 
own claims to territory, economic benefits or access to natural resources, or support the socio-
political ambitions of allies’ (Bellamy et al, 2004: 35). Examples include Russia in Georgia 
and Nigeria in West Africa. Although they exhibit strong enthusiasm and have effective 
power, these actors are highly likely to be partial to certain factions and may be motivated to 
pursue narrow national interests. Since the collapse of the global bipolar system in the late 
1980s, the role of regional hegemons has been increasing. South Africa’s mediating role in 
recent internal conflicts in neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe demonstrates the 
enhanced and complicated roles of regional hegemons in conflict resolutions. In addition, 
many regional hegemons such as China, India, and the US are also global powers. 
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 Although not expressly mentioned in this thesis, many middle-sized countries have recently made strong 
efforts to contribute to such interventions, such as the Nordic states, Canada, Australia and South Korea. 
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B. Former Colonial/Ideological Powers 
Many Western countries that had previously colonised the states in civil war also intervene. 
In the Cold War period, a few hegemonic states also participated in civil war peace processes. 
Since former colonial powers ‘have close economic, political and social ties with their former 
colonies’ and Cold War hegemons strongly supported developing states, they had relatively 
strong leverage. Most peace processes in the Cold War era and some in the post-Cold War 
period (including the UK in the case of Sierra Leone and France in Rwanda) provide 
examples of these close ties and leverage.  More recently, these countries have created a 
number of value-based groups such as the Community of Democracies and have restructured 
the role of institutions like the Council of Europe, in which members closely cooperate in 
peace keeping activities.16 
C. Concerned Neighbours  
If the countries neighbouring the states in civil war are vulnerable to the impact of the war, 
they often try to intervene. As Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall put it, civil wars ‘have 
external effects on the region through the spread of weaponry, economic dislocation, links 
with terrorism, disruptive floods of refugees, and spill-over into regional politics when 
neighbouring states are dragged or the same people straddle several states’ (Ramsbotham et al, 
2005: 98-9). As a result, states tend to be deeply concerned about the security issues of their 
neighbours and try to minimise the external effects of their neighbours’ violent conflicts. 
However, despite their strong desire to resolve the conflicts, in many cases they lack the 
ability to intervene effectively and are therefore unable to contribute significantly to the 
resolution of the conflicts. 
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 Since these communities are based on democratic values, Wallensteen refers to them and their underlying 
ideology as a Pax Democratica (Wallensteen, 2007: 254). 
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International Organisations 
International organisations have played the most active roles in peace processes in the post-
Cold War era. While international financial organisations such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund have played a major role through economic assistance (Paris, 
2002; Boyce, 2000; de Soto & del Castillo, 1994), the United Nations has been at the centre 
of international intervention for conflict resolution, and the importance of regional 
organisations is growing rapidly.   
A. The United Nations 
The UN has been the most vigorous actor in peace negotiation processes. As a mediator, it 
has provided the main momentum and opportunities for talks in peace processes in El 
Salvador, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, the Central African Republic, Tajikistan and the 
Western Sahara (Wallensteen, 2007: 221). The UN’s legitimacy as an impartial external actor 
helped the organisation to play relatively effective roles in these operations (Ramsbotham et 
al, 2005: 170).   
The UN’s organisational structure plays a significant part in guaranteeing and legitimising its 
impartiality. The UN Security Council and the General Assembly act as consultative 
organisations in which member states debate. Since the UN can act only with the consensus 
of the five permanent members of the Security Council, it is a relatively impartial intervener. 
The UN Secretariat, headed by the Secretary-General, resembles and functions as an 
independent bureaucratic organisation.  
However, the UN’s impartiality and autonomy have not always played positive roles in peace 
processes. Doyle confirms that many smaller non-Western states have doubted the 
impartiality and neutrality of the organisation (and of the Security Council, in particular) 
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(Doyle, 1996: 485-6). Moreover, critics have also noted that the UN frequently lacks 
operational efficiency and that it relies heavily on the financial, military, and human resources 
of member states (Crocker et al, 1999: 38). 
B. Regional Organisations 
A number of regional organisations, including NATO in Europe and ECOWAS in Africa, 
sometimes play key roles in peace negotiations. Increasing numbers of cases are dealt with by 
regional security organisations. Examples include NATO’s intervention in the war in Kosovo, 
The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) 
intervention in Liberia (consisting mainly of Nigerian military forces), and the intervention 
by the International Military Advisory Team (IMAT), led by the British army, in 
Sudan.(Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 149). While some organisations, including the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Europe, were intentionally established ‘to 
bridge the divide in an existing conflict and provide a venue for discussion and dialogue’, 
others like the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of 
American States (OAS) and ECOMOG were founded on broader shared interests. 
In particular, the roles of the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) are 
prominent in the post-Cold War period. As the UN has increased its reliance on regional 
organisations in conflict resolution17, both the EU and AU have been key actors in many 
regional conflicts. In recent years, the AU has played a ‘stronger and more influential’ role 
and has moved towards ‘responding earlier to political challenges’ (DFID, 2008: 1), and the 
EU has expanded its concerns outside Europe to other parts of the world.  
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 Since 1992, when former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali issued An Agenda for Peace, the UN has 
repeatedly emphasised the increasing importance of regional organisations in conflict resolution. A number of its 
reports, including Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations/Arrangements in a 
Peacekeeping Environment: Suggested Principles and Mechanisms in 1999, have sought ways of establishing 
mutual cooperation with regional organisations. 
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The member states of these regional organisations have a relatively strong interest in 
stabilising the conflicts, and some of the organisations possess a relatively wide range of 
operational methods, including military options. Hence, in many cases, these organisations 
conduct much more energetic inventions than international organisations. However, because 
of this, the scope of their operations tends to be limited by the fact that ‘member-states have a 
primary interest in capturing its flag for their side of the dispute’ (Zartman, 2002: 80). 
 Sub-state Actors 
The role of sub-state actors has been growing since the end of the Cold War. In particular, 
NGOs’ participation in conflict resolution and post-war reconstruction and development has 
increased significantly, and individuals have played key roles in many peace processes.  
A. Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs)  
The mediating roles of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in civil wars are attracting 
more attention than before. In fact, many of them ‘have developed the capacity for the most 
intimate forms of intervention in states and civil society’ (Richmond, 2005: 5). In the post-
Cold War period, many NGOs, including the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD) in 
the Liberian conflicts, have contributed to peaceful conflict resolutions as mediators. 
Although they do not provide any military power, they help to support good communication 
between the parties due to their neutral and reliable reputations. Moreover, they can ‘give 
assistance to conflicting parties in addressing their interest in a locally workable way’ (Cert, 
2004: 5). As a result, the UN is extending its partnership with NGOs in intervention projects. 
B. Private Individuals 
In international and intrastate conflicts, an individual’s mediation can sometimes play a 
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critical part in peaceful resolutions. Examples of effective individual mediation include 
Jimmy Carter (former President of the United States) in the Palestine/Israel disputes, George 
Mitchell (former Senator of the United States) in the Northern Ireland civil conflict, Kofi 
Annan (former UN Secretary-General) in a number of African crises, and Johan Jørgen Holst 
(former Norwegian Foreign Minister) in the Oslo Channel for Palestine/Israel. The Elders, 
which was formed in 2007 and comprises a group of elder politicians and peace activists 
including Nelson Mandela, is another good example. 
Since they cannot provide material support, they act as ‘the facilitator (who provides secrecy 
and deniability), the communicator (who supplies information and [carries] messages), the 
formulator (who finds acceptable formulations) and the psychoanalyst (who confronts self 
and enemy images)’ (Bercovitch, 2002: 64-9).  
 
Table 2.1. Internal Peace Agreements: 1991-2005 
UN (19) 
Non-UN 
Organization (6) State (18) 
Sub-national 
Actor (8) 
No Intervener 
(14) 
Angola I (1991) Comoros (2001) Afghanistan (1993) Chad III (2005) Angola III (2002) 
Angola II (1994) DR Congo (2003) Bangladesh (1997) Congo (1999) Djibouti I (1994) 
Bosnia (1995) Guinea-Bissau 
(1998) 
Burundi I (2000) Croatia (1995) Djibouti II (2000) 
Cambodia (1991) Liberia II (2003) Burundi II (2003) Indonesia I (2002) India I (1993) 
Colombia (2002) Macedonia (2001) Chad I (1997) Indonesia II (2005) India II (1993) 
El Salvador 
(1992) 
Sierra Leone II 
(2000) 
Chad II (1999) Northern Ireland 
(1998) 
Lebanon (1989) 
Ethiopia/Eritrea 
(1993) 
 Ecuador/Peru (1998) Yugoslavia (1991) Mexico (1996) 
Ethiopia/Eritrea 
(2000) 
 Israel/Palestine I 
(1993) 
Yugoslavia (1999) Philippines (2001) 
Guatemala (1995)  Israel/Palestine II 
(1998) 
 Philippines (1996) 
Haiti (1993)  Mali (1992)  Philippines (1998) 
Ivory Coast 
(2005) 
 Moldova (1997)  Senegal (2004) 
Liberia (1995)  Niger (1995)  South Africa 
(1991) 
Mozambique 
(1992) 
 Papua New Guinea I 
(1991) 
 Sudan I (1997) 
Namibia (1988)  Papua New Guinea II  Uganda (2002) 
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(1994) 
Rwanda (1993)  Papua New Guinea III (2001)  
Somalia I (1993)  Sierra Leone I (1996)   
Tajikistan (1997)  Somalia II (1997)   
Western Sahara I 
(1988) 
 Sudan II (2004)   
Western Sahara II 
(1997) 
        
Source. UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset.  
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/datasets.htm 
 
Table 2.1 categorises the peace agreements promoted between 1991-2005 (extracted from the 
cases in the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset) according to the types of major interveners 
based on the criteria presented above. It can be seen that the United Nations and states were 
the most common interveners and that most mediation by non-UN international organisations 
occurred from the late-1990s. This is because regional organisations began to expand their 
scope of action from the early 1990s after the bipolar system collapsed. In addition, it took a 
long time for regional organisations such as OAU and ASEAN to nurture sufficient power to 
deal with security issues.    
In the case studies in this thesis, the UN and three national states are selected as the 
intervening actors for analysis. Specifically, the United States, a global power, and the UN are 
selected as impartial third-parties and China and the US are analysed as the partial advocates 
of the national factions for Cambodia and El Salvador, respectively.  
 
Methods of Intervention 
This section discusses the major strategies that many third-parties employ in their peace 
interventions. Since the impact of these powers and skills varies according to the context in 
which they are employed, there are various methods of differentiating the strategies of 
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interveners (Bercovitch, 1996; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 1999: 20; Boulding, 1989; 
Nye, 2002; Nye, 2004). This thesis adopts two of the criteria commonly used, strength and 
form, and uses them to understand the types of intervention methods in the following 
chapters. This section summarises the discussions in previous research on the methods of 
third-party intervention by using the categories based on these two criteria.18  
Strength: Light Methods and Heavy Methods 
The first analytic lens for observing intervention methods is strength, and two categories are 
proposed: light intervention and heavy intervention. Light intervention indicates pure 
mediation, which uses diplomatic methods such as providing good offices, suggesting 
proposals and establishing negotiation rules. By contrast, heavy intervention employs 
coercive methods such as diplomatic threats, economic sanctions, military operations and the 
like. The main intervention methods that make up the two categories are outlined below. 
A. Light Methods 
Light intervention methods chiefly aim to provide better conditions for warring factions to 
begin dialogue and make compromises. Frequently used methods include stage setting, rule 
making, suggesting negotiation targets, information transmission, and the provision of 
diplomatic incentives and pressure.  
(1) Providing Good Offices 
Offering good offices is the most basic light intervention strategy and is usually conducted in 
the initial phase. Before the start of formal negotiations, interveners provide an environment 
in which all the factions can get together and talk to each other. As Stevens argues, the 

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 The methods explained in this section point to an ideal-type scenario. 
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chance of successful negotiation becomes much higher when interveners ‘(1) create a 
contract zone; 19 (2) help the parties to save face and to recreate the contract zone, and (3) 
assist the parties to weigh and to rank existing alternatives and create a truly integrative 
strategy’ in the stage setting phase (Stevens, 1963 cited in Lewicki, Weiss & Lewin, 1992: 
235).  
In order to do this, interveners in the initial phase of the negotiation need to make contact and 
establish connections with the warring factions. Indirect talks (e.g. China’s mediation 
between the Khmer Rouge and the State of Cambodia), track II diplomacy (e.g. the Oslo 
Negotiation between scholars from Israel and Palestine), and direct informal talks (e.g. South 
Africa, Northern Ireland (Hume-Adams Dialogue)) are common strategies in this phase. 
Once trust between national factions and external interveners is established, interveners 
initiate negotiations in which all negotiating parties can exchange their ideas with minimum 
restrictions. 
For mediators who are considered neutral, impartial and not harmful by all warring factions, 
the facilitation of communication between the warring national factions is not particularly 
difficult to implement and does not require many resources. 
(2) Building the rules of the negotiation  
As du Toit explains, rules and procedures are important because they construct ‘the arena 
within which negotiators cooperate and compete with each other’ (du Toit, 2003: 74). When 
opposing factions in conflicts express their intention to negotiate, they usually have 
‘exploring’ and ‘signalling’ stages. In the exploring phase, actors exchange their basic views 
on the issues. Subsequently, in the signalling stage, they explain their specific positions on 

19
 A contract zone means a common area of disputing actors’ interest, which makes all the actors consent to a 
certain peace proposal. 
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the issues and express their willingness to enter negotiation. 
In these stages, the interveners frequently employ the strategy of ‘rule making.’ Since both 
factions are extremely suspicious about possible deception by their counterparts and as many 
factions are not familiar with bilateral or multilateral negotiation, a negotiation in the early 
stage is extremely fragile. The mediators’ neutral suggestions on negotiation principles and 
conditions may contribute to its sustainability. For example, they need to agree on basic 
issues such as the following: the people participating in the negotiation, inviting mediators, 
the basic principles of the negotiation. ‘The greater their fear and mistrust, the more detailed 
they will want the contract to be and the more guarantees they will believe they must exact’ 
(Jervis, 1976: 45). 
(3) Suggesting the contents and feasible targets of the negotiations 
When players agree with the basic rules of the negotiations, each player presents more 
detailed and concrete proposals. During this stage, the interveners use compromise strategies 
to entice factions to remain at the negotiation table. When factions approach each other, the 
interveners help them to produce explicit resolutions. First, interveners sometimes help the 
factions make a list of issues of mutual interest to discuss. For warring parties, this is a highly 
sensitive process. Each faction makes strong efforts to prevent the issue that might most 
hamper their position from being the topic of negotiation. Many negotiations remain 
deadlocked in this phase for a long time, and many warring parties have in fact left the 
negotiation table and have become ‘outside spoilers’ during this phase. However, if 
interveners are considered impartial and neutral, their suggestions are more likely to be 
accepted by the factions. The biggest challenge for interveners is making the factions believe 
that they will not be victimised nor have their positions undermined by the negotiations. 
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Second, the mediators from time to time present their own suggestions or compromise 
proposals to the factions. After the issue list is agreed to by the factions, the negotiators begin 
specific bargaining. It is highly likely that factions will have completely different views on 
many issues and demand unacceptable things from each other. It is therefore important that 
the suggested proposals should be seen as beneficial, or at least not harmful, to all factions. 
Disappointed factions are likely to leave the table or approve proposals with no intention of 
implementing them (being inside spoilers). 
Moreover, the interveners’ capacity for agenda setting and their effective use of process 
management skills are essential. Scholars have proposed a range of tactics that interveners 
employ to increase their effectiveness in setting agendas and managing processes.  For 
instance, there may be different kinds of peace accords.20 Interveners may advocate 
‘comprehensive compromise’, in which all the players strike a deal on the all issues at stake, 
or they may recommend discussing the issues consecutively (one by one). Wallensteen 
suggests that there are seven possible means of promoting a successful outcome in this phase: 
changes of priorities, dividing values in conflicts, a trade-off arrangement, power-sharing, 
leaving control of minorities to third parties, appropriate conflict resolution mechanisms, and 
postponing controversial issues (Wallensteen, 2007: 131-2). What is more, he insists that 
these can be pursued through democratic systems. 
(4) Transmission of information 
The conveying of information is a prerequisite for successful negotiation in all phases. A 
major challenge in any negotiation is obtaining precise information. A large number of 
negotiations break down because of a lack of information. In conflict situations, information 

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 Mac Ginty explains that accords may take various forms. For example, they might be comprehensive or 
interim, publicly endorsed agreements or elite-level compacts (see Mac Ginty, 2006: 6).  
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transmission is crucial, but it is also difficult. After long military conflicts, factions naturally 
acquire a deep-rooted mistrust of adversarial parties. Although they desperately need to know 
what the others think, they rarely have the opportunity to obtain direct information. In these 
cases, information circulation becomes the critical factor in achieving a successful 
negotiation. Moreover, communication is not only a matter of passing information but also a 
way of sustaining dialogue between the actors (Curle, 1971: 254). A large number of studies 
underline the importance of communication (Wallensteen, 2007; Regan, 2000; Avruch, 1998; 
Curle, 1971; Warner, 2001). 
Interveners contribute to the development of good communication channels between the 
adversarial actors. Most commonly, interveners act as a messenger, conveying the messages 
of one actor to another (e.g., Norway in Israel-Palestine conflict). Another frequent role is 
that of a mediator that transmits each party’s will as well as their own suggestions. 
Recognising this, Avruch affirms the critical role that clear and effective communication 
plays in the success of international negotiations and stresses the importance of intervention 
in conflicts. However, he cautions interveners to make efforts not to create misunderstanding 
among actors, arguing that ‘effective communication, especially across national, cultural, and 
linguistic boundaries, requires constant attention to make sure that messages are sent clearly 
and interpreted similarly by both parties’ and ‘an awareness of the individual and group 
sources of potential misinterpretation so that conscious efforts must be made in negotiations 
to communicate in spite of these differences’ (Avruch, 1998: 40). 
(5) Diplomatic tactics 
A variety of skills that utilise the diplomatic power of interveners are considered ‘diplomatic 
tactics.’ First, negotiation with warring factions is a direct strategy. In many cases, the 
interveners join the negotiation as players and engage in direct bargaining. Among the many 
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diplomatic resources that interveners use, one frequently used method is ‘diplomatic 
recognition.’ In the modern international political system, obtaining national sovereignty for a 
state is essential. Therefore, when a faction wins a war, obtaining recognition as the 
legitimate authority from the international community is of paramount importance to the 
victorious party (e.g. the State of Cambodia (Hun Sen) in the Cambodian civil war). 
Second, indirect strategies are also commonly employed. One of the most widely used 
strategies is ‘alignment.’ In managing a negotiation, a vigorous intervener will call for 
support from other states or organisations. Particularly when the negotiation has stalled on the 
most important issues, the consensus of interveners and supporters sometimes helps the 
factions to find a breakthrough. If warring factions rely on support from advocating states, 
interveners’ skill in persuading the advocates to exert pressure on their client factions can 
become a critical factor in the outcome of the negotiation.  
Interveners sometimes use a third-party actor whose role is to target another external actor. 
Especially when a particular faction is heavily reliant on an external advocate state, the 
advocate is likely to be the target of indirect diplomacy. By persuading the advocate, 
interveners may have an indirect influence on the factions. 
 
B. Heavy Methods 
In cases where light intervention strategies have been employed, but factions still refuse to 
agree to compromise, interveners may use heavy tools to attract or force them to do so. The 
heavy methods might include ‘threats of sanctions, promises of trade relations, international 
law, pressure from neighboring states’ as well as withdrawal of military aid (Crocker, 
Hampson & Aall, 1999: 53). This thesis identifies the economic and security ‘push-and-pull’ 
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factors used by interveners. 
(1) Economic Incentives and Pressure 
Among various means of enforcement, economic methods are frequently used by state actors 
and international or regional organisations. Economic assistance (e.g. agreements on revenue 
sharing, official development assistance, establishing new trade routes, and long-term loans) 
may be a major ‘carrot’ used to attract warring factions to the negotiation table. Some people 
describe this assistance as ‘buying peace’. One of the most common types of ‘carrot’ is 
revenue sharing. Interveners might give official consent to the use of resources already under 
the control of the factions. In other cases, interveners may grant access to new resources. For 
instance, the strategy of revenue sharing was used in Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Angola (Le Billon & Nicholls, 2007: 618). Moreover, the reconstruction package is another 
type of economic incentive that is frequently used by international interveners (Baranyi & 
North, 1996: 15-6; Whitfield, 2001: 37).  
However, economic sanctions can be used as a ‘stick.’ Jentleson defined economic sanctions 
as ‘the actual or threatened denial of economic relations by one or more states (senders) 
intended to influence the behaviour of another state (target) on noneconomic issues or to limit 
its military capabilities’ (Jentleson, 2000: 126).21 Although the UN Security Council had used 
only two economic sanctions during the Cold War (on Rhodesia and South Africa), the 
imposition of the UN economic sanctions became much more frequent since 1990 including 
the sanctions on Angola, Cambodia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Iran 
(Wallensteen, 2007: 240; Rhyu & Bae, 2010: no pagination). The economic sanctions 
imposed on Liberia, Haiti, Eritrea and Ethiopia are considered to have played significant 

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 This thesis regards both the economic sanctions that are actually imposed and an explicit declaration of the 
threat of sanctions as the strategies in this category. 
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roles in the persuasion of parties, while the sanctions on Iraq, Rwanda, Somalia and Sudan 
have been deemed failures. Although economic sanctions clearly demonstrate the intentions 
and determination of the international community, they also provide ‘opportunities for 
evasion by the actors, using go-betweens, family or clan members, and even strengthening 
the determination of the ruling clique to keep itself in power’ (Wallensteen, 2007: 242). It is 
very important, therefore, to choose an appropriate timing and procedure when imposing 
sanctions (Regan & Aydin, 2010).  
(2) Military Incentives and Pressure 
Military involvement in civil war is another core intervention strategy and performs two 
significantly different roles. On the one hand, military forces play the role of ‘peace 
guarantor.’ It is natural for warring factions to consider political survival as their primary 
concern. In a civil war, it is extremely difficult for warring factions to trust other negotiation 
partners’ sincerity because of the high probability of deception. One side’s ‘cheating’ may 
cause irreparable damage to their adversary. Thus, international interveners normally assure 
the security of all factions. In promising to dispatch peacekeeping troops, interveners ensure 
that the factions are inclined to implement the resolution under negotiation. 
On the other hand, the interveners may threaten to use military force as a ‘pushing method’. 
From time to time, factions stubbornly refuse to attend the peace negotiation processes. In 
some extreme cases, the superpowers and neighbouring countries threaten to use their 
military strength to force such factions to abide by pre-agreed rules. This method is more 
frequently used after the peace resolution has been issued rather than in the initial phase of 
the negotiation.   
Depending on the negotiation contexts, the effects of military ‘push-and-pull’ may differ 
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(Regan & Aydin, 2010:738-9). For example, as Crocker, Hampson and Aall contend, 
‘mediators could impose a settlement on parties to a conflict when the mediators had access 
to overwhelming force and were willing to use it, as happened in Bosnia, or when there was a 
well-organized and generalized external consensus favouring settlement, as happened in 
Cambodia. In most other cases, however, the mediator enters into a complex dance with the 
combatants’ (Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 1997: 52-3). In other words, military intervention is 
a risky method that needs to be chosen carefully and used cautiously in accordance with the 
context of the conflicts and negotiations. 
 Forms: Process Control, Content Control, and Motivational Control 
The second criterion for categorisation is the forms of intervention. In examining the 
intervention methods in the case studies, this thesis relies on Sheppard’s three forms of third-
party contribution: process control, content control, and motivational control (Sheppard, 1983 
& 1984 cited in Lewicki, Weiss, and Lewin, 1992: 231).  
A. Process Control: Coordinating Procedural Issues 
Process control describes the intervening methods that coordinate processes in order to enable 
the parties to negotiate easily and directly. The intervening methods presented in Chapter 2, 
including providing good offices, building the rules of negotiation, transmission of 
information, and some parts of proposal suggestions, fall into this category. In general, non-
coercive mediators rely heavily on these types of methods. Two types in particular are most 
frequently observed in this research: the offer of good offices and the setting of negotiation 
rules (see above for details). 
B. Content Control: Suggesting Peace Proposals 
Proposal suggestion is a more direct means of intervention. As negotiation processes are 
 


taking place, actors endeavour to make negotiation proposals that guarantee the realisation of 
their goals (Burton, 1990: 182). Moreover, when a proposal is presented, the actors examine 
whether they can achieve their targets under the conditions that the implementation of the 
proposal would bring about. Thus, in many cases, third parties try to provide impartial 
proposals so that the direct parties make progress in the negotiations.  
This thesis analyses content control by dividing the issues into two categories: issue selection 
and deal making. First, choosing the issues for negotiation is one of the most problematic 
parts of a negotiation process (Burton, 1990: 217). The issues that frequently make the 
negotiation process difficult include power sharing issues, land reform questions, 
demilitarisation, amnesty, poverty, economic and social justice, economic policies, and 
human rights issues (Wallensteen, 2007: 131-2). Since national factions are very sensitive to 
those issues that may affect their critical interests, selecting the issues for discussion is a 
difficult matter.  
Second, the selection of the contents of proposals is crucial to the chances of being able to 
strike a deal (Young, 1972, cited in Bartunek, Benton, & Keys, 1975: 534). Many 
negotiations fail because the suggested proposals and the issues selected for discussion do not 
reflect the core interests of the actors in the negotiations. Cases show that some contents are 
good for the negotiation process but disastrous for the implementation process. For example, 
although ambiguity helps a negotiator to avoid sensitive issues, it can cause many problems 
in the implementation phase.  
C. Motivation Control: Setting Response Rules 
Motivation control refers to the manner in which a third party employs inductive or coercive 
methods to persuade disputants to negotiate. Although there might be multiple ways to attain 
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motivation control22, this thesis regards the response rules set by international interveners as a 
representative method of this type of control. A response rule (also called a reaction function) 
indicates that an actor’s move is conditional on another actor’s behaviour (Dixit & Skeath, 
1999: 290). In other words, it is a condition used by an actor for ‘deterrence’ or ‘coercion’. 
There are two types of response rules: incentives and pressure23. In many conventional 
studies, the role of response rules has been considered critical to the success of the 
negotiations (Collier & Sambanis, 2005; Regan, 2000; Walter, 2002; Kaufmann, 1996). 
In line with many previous studies, this thesis concurs that the major response rules employed 
by third parties are diplomatic, economic and military powers. Diplomatic tactics consist of 
direct strategies (such as negotiation with domestic factions and diplomatic recognition) and 
indirect methods (including the alignment of third parties, using advocate states). Economic 
assistance and sanctions are the most frequently used methods of providing incentives and 
applying pressure, respectively. As regards the security aspect, while military forces play 
roles as peacekeepers or peace guarantors, they also frequently become a means of 
compelling factions to continue their negotiations. 
The following chapters will examine the strategies of third-party interveners by using these 
two categorisations. It is observable that most peace negotiations in the post-Cold War era 
have applied a mixture of the two types of methods.24 Hence, it may be argued that this 
categorisation might be useful for analytical purposes but is inapplicable to the real world. 
However, as the following chapters will demonstrate, although many interveners employ a 
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 Sheppard does not present the types of motivation control methods in detail. 
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 Pressure and incentives in this thesis are equivalent to Dixit and Skeath’s ‘threat’ and ‘promise’. For them, 
‘threat’ takes the following form: ‘unless your action (or inaction, as the case may be) conforms to my stated 
wish, I will respond in a way that will hurt you’. ‘Promise’ functions in the following way: ‘if your action (or 
inaction, as the case may be) conforms to my stated wish, I will respond in a way that will reward you.’ (1999: 
290) 
24
 To provide a clearer illustration of this trend, Appendix II presents a historical overview of the changing 
characteristics of international third-party intervention. 
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mixture of the methods from the different categories in their intervention, there are patterns in 
their mixture of methods. Moreover, this thesis considers the changing pattern of intervention 
methods as a sign of changes in their mid-term intervention strategy. Hence, this thesis will 
use these categories as a tool for analysing the case studies. 
 
Impartiality and Strength of Intervention 
This thesis focuses particularly on two factors that directly relate to intervention ‘before and 
during negotiation’: impartiality and strength. These are important factors in helping external 
interveners (or mediators) attain successful peace intervention (Toubal & Zarman, 1985; 
Curle, 1986: Mitchell & Webb, 1988; Van der Merwe, 1989; Bercovitch, 1996).  
On the one hand, intervention is seen as a process involving the exercise of power. The 
intervener can have the ‘power to reward, power to punish, and power to induce parties’ to 
reach the agreement that the intervener wants them to reach. Especially when warring 
factions are reluctant to abide by the negotiation proposals, the strength of interveners can 
leave the negotiators little choice but to accept mediation (Smith, 1994: 447). Hence, most 
studies highlight the role of military operations and economic sanctions as coercive methods 
of intervention (Rauchhaus, 2010: 3-4).  
However, some people disagree with this idea. For instance, Fisher argues that although 
coercive methods are useful for promoting an ‘initial settlement’, they are counter-productive 
for developing ‘the values of autonomy and free choice’ among the national actors (Fisher, 
2001: 19). Other commentators claim that since most interveners have limits to their ability 
‘to police the terms of settlement’ and ‘to observe and control the actions of the disputants’, 
external intervention is also likely to prolong the conflicts (Watkins & Rosegrants, 2002: 271). 
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Moreover, in some cases, interveners who have relied too heavily on pressure are likely to 
bring about a situation that leads to a ‘dangerous win-lose outcome, to rebellion, and to more 
conflict’ (Peou, 1997: 298). 
On the other hand, for mediators, impartiality is an essential element for a successful job. In 
many cases, warring parties have little trust in the intervention and will not consent to 
negotiate without proper levels of neutrality on the part of the mediator. In the traditional 
discourse, the neutrality of third parties has been viewed as a prerequisite for successful 
intervention. This idea is based on the assumption that warring factions cannot trust 
mediators if the factions believe that they are ‘involved in some way with the other side’ 
(Folberg & Taylor, 1984: 7). Thus, it is believed that neutrality and impartiality make it easier 
for national factions to accept the legitimacy of the intervention and give interveners more 
opportunities to promote creative suggestions (Moore, 1986: 14; Bercovitch & DeRouen, 
2005: 104). In particular, American mediation discourses tend to stress that an ideal mediator 
is ‘completely impartial and unbiased, ideally unconnected’ to the negotiating parties (Avruch, 
1998: 83). 
However this assumption faces criticism from a variety of viewpoints. First, there is the 
question of whether a third party can be purely impartial and unbiased. Some commentators 
insist that ordinary peacekeeping operations generate opportunities for profit (Bhatia, 2005: 
205-24). Even for the actors who do not have direct economic and security interests in the 
conflicts in which they become involved, the interveners in many cases consider the indirect 
interests that they might gain from the result of the peace process. In addition, many external 
actors that have no particular economic or security interests have ideological and cultural 
biases. The cultural and perceptual limitations of Western interveners described in this 
chapter are a good example (see above). 
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In a more practical sense, some scholars claim that neutrality does not necessarily provide the 
basis for successful intervention. They provide evidence of the ineffectiveness of impartial 
and non-forcible intervention in war zones and assert the need to consider the alternatives of 
either letting the conflicts ‘burn themselves out’ or of intervening decisively on one side. 
Others provide evidence that mediators who are favourable towards one national party can 
play significantly productive roles (Touval & Zartnam, 1989). Thus, in some extreme cases, 
people argue that letting the conflicts ‘burn themselves out’ or ‘intervening decisively on one 
side’ might prove better options than simple impartial mediation (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, 
and Miall, 2005: 142). 
In light of these ongoing debates, this thesis examines the usefulness of these two factors 
(strength and impartiality) by tracking the responses of the national factions in Cambodia and 
El Salvador to the external interveners’ pressure and incentives. It also reveals the different 
patterns of application of strength and impartiality by the impartial third parties and the 
advocates of certain national factions (see Chapter 3 for details). 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has reviewed the conceptual and theoretical discussions in the conventional 
studies on negotiation and intervention, defined the core concepts to be used in this thesis, 
and has critically applied them to and adopted them in the framework and methodology of 
this research.  
First, this chapter clarified how this thesis defines the following concepts: civil war, peace 
negotiation, interplay, and third-party intervention. Owing to the internal diversity of the 
concept, this thesis employs a minimalist definition of civil war: a type of violent conflict 
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conducted mainly within a state’s territory and initiated by domestic factions. Using the 
concepts of game theory, this research restricts the definition of peace negotiation to ‘a 
strategic compromise between the actors in adversarial relations, which takes place to 
terminate violent conflicts.’  Moreover, this thesis narrows down the meaning of interplay by 
focusing only on the exchange of strategic moves that the actors intentionally make. Finally, 
this thesis defines third-party intervention as ‘the military, economic and diplomatic efforts of 
external parties which aim at a pacific accommodation in a violent conflict’, and 
interventions that do not pursue a balance of power between the warring national factions will 
be considered a ‘meddling’. These definitions and categorisations will be applied in 
formulating the basic analytical framework for this research and in generalising the findings 
of the case studies. Specifically, the definitions delineate the boundary of the analytic 
framework used in this research. 
Second, it has also examined the various theoretical discourses on peace negotiation in terms 
of the ongoing debate between two different traditions – positivism and non-positivism – that 
emphasise different aspects of human perception: rationality and cultural diversity. With 
regard to the rationality assumption inherent to positivism, the discourse on the conditions for 
successful negotiation, game theories, timing for conflict resolution, and two-level game were 
reviewed. As regards the non-positivist discussions, the perceptual issues in peace negotiation, 
such as bounded awareness and the role of ethnocentric culture, were discussed. 
In applying these theories to the case studies, this thesis employs a mixture of both traditions. 
The theories based on the assumption of rationality provide the fundamental analytical 
framework for this research. Thus, this thesis assumes that the negotiating actors decide upon 
their next move by weighing their options against their fundamental goals. The principles of 
game theory are applied in conceptualising the anticipated dynamics of the interplay between 
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the external interveners and the national factions, and its assumptions, such as the actors’ 
rational choice, ripeness, and zero-sum and two-level games, are all employed in the analysis 
of the case studies. 
By adopting non-positivist ideas, this thesis intends to supplement the shortcomings in the 
positivist theories. Specifically, it acknowledges the importance of the actors’ cultural values 
and imperfect information. In other words, rather than assuming that the actors are 
completely rational, it emphasises the cultural aspects of conflict and pays particular attention 
to the examination of the motives and goals of parties. Although the national factions are 
rational in their decision making, the issues that are of most concern to them when making 
their decisions may be strikingly different from what the external actors assume them to be. 
Moreover, in rejecting the perfect information assumption, this thesis recognises that the 
parties in military conflicts have a serious information deficit and therefore face significant 
obstacles to achieving effective communication with other actors or within the party. 
Third, the academic discourse on the typologies of third-party interveners and their methods 
of intervention has been discussed. Traditionally, states, including regional hegemons, former 
colonial/ideological powers and concerned neighbours, have been the crucial actors in third-
party intervention. However, the role of international organisations such as the UN, the World 
Bank and the IMF has become much more prominent in the post-Cold War era. Sub-state 
actors such as NGOs and individuals also contribute to the success of international 
intervention. 
The methods of intervention have been discussed on the basis of two criteria for 
categorisation: strength and form. On the one hand, the methods were divided into two 
groups based on strength: light intervention and heavy intervention. Among them, stage 
setting, building the negotiation rules, suggesting the contents of negotiation, and 
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transmission of information, diplomatic tactics are regarded as ‘light intervention’ methods in 
that they do not coerce warring factions. By contrast, this thesis regards the methods that 
‘push-and-pull’ the opposing factions, before and during the negotiations, as ‘heavy 
intervention’ tactics. These heavy intervention tactics have two dimensions: economy and 
security.  
On the other hand, the intervention methods have been categorised into three types according 
to their forms: process control includes the interventions that aim at encouraging warring 
factions to negotiate by eliminating procedural barriers for talks; content control refers to the 
third-parties’ proposals or suggestions on the topics under negotiation; and motivation control 
indicates the intervention methods that convince national factions to talk to each other by 
applying incentives or coercion. Finally, the arguments in previous studies on the contribution 
of the impartiality and strength of interveners to successful third-party intervention were 
summarised.  
Based on these definitions, theories, and typologies, Chapter 3 conceptualises the research 
framework and methodologies. After a brief overview of the analytical framework, it presents 
the key questions and core variables that affect the actors’ decisions. It also presents the main 
research methodologies used in this thesis, and in addition to the theoretical background that 
this thesis relies upon, it reveals the specific research methods used and practical information 
about the fieldwork. 
 


Chapter 3 
Research Framework and Methodology 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In order to obtain the evidence that enables this research to answer its key questions, 
establishing the right research design is essential. This chapter describes three components of 
the research design: the research framework of this thesis, its methodology, and practical 
issues related to the field research.  
First, it sets out the research framework of this thesis. Since the purpose of this thesis is to 
determine the most effective means for promoting successful peace negotiation by tracking 
the changes in the interplay between the negotiating actors, both the description and 
explanation of actors’ behaviour are pursued. Since this research intends to demonstrate the 
dynamics of interaction between actors, verifying when and how the actors’ strategies 
changed is therefore a crucial goal. In order to more clearly observe these changes, this thesis 
proposes the types of strategic moves that the actors may make. When an actor changes his 
type of strategic move, this thesis regards the actor as having transformed its strategy (rather 
than every strategic move indicating a transformation in the actor’s strategy). 
Demonstrating the reasons behind the changed strategies is also a principal goal, and, 
therefore, a number of variables that affect the actors’ decisions are proposed. Since this 
thesis aims to analyse the reasons why actors changed their strategies by looking at the 
mutual interaction between the actors, the strategic moves of the counterparts are included as 
an important variable. In addition, this chapter proposes some of the moves that actors can be 
anticipated to make depending on the combination of the variables. 
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Second, this chapter introduces and discusses the major methodological components adopted 
in this thesis. Overall, this research is an actor-oriented, qualitative, and comparative study; 
by comparing and contrasting the peace negotiation processes in Cambodia and El Salvador, 
this thesis seeks to reveal the patterns and features of the actors’ behaviour. The assumptions 
and principles of two contradictory theories – game theory and bounded awareness – provide 
the bedrock for the analysis. While game theory informs the construction of the basic 
framework for analysing ‘interplay,’ bounded awareness ideas supplement or replace some of 
the assumptions of game theory that do not reflect the reality of peace negotiation. 
Additionally, this qualitative study undertakes field research in order to investigate and 
confirm the issues related to peace negotiation. Since civil conflicts and peace negotiations, 
the two topics of this research, are politically sensitive, assuring the validity of the 
information obtained, protecting the confidentiality of research subjects, and avoiding bias 
are particularly important. Hence, this chapter also describes a number of practical methods 
that were used to achieve the research goals.     
This chapter consists of two parts. The first section discusses a number of issues related to the 
research framework of this thesis. This section begins by describing the primary analytical 
framework. It also discusses the core questions that this research focuses on. After this, the 
variables affecting the behaviour of external interveners and national factions are discussed. 
Finally, justification of the case selection, the main issues to be dealt with in the case studies, 
and the focus of the arguments are presented. 
The second section presents the various methodological ideas and practical methods that this 
research employs. After introducing the methodological grounds on which this thesis is based, 
this section presents and justifies the research methods and theories used in this research. In 
addition, it discusses the cases chosen for comparison and contrast, the focus of the 
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arguments, the topics under consideration, and the means of data collection. Finally, this 
section also discusses practical issues related to the implementation of the field research. 
 
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
The first section of this chapter sets out the main research framework and a number of 
analytical components. After providing an overview of the framework and the key research 
questions, it discusses how this research understands the ‘interaction moves’. In addition, the 
variables that differentiate the actors’ strategic moves are presented. It also justifies the case 
selection and explains the focus of the arguments.  
 
Overview of the Main Analytical Focuses 
The central aim of this research is to examine the following question: ‘what does the 
interplay between national factions and external interveners in peace negotiation tell us about 
their chances of achieving their goals?’ In order to investigate this question in more 
systematic ways, three subordinate questions are raised: (1) What strategies do national and 
external actors use to achieve their goals? (2) Which intervening methods are more effective? 
(3) What are the major perceptual obstacles that prevent effective third-party intervention? 
To answer these questions, this thesis adopts the following analytical components. First, 
regarding the analytical framework of this research, the key word is ‘interplay.’25 This thesis 
analyses the interplay between negotiating parties to discover a means for achieving 

25
 As explained in Chapter 2, this thesis defines interplay as ‘the actors’ exchange of intentional behaviours’ in 
peace negotiations. 
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successful peace negotiation. More specifically, it considers three aspects of interplay: the 
process of interaction between actors, the background reasons for the changes in actors’ 
interacting behaviour, and the outcomes of the interplay.  
 
Figure 3.1. The Framework of Analysis 
 
 
The first analytical focus of this thesis is tracking the negotiation processes. As Figure 3.1 
shows, this thesis views a peace negotiation as a process of strategic move exchanges by 
negotiating actors. In terms of the case studies, it also observes how the negotiating actors’ 
attitudes towards the core negotiation issues changed in Cambodia and El Salvador and how 
the changes affected their counterparts’ negotiating strategies. As regards the external 
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interveners’ moves, this research takes account of their peace proposals and response rules, 
including diplomatic, economic, and military incentives and threats. As for the national 
factions’ moves, their responses to the suggested proposals include rejection, transformation 
of the proposal, counter proposal, and consent (details are discussed below).  
Moreover, this thesis investigates the factors that cause the changes in the actors’ behaviour. 
Once a particular actor modifies its attitudes towards a core negotiation issue, the motives 
and background factors for the changes will be examined. In order to do this, a number of 
variables that affect the actors’ moves are proposed below. Finally, it also examines the 
outcomes of the negotiation and their effects on the negotiating parties. For evaluating the 
interplay, this research considers both the final peace agreements and the implementation of 
the peace accords. 
Second, although the analysis relies on game theory to describe the interaction between the 
actors, this study also considers the perceptual issues that affect the actors’ decisions (for 
details, see the methodology section presented below). In order to conceptualise the interplay 
on the basis of game theory, this thesis assumes a number of variables determine the 
strategies of the actors. For instance, it is assumed that their fundamental goals, the domestic 
resources that they control, and the reaction functions of external interveners are critical 
factors in determining the behaviour of national factions26. In terms of external interveners, 
this type of negotiation is asymmetric in that the interveners are rarely affected by the threats 
or promises of national factions. Thus, this thesis regards the external interveners’ main goals 
as the only variable affecting their behaviour. 
Third, in terms of the level of analysis, this research focuses on the interplay between the core 

26
 Here, the definition of ‘response rule’ and ‘reaction function’ follows Dixit & Skeath (1999) (see Chapter 2). 
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leaderships of the national factions and the representatives of the external interveners (Level 
4 in Figure 3.2). Although it is in the negotiations between national factions where the most 
important bargains are struck in a civil war peace process, the role of third-party interveners 
in peace processes has become very important since the end of the Cold War (Ramsbotham et 
al, 2005: 134). In some civil war negotiations in this period, including those in Cambodia and 
El Salvador, external third parties have played key-roles in changing national factions’ 
attitudes towards the core issues under negotiation (Crocker, Hampson & Aall, 1999: 6-7; 
Song, 1997: 59-76). Hence, studying the interplay between national factions and external 
interveners can reveal many important factors that affect the effectiveness of peace 
negotiations. 
 
Figure 3.2. The Level of Analysis 
 
 
Fourth, the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador are selected as the research cases. 
While a diverse range of issues were discussed in the peace negotiations in the two countries, 
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this thesis focuses on demilitarisation and the establishment of transitional authorities. 
Although the two cases share many similarities as regards the characteristics of the conflicts 
and the methods employed by the actors during the negotiation, the dynamics of the interplay 
between the national factions and the international interveners exhibit strikingly dissimilar 
patterns. 
Through the use of this analytical framework, it is expected that this research will reveal the 
negotiating actors’ patterns of behaviour and some of the critical perceptual factors that led to 
changes in their behaviour, such as their ethnocentric cultural values and lack of 
communication. As its central argument, this thesis highlights the importance of actors’ 
mutual understanding of their fundamental goals. 
 
Interplay Moves 
Observing the interplay, or the actors’ exchanges of strategic moves, is a core part of this 
research. It is therefore necessary to clarify the moves that this research looks at. As 
presented in Chapter 2, this thesis defines the interplay in peace negotiation as the actors’ 
exchange of intentional moves. Based on this definition, this research focuses on the 
following three aspects. First, it considers the external interveners’ coordination of 
negotiation procedures, submission of peace proposals, and set of response rules. Second, the 
national factions’ various responses to the proposals of the external actors are discussed. 
Finally, this thesis tracks the changes in the actors’ moves and thus reveals the patterns of 
interplay between the national factions and the international interveners. 
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The Strategic Moves of External Interveners 
In order to understand the various methods employed by the third-party interveners in their 
intervention moves, this thesis reviewed the conventional discussions on the criteria for 
categorising methods of intervention in Chapter 2 and proposed two  categorisations: form 
and strength. This thesis adopts these two criteria as the main analytic tools for examining the 
changes in the third-parties’ intervention strategies in the following chapters.  
First, in the case studies, this thesis employs the three forms of third-party contribution 
proposed by Sheppard: process control, content control, and motivational control (1983 & 
1984, cited in Lewicki et al, 1992: 231). To reiterate, process control refers to the intervention 
methods that reduce the procedural barriers in talks between national factions by providing 
good offices, transferring information, conveying national factions’ messages to their 
counterparts, and the like. Content control concerns helping warring factions reach 
agreements more easily via third parties making proposals on core negotiating issues. 
Motivational control is the material or non-material incentives and pressure used to convince 
or compel national factions to become more committed to ending their wars by making 
compromises with their counterparts (for details of the three forms, see Chapter 2).  
Second, although categorising the methods based on the forms of intervention is useful for 
tracking the change in an external third party’s intervening moves, in order to achieve a 
clearer analysis, it is also necessary to distinguish the methods according to the strength of 
the intervention: light intervention and heavy intervention. In fact, although an intervener 
may use methods that occur within the same form of intervention category, the impact of one 
method may be significantly different from another. For instance, the influence that 
diplomatic incentives might have on a national faction would be very different from that of a 
military threat.  
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This categorisation is useful in understanding what types of methods the different intervening 
actors prefer to use. Although third parties tend to mix different types of intervention methods 
in most peace processes, the case studies show that the different types of interveners tend to 
have varied but specific preferences in the methods used. More specifically, whereas 
(relatively) impartial third parties rely mostly on process control, content control, and light 
methods, the external interveners that advocate particular national factions are likely to use a 
wider range of methods. 
These categories will be used to examine the relationship between the types of intervening 
methods used and the outcomes of the negotiation. By examining the national factions’ 
negotiation attitudes after the changes in the external actors’ intervention methods, the case 
studies in Chapters 5 and 6 will investigate which methods are more useful in promoting 
progress in peace negotiations. 
National Factions 
The negotiation between national and international actors in civil war is an asymmetric 
interplay. Because external actors are third parties whose interests are not critically affected 
by national factions, and since they normally have greater resources to use than national 
factions, in most cases, the response rules of national factions are unlikely to influence 
external actors unduly. Hence, although national factions use various types of proposals, 
responses to the suggested proposals, and response rules, this thesis excludes the response 
rules of national factions from being regarded as an important strategic move. 
As explained in Chapter 2, most previous studies on the strategies of warring actors have 
focused on symmetrical warfare between states founded on realist ideas. Thus, very few ideas 
on the strategic moves of the national factions in civil wars have been forwarded. Although 
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there are some exceptions that have investigated the multiple roles of national leaderships 
(Gormley-Heenan, 2007), most of the few studies that have addressed national factions’ 
actions have typically regarded them as limited to simple reactionary moves, such as their 
acceptance or refusal of the suggested proposals (Walter, 2002: 32; Regan, 2000: 72-9).  
Thus, the conceptualisation of national factions’ responses in this section is based on the case 
studies of Cambodia and El Salvador rather than on a review of previous studies. Although 
the detailed behaviour of the actors varies, national factions’ responses to external third-
parties’ intervention can be divided into five general categories: (1) rejection (ignorance), (2) 
delaying the procedure, (3) devious consent, (4) conditional consent, and (5) full acceptance.  
First, rejection (ignorance) of the third-parties’ suggestions is the most extreme expression of 
the national factions’ unhappiness or disinterest. Factions usually take this type of action 
when they are sufficiently confident that they are in control of or prevailing in the civil 
conflict. Second, delaying the procedure and devious consent occur when national actors are 
unable to resist the suggestions openly even though they do not wish to consent to them. 
Third, full acceptance and conditional consent are cooperative positions taken by national 
factions, although the level of cooperation in the two actions is dissimilar.  
Based on these attitudes toward negotiation, this thesis posits five types of actors: initiator, 
follower, spoiler (inside, outside), and loner. The initiator is the actor who eagerly and 
strongly supports the progress of the negotiation. It should be noted, however, that the 
initiator does not necessarily have to initiate the first phase of a negotiation. If an actor takes 
the lead in a negotiation and brings about a consensus, this thesis will consider this actor an 
initiator. The follower is a player who wishes for the success of the negotiation but does not 
have sufficient resources to take the lead. When a negotiation takes place, followers normally 
choose one of two options: they follow the lead of the initiator and consent to his decisions, 
 


or they form alliances with each other to strengthen their voice. The inside spoiler and the 
outside spoiler essentially follow Stedman’s definitions, as these actors ‘spoil’ the peace 
processes and harm neighbours from inside or outside the negotiation table (Stedman, 2003: 
105). Finally, the loner is the actor who strongly opposes the direction that the negotiations 
take but is neglected by other actors because of their lack of resources. In this case, other 
actors ignore loners’ opinions, and they have only a nominal position in the negotiations.  
Change of Moves 
Interplay is a chain of actions and reactions, or a chain of moves in game theory terms. Such 
moves are not unthinking actions but the result of actors’ strategic analyses. Hence, when 
players change their strategies, it is necessary to understand what factors make them do so. 
However, judging whether an actor’s strategies have changed is not a simple matter. 
In negotiation, actors’ strategic changes are expressed in various ways. Sometimes many 
moves represent one strategic calculation, and one move may embody multiple intentions. 
Although not a civil war issue, the frequent changes in North Korea’s position with regard to 
its nuclear ambitions is a good example. From 1990 to the present, the Kim Jong-il regime 
has changed its attitude towards the abandonment of nuclear weapons numerous times. 
Nevertheless, such frequent reverses in position do not reflect a change in its strategy or 
fundamental attitude but are part of its consistent strategy of ‘retaining nuclear technology.’  
Therefore, as a criterion for determining the actors’ change of moves, this thesis views an 
actor as having changed its moves only when it has added another type of move or has 
changed its behaviour from one type to another (in the typology presented above). For 
instance, although the UN issued a series of proposals in 1990 containing different procedural 
ideas intended to convince the two Salvadoran national factions to negotiate, this thesis 
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regards the series of proposals as parts of the same behaviour pattern (procedural control). 
However, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK)’s move from its low-profile 
cooperative stance towards the UN P-5’s Framework Document to postponing acceptance of 
the document and renegotiating the issue with other Cambodian factions is regarded as an 
obvious change of strategic move (devious consent → dragging procedure). 
 
Variables for National Factions’ Actions 
What, then, are the variables that determine the decisions of the actors? The following two 
sections discuss the factors that lie behind the change in actors’ attitudes towards core 
negotiation issues. First of all, this section deals with the variables that determine national 
factions' strategies. Since they have to deal with other national factions, external interveners, 
and their own constituencies, distinguishing the factors that decisively influence their 
behaviour towards external interveners is difficult. Nevertheless, conventional studies 
generally agree that the impact of the following three variables is critical: their fundamental 
goals, the domestic resources under the control of the national faction, and the response rules 
of external interveners (Walter, 2002; Regan, 2000; Zartman, 2002) (see Figure 3.3). 
 
Figure 3.3. Variables Determining National Factions’ Strategies 
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Goals 
One of the biggest factors that affects the behaviour of national factions is their fundamental 
goals. Unlike many previous studies, which argue that negotiation is about compromising 
one’s goals, this thesis assumes that actors are unlikely to make concessions on their 
fundamental goals in peace negotiations. Thus, this thesis argues that verifying the true goals 
of each national faction and reflecting them in the peace proposal is crucial for negotiators. 
Traditional discourses assume that the peace process is an effort to achieve agreements by 
convincing national actors to sacrifice some of their goals or by creating new common 
ground. For example, Bercovitch defines mediation as ‘a process of conflict management 
[…] to change […] perceptions or behaviour, and to do so without resorting to physical force 
or invoking the authority of law’ (Bercovitch, 1997:130). Lewicki, Weiss, and Lewin have a 
similar viewpoint, saying ‘[a] bargainer must choose among three basic strategies for moving 
toward agreement; conceding unilaterally, standing firm and employing pressure tactics 
(competition) or collaborating with the other party in search of a mutually acceptable solution 
(coordination)’ (Lewicki, Weiss & Lewin, 1992: 223). 
However, in many cases, national leaderships do not negotiate with the intention of achieving 
peace through compromising their goals but rather with the aim of seeking better 
opportunities to achieve them. Especially in chronic wars, leaderships do not tend to change 
their fundamental positions. The goals established in the initial phase of conflicts are re-
selected and transformed during the conflicts, but the fundamental goals remain unchanged 
and prominent, and warring factions stubbornly adhere to them.  
A cursory examination of twenty-eight peace accords from 1989 to 2004 confirms the rarity 
of compromise on fundamental issues. Among these cases, the final peace accords (where 
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more than one accord was reached) in eleven cases27 achieved the target of initial 
implementation. However, in Angola, Nicaragua, Somalia, Djibouti, El Salvador, Guatemala 
and South Africa, the accords could only be reached after a change in the core members of 
the leaderships (i.e. the death of a leader or a change of presidents). In addition, in Cambodia 
and Haiti, the agreements were implemented not through the cooperation of factional leaders 
but through excluding certain parties from the processes. Thus, only two (Macedonia and 
Mozambique) of the twenty-eight cases achieved cooperative implementation of peace 
accords through national leaders compromising on their fundamental goals.28 Therefore, this 
thesis maintains that actors’ fundamental goals are rarely compromised. 
In civil war analyses, however, identification of the ‘real’ goals of a particular faction is not 
an easy task. Obviously, not all claims made by the factions are ‘central’ to their aims. While 
rhetorical or strategic demands are proclaimed overtly, the fundamental aims that are the 
foremost reasons for deadlock in the negotiation processes are likely to be hidden.29 In this 
sense, Leigh distinguishes ‘aspirations’ from ‘reservations’ (2006: 29). Since the actor who 
focuses on aspiration achieves more in negotiation than the player focusing on reservation 
(Galinsky et al., 2002: 1132), many negotiators’ initial proposals contain many aspirations. 
Moreover, even the parties that have the same fundamental targets are likely to express them 
in different ways. For example, among actors who wish to have control of their countries, 
some (particularly opposition parties) demand a share in government, whereas others (such as 
the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación 
Nacional: FMLN) in El Salvador) simply demand a secure opportunity to participate in the 

27
 Angola, Haiti, Djibouti, Macedonia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Sierra 
Leone and South Africa. 
28
 In fact, when a pragmatic faction replaces a leadership, the likeliness of an attitude change increases 
(Rupesinghe, 1998: 140). 
29
 One example is the dispute between Egypt and Israel over Sinai. Although both parties claimed the 
occupation of the region as a fundamental goal, it turned out that ‘Egypt’s main interest [was] in national 
territorial integrity and Israel’s main interest [was] in security’ (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 18; Burton, 1990: 44). 
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political process (Wallensteen, 2997: 136).  
In considering reservation, this thesis takes into consideration political survival, which is 
believed to be a critical goal of national factions. Moreover, two major negotiation issues 
directly related to reservation will be discussed in the following chapters: the establishment 
of an interim authority and demilitarisation.  
Domestic Resources under the Control of National Factions 
‘Domestic resources’ are another crucial variable in national factions’ strategies. After 
consideration of the peace proposals, national leaderships establish their positions and related 
strategies based on the resources under their control. In this thesis, domestic resources 
represent the material and non-material resources that are under the control of national 
factions and that enable the factions to keep undertaking military operations. Even though 
material resources such as food sources and military forces are critical, psychological 
resources such as internal integrity, popularity among constituencies, esteem, and identity are 
also essential factors (Anderson, 1999: 37-9). 
Traditionally, many studies have insisted that conflicts tend to last longer and peace processes 
tend to be less successful when warring factions have good access to valuable resources 
(Fearon, 2004: 275-302; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000: 799-801). Empirical research supporting 
this argument has shown that warring factions in many chronic conflicts possess stable 
natural resources. The following are major examples: UNITA in Angola (diamonds), the RUF 
in Sierra Leone (diamonds), the Liberian government (timber), the Khmer Rouge in 
Cambodia (timber), the Myanmar government (timber), FARC in Colombia (cocaine), the 
Rwandan government (coltan), the Sudanese government (oil), and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan (opium). If factions rely heavily on foreign support, however, this means that 
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they may be vulnerable to the third parties’ demands. 
Nevertheless, owing to the complexity of the concept of what constitutes resources and how 
to measure them, precise quantitative and qualitative assessment of resources is very difficult. 
In fact, ‘resources come in many shapes and sizes, destroying the ability to aggregate them in 
a single measure’ (Zartman & Rubin, 2002: 10). Resources are not only material (economic 
and military factors) but also non-material (psychological and cultural factors). Moreover, the 
importance of a certain resource can vary according to the type of conflict.30 In fact, there are 
various non-material factors that can have a critical effect on the progress of a conflict and 
negotiations, such as the morality of the factions, individual negotiation skills, networks with 
external states, domestic frictions, education, and the like. Azar suggests that there are four 
types of non-material resources in conflicts: communal contents, human needs, governance 
and the state’s roles, and international linkages (1990: 11).  
Considering these issues, this thesis limits the scope of the analysis to a few critical resources. 
First, as regards non-material resources, popular support from constituencies is included. 
Popular support is a critical factor that limits the scope of factions’ military operations, and in 
particular, guerrilla warfare (Mack, 1975: 176-7). There are various factors that influence 
popularity. For instance, some national factions acquire people’s support by demonstrating 
their ability to provide for people’s security and well-being. Moreover, there are other 
factions that enjoy high popularity simply because the leaders are royal family members.  
Second, as regards material resources, movable property and natural resources 
(economically) and the number of soldiers and weapons (militarily) are regarded as the 
primary resources. As small-scale guerrilla warfare was the common military strategy (rather 

30
 For instance, in comparing greed-based conflicts with grievance-based ones, the former is much more 
dependent on economic and military assets. Moreover, some types of wars, such as guerrilla wars, demand much 
fewer resources. 
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than nationwide campaigns) in Cambodia and El Salvador, the number of troops and light 
weapons was more important in both cases than heavy weapons such as tanks or missiles. 
These two resources will be specifically mentioned in the overview of the actors in Chapter 4. 
However, this thesis does not pay too much attention to the actual number or quantity of 
resources. In fact, there are many cases in which government factions have possessed much 
greater military force but have failed to defend the capital city from guerrilla rebels 
(McClintock, 1998: 201; Mack, 1975). Thus, instead of numerical calculation, this thesis 
considers whether a faction has sufficient resources to continue the war. It therefore considers 
‘sufficient resources’ to continue the war in the following way: if a war is chronic, the 
resources and powers of each faction are relatively balanced. ‘Balance’ does not mean that all 
factions’ resources are equal but rather that a certain faction does not have ‘dominant’ 
resources with which to defeat the other. This assumption is widely accepted in the academic 
community (Curle, 1971: 5-6). 
Response Rules set by External Interveners 
The response rules of external interveners are regarded as an important variable in 
influencing domestic actors’ behaviour. In particular, when national factions do not have 
substantial domestic resources, threats and promises from external interveners are important 
factors. All the forms of intervening methods presented above are also adopted as response 
rules in this thesis. 
The three factors above – goals, domestic resources, and the response rules of external 
interveners – are deemed to be the three major variables affecting national factions’ strategic 
moves. This thesis assumes that the combination of these variables critically influence the 
national factions’ decisions and changes in their strategic moves.  
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The table below shows their expected behaviour according to the combined effect of the three 
variables. An actors’ behaviour is determined by three questions: ‘Is the suggested proposal 
critically harmful to its fundamental goals?’; ‘Does it have enough resources to continue the 
war?’; ‘Are the threats and promises from external actors compelling?’ By reflecting on the 
patterns of the national factions’ moves during the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El 
Salvador, Chapter 7 examines the relevance of these assumptions in the two cases. 
 
Table 3.1. The Typology of National Factions’ Choices 
Type A B C D E F G H 
Goals P P P P N N N N 
Resource P N P N P P N N 
Response 
Rules P P N N P N P N 
Decision 
Of Actors 
Consent 
(Initiator) 
Consent 
(Follower) 
Consent 
(Initiator) 
Consent 
(Follower) 
Pretend 
Consent 
(In Spoiler) 
Refuse 
(Out  Spoiler) 
Refuse 
(Inside or 
Outside 
Spoiler) 
Pretend 
Consent 
(Follower) 
Refuse 
(Loner) 
Refuse 
Implemen- 
tation 
Highly 
Probable Uncertain 
Probable 
But Slow Uncertain 
Highly 
Unlikely 
Highly 
Unlikely Uncertain 
No 
Progress 
 
1. Proposal Contents:  P – the suggested proposal is favourable or neutral to the faction’s fundamental goals 
     N – the proposal is contrary to pursuance of the faction’s fundamental goals 
2. Resource:     P – resources of the faction are relatively abundant 
           N – resources of the faction are relatively few  
3. Response Rules:  P – response rules from external interveners are forceful 
     N – response rules from external interveners are not forceful 
 
The Variable for Interveners’ Strategies: Goals 
This section discusses the major variables that affect external interveners’ strategic moves. As 
mentioned above, the negotiation between national factions and international interveners is an 
asymmetric interplay. The response rules from national factions are not likely to affect 
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external actors’ behaviour. Thus, interveners’ strategies are generally determined solely by 
their goals. This thesis pays more attention to interveners’ moves when the goals of 
interveners are inconsistent with those of warring factions. This difference in goals prevents 
negotiators from developing mutual understanding and from reflecting the fundamental 
interests of their counterparts in their proposals.  
When they become involved in a peace negotiation, all actors pursue their own interests. 
External interveners also make efforts to reflect their interests in the negotiation processes in 
which they engage. However, it is frequently observed that external interveners’ goals are 
inconsistent with those of national factions. For instance, the importance of selfish interests is 
greater for regional interveners since they tend to have more direct and stronger interests in 
the conflicts. Hence, in many cases, regional interveners are likely to be partial supporters of 
a certain national faction and to have goals consistent with that faction. 
On the international level, global powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union were 
particularly enthusiastic in expanding or securing their hegemony by manipulating civil war 
peace negotiations during the Cold War period (Haas, 1991: 72-86, 160-7; Munck, 1993: 77-
8). Smaller international interveners such as France, Spain, and Japan, which once colonised 
the countries in conflict as imperial powers, tried (or have tried since) to maintain their 
influence over the country or the region in which the negotiations were (or are) taking place 
(Haas, 1991: 178; Whitfield, 2007: 64-7). Moreover, in many cases, international interveners 
had (and have) only limited understanding of national factions’ perceptions precisely because 
of their position as a third party. The way that one actor perceives a certain issue when it is a 
third party will be very different from the way it sees the issue when it is a direct party. 
In sum, this thesis assumes that the only question that external interveners ask when deciding 
upon and executing their strategic moves is whether their strategies are effective in changing 
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the attitude of national factions. 
 
Case Selection and Issues to Be Studied 
This section justifies the case selection and discusses the issues that will be analysed in the 
following chapters. First, it explains why Cambodia and El Salvador were selected as the case 
studies. In short, this is because the two cases demonstrate significantly different outcomes in 
peace implementation even though they share striking similarities in the characteristics of 
their civil wars and peace processes. Second, with regard to the topics to be studied, 
demilitarisation and the establishment of a transitional authority are at the centre of the 
analysis because both issues were highly contentious and caused serious delays and 
renegotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador. Third, this research includes the first phase of 
implementation as a part of the negotiation process since many negotiators attempted to 
renegotiate on controversial issues during this period, and the success of the negotiations can 
be assessed by considering not only the signing of the peace agreements but also their 
implementation. 
 Case Selection: Cambodia and El Salvador 
Cambodia and El Salvador are chosen as case studies because they demonstrate significantly 
different peace negotiation processes and outcomes despite similarities in the characteristics 
of the conflicts and the forms of third-party intervention. Between 1989-2006, twenty-eight 
civil war cases ended in peace agreements (Wallensteen, 2007: 124). Table 3.2 displays a 
number of cases that share analogous critical factors related to the characteristics of conflicts 
and intervention conditions. 
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Table 3.2. Eleven Peace Negotiation Cases in the Post-Cold War Period 
 Characteristics of Conflicts Back- Ground Interveners Results 
Name Ethnic 
War 
Type of 
Violence 
Duration 
Of War 
Colonial 
History 
UN Power 
State 
Agreement Implemen-
tation 
El Salvador No Vertical Long Yes Yes Yes Yes Success 
Namibia No Vertical Long Yes Yes Yes Yes Success 
Nicaragua 
(1990) No Vertical Long Yes Yes Yes Yes Success 
Guatemala No Vertical Long Yes Yes Yes Yes Success 
Cambodia No Vertical Long Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial 
Mozambique No Vertical Long Yes Yes No Yes Partial 
Somalia No Vertical Long Yes Yes Yes Yes Failure 
Liberia No Vertical Long Yes Yes Yes Yes Failure 
Angola 
(1991) No Vertical Long Yes Yes Yes Yes Failure 
Ethiopia No Vertical Long No No No No No 
Tajikistan No Vertical Short No No No No No 
 
In this table, the components shown at the top are some of the ‘determinants of conflict and 
negotiation’ commonly suggested by previous studies. As to the characteristics of conflicts, 
the possibility of successful negotiation is believed to vary according to whether a conflict is 
related to ethnicity, whether the conflict involves central government (vertical violence), and 
whether the war is chronic (Carment, Rowlands, & James, 1998; Brown, 1993; Burton, 1987). 
In addition, colonial history is also frequently cited as a factor that determines the 
circumstances of a negotiation, particularly national factions’ perceptions of negotiation and 
the role of external interveners (Cooper & Berdal, 1993; Baumhoegger, 1984). Regarding 
intervention, the participation of the UN and one or more global powers is also an important 
variable (Sambanis, 2000; Carment & Schnabel, 2000; Lewicki, Weiss, & Lewin, 1992; 
Andemichael, 1972). In comparison to the last two cases, the first nine civil wars share 
similar characteristics even though they are separated geographically.  
 


Nevertheless, the result of the negotiations in the cases varied, thus failing to meet the 
expectation of conventional studies. While the negotiations in El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, and Namibia are regarded as successes, those in Angola, Somalia, and Liberia are 
viewed as failures. The peace processes in Cambodia and Mozambique achieved only partial 
success.31 This suggests, therefore, that the factors that are proposed by conventional studies 
to be determiners of the success or failure of a negotiation process do not provide a universal 
explanation. It is therefore necessary to identify supplementary factors that contribute to the 
success or failure of negotiations. 
There are a number of new approaches that aim to explain civil war outcomes that appear 
contradictory to the conventional studies’ arguments, including those approaches aiming to 
identify omitted factors, analyse the effect of a combination of factors, or refine the criteria 
for judging the success of implementation (van der Stoel, 1999: 61). This thesis aims to 
identify the negotiation process itself as one of the hidden factors contributing to the outcome 
of a negotiation. It selects the Cambodian and Salvadoran peace negotiations as the targets 
for case study.  
As shown in the table above, the two cases share significant similarities in terms of the 
characteristics of their wars and interventions: neither war was due to ethnic cleavage; 

31
 Evaluating the success of the negotiation is complicated by the complexity of the concept but also because 
different interpretations of what constitutes ‘success’ are dependent on different people’s perceptions. This thesis 
uses the four issues conceptualised by Simpson (1996) and Pushkina (2002) to evaluate the ‘success’ of a 
negotiation process: (a) the fighting came to an end, (b) demobilisation of forces was completed, (c) key 
provisions of the accords provided for a restructuring of the armed forces and police, and (d) the holding of free 
and fair elections occurred. In addition to the previous studies on the success and failure of peace 
implementation, the evaluation was supplemented by the information from one conflict database, the Korea 
Institute for Defense Analysis (www.kida.re.kr).  
Although it might still be deemed controversial to state that the implementation processes in Namibia, 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala were completely successful, it is evident that the four cases exhibit more 
complete implementation of the three projects stated above. In Cambodia and Mozambique, demilitarisation and 
the implementation of an electoral process were unsuccessful. In the remaining cases, national factions broke 
their ceasefires in the first phase of the implementation (Hampson, 1996; Peceny & Stanley, 2001; Pasára, 2001; 
Walter, 1999; Alden & Simpson, 1993). 
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vertical violence between central governments and resistance groups had dominated the 
countries for a long time; both countries had experienced a colonial period that transformed 
their indigenous cultures; and during the negotiation period, external interveners such as the 
United Nations and the United States played important roles (Solomon, 2000; Whitfield, 
2009; Munck & Kumar, 1993: 169). 
In addition to the similarities presented above, there are others that the two cases share. First, 
the two wars were affected by similar international circumstances. The Cambodian civil war 
ran from 1979 to 1991, and the Salvadoran conflict began in early 1981 and ended in early 
1993. The international bipolar system during the Cold War played an important role as an 
external factor, and the collapse of this structure in the late 1980s had a critical effect on the 
peace processes in both countries (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 34; Thakur & Thayer, 1992: 203; 
Montgomery, 1992: 216; Munck & Kumar, 1995: 171). Although regional political contexts 
meant that the specific effects of the collapse of the Cold War system on the two regions were 
different, the changed international structure nevertheless prompted a fundamental 
transformation of the inter-state relationships in both Central America and Southeast Asia as 
the two global powers withdrew their security umbrellas and new possibilities to resolve 
military confrontations via peaceful means consequently emerged (Munck & Kumar, 1995: 
195).  
Second, the United Nations played an active role in the settlement of the two conflicts. With 
the support of the United States and the cooperation of the USSR, the UN could make a great 
contribution to the peace processes as a mediator and negotiation facilitator (Hampson, 1996: 
136). Although the specific roles and forms of the UN’s intervention in resolving the two 
conflicts were quite dissimilar, the organisation played an ‘instrumental role in brokering 
both countries’ respective peace accords’ (Munck & Kumar, 1995: 195). 
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Nevertheless, the implementation processes in the two cases were very different. Despite 
some delays and rescheduling, the implementation of the Salvadoran peace process 
progressed relatively smoothly. The major projects, including demilitarisation, holding an 
election, and national reconciliation processes, were eventually completed without 
encountering decisive problems (Hampson, 1996: 142-66). The Cambodian implementation 
process, however, was much more difficult. The Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK, 
Khmer Rouge) flatly refused to cooperate with UN supervision of the demilitarisation process 
and to compete in the general election, while the State of Cambodia (SOC, the successor of 
the PRK) openly rejected the election result (Ashley, 1998: 24). With this in mind, this thesis 
will treat the Cambodian peace negotiations as an example of a partially successful peace 
process, while the El Salvadoran case will be regarded as an example of a relatively 
successful multilateral peacekeeping operation. A comparison of the two cases will identify 
the factors that differentiated the processes and outcomes of the peace negotiations in each 
case. 
 Issues to Be Studied: Demilitarisation and the Transitional Authority 
Of the issues that were discussed during the two negotiation processes, which are to be 
analysed in this research? The formation of the transitional authority and demilitarisation 
have been selected because they are directly related to a national factions’ fundamental goal – 
political survival. Since the outcome of negotiations on these issues could change the national 
factions’ future destiny, disagreement on these topics frequently causes stalemates in peace 
negotiations (Hampson, 1996). 
First, the issue of an interim authority concerns the establishment of a provisional national 
controlling power that manages and supervises all the processes between a ceasefire and a 
general election. However, national actors are extremely sensitive to the composition and the 
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power of the authority for the following reasons. Above all, the composition of the interim 
authority may determine who will win the forthcoming election. In contrast to Western ideas, 
which assume that an interim government will take the form of a short-term technical 
management governing body, many warring factions fear that it may strongly influence the 
result of their future election(s) (Lee, 2011: 15). Since a transitional authority deals with 
many important tasks, including electoral processes, reconciliation issues, and refugee 
repatriation, it may have a significant influence on the election results. Thus, many peace 
negotiations between the late 1980s and the mid-1990s, including Namibia, Sierra Leone, and 
Mozambique, became deadlocked and were delayed because of strong disagreements 
between the actors on this issue (KIDA, 2007: no pagination). It is also very important in 
controlling internal solidarity. Since the interim authority frequently is a symbol of the 
negotiation result (Lee, 2011: 15), factional leaders are keen to ensure that their practical and 
symbolic interests are reflected in the formation of the interim authority. 
In the peace processes in Cambodia and El Salvador, the structures of the transitional 
authorities were ostensibly similar. In both cases, a UN body as an external supervisor 
(UNTAC and ONUSAL), a national reconciliation council that allowed most warring 
factions’ participation (SNC and COPAZ), and the de facto government (the PRK/SOC and 
the Cristiani government) comprised the core governmental authorities during the post-
conflict recovery period (for details of the organisations and national factions, see Chapters 4 
and 7). Nevertheless, despite their similar compositions, the ways in which the parties 
cooperated within the authorities and effectiveness of their cooperation were significantly 
different. This thesis argues that some of the reasons for the differences are imbedded in the 
negotiation processes themselves. 
Second, demilitarisation issues, including the demilitarisation of soldiers, closing of bases 
 


and other measures, are often the most controversial parts of negotiations because 
demilitarisation is a process of removing a fundamental part of the means by which actors’ 
conduct activities (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005: 176; Berdal, 1996: 5). 
Moreover, the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) is 
considered one of the most crucial issues in the post-conflict reconstruction period in that the 
progress of DDR determines the security conditions in the post-conflict society and 
ultimately affects the success of a peace process (Barakat & Özerdem, 2005: 228-35).  
For the factions in a military conflict, demilitarisation removes the most important resources 
that they use to carry out their campaigns. Once they lose their military capability, they find it 
difficult to return to violent conflict even if they experience unexpected attacks. Hence, each 
faction tends to be very reluctant to agree to a specific proposal on demilitarisation unless 
they are confident about the following two issues: (1) the fairness of demilitarisation targets 
and processes and (2) clear verification of the implementation (Spear, 2002: 141-82). 
In addition to the security dilemma presented above, for the Cambodian factions, 
demilitarisation was also closely related to their future political power. While the PRK, which 
wanted to preserve its power, insisted on a proportional reduction in the military forces of all 
factions, the other resistance groups, which had much smaller armies, argued that all factions 
should possess the same number of soldiers. As all knew the intentions behind the proposals, 
neither side was receptive to demilitarisation proposals in the early phase of the negotiations.   
For the FMLN in El Salvador, the complete demilitarisation of the Salvadoran government’s 
army was the fundamental goal of its revolutionary movement. As the army’s brutal human 
rights abuses were one of the biggest motivations for many Salvadorans to join the rebel 
movement, the FMLN could not abandon this demand. Nevertheless, purging the army was 
an extremely difficult issue for President Cristiani because this did not simply involve 
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reducing the size of the military but rather eliminating the power group that had controlled 
the country for decades (Palmer, 2006: 9; Negroponte, 2005: 164; Juhn, 1998: 126-7) (see 
Chapter 4 and 6 for details). 
There are other critical issues that are worthy of attention, such as repatriation of refugees, 
uncovering the truth about war crimes, redistribution of natural resources, human rights 
issues, and economic and social justice. For instance, while land reform issues were 
extremely controversial in El Salvador, human rights issues related to the Khmer Rouge’s 
former administration severely hampered the negotiation process in Cambodia. However, 
whereas the transitional authority and demilitarisation were critical in both cases, other issues 
assumed greater importance in one case than the other. Thus, the dynamics of the negotiators’ 
interplay is better explained by the two issues that assumed critical importance in both cases. 
 The Time Period under Consideration 
With regard to the time frame, the author contends that it is necessary to examine the two 
peace negotiations from a wider perspective by accepting that a peace negotiation is a part of 
the overall peace process. There are two justifications for the author’s position. First, in many 
peace negotiations, the distinction between negotiation and other procedures is not clear. In 
other words, the peace processes were comprehensive amalgamations of various procedures, 
including pre-negotiation confidence building, peace initiating, peace negotiation, and peace 
implementation. Moreover, in many cases, these procedures do not occur in a specific order. 
Some may occur simultaneously, whereas others sometimes take place repeatedly.  
For example, in the Colombian conflict, peace negotiation and post-war reconstruction were 
taking place while violence continued. In addition, during the Northern Ireland negotiations 
phase, the British Government undertook symbolic confidence building measures such as 
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police reform, and during the talks with the political leaders of Northern Ireland, it began the 
transfer of long-term Republican prisoners in English prisons to Ireland (Darby & Mac Ginty, 
2000: 75).  
Although the Cambodian and Salvadoran cases do not provide such striking examples, the 
national factions in both cases regarded the implementation period as another phase of 
negotiation. Therefore, rather than concentrating on fulfilling the expectations of external 
third parties, they continued to renegotiate the agreements on controversial issues during the 
implementation phase (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
Second, from a more practical viewpoint, it is impossible to evaluate the outcomes of a peace 
negotiation without considering its implementation process. The production of a peace 
agreement does not guarantee the success of its implementation (Munck & Kumar, 1995: 
180-1). As was shown earlier, although the national factions in Angola and Liberia signed 
peace agreements, the implementation of these agreements was unsuccessful, and their peace 
negotiations turned out to be a complete failure. 
Hence, although this project focuses on negotiation, both the peace negotiation process and 
the first phase of the implementation period are included in the scope of this research; or 
more specifically, the time period between the signing of the peace agreement and the first 
general election (October 1991 – July 1993 in Cambodia; January 1992 – September 1993 in 
El Salvador) is the period under analysis. 
 
The Focus of the Arguments 
There are four purposes of academic research: exploring, describing, explaining, and 
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predicting (Blaikie, 2010: 76). Among these, this thesis pays particular attention to the 
following two aspects: (1) describing two distinctive patterns of interplay between the actors, 
and (2) explaining these patterns by including the actors’ perceptions as a factor that 
influences their strategic moves.  
First, the two case study chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) aim to show the significantly different 
interaction between the national factions and different external interveners. An impartial 
intervener’s attitude towards and influence over national factions is significantly different 
from those of an advocate state. In terms of neutrality, for instance, whereas an impartial third 
party does not really care who comes to power in the post-conflict political arena, a national 
faction’s advocate normally has a strong interest in the shape of the future political landscape. 
In addition, an advocate state normally has much greater influence on and over the national 
actor that it supports than an impartial intervener has. Since the advocate has provided 
material and diplomatic support to the national faction, it possesses many response rules as 
incentives and pressures. Impartial third parties need to devise new strategies to influence 
domestic actors because they tend not to have strong pre-existing connections with them. 
However, the impact of these new response rules are generally weaker than those of advocate 
states because the incentives and pressures are not critical to the national faction’s survival 
and are largely ineffective without the cooperation of other advocate states in the regions 
(Cortright, 1997: 3-11) (for detailed discussions on this, see Chapter 7). 
Hence, there are many aspects of the interplay between a domestic actor and an impartial 
third party that are different from the interaction between a national faction and its advocate. 
In order to demonstrate this, Chapter 5 describes the national factions’ relationship with the 
impartial third-party interveners (the PRK-US in Cambodia and the FMLN-UN in El 
Salvador), whereas Chapter 6 details their interplay with their advocate states (PDK-China in 
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Cambodia and the Cristiani government-US in El Salvador). Moreover, each chapter 
highlights some of the similarities in the interplay between the actors in Cambodia and El 
Salvador that are distinct from the interplay in the other chapter.  
Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 2, there are few, if not no, purely impartial third parties. 
From substantial security or economic interests to cultural biases, various factors prevent 
external interveners from being completely impartial (Carnevale & Arad, 1996: 39-57). 
Hence, this thesis regards an external actor as an impartial intervener when the actor pursues 
a negotiated conflict resolution between warring factions with little intention of supporting 
gains for particular domestic actors. In this sense, ‘impartial’ in this thesis is a relative term.32  
Second, these chapters analyse the role that perceptions play in influencing actors’ strategic 
moves. As discussed in Chapter 2, perceptual issues frequently determine the extent of an 
actor’s understanding of the issues related to the negotiation and strongly influence the 
effectiveness of the negotiation. Although there are various perceptual factors, this thesis 
pays most attention to the issue of ‘bounded awareness’, which means a phenomenon that 
actors are not able to react or make an informed decision about given negotiation issues either 
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 The author recognises that representing the US as an impartial intervener is controversial. Until the mid-phase 
of the civil war, the US behaved more like an advocate of the CGDK rather than an impartial mediator. The 
country had provided (official) economic and (unofficial) military aid to the KPNLF since the outbreak of the 
civil war and to FUNCINPEC from the mid-1980s (Son Soubert & Lu Lay Sreng, 2009, Author’s Interview). 
However, when the Cambodian peace negotiation began, the US assumed a relatively impartial mediating role. 
In this period, the US was implementing its ‘exit from Indochina’ strategy and did not have strong interests in 
the civil war. The US was trying to seek diplomatic solutions behind the scenes by placing France and Indonesia 
(in the early phase) and the UN (in the late phase) at the forefront of diplomatic efforts to secure a 
comprehensive resolution of the Cambodian conflict (Solomon, 2000: 22, 72). 
Thus, the country is selected as an impartial actor because its behaviour in the latter phase of the Cambodian 
civil war provides a good example of the strategies used by an impartial intervener. It may be argued that the 
inclusion is problematic because some national factions still regarded the US as an advocate of the CGDK 
despite its relatively impartial behaviour since the late 1980s. In answer to this criticism, it should be noted that 
this thesis regards such perceptual prejudice as a factor that affect the relationship between the effectiveness of 
the US’s efforts.  
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through lack of understanding or inaccurate information (Chugh & Bazerman, 2005: 2; 
Simon, 1983: 34).   
In particular, this thesis pays attention to the role of actors’ perceptions and suggests two 
factors that cause such perceptions: negotiating actors’ ethnocentric cultural values and their 
internal ability to gain and assess information.  
First, Chapter 5 discusses the limitations of the actors’ ethnocentric cultural values. 
Specifically, the chapter argues that the international interveners’ perception, informed by 
their ethnocentric Western culture, hampered the effectiveness of their strategic moves. 
However, the impact of the interveners’ Western culture on the negotiation process in 
Cambodia was significantly different from its impact in El Salvador. Whereas the 
interveners’ restricted understanding of negotiation, violence, and peace (constrained as it 
was by their liberal understanding of these concepts) prevented them from developing a 
thorough understanding of the intentions and strategies of the Cambodian national factions, 
the UN’s same ethnocentric culture did not adversely affect the peace negotiation with the 
FMLN in El Salvador (See Chapter 5 for details).  
Second, Chapter 6 focuses on the domestic organisations’ limited ability to communicate 
with external actors and interpret other actors’ moves. The chapter demonstrates how the lack 
of a systematic structure of communication and discussion prevented the PDK in Cambodia 
from assessing the negotiation situation properly, whereas the Cristiani government had 
better communication systems (See Chapter 6 for details). These differences were one of the 
reasons for the divergent processes and outcomes of the two peace negotiations. 
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METHODOLOGICAL COMPONENTS 
This section explains the main methodologies and research techniques used in this research. 
Firstly, it describes and justifies the main methodological features of this research – an actor-
oriented, qualitative, and comparative study. Secondly, the main theories used in the analysis, 
game theory and bounded awareness, are presented. Thirdly, on a more practical level, the 
details of how the author collected the data for this research are described. Finally, potential 
biases that may be caused by these methodologies and triangulation are discussed. 
 
Research Methodologies: Qualitative Research 
With the aim of seeking the ways in which successful peace negotiation is accomplished, this 
research considers the ‘interplay between external interveners and national factions.’ At the 
most fundamental level, the analysis in this research is based on the qualitative research 
paradigm. According to Bryman, the qualitative approach is ‘an approach to the study of the 
social world which seeks to describe and analyse the culture and behaviour of humans and 
their groups from the point of view of those being studied’ (1996: 46). As the strength of 
qualitative research lies in ‘gaining a rich and complex understanding of a specific social 
context or phenomenon’ and in investigating the ‘behaviors, beliefs, opinions, emotions, and 
relationships of individuals’ (Mack et al, 2005: 2), it is an appropriate approach for this study, 
which analyses the interplay between negotiators and the reasons behind it. From among the 
various qualitative methods, this research applies an actor-oriented, comparative, and case 
study method. 
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Actor Oriented Research 
One of the factors that distinguishes this research from other studies is that it seeks ‘the 
factors that contribute to successful peace negotiation’ by focusing on ‘human behaviour and 
perception’ rather than social or international structure or material constraints. However, this 
research does not neglect the importance of material and structural conditions and factors. 
Rather, it intends to reveal and examine factors that have not received enough attention from 
the academic community (see Introduction). This thesis regards people’s perception as one of 
the critical factors that determines the nature and the outcome of the negotiation process. If 
one actor strongly believes that a particular issue is harmful to their political survival, it has a 
strong impact on the negotiation process, regardless of whether it is true or not.  
In this sense, as the fundamental basis of the research, this actor-oriented research method is 
based on constructionist ontology and interpretivist epistemology. As regards an ontological 
approach to the nature of ‘being’ or ‘existence,’ there are two main positions: objectivism and 
constructivism. Whereas objectivism claims that ‘social phenomena and their meaning have 
an existence that is independent or separate from actors’ (Bryman, 2001: 17), constructivism 
insists that reality ‘arises from the interactive process and its temporal, cultural, and structural 
contexts’ (Charmaz, 2000: 524). The ontological position that this thesis takes is that the 
outcome of a peace negotiation is the result of the interplay between actors rather than 
entirely a result of material or structural forces. In terms of epistemology, which concerns 
‘what’ knowledge to learn and ‘how’ to do it, there are two traditions: interpretivism, and 
positivism. While interpretivists maintain that ‘the human sciences aim to understand human 
action’, positivists believe that ‘the purpose of any science […] is to offer causal explanations 
of social, behavioral, and physical phenomena’ (Schwandt, 2000: 191). This thesis assumes 
that knowledge about peace negotiation can be more effectively obtained when contextual 
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issues such as the actors’ cultural backgrounds, unexpected or accidental events, and the like 
are considered. 
Comparative Case Study 
This research applies a comparative case study to achieve its goal. In fact, comparison and 
case study are not exclusively qualitative research methods. However, in contrast to the large 
number of cases that quantitative comparative studies use, this study examines a wide range 
of dimensions of a small number of cases to explain negotiation processes by highlighting the 
diverse factors that constitute a broader social context of negotiation. 
This thesis focuses on the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador. Field research 
was conducted as its findings are used as the core means for clarifying the factors that affect 
peace negotiation. Fundamentally, field research investigates ‘social settings and grasps 
multiple perspectives in natural social settings … [getting] inside the meaning system of 
members and then goes back to an outside or research viewpoint’ (Neuman, 2002: 368). The 
primary method used for the fieldwork was elite interview (for details, see below). 
Case studies are intended to be comparative in that they ‘examine patterns of similarities and 
differences across cases and try to come to terms with their diversity’ (Ragin, 1994: 107 cited 
in Neuman, 2006: 437). If case studies are useful for gaining an in-depth understanding of the 
diverse aspects of social events, comparative study is helpful in distinguishing the common 
characteristics of a case from its unique traits. The specific type of comparison used here is 
case study comparative research, which ‘[compares] particular societies or cultural units and 
[does] not make broad generalizations’ (Kohn, 1987 cited in Neuman, 2006: 438). In other 
words, after observing the behaviour of the actors and analysing the notable factors that 
influence such behaviour in the two cases, the common features found in both cases are 
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considered to be the targets of generalisation.  
 
Theories  
The research framework of this thesis is based on two contradictory theories: game theory 
and the concept of bounded awareness. First, in the analysis of the actors’ strategic moves, 
the concepts of game theory provide the bedrock for the framework. This thesis views the 
peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador as negotiation games between actors who 
aim to achieve their goals. Second, it is assumed that the actors in negotiation determine their 
next moves by calculating their benefits and costs. Third, since peace negotiation is 
considered an extreme form of adversarial negotiation, most of the difficulties encountered in 
adversarial games are expected to emerge in peace negotiation (see Chapter 2 for the details 
of adversarial games). Finally, as for the strategy of actors, basic assumptions related to 
response rules33 and commitments34 are widely accepted in this thesis.  
However, although these assumptions and theories are very useful in explaining actors’ 
behavioural characteristics and the dynamics of interplay between actors, game theory has a 
number of weaknesses. One weakness is the ‘rationality’ assumption, which is a reflection of 
Western values. Game theory assumes that all actors are rational and behave according to a 
rational appraisal of the benefits and costs of the behaviour. However, the extent of the costs 
and benefits are largely subject to actors’ psychological values. In light of this, while this 
thesis assumes that warring factions make decisions according to their costs and benefits, it 
also takes into account the actors’ cultural and psychological estimation of the extent of the 
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33
 As explained in Chapter 1, a ‘response rule’ is a promised response (incentive or punishment) from 
negotiation counterparts when a negotiator makes a move. 
34
 Commitment is a non-response move that is made by negotiators or mediators to increase the possibility of 
negotiation success. 
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costs and benefits. It is the actors’ interpretation, their perception, of the extent of the costs 
and benefits that may lead to the same intervention strategy having different effects on the 
behaviour of actors.  
In addition, the fundamental assumption of perfect information is contrary to the reality of 
many peace negotiations. The actors in most peace negotiations suffer from a lack of 
information on their counterparts’ strategies and their domestic and the international 
environment. A number of factors prevent them from obtaining good information. First, the 
warring factions in civil wars normally have very limited means of communication. Thus, 
they do not transmit information or messages within their internal organisations, with their 
negotiation counterparts, nor with external actors (Norman, 2009). Second, the national 
factions’ mutual distrust makes the information that is transmitted between actors less reliable. 
A national faction tends to be very reluctant to release useful information about itself. 
Likewise, they tend to doubt the accuracy of the information that their ‘enemies’ divulge 
(Norman, 2009; Lu Lay Sreng, 2009: Author’s Interview). Thus, most actors in peace 
negotiations have limited or distorted information, and the perfect information assumption is 
not applicable to this type of negotiation. In fact, actors tend to base their decisions on what 
they believe is right or accurate.   
Thus, it is useful to include the cultural and perceptual concerns of actors that are critical to 
the progress of a negotiation. Many recent research projects have paid great attention to the 
emotional and perceptual aspects of negotiation, foreign policy, and conflict resolution (Long 
& Brecke, 2003; Womack 2003; Kimmel 1994). In short, as an analytical background, this 
thesis uses game theory on the bases of diverse human perceptions. More specifically, this 
thesis rejects the two previously mentioned assumptions of game theory – the rationality of 
actors and perfection information – and uses the concept of bounded awareness in their place. 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, since many factors may prevent actors from seeing accessible and 
perceivable information, they normally have only bounded awareness of the reality during the 
negotiation (Chugh & Bazerman, 2005: 2). Moreover, in order to provide evidence to support 
the rejection of the two assumptions, this thesis pays particular attention to two sources of 
bounded awareness: the actors’ ethnocentric cultural values and their limited capacity for 
communication. 
First, ethnocentric cultures predetermine actors’ perception and limit the scope of their 
negotiation strategies. It is widely accepted that the ethnocentric cultures of third-party 
interveners play significant, if not critical, roles in shaping and determining the outcome of a 
civil war peace process (Jervis, 1976: 44; Ross, 2007: 42; Bazerman et al., 2000 cited in 
Thompson, 2006: 9; Brett, 2001: 8; Sama, 2007: 206; Ikeda & Tehranian, 2004). These 
cultural differences, resulting from divergent historical events, have a strong impact on the 
negotiation process. In particular, negotiators from differing cultural backgrounds are likely 
to have dissimilar definitions and accounts of the conflicts and negotiations. Moreover, they 
also tend to approach the core issues of the negotiation from different perspectives. However, 
the effects of such cultural differences are normally hidden, and they are not well recognised 
as a key factor by the actors in the negotiation. Thus, in many cases, the negotiators exchange 
their own strategies on the basis of a very limited understanding of those of their counterparts. 
In particular, since interveners from Western societies share standardised concepts about 
peace and negotiation, this limits the interveners’ scope for contribution. As regards this 
attitude towards peace, Western societies have a standardised model – liberal peace – which 
consists of ‘democratisation, the rule of law, human rights, free and globalised markets, and 
neo-liberal development’ (Richmond, 2006: 292). In this ‘experiment that involves 
transplanting western models of social, political, and economic organization into war-
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shattered states’ (Paris, 1997: 56), ‘there is a bias towards using the state, bureaucracy and 
formal political processes (e.g. elections and parties) as core lenses for the interrogation of a 
proclivity towards conflict or passivity’ (Mac Ginty, 2008: 146). As to perceptions of 
negotiation, three distinct components of culture are prominent: individualism, egalitarianism, 
and low context communication (Gellman, 2007: 25-6) (for details, see Chapter 2). 
Second, this thesis also looks at the negotiating parties’ internal ability to communicate with 
other actors and to interpret the resultant information accurately as a factor influencing their 
bounded awareness. Since negotiating actors’ abilities vary too much to be able to make 
generalisations, few conventional studies have attempted to provide theoretical perspectives 
on this factor. However, a number of studies have addressed some issues related to the 
bounded awareness caused by group behaviour, such as the social validation of information 
(Stasser and Stewart, 1992), the influence of group familiarity (Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams, 
and Neale, 1996), and people’s reluctance to give ‘information contrary to the prevailing 
group opinion’ (Hartwick, Sheppard, & Davis, 1982, cited in Lightle, Kagle, & Arkes, 2008: 
27).  
In particular, the Acquiring a Company game and the Attribution game are relevant to the 
case studies. The Acquiring a Company game demonstrates people’s tendency to ‘focus much 
more on shared information than on unique or unshared information’ (Chugh & Bazerman, 
2005: 13, Stasser and Stewart, 1992; Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams, and Neale, 1996). Thus, 
when Acquiring a Company players have a major influence on a particular group’s decision 
makers, it is difficult for them to gain the benefits of group discussion and information 
sharing. In many cases, the negotiators in these circumstances would ignore or simplify the 
strategic calculation of other actors or the rules of the game (negotiation) (Chugh & 
Bazerman, 2005: 20-1). Moreover, how much impact would a certain group will receive by 
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the Acquiring a Company game when it make a decision, largely depends on the 
organisation’s internal information gathering structure and decision-making system. The 
more international structures for information sharing are unorganised, the more difficult free 
and mutual communication is between internal groups, and the stronger is the influence of 
this tendency. These aspects of bounded awareness are closely analysed in Chapter 6. 
The negotiating actor’s internal ability to obtain accurate information and to assess the 
negotiating environment is a main topic of Chapter 7. By comparing the PDK of Cambodia 
and the Cristiani government in El Salvador, the chapter will demonstrate how such internal 
structures and communication systems are important for successful negotiations. 
 
Data Collection: Document Analysis and Elite Interview 
The data collection methods used in this study consisted of two phases. First, as a preliminary 
process, examination of a range of written materials was conducted to discover the ‘facts’ 
about negotiation processes. It was necessary to study as many available materials as possible 
in order to gain a good understanding of negotiation. In addition, the materials are excellent 
points of reference against which to confirm the findings of the interviews. 
Details relating to the behaviour and motivation of national factions were investigated by 
analysing various sources. This research considered secondary sources such as UN reports 
and academic papers documenting the negotiations; the biographies of related figures 
including Prince Sihanouk, Pol Pot (the leader of the PDK), and Khieu Samphan (a core 
leader of the PDK) were included as part of this research. Moreover, an analysis of primary 
sources such as documents released by local governments and the speeches of the factional 
leaders was made. The strategies of interveners are relatively well documented in materials 
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such as news articles, UN reports, research reports from various institutes, and the published 
memoirs of the individuals who were involved in the negotiations.  
However, the materials on the methods of negotiation employed by national factions are still 
rare. Even where official documents issued by the factions and personal memoirs are 
available, the information in the materials is not reliable enough for the purposes of this study. 
Therefore, fieldwork to collect first-hand data needed to be conducted. Hence, the fieldwork 
in Cambodia was carried out between June and September 2009 in order to discover how the 
then factional leaders perceived various issues related to the peace process.35 The data 
collection mainly took the form of elite interviews. The interview is ‘one of the most 
common and powerful ways’ to obtain data in social science (Fontana & Frey, 2000: 645), 
and it is a particularly important research method for this research because a core part of this 
thesis is concerned with identifying the reasons for specific behaviours: for example, ‘how 
the actors in peace negotiation perceived crucial issues’, and ‘why did they employ certain 
strategic moves?’ 
Specifically, the fieldwork primarily involved conducting elite interviews with former 
factional leaders who had participated in the Cambodian peace negotiations because first-
hand accounts of the negotiation process were adjudged most likely to reveal the factors that 
proved crucial in promoting and inhibiting the progress of the negotiations. By questioning 
people who were directly involved in the peace negotiations, the interviews were likely to 
unearth what this research is designed to discover. More specifically, four factional leaders 
who participated in the Cambodian peace negotiations, four former PDK leaders who 
conducted military operations, and six people who were involved in the post-conflict 
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 More specifically, preliminary research was conducted in South Korea and Japan in June 2009. In this 
research, a number of interviews with scholars who study the Cambodian case were carried out in both countries. 
The field research in Cambodia was conducted from July to September 2009.  
 


recovery projects were interviewed (the list of interviewees is at the end of the bibliography). 
Semi-structured interviews were selected as the preferred interview format so as to combine 
the strengths of structured and unstructured interviews. On the one hand, while the structured 
interview is useful for addressing all the issues with which a piece of research is concerned, it 
usually provides ‘little room for the interviewer to improvise or exercise independent 
judgment’ (Fontana & Frey, 2000: 649). On the other, the unstructured interview is highly 
flexible but tends to be ‘persistently slippery, unstable, and ambiguous from person to person, 
from situation to situation, from time to time’ (Scheurich, 1997: 62 cited in Fontana & Frey, 
2000: 654). Although a number of issues were central to this research, and the interviews 
were structured so that needed these could be addressed by the interview respondents, it was 
also necessary to be ready to uncover new (or hidden) factors that were relevant to the 
research. Hence, the semi-structured interview was selected as the method for the fieldwork. 
The first half of each interview centred on the following key themes: 
The central methods of communication between the actors. 
The major concerns of the actors in negotiation. 
The key events for negotiators, and the impact of the events on their negotiation 
strategies. 
The priorities of the national factions. 
The perception of the neutrality and the power of external interveners (for details of 
the interview questions, see appendix IV). 
 
In order to find and select interviewees, a snowball sampling method was used. This is a 
common method for identifying and approaching potential targets for interview when the 
targets are ‘inaccessible or hard to find’ (Trochim, 2006: no pagination). Since the negotiation 
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processes in civil war cases are still considered sensitive topics in many societies, access to 
interview subjects is largely restricted. In addition, many of the people who were central to 
the decision making in the Cambodian peace negotiations are no longer in public life or 
easily available for interview. With its flexibility, snowball sampling provided the most 
effective way to overcome these obstacles. 
After the data was collected, transcribed, and saved as electronic files, two copies of the 
electronic data (recordings and typed scripts of the interviews) were produced. To protect the 
data from potential risk of damage, one copy was kept by the author, while the other was 
stored at the office of an NGO in Phnom Penh that the author had worked with. The written 
consents obtained from the interviewees were put into an envelope and sealed.  
The interview data was collated and analysed by the author after completing the field 
research. Any claims made by the interviewees about facts or events were rechecked against 
secondary published sources and, when necessary, the author consulted with the scholars that 
he interviewed during the preliminary research.   
Nevertheless, it should be noted that although this thesis examines two cases, Cambodia and 
El Salvador, the field research was conducted only in Cambodia. It is clear that fieldwork in 
El Salvador is necessary for this research to be a comprehensive and systematic study. 
However, because of the limited time and funding given to a PhD student, the analysis on the 
Salvadoran case in this thesis had to rely on published materials. Compared to the Cambodian 
case, more research on the Salvadoran case has been published in English, and this helped the 
author to find evidence for the arguments on this thesis without conducting field research. 
Moreover, e-mail exchanges with some of the scholars who have studied the civil war in El 
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Salvador supplemented this weakness.36 This limitation will be revisited in the conclusion of 
this thesis. 
 
Ethical Issues 
This section demonstrates how this study avoided potential ethical problems. Although the 
subject of the study is not a contemporary civil conflict, many contemporary issues in 
Cambodia are directly and indirectly related to its civil war and peace negotiations. For 
instance, the former PDK (Khmer Rouge) leaders, who were once accepted as high-ranking 
government officials, are currently detained and awaiting the sentence of the Special Tribunal 
for Cambodia. Moreover, mentioning Hun Sen’s collaboration with Vietnam during the civil 
war is considered taboo among many politicians. Thus, conducting interviews on the 
Cambodian peace negotiations may raise politically or ethically sensitive issues for many 
Cambodian people.  
Although there are various ethical considerations in social science, the author was most 
concerned about the following ethical issues: informed consent, no deception, protection of 
subjects, and accuracy of information.37  
First, it is essential to obtain the informed consent of the research subjects. Research 
participants have ‘the right to be informed about the nature and outcomes of experiments in 
which they are involved’ (Christians, 2000: 138). Therefore, the research participants, 
including the interview subjects or interpreters, were provided with written information that 
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 Although some of the scholars’ names appear in the acknowledgements, the author once again wishes to 
express his deep appreciation for their kind and generous comments and advice. 
37
 This categorisation follows that proposed by Christians (2000: 133-55). After setting a detailed field research 
plan based on the following ethical considerations, the author sought and gained ethical approval from the 
University Ethics Committee. 
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explained the purpose of the research, their rights as a research subject, and details of the 
interviews (the written information used during the fieldwork is attached to Appendix V). In 
addition, each research subject received his/her own interview questions in advance. In most 
cases, they agreed with the research conditions by signing written forms. 
Nevertheless, from time to time, the attempts to gain written consent failed. As Norman 
explains, trust is emotional, and people are frequently sceptical of formal paperwork and 
explanations about research purposes in high-context societies like Cambodia (Norman, 
2009: 73). The occasions on which the author failed to get written consent from national 
elites were mainly due to this reason.38 Less prominent leaders or local people often had 
different reasons. Because of Cambodia’s tragic past, a number of people were afraid that 
signing documents might cause them future trouble with their current government or their 
former fellow combatants. For example, some former leaders of the PDK (Khmer Rouge) 
only agreed verbally to the research conditions.39 
Second, research subjects were not deceived in any way. Fundamentally, there was no need to 
deceive them since most of the research questions concerned ‘past’ history and do not directly 
relate to current Cambodian political issues. Hence, in most cases, research subjects were 
happy to share their experiences. In addition, since the trust between the researcher and the 
subjects was crucial to this research, deception would have been a highly risky strategy to 
adopt. 
Third, protecting the identity of the research subjects is important when investigating 
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 For instance, when he received the form of written consent, the Son Soubert’s secretary remarked, ‘Do you 
really need to get this signed? I don’t recommend you to do so, because His Excellency will feel that he is not 
trusted by you. He knows why you are here, and he knows what he will say.’ In his interview, Ieng Mouly said, 
‘I can see that you are a trustworthy student. That’s it. We Cambodians consider trust important.’ 
39
 Quite a number of local village leaders flatly refused to answer any questions in case I asked them to fill out 
the written consent form. 
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politically sensitive issues. The study of peace negotiation processes is defined as a sensitive 
research topic because it ‘potentially poses for those involved a substantial threat, the 
emergence of which renders problematic for the researcher and/or the researched the 
collection, holding, and/or dissemination of research data’ (Lee & Renzetti, 1990: 512). Thus, 
the field research on this topic might expose the people involved to a potential threat (Lee, 
1993: 4). Above all, protecting the identity of the research subject is essential in societies 
experiencing violent conflict or where the issues under investigation might expose the 
interview subjects to potential risk (Armakolas, 2001: 169; Paluck, 2009: 44). Moreover, 
assuring the confidentiality of the interviewee is also helpful in guaranteeing a more honest 
response from the interview subjects (Norman, 2009: 81).  
Therefore, the research subjects were asked in advance whether they agreed to exposure of 
their identity. If they did not consent, their identities were not released, and descriptions that 
might reveal clues to the identity of interviewees (e.g. where the interview took place, the 
person who introduced the interviewee) were minimised.40 Furthermore, even in cases where 
the subjects agreed to provide their names, they were asked again whether their identities 
could be exposed when their answers to questions might be considered politically sensitive.  
Fourth, accuracy of information is also ethically important since ‘fabrications, fraudulent 
materials, omissions, and contrivances are both nonscientific and unethical’ (Christians, 
2000: 139). Of these, the effect of omissions on the analysis was the most significant issue in 
this study. Since certain information has had to be omitted from the description and analysis, 
there is a possibility that this leaves the information open to misinterpretation. However, 
since this study considers the historical and cultural context of the negotiation important, it 
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 Hence, the names of some of the former PDK (Khmer Rouge) leaders and former PRK soldiers are not given 
in the interview list (see interview list at the end of bibliography). However, contrary to the author’s expectation, 
many interviewees agreed to the disclosure of their identity. 
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attempts to reveal the details of the factors related to actors’ behaviour in the negotiations as 
much as possible (for these factors, see Chapter 5 and 6). 
 
Research Biases and Triangulation 
This section describes potential biases that this thesis might possess and the efforts taken to 
reduce this risk. Research bias is one of the most important factors impairing the accuracy of 
studies. Since this research adopts an interview technique that promotes ‘active interactions 
between two (or more) people leading to negotiated, contextually based results’ (Fontana & 
Frey, 2000: 646), a range of subjective biases may result. Hence, it is important to recognise 
the biases that this research is likely to encounter and to try to improve the accuracy of the 
analysis through triangulation.41 According to Katzer, Cook & Crouch, there are two kinds of 
biases: ‘biases due to the researcher’ and biases ‘due to the behaviour of subjects’ (1998: 56). 
First, in terms of the biases due to the researcher, the researcher’s expectation is a major 
problem. When information related to the research is ambiguous, ‘the expected or desired 
outcome of the study may distort the judgment of the researcher’ (Katzer, Cook, & Crouch, 
1998: 57). For example, when the researcher receives an answer from an interviewee that 
he/she considers vague and then finds clear evidence to the contrary, he/she may be inclined 
to interpret the interviewee’s answer so that it more closely corresponds to the ‘evidence’ 
(especially when the evidence is in keeping with his/her expectations). In such instances, the 
risk of these biases is high. 
To prevent this potential problem, the author interviewed at least two people from each 
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 Triangulation is ‘a process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an 
observation or interpretation’ (Stake, 2000: 443-4). 
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national faction with the same set of questions so as to determine the accuracy of their 
answers. In order to check the accuracy of the analysis, the researcher met with a number of 
expert scholars in Cambodian issues. By visiting these scholars in the UK, Cambodia, Japan, 
and Singapore, the author confirmed the relevance of the information obtained during the 
fieldwork and gained a broader perspective from which to view the peace negotiations (the 
list of the interviewees is presented at the end of the bibliography). 
Second, another important potential bias due to the researcher is bias as a result of cultural 
difference. Since the author does not have a Cambodian cultural background, there was a 
high possibility that the responses of the interview subjects would not be interpreted correctly. 
In particular, when the interview subjects recounted the impact of individuals’ behaviour on 
the negotiations, this risk was high. Without a thorough understanding of the Cambodian 
people’s traditions and culture, recognising the hidden connotations of the interviewees’ 
behaviour and language was impossible. 
However, the problems caused by cultural differences were relatively minor during the 
fieldwork for the following reasons. First, since the factional leaders involved in the 
negotiation processes had been exposed to Western culture42, they normally clearly 
articulated the meaning of their actions. Moreover, since the author had already been working 
in Cambodia for approximately eight months, he had developed a reasonably good 
understanding of how Cambodian people generally behave in negotiations. In cases where the 
issues related to Cambodian culture, such as the involvement of Buddhist groups in the 
negotiation process and the emerging importance of the members of the royal family in the 
Cambodian political arena, the answers given by the interviewees were interpreted after 
consultation with a number of Cambodian people.  
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 Many of them had lived in American or European countries for work or education. 
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Third, in terms of the biases due to research subjects, an interview frequently reveals only 
partial aspects of an event because it relies heavily on a person’s subjective opinions, 
experiences, and memories. Answers based on rumours, invention of stories, denial of facts, 
evading or avoiding answering questions, and silence are frequently occurring problems. 
Moreover, people tend to avoid sensitive or threatening topics and instead provide normative 
responses (Fujii, 2009: 149-60; Ruane, 2005: 155).  
In the field research in Cambodia, the problems related to rumours, inventions, and evasions 
were most frequently encountered. As many former leaders had relied on the reports of their 
internal informers, they could not confirm whether some controversial events had really 
occurred. In particular, the withdrawal of the Vietnamese army and the human rights abuses 
of the PDK were the issues on which the factional leaders recounted strikingly different 
‘facts.’ Moreover, the interviewees who had worked for the CPP government (the government 
led by Hun Sen) were very reluctant to answer questions on anything related to the PRK 
leadership (the military faction led by Hun Sen during the civil war). It was essential, 
therefore, to screen inaccurate information. 
To this end, this thesis confirmed information to be accurate only after the information was 
corroborated by at least one counterpart who was also involved in the negotiations. In 
addition, interviews with people from different backgrounds were pursued, and interviewing 
low-profile negotiating staff as well as policy makers was considered desirable in order to 
gain a comprehensive understanding of the negotiations. When contradictions between the 
answers were encountered, the answers were re-examined using a third source. In cases 
where the use of a third source was impossible, the contradictory answers were not used as 
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evidence in this research.43 In this way, many fabrications and answers founded on rumours 
were screened. However, if all the interviewees’ answers to a question were different, the 
author classified the question as unanswered.44 
Finally, there are problems that are caused by language issues. Since the author is not a fluent 
local language speaker, it was necessary to use interpreters. However, using interpreters runs 
the risk of researchers receiving distorted or limited information since interpreters are also a 
research subject who bring ‘their own assumptions and concerns to the interview and 
research process’ (Temple & Edwards, 2002: 5). Therefore, it is necessary to perform an 
‘exploration of the social location of the interpreter’ in order to guarantee the validity of the 
research results (Temple & Edwards, 2002: 5).  
In most cases, the use of interpreters was not a major issue since most interview subjects 
were national elites who had participated in international negotiations and could speak fluent 
English. In these cases, the main role for the interpreters was taking the author to the 
interview subjects, where the interviews were conducted in English.  
However, when interviewing some former PDK (Khmer Rouge) leaders and local survey 
subjects who could not speak English, the omission or distortion of information due to the 
interpreter’s own interpretation of answers occurred from time to time. Hence, to minimise 
this risk, in addition to ensuring that interpreter’s translation was correct, the author recorded 
all interviews when interviewees agreed to it and double-checked the recorded interviews 
with other native Cambodians. In these cases, in order to protect the anonymity of the 
interviewees, the first parts of the interviews, which usually dealt with the interviewees’ roles 
in the civil war and the peace process, were excluded from recording. Moreover, whenever 
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 In particular, many answers from the former PDK leaders had these problems. 
44
 For instance, the complete cessation of Chinese military assistance to the PDK in late 1989 and the complete 
withdrawal of the Vietnamese army could not be confirmed in this research. 
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issues that the author considered politically sensitive were encountered, he double-checked 
with the interviewees that they agreed to the recording of the conversation. 
Nevertheless, even in the interviews conducted in English, there remained the risk of 
misinterpretation. Most notably, some terms and words have quite different meanings in the 
Cambodian society. For instance, ‘conflict resolution (kar dors sray)’ and ‘conflict settlement 
/ negotiation for settlement (chor cha)’ refer to quite different processes for Cambodians. 
Moreover, although there are various terms that differentiate the classes and roles of Buddhist 
monks (who served a role as social mediators), it was impossible to translate them into 
English accurately because there are no equivalent concepts or terms in English. Hence, such 
confusions were clarified and rechecked by asking other native Cambodians after the 
interviews had been conducted. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described the analytical framework and methodological elements utilised 
within this research. First, with regard to the main analytical design, this chapter has 
addressed the following topics. It began by articulating the elements of interplay in order to 
lay the foundation for the key question: What does the interplay between national factions 
and external interveners in peace negotiation tell us about their chances of achieving their 
goals?  
In terms of the interaction of strategic moves, international interveners’ use three main types 
of moves to promote successful peace intervention: process control, content control, and 
motivation control. In order to reflect the different intervention patterns according to the 
types of third parties, this chapter further categorised the external actors’ moves as light 
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intervention and heavy intervention. In addition, this chapter generalised the national 
factions’ responses towards the third-parties’ efforts into five categories: rejection, dragging 
out the procedure, devious consent, conditional consent, and full acceptance. It was also 
indicated that the change of moves in this thesis refers to a transformation in the types of 
behaviour of actors rather than a simple change of action.  
Moreover, in order to verify the reasons why a change in strategic moves occurs, the 
variables that determine the strategic moves were proposed. In the case of interveners, their 
goals are assumed to be the sole variable. However, the variables of national factions are 
more complex, and include goals, domestic resources, and response rules set by external 
interveners. 
The focus of the case studies was also presented in this section. The peace negotiations in 
Cambodia and El Salvador are selected as the case studies because the outcomes of their 
negotiations were significantly different despite striking similarities in the characteristics of 
the conflicts and peacekeeping interventions. With regard to the issues to be analysed, the 
case studies pay particular attention to the negotiation processes on demilitarisation and the 
formation of the transitional authority. Additionally, in analysing the cases and the issues, this 
research has two focuses: the different patterns of interplay (in terms of description) and the 
role of perception in peace negotiations (in terms of explanation). 
The second half of this chapter focused on the methodological grounds of this research. This 
research is a qualitative study that primarily uses actor-oriented, comparative, and case study 
methods. Specifically, elite interviews are used for collecting information. In addition to the 
survey of written materials for the preliminary research, this study investigated how the 
people involved in peace negotiation perceived various negotiation issues by conducting a 
series of semi-structured interviews with former leaders of the national warring factions in 
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the Cambodian civil conflict. 
Regarding background theories, this chapter brought the assumptions and ideas of game 
theory to the centre of the research framework. In particular, game theory’s ideas on the 
strategic moves of actors are adopted in the analysis. However, this thesis also makes efforts 
to reflect the importance of perceptual issues such as local values, traditions, and rituals. 
This study’s data collection relies on document analysis and elite interview. The author 
conducted field research in Cambodia in 2009 for the purpose of interviewing Cambodians 
who were directly or indirectly involved in the Cambodian conflicts and peace processes and 
some expert scholars who have studied the issues related to the Cambodian peace 
negotiations. During the field research, the author endeavoured to meet ethical concerns by 
gaining explicit consent from the research subjects on the purpose and methods of the 
research and by ensuring that no deceptive measures were used. 
Finally, research biases are another concern for this research. To reduce potential biases due 
to the researcher, efforts were made to consult both with experts on Cambodian issues and 
native Cambodians. Moreover, as for the biases that may be caused by research subjects, this 
study regards certain information as a fact only when it can be corroborated by their 
counterparts or other sources. 
The following three chapters examine the peace negotiation processes in Cambodia and El 
Salvador by applying the research elements that this chapter has set out. Chapter 4 provides 
background information on the conflicts and peace negotiations in the two countries, the 
national and external actors who participated in the negotiations, and the international and 
domestic factors that instigated the peace negotiations. Based on this background to the cases, 
Chapters 5 and 6 compare and contrast the interplay between the actors. While Chapter 5 
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looks at the interplay between the national factions and the impartial interveners (the PRK 
and the US in Cambodia, and the FMLN and the UN in El Salvador), Chapter 6 studies the 
interaction between the national factions and their advocate states (the PDK and China in 
Cambodia, and the Cristiani government and the US in El Salvador). 
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Chapter 4 
Case Study Overview 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter intends to provide introductory information that is necessary for the core 
analyses in the following chapters. Specifically, it considers three topics: a brief history of the 
conflicts and negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador, the characteristics of the main 
negotiating actors, and the chief factors that promoted negotiation between the national 
factions. This chapter consists of two separate sections that describe the two cases, with each 
section comprising three subsections that discuss the issues presented above. 
First, each section begins with a brief history of the conflict and peace process. For accurate 
analysis, it is important to review the historical circumstances of both cases before observing 
the interplay between the actors in the negotiation processes with micro-level frameworks. 
The causes of the conflict, the development of the war, the major stalemates in the peace 
negotiation processes, and the efforts of interveners to bring about successful peace talks are 
briefly discussed in this subsection.  
Second, a description of the actors that were involved in the negotiation follows. In particular, 
this section focuses on some of the elements that affected the actors’ decision making during 
their negotiations. For instance, the national factions’ main negotiators, their material and 
non-material resources, and their fundamental aims are described. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
resources and fundamental aims are critical factors that determine actors’ strategic moves in 
peace negotiation. 
Additionally, this section also outlines the external interveners’ attitudes to the conflicts, their 
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fundamental goals in the negotiation, and their strategies to achieve them. Discussion on 
interveners’ fundamental aims is necessary since this thesis regards the aims as a decisive 
factor in determining their strategic moves. Moreover, the strategies that were applied by 
these interveners were response rules, another critical constraint of national factions’ 
behaviour. Although there were a large number of interveners that played direct or indirect 
roles in the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador, this chapter only deals with the 
regional interveners and international mediators that are at the centre of the analyses in the 
following chapters.   
Finally, this chapter presents the long-term and short-term factors that convinced national 
factions to negotiate with their opponents. This section deals with the long-term factors and 
short-term factors separately; in addition, international and domestic factors are described 
separately. Understanding these factors is important because they contributed to the peace 
negotiations as either incentives to or pressures on the national factions. However, this 
chapter has another reason to pay close attention to these factors; these domestic and 
international factors had a range of effects on the national factions. For instance, the detente 
between the Soviet Union and the United States in the late 1980s provided a mixture of 
opportunities and threats to the national factions in Cambodia and El Salvador, and the 
factions had to develop different negotiation strategies in response to these factors.  
 
CAMBODIA 
Brief History of the Conflict and Negotiation 
The Cambodian civil war was a military conflict between four national leaderships that had 
governed the country rather than a war mobilised by the citizens. After gaining its 
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independence from France in 1953, Prince Norodom Sihanouk ruled the Kingdom of 
Cambodia as a prince (de facto king), prime minister, and head of state until 1970. Then with 
support from the US, General Lon Nol deposed Sihanouk and established the Khmer 
Republic. The Republic was overthrown by a socialist military group called the Party of 
Democratic Kampuchea (PDK)45 in 1975. During its four years of rule, the PDK launched 
radical socialist projects such as a collective agricultural system, depopulation of cities, and 
prohibition of markets, which caused the deaths of approximately 1.5 million people.46 A 
group of PDK officers who were opposed to the direction the party had taken escaped to 
Vietnam and formed an anti-PDK socialist movement called the Kampuchean United Front 
for National Salvation (KUFNS) (Chandler, 1998: 15-8). 
When the KUFNS, headed by Heng Samrin and Hun Sen with backing from Vietnam, 
overthrew the PDK regime and established the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) in 
1979, the Cambodian civil war began. Against the PRK government, three major military 
movements led by former national leaders emerged, basing themselves near the Thai border. 
First, although it had been ousted from power, the PDK’s military strength and support from 
China remained a grave threat to the PRK (Slocomb, 2004: 54). Second, the National United 
Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) was 
formed by Prince Sihanouk. Although lacking the PDK’s substantial military and financial 
resources, the king’s perceived legitimacy and his intimate relationship with China made the 
party an important actor in the resistance movement (Etcheson, 1987: 197-8). Finally, the 

45
 The group that established Democratic Kampuchea is commonly known as the Khmer Rouge in the West. The 
term Khmer Rouge (meaning Red Khmer in French) was originally coined by Prince Sihanouk and is commonly 
used to refer to the faction. However, this thesis uses the Party of Democratic Kampuchea, the name that was 
officially used by the organisation itself. 
46
 Although the number of people killed under the DK regime is still disputed, many sources generally agree 
with an approximation of between 1.5 million and 2 million. For instance, the Cambodian Genocide Program at 
Yale University suggests that 1.7 million died (The CGP, 2010), while Short argues that the number of victims 
should be estimated at 1.5 million (2005). Kiernan (1993, 2002) and Heder (1999) also agree with a figure of 
between 1.5 – 1.7 million deaths. 
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former prime minister, Son Sann, established the Khmer People's National Liberation Front 
(KPNLF), which pursued the formation of a republican government from 1979. Chiefly 
supported by and composed of refugees from near Thai border, the KPLNF normally 
conducted guerrilla operations and received moderate support from the US and ASEAN. The 
UN’s refusal to recognise the new government was well received by resistance parties and 
was seen as a sign of tacit UN support (Jones, 2007: 527; Long, 1989: 155). As these 
organisations began to resist, the PRK government released evidence of the Khmer Rouge’s 
mass executions of Cambodians. However, despite their different views, rivalries and targets, 
the three parties formed a coalition named the Coalition Government of Democratic 
Kampuchea (CGDK) in 1982 (Sihanouk, 2005: 198-9).  
After fierce external combat and turbulent internal struggles, Hun Sen became the new prime 
minister of the PRK, and peace talks between the government and the CGDK began in 1987 
(Osborne, 1994: 254-5; Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 38-49). However, despite several formal and 
informal meetings in Paris and Jakarta, the parties could not reach agreement on the inclusion 
of the PDK in the forthcoming government and the contours of new political institutions. 
Compounding this, the PDK’s stubborn refusal to enter into negotiation was proving to be 
another obstacle to the peaceful settlement of the conflict, and ongoing combat continued to 
take a heavy toll of casualties (Haas, 1991: 203-5; Gottesman, 2004: 223-37; Um, 1990: 100-
2). 
The collapse of the Cold War system opened a new phase of peace talks. With 
encouragement from the Soviet Union and Vietnam, the State of Cambodia (SOC, the 
successor of PRK government) showed signs of changes in its posture, and China in 
particular applied strong pressure on the Khmer Rouge (Lizée, 1999: 60; Haas, 1991: 156-8; 
Ross, 1991: 1180). The US also applied pressure on the PDK by announcing the withdrawal 
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of its support for the PDK’s continued possession of its UN seat. In addition, Australia and 
the UN Security Council provided peace proposals, including ‘Cambodia: An Australian 
Peace Proposal’ (November 1989) and the UN P-5’s ‘Framework Document’ (28 August 
1990), while ASEAN, France, and Japan convened talks between the national factions 
(Solomon, 2000: 34; Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 70; Richardson, 2009: 149; Lizée, 1999: 66-71). 
The four factions finally agreed to the UN Security Council’s proposal, and the four parties, 
the UN Secretary General, and representatives from 19 countries signed the Paris Peace 
Agreement on 23 October 1991.  
In 1992, implementation of the peace agreements, including the repatriation of some 350,000 
refugees and demobilisation of the military factions, began. Under the control of the Supreme 
National Council (SNC), headed by King Sihanouk, and the supervision of United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and although the PDK boycotted it and 
attempted to coerce people in the regions under its control not to participate, a nationwide 
election was held in May 1993 (Heder, 1999: 277-8; Richardson, 2009: 163; Solomon, 2000: 
90). FUNCINPEC was declared the winner of the election, but Hun Sen’s Cambodian 
People’s Party (CPP) rejected the result and military conflict resumed (Brown & Zasloff, 
1998: 167-8). However, King Sihanouk’s mediation and pressure from the international 
community led to FUNCINPEC and the CPP establishing a coalition government, with 
Prince Rannaridh (son of Sihanouk) and Hun Sen becoming the first and second prime 
ministers, respectively (Ashley, 1998: 24). After three years of peace, however, Hun Sen 
staged a coup, executing prominent FUNCINPEC ministers, and became the sole prime 
minister in 1997 (Roberts, 2001: 155). 
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Figure 4.1. Map of Cambodia 
 
Source. Nations Online Project 
http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/cambodia_map2.htm 
 
National Factions 
People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) / State of Cambodia (SOC) 
Brief History - On 2 December 1978, the KNUFNS was formed by former PDK commanders 
and Hanoi-trained revolutionaries that included Heng Samrin, Hun Sen, and Chea Sim. After 
the Vietnamese army ousted the PDK from Phnom Penh on 10 January 1979, the KNUFNS 
staked its claim to authority and became the PRK, appointing Heng Samrin as the head of 
state. Although Foreign Minister Hun Sen was the youngest of the PRK’s top leaders, his 
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political leadership and political skills resulted in him becoming prime minister in 1985 
(Slocomb, 2004: 195). Initially, the government operated under strong Vietnamese influence. 
Most bureaucratic issues were managed by people trained in Vietnam, and Vietnamese 
soldiers controlled the major cities. The PRK’s failure to generate sufficient popular loyalty 
to and support for the party resulted in the PRK’s 30,000 troops suffering from poor morale. 
With the lack of capable civil workers and the regime’s low popularity, the PRK achieved 
only limited success in building an effective state structure, leaving a large proportion of rural 
areas outside its control until the peace negotiation began in the mid-1980s (Slocomb, 2004: 
245-7; Gottesman, 2004: 53). 
Primary Negotiator - Although critical diplomatic issues were discussed by the PRK’s central 
committee under the supervision of Vietnam, international negotiation was managed chiefly 
by Prime Minister Hun Sen (Slocomb, 2004: 64-5). However, the leaders of the PRK/SOC 
(especially Chea Sim) periodically challenged Hun Sen’s authority to negotiate on the behalf 
of the PRK (Ieng Mouly, 2009: Author’s Interview). 
Resources - Regarding its military resources, the joint army of the PRK and the People’s 
Army of Vietnam (PAVN) had some 180,000 soldiers.47 Although the number of troops 
decreased dramatically when the PAVN withdrawal took place, the PRK/SOC always had 
superior military capacity than the CGDK (Turner, 2004: 56). 
Economically, it relied heavily on aid from Vietnam and the USSR. Total Soviet economic 
assistance to Cambodia is estimated to have reached 284 million roubles (equivalent to $ 71 
million) for the period between 1979 and 1990 (Country Data, 2008: no pagination). Initial 
Vietnamese aid was estimated at around $ 60 million annually but this decreased in the 

47
 The number of PAVN troops had been maintained between 150,000 and 140,000 until 1986, when Vietnam 
proclaimed the withdrawal of the army (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 32). 
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middle and late 1980s. Since China and the West refused to have direct economic relations 
with the regime, the PRK/SOC’s international trade had to be conducted in indirect ways 
through Vietnam. Thus, the government was very vulnerable to changes in economic support 
from its two sponsors (Gottesman, 2004: 149). 
As for non-material resources, the PRK/SOC was unable to gain much domestic support. 
Most Cambodians refused to be enlisted as PRK soldiers, and tens of thousands of people 
moved to the refugee camps along the border with Thailand (Gottesman, 2004: 227; Brown 
& Zasloff, 1998: 15). At first, people were suspicious about the communist PRK because of 
their disastrous experience under the rule of the PDK. After that, deep-rooted Cambodian 
nationalism prevented the regime from commanding people’s loyalty. Externally, the 
PRK/SOC had not been recognised as a legitimate government by the international 
community. This diplomatic isolation made it difficult for the regime to receive the economic 
support necessary for them to build and run an efficient state structure (Long, 1989: 155). 
Fundamental Goals – When the negotiation in Cambodia began in the mid-1980s, the PRK 
had two fundamental goals: the removal of the PDK and maintaining its superiority in the 
post-conflict Cambodian political arena. The former goal was set when the KUFNS was 
established and had been a core principle of its movement. For instance, when it undertook its 
first military operation in Cambodia, Heng Samrin proclaimed that the PRK should repel the 
‘dictatorial’, ‘neo-slavery’, and ‘reactionary’ ‘Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique’ (the Declaration of 
the KUFNS on 2 December 1979, cited in Slocomb, 2003: 45). The second goal emerged 
when it became clear that the PRK could not eliminate its opponents militarily. Hence, if it 
could not stand as the sole legitimate authority, the PRK needed to continue to be a leading 
political organisation (Turner, 2004: 163). These two goals are reflected in its initial peace 
proposals, including the Six Point Peace Plan (January 1985). 
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The Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) 
Three anti-Vietnamese military movements established a coalition group, the CGDK, in 1981 
and proclaimed that they would ‘avoid any clashes among themselves’ (Joint Statement of the 
Three Khmer Leaders, 4 September, 1981, cited in Sihanouk, 2005, appendix). However, the 
organisations rarely demonstrated coordinated actions as a unified entity. Therefore, this 
thesis considers these three groups as independent actors.   
(A) The Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) 
Brief History – The PDK emerged from the Cambodian communist party, which had been 
formed in 1951 with the support of the Vietnamese communists. During the 1960s and 1970s 
under the leadership of Pol Pot, the party developed its own unique political ideas that 
reflected its anti-colonialist stance. After years of war against what it saw as US interference 
in Cambodia, the PDK overthrew the pro-American Lon Nol regime in 1975 and established 
Democratic Kampuchea (Kiernan, 2002: 159). Between 1975 and 1979, the PDK 
implemented radical programmes that resulted in the deaths of some 1.5 million Cambodians. 
When the PDK lost Phnom Penh on January 7 1979, it regrouped in a region near the Thai 
border and began to undertake guerrilla operations (Chandler, 1998: 15-8; Kiernan, 2002: 
159-312; Heder, 1999: 74). 
Primary Negotiators - The delegations from the PDK at the negotiation were led by Khieu 
Samphan, the faction’s official chief. However, all major issues were discussed and 
determined by the central committee of the party (Khieu Samphan, 2004: no pagination). 
Thus, all major decisions were actually made by Pol Pot and Ieng Sary although their 
retirement had been officially announced in 1985 (Heder, 1999: 73). 
Resources – During the 1980s, the PDK enjoyed a relatively stable supply of resources. Its 
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armed forces constituted the biggest military threat to the PRK. In 1985, the National Army 
of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) possessed an estimated 30,000 - 40,000 troops (See 
Table 4.1). In terms of its economic resources, it exported diamonds and timber to Thailand. 
In addition, until the end of the 1980s, it received strong military support from China and 
Thailand and a large amount of economic aid from the U.S. and ASEAN countries (Brown & 
Zasloff, 1998: 17).  
Although the party received little popular domestic support, it achieved the support of the 
people in Pailin (an area near Thai border that possessed rich gem mines, see Battambang 
province in Figure 4.1) by providing them with more food and supplies than the PRK did. In 
addition, having achieved victory in the war against the US backed Lon Nol regime through 
the use of guerrilla warfare, it was very confident in its ability to conduct a long-term war. 
Diplomatically, the PDK had retained its UN seat until 1982, when it was replaced by the 
CGDK. Furthermore, within the CGDK, Khieu Samphan played a significant role as the 
leader of the only de facto military force fighting against the PAVN. 
Fundamental Goals – The PDK’s goal was returning to power. The party characterised the 
Cambodian conflict as a war against an external threat and was willing to cooperate with two 
non-communist resistance groups. However, the PDK believed that the conflict would be a 
‘war against other classes’ after the withdrawal of the Vietnamese imperialists and that the 
PDK would eventually win the war with the support of the “basic people” (poorer people in 
society) (Ashley, 1992: 42; Heder, 1999: 43-84). 
(B) FUNCINPEC 
Brief History - Immediately after the collapse of the PDK regime, the followers of Prince 
Sihanouk organised an armed movement called the Movement for the National Liberation of 
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Kampuchea (MOULINAKA) near Cambodia’s north-western border in 1979. Founded on 
this organisation, Prince Sihanouk and his followers officially launched FUNCINPEC and its 
army, the Sihanoukist National Army (ANS), on 21 March 1981 (Sihanouk, 2005: 235). 
Although the key administrative and military organisations were led by a group of people 
who had been exiled in Western countries, including Norodom Ranarridh and Lu Lay Sreng, 
it was Prince Sihanouk’s legitimacy and material support from Western countries that 
sustained FUNCINPEC (Osborne, 1994: 248-51; Lu Lay Sreng, 2009, Author’s Interview).  
Primary Negotiator - The primary negotiator was Prince Sihanouk himself. As a former king, 
prime minister, and party leader, Prince Sihanouk had the most autonomy in decision making. 
Although his son Ranarridh had served as Sihanouk’s authorised spokesman, most of 
FUNCINPEC’s decisions were made by Prince Sihanouk (Osborne, 1994: 250-7).  
Resources - From a military viewpoint, FUNCINPEC was the weakest faction. The ANS 
possessed approximately 7,000 troops (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 32). Moreover, disagreement 
among its military leaders lowered their military effectiveness. Despite consistent official and 
unofficial military assistance from Western countries (the US in particular), the ANS rarely 
mounted successful attacks on the PRK/SOC. Economically, this group relied entirely on 
relatively abundant aid from Western and regional countries, mainly the United States and 
China (Um, 1990: 104). 
Considering non-material resources, Cambodian citizens’ considerable respect for Sihanouk 
made FUNCINPEC a leading player in the peace negotiation process. Although he had been 
deposed 10 years previously, he still enjoyed a level of popular support that the PRK’s 
propaganda was unable to challenge (Gottesman, 2004: 140; Peang-Meth, 1991: 448-9.) 
Internationally, he also received strong support from China and assistance from the 
international community. 
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Fundamental Goals – Although FUNCINPEC’s fundamental goal was resistance against 
Vietnamese imperialism, its detailed aims were not clearly set out. However, at the heart of 
the proposals made by Sihanouk were two main objectives: the withdrawal of the PAVN and 
the establishment of a democratic country under international supervision (Sihanouk, 2005; 
Brown & Zasloff, 1998). Although never explicitly pursued as an aim, he also assumed that 
he would be the head of the post-conflict Cambodia. 
(C) The KPNLF 
Brief History - Before the end of the PDK regime, Son Sann, ex-President of the Cambodian 
National Bank and Prime Minister (1967-68), exiled in France, ran the Association of 
Overseas Cambodians (AGKE), which organised an anti-PDK movement and attempted to 
preserve Cambodian traditional culture (Corfield, 1991: 6-7). In October 1979, Son Sann and 
a number of former senior officials in the Sihanouk and Lon Nol regimes formed an armed 
resistance organisation, the KPNLF. Although internally fractured and beset by infighting, the 
KPNLF soon became a significant military resistance group. As the largest non-communist 
group, it controlled approximately 160,000 refugees in the camps in Thailand (Country 
Studies, 2008: no pagination). 
Primary Negotiators - Although the KPNLF’s main negotiator was Son Sann, his prominence 
was limited by internal and external obstacles after joining the coalition. Externally, 
Sihanouk’s high profile and Khieu Samphan’s rigid attitude left little space for him to 
promote his own initiatives. Internally, many former ministers and generals openly disagreed 
with him and refused to comply with his decisions (Ieng Mouly, 2009: Author’s interview; 
Son Soubert, 2009: Author’s interview). 
Resources - Stable military and economic aid from China and Western countries bolstered the 
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KPNLF’s military offensives against the PRK and Vietnam. Since it pursued the 
establishment of a ‘democratic’ country, the faction gained favourable publicity in the West 
and received substantial humanitarian support from governments and non-governmental 
organisations (Ieng Mouly, 2009, Author’s Interview). However, although the organisation 
controlled approximately 15,000 soldiers, the KPNLF’s actual military campaigns were not 
particularly successful and did not significantly affect the course of the conflict (Brown & 
Zasloff, 1998, xiii). Furthermore, it achieved only limited success in attaining domestic 
popularity. Although refugees in Thai camps were largely sympathetic to the organisation, 
most people inside Cambodian territory were not interested in its activities. 
Fundamental Goals – The core leaders of the KPNLF were defectors from the Khmer 
Republic, which had been ousted by the PDK. Having lost power, assets, and family due to 
PDK’s victory, the KPNLF set three main goals in 1980: (1) “the liberation of Cambodia 
from Vietnamese occupation”, (2) the removal of the Khmer Rouge, and (3) the building of a 
new “independent, free, and sovereign Cambodia” (Corfield, 1991: 21). If the last goal was a 
vague rhetoric, the first two were specific and concrete goals that were pursued fairly 
stubbornly during the negotiation process (Ieng Mouly, 2009, Author’s interview). 
(D) After the establishment of the CGDK 
The CGDK was a loose gathering of three factions that allowed each group to operate with a 
certain degree of freedom and to maintain autonomy. Although it held periodic ‘inner cabinet’ 
sessions inside Cambodia to demonstrate its jurisdiction over the territory under its control, 
the issues raised and discussed in the sessions did not generally concern the means of 
governing the country. Both FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF had a deep-seated distrust of the 
PDK. However, there was also keen rivalry between the KPNLF and FUNCINPEC. 
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Figure 4.2. CGDK Areas of Control, mid-1980s 
 
Source. Etcheson (1987: 189). 
 
Moreover, as shown in Figure 4.2, the CGDK controlled a number of refugee camps near the 
border with Thailand. As the war progressed, the CGDK (particularly the PDK) occasionally 
expanded its influence over areas deeper inside Cambodia. However, unlike the FMLN in El 
Salvador, the CGDK failed to become a de facto government that could claim to govern a 
significant portion of Cambodian territory (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 26-7). 
After the launch of the CGDK, Western countries began to provide a large amount of aid. In 
the late 1980s, the U.S. alone generally offered more than $ 20 million annually in non-lethal 
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aid and $ 5 million in humanitarian aid to the two non-Communist groups (Erlanger, 1989: no 
pagination). 
Table 4.1. Actors in the Cambodia Conflict, 1975-199348 
 PRK/SOC PDK FUNCINPEC KPNLF 
Governmental 
Identity 
People’s Republic 
of Kampuchea 
(1979-1989) 
State of Cambodia 
(1989-1993) 
Democratic 
Kampuchea 
(1975-1982) 
United Front for 
an Independent, 
Neutral, Peaceful, 
and Cooperative 
Cambodia 
(1981-1992) 
Khmer People’s 
National 
Liberation Front 
(1982-1982) 
Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea 
(1982-1990) 
National Government of Cambodia 
(1990-1993) 
Core Negotiator Hun Sen Khieu Samphan Prince Sihanouk Son Sann 
Leaders 
Hun Sen 
(prime minister) 
Heng Samrin 
(president of the 
PRK) 
Pol Pot 
Ieng Sary 
Prince Sihanouk 
(former head of 
state) 
Prince Ranariddh 
(Sihanouk’s son) 
Son Sann 
(former prime 
minister) 
Regional 
Supporters Vietnam Thailand ASEAN 
Aligned outside 
Powers USSR China Australia, France, Japan, USA, UK 
Number of 
Soldiers 
30,000 
(150,000)* 30,000 ~40,000** 7,000 15,000 
* Including Vietnamese PAVN forces fighting in Cambodia. 
** There are no agreed figures for the number of troops commanded by the resistance groups. 
Although many previous studies accept the figures given above, other studies contend that the 
number of troops under the control of resistance groups differed markedly from the above 
totals. For instance, Turner insists on the following figures: NADK 25 000, ANS 1500-1200, 
the KPNLF 7000 (2004: 56). 
 
External Interveners 
Regional Actors 
This section describes the regional actors’ basic attitudes towards the Cambodian conflict and 

48
 This table is partly quoted from Brown & Zasloff (1998: xiii, 32) and updated by the author. The numbers of 
solders are the estimated number in 1985. 
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main goals in the peace negotiation. During the Cold War period, the Southeast Asian states 
were divided into two groups: the Indochinese communist countries (Vietnam, Cambodia, 
and Laos) and the ASEAN states (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the 
Philippines) (Prasad, 2001: 44-6; Acharya, 1993: 7-8). When the Cambodian war began, the 
interaction between the regional states generally reflected this cleavage (see Figure 4.3). 
Specifically, this thesis pays attention to Vietnam, which had a direct influence on the conflict 
as an advocate of the PRK, and Thailand, which adopted a very aggressive diplomatic posture 
towards the Vietnamese occupancy of Cambodia.49  
 (A) Vietnam 
The biggest motivations for the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia are usually analysed in 
two aspects. First, following consistent diplomatic confrontation, the PDK’s military 
operations to occupy parts of Vietnam (claimed by the PDK as Cambodian territory) in 1975 
and 1977 were interpreted as a direct threat to Vietnamese security. In fact, the Vietnamese 
deemed these invasions to be part of a wider Chinese strategy to encircle Vietnam (Karnow, 
1991: 58). Second, from the 1930s, Vietnam had pursued the establishment of an Indochina 
Federation led by itself as one of its long-term goals. This ambition was still being pursued 
during the 1970s (Morris, 1999: 65-6). 
In the initial phase of the conflict, Vietnam insisted that the war in Cambodia was a civil 
conflict between the “genocidal Pol Pot regime” and a “Cambodian salvation front” in order 
to stave off intervention from the international community (Acharya, 2001: 82). Moreover, 
although claiming that the presence of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia was merely an 
indirect and voluntary support to opposition to the Khmer Rouge, Vietnam nevertheless made 

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 However, although the country is not at the centre of this thesis’s analysis, Indonesia’s constructive role in the 
peace negotiation process as a relatively neutral and autonomous mediator need to be recognised (Prasad, 2001; 
Lee, 2010). 
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efforts to ensure that regime change in Cambodia would be irreversible. However, as the 
Vietnamese government began to prioritise economic issues from the mid-1980s, its attitudes 
towards the Cambodian conflict gradually changed. The ‘New Thinking’ policy of the Soviet 
Union effectively led to the reduction in economic aid to Vietnam and its isolation from the 
international community. Moreover, Vietnam’s domestic economic crisis forced it to adopt a 
more conciliatory diplomatic approach in its international relations (Vuving, 2006: 811; 
Prasad, 2004: 75-7). However, despite its relatively progressive attitudes towards the 
normalisation of its relationship with China and the United States, Vietnam did not 
demonstrate a dramatic change of position on the settlement of the Cambodian conflict until 
1991. 
 (B) Thailand 
The Thai leaders defined the Cambodian conflict not as a civil war but as an invasion by 
Vietnamese imperial forces. Moreover, they considered that the invasion constituted a direct 
threat to internal security because of the high possibility of fighting spilling over into Thai 
territory and the negative political effects of the expansion of Vietnamese power on Thai 
national interests.  
Hence, Thailand made efforts to reverse the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia by employing 
two strategies. First, the country provided material support to the resistance groups 
(Chinwanno, 2004: 197) (see Figure 4.3). In addition to facilitating the transfer of economic 
and military aid from China and other states, Thailand provided a sanctuary for three anti-
Vietnamese groups. Furthermore, Thailand also traded with the PDK forces that settled at 
Pailin, a region near the Thai border that was home to lucrative gem mines (Widyono, 2007: 
87). Second, in conjunction with other ASEAN member states, Thailand employed a variety 
of diplomatic tactics. For instance, coercive diplomacy was applied during the early stage of 
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ASEAN’s intervention. During this period, Thailand tried to win the support of the 
international community by raising the Cambodian conflict issue in UN sessions, issuing 
joint resolutions or statements, and organising international conferences (Alagappa, 1993: no 
pagination; Long, 1989: 155).  
From 1982 onwards, Thailand and the rest of ASEAN began to play more constructive roles 
in the Cambodian peace process. Specifically, ASEAN held a series of regional and 
international talks aimed at settling the conflict. Through the meetings, the Cambodian 
warring factions had their first and most concrete opportunities to sit together and discuss 
ways to resolve the conflict peacefully. Thailand’s main goals were reflected in the ‘An 
Appeal for Kampuchean Independence’ proposal that was put forward by ASEAN in 
September 1983. In this appeal, they called for the following: the withdrawal of all foreign 
military forces under the supervision of UN peacekeeping forces, the disarmament of all 
Cambodian factions, and an internationally supervised election (ASEAN Secretariat, 1987: 
461). 
Global Actors 
This section examines the initial aims and strategies of two countries that interacted closely 
with the national factions during the negotiations: the United States, which played a key role 
in the coordination of the external actors’ policies, and China, a global power with strong 
regional interests. Although the role of the United Nations was important, this section does 
not focus on the UN because it functioned more like a forum for debate rather than a 
unilateral organisation that had a specific position on the conflict.50  
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 Furthermore, although not examined in this chapter, the conspicuous contributions of Australia, France, Japan, 
and the USSR should be noted. 
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(A) The United States 
The US viewed the conflict as an invasion by Vietnam and held that its resolution 
necessitated the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia (Altschiller, 
1989: 115). However, there were a number of concerns that had a direct effect on the US’s 
Cambodian policies in this period. First, since its defeat in the Vietnam War had resulted in 
huge domestic friction, political leaders in the US wanted to have a clear “exit strategy” from 
Indochina (Solomon, 2000: xv). Second, from the early-1980s, the crimes against humanity 
committed by the PDK became a prominent political issue in the United States (Chanda, 
1988: 39).  
These two factors had mixed effects on the negotiation processes. First, economic and 
military aid to the resistance groups was one of the main factors that enabled the Cambodian 
resistance groups to continue fighting the PRK and allowed them to adopt a relatively strong 
stance during the negotiations. Second, the US’s non-aggressive attitude enabled it to be a 
neutral mediator among the international interveners (Turner, 2004: 194). Finally, the 
domestic politics of the US prevented its diplomats from assuming more pragmatic positions 
in the negotiation processes (Kiernan, 1993: 191-272). 
In the early phase of the conflict, the US joined ASEAN’s containment strategy against the 
PRK and Vietnam (Solomon, 2000: 50) (see Figure 4.3). While the United States used its 
diplomatic power to prevent the international community from providing economic assistance 
to Vietnam, it provided aid directly to non-communist resistance factions (Turner, 2004: 35-
6). This initial position gradually transformed during the mid-1980s. Whereas the US began 
to exhibit more flexible attitudes towards the USSR and Vietnam (Raszelenberg & Schier, 
1995: 183), it continued to provide steady material aid to the resistance groups . 
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When the negotiations began in 1987, the Bush government set four main goals: ‘the verified 
withdrawal of all foreign forces; the creation of a neutral political process culminating in free 
and fair elections under UN auspices; the preservation of a viable non-communist alternative; 
and a settlement which guaranteed that the Khmer Rouge would not return to power’ (Turner, 
2004: 190). 
(B) China  
During the 1970s, the tension between China and the USSR exacerbated as the latter 
launched a so-called “encirclement” of China policy. Although China tried to prevent it, the 
influence of the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia (and in Vietnam in particular) became 
increasingly evident. In this context, the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam was considered by 
China as a part of the “Balkanisation” of Indochina. Based on this interpretation, China 
pursued three major goals: a significant reduction in Soviet influence in the region, 
Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, and the dissolution of the PRK government (Ross, 
1991: 1170-1). However, although it was a strong advocate of the PDK (see Figure 4.3), 
China did not seek to secure outright victory for the party because the four years of Khmer 
Rouge policies had not been beneficial to Chinese interests (Ross, 1991: 1173). 
In the early phase of the conflict, China made military, economic, and diplomatic efforts to 
thwart the PRK regime. First, China provided economic and military aid to the PDK through 
Thailand. Moreover, it hosted a series of meetings to encourage the Cambodian resistance 
groups to forge an alliance (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 22). Diplomatically, in addition to open 
condemnation of the invasion through its government-controlled mass media, China made 
efforts to convince the UN not to recognise and deny legitimacy to the PRK regime (Vang, 
2008: 221-2). 
 


In the mid-1980s, China revised its regional strategies and improved its relationships with the 
Soviet Union and Vietnam, which it had hitherto regarded as aggressors. Sino-Vietnamese 
relations began to show signs of improvement from 1987 (Turner, 2004: 116). More 
importantly, the USSR and China moved closer to each other after Gorbachev identified the 
normalisation of ties with China as his diplomatic priority in 1986. During a series of bilateral 
talks between China and these countries, the Cambodian problem was one of the main issues 
that were discussed (Turner 2004, 105-6). 
 
Figure 4.3. Relations between the Major Actors in the Cambodian Peace Negotiations 
 
Factors Occasioning the Cambodian Peace Talks 
Long-term Factors 
This section describes five major long-term factors that convinced the Cambodian national 
factions to change their attitudes towards negotiation and resolution of the war: the change in 
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Sino-American relations, the transformation in the USSR’s diplomatic priorities, the military 
stalemate in the conflict, and the lack of both material and non-material resources. The 
former two factors are attitudinal changes that occurred at the international level, and the 
latter three are changes that originated from within the country. 
 (A) International Factors - Changes in the Relationships between the Power States 
As global powers such as the Soviet Union, the USA, and China began to escape from the 
politics of ideological confrontation in the mid-1980s, the Cambodian national factions and 
Vietnam were encouraged to reconsider their war strategies. The relationship changes began 
with Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech in Vladivostok on 28 July 1986 in which he proclaimed 
perestroika (reform) and glasnost (opening). As a part of the transformation, the USSR 
pursued reconciliation with China and ASEAN (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 34). Although the 
USSR did not reduce its material aid to Vietnam and the PRK dramatically (Thakur & Thayer, 
1992: 203), its new approach nullified the system of global ideological hostility that had 
underpinned the regional strategies of the actors. 
Although their change in diplomatic stance was less radical than that of the USSR, the US 
and China also assumed more moderate postures toward Vietnam and the PRK. Although 
both countries continued to insist that the Vietnamese army withdraw from Cambodia, they 
acknowledged that they did not seek the return of the PDK (Ross, 1991: 1172). This change 
gradually convinced the PRK to seek an opportunity to achieve its goals through diplomatic 
means (Ieng Mouly, 2009: Author’s Interview). 
Furthermore, facing the prospect of economic isolation and suffering chronic economic 
depression, Vietnam was compelled to improve its relationship with the US and China. To 
promote economic recovery, Vietnam sought an infusion of foreign funds. However, major 
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international monetary organisations (e.g. the IMF) and states requested its withdrawal from 
Cambodia as a condition for assistance (Turner, 2004: 140). Thus, Vietnam had to make some 
concessions on the Cambodian issue.  
All these external changes caused Vietnamese attitudes towards the Cambodian conflict to 
soften. As a consequence, the PRK also actively began to seek a negotiated settlement of the 
conflict. Seeing this, the CGDK felt that this new scenario provided a good opportunity to 
gain concessions from Vietnam through negotiation. In particular, the PDK thought the 
changes provided opportunities to improve its negative international image by demonstrating 
its eagerness to engage in peace negotiation (Heder, 1999: 69-70).  
(B) Domestic Factor (1) - Stalemate in the War 
In the mid-1980s, it became more evident that ending the war through one party’s military 
victory was impossible. Although the PRK-PAVN alliance dominated the combat in the initial 
phase of the civil conflict, it failed to control territories effectively. The resistance groups 
conducted guerrilla warfare, and the PRK was unable to wipe out its opponents. Although the 
heavily armed PRK-PAVN were able to attack and destroy the PDK’s military bases during 
its dry season campaigns, the resistance groups were successful in organising 
counteroffensives that attacked the PRK’s provincial offices during the rainy season. 
Gradually, both sides began to worry that the war might become a protracted affair.  
The PRK-PAVN alliance’s dry season campaign in 1984-85 heightened the concerns of both 
sides. In fact, the alliance had achieved its greatest conventional victory since 1979. It 
destroyed most major KPNLF and the PDK bases and forced the majority of the PDK troops 
to retreat to the border (Bilveer, 1985: 28-36). As a result, all the resistance groups realised 
that their forces were unlikely to prevail and that an outright military victory was improbable. 
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Particularly, the PDK and the KPNLF, which had pursued a policy of ‘total victory’ over the 
PAVN, were shaken by the destruction of most of their bases (Haas, 1991: 141). As Hun Sen 
recalls, however, the campaign also strained the PRK and caused it to re-evaluate its potential 
to militarily bring about an end to the war and to consider peace talks as a supplementary (if 
not an alternative) way of resolving the conflict (SWB, 1985: 3; Haas, 1991: 140-1).  
(C) Domestic Factor (2) - Insufficient Resources 
As the war dragged on, the lack of resources became a paramount issue to all national 
factions. However, the issue was particularly important to the PRK. As briefly described 
above, it lacked popular support during the mid-1980s. This low popularity affected other 
material resources. For instance, the army failed to recruit and train new soldiers (Bangkok 
Post, 3 January 1986). Furthermore, the chronic military conflict, the lack of capable human 
resources following the PDK’s failed socialist projects, and the international economic 
embargo prevented the PRK from promoting economic stabilisation (Haas, 1991: 139-40). 
Therefore, it became increasingly difficult for the PRK to continue conducting nationwide 
military combats. 
The resistance groups suffered less from lack of resources. The resistance armies normally 
conducted sporadic guerrilla operations and needed much fewer military and economic 
resources than the PRK regime. Moreover, although not sufficient, relatively stable military 
support (from China) and economic aid (from the US and ASEAN) were provided. Although 
the legacy of the PDK’s rule could have adversely affected domestic and international 
opinion, Prince Sihanouk’s leadership of the CGDK afforded it legitimacy and helped to 
secure a degree of domestic and international support (Heder, 1999: 16-7). 
The combination of the factors presented above brought about the Cambodian national 
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factions’ enthusiasm for peace talks.  The PRK was especially keen to enter negotiation and 
took active steps to engage with the CGDK. After Hun Sen expressed his willingness to meet 
with Prince Sihanouk, the PRK government began in 1987 to officially promote policies for 
‘national reconciliation’ (Osborne, 1994: 254). Moreover, Vietnam announced a plan to 
withdraw its army by 1990 (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 29). The CGDK, especially Prince 
Sihanouk, responded favourably to these gestures. Eventually, the first meeting between 
Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen was held in December 1987 in France. 
Short-term Factors – Withdrawal of the Vietnamese Army from Cambodia 
If the long-term factors provided the bedrock for negotiation, there were a number of short-
term factors that provided more instant and direct motivation to the Cambodian national 
factions to enter negotiation. In fact, many factors contributed to bringing the Cambodian 
factions to the negotiating table, such as external interveners’ intense diplomatic pressure on 
the factions to negotiate, the proliferation of anti-PDK movements in US domestic politics, 
and China’s diminishing enthusiasm for Cambodian issues. However, the greatest momentum 
was provided by the withdrawal of the Vietnamese army in 1989. 
The withdrawal of the PAVN from Cambodia was an issue that was critical to the resolution 
of the conflict. The CGDK and many external interveners, including China, Thailand, and 
Singapore, demanded Vietnamese withdrawal as a prerequisite for negotiation or as a non-
negotiable condition. However, after confronting the resistance armies during the dry-season 
campaign in 1984-85 and recognising their strength, the PRK and Vietnam became 
increasingly concerned about the outcomes of withdrawal and requested a ‘guarantee that Pol 
Pot would never return to power’ (Haas, 1999: 150-1; Chhin Kim Thong, 2009: Author’s 
interview). Hence, the withdrawal of the PAVN in September 1989 removed a huge obstacle 
to the Cambodian negotiation process.  
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However, Vietnam and the PRK’s concession did not result directly in a stable and productive 
negotiation. In contrast, believing that the PRK had been weakened, the CGDK conducted 
vigorous military operations during the rainy season in 1989-90. However, although these 
operations achieved relative success, the PRK recovered most of its lost territories in the next 
dry-season campaign (Turner, 2004: 208). All Cambodian provincial capitals and all but two 
district towns remained under PRK rule (Kiernan, 1992: no pagination). It was obvious that 
the PRK’s military strength was stronger than the resistance groups had estimated. Finally, 
FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF more actively engaged in negotiation. 
In general, after the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, all the national factions showed more 
readiness to negotiate than before. Losing its largest military resource (the PAVN) and seeing 
that Vietnam had more important national interests than supporting its Cambodian ally, the 
PRK began more earnestly to work towards the success of the negotiation. For the resistance 
groups, the withdrawal meant that they achieved their primary goal (the removal of 
Vietnamese Imperialism). After realising that the Vietnamese ‘puppet’ regime was still strong 
despite Vietnam’s withdrawal, the CGDK finally acknowledged Hun Sen as a negotiation 
partner. 
 
El Salvador 
Brief History of the Conflict and Negotiation 
The historical roots of the civil conflict in El Salvador, in which 100,000 were killed and 
38,000 disappeared (Stanley, 1996: 3), lie in its economic system, which has traditionally 
relied heavily on coffee exports. The cultivation of coffee had led to the widespread 
displacement of subsistence farmers (mestizos) after The Vagrancy Law (1881) and the 
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Agrarian Law (1907) expropriated their lands and compelled them to either work on large 
estates or seek new land to clear. Their former lands were consolidated into coffee plantations, 
resulting in the majority of Salvadorans becoming landless labourers. The disaffection of 
Salvadoran peasants and workers with their chronic poverty, government corruption, and the 
suppression of human rights intensified. However, the ‘military-oligarchy alliance’ ruthlessly 
suppressed any resistance to its rule (Juhn, 1998: 1-2). 
During the 1970s, with the support of Christian priests and rural peasants, five major 
revolutionary organisations were established, mainly by intellectual ideologues. While the 
government responded to popular resistance with violent suppression and assassination, the 
five organisations undertook ‘executions, kidnappings, acts of financial “recuperation”, 
bombings, and mass action’ (Torres-Rivas, 1997: 217-8). After the establishment in October 
1980 of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), a coalition of the five 
revolutionary groups, the conflict in El Salvador escalated into a full-scale civil war (Karl, 
1992: no pagination). 
Finally, with the peaceful election of Alfredo Cristiani of the Alianza Republicana 
Nacionalista (ARENA) in 1989, the first signs that a negotiated peace settlement might be 
reached emerged (Byrne, 1996: 177; Montgomery, 1995: 214). Additional momentum for 
negotiation came when the FMLN’s largest military campaign, launched on 11 November 
1989, resulted in failure (Pugh, 2009: 88-9). Internationally, many changes related to the end 
of the Cold War led the FMLN to transform their military and negotiation strategies 
(Negroponte, 1996: 241-2; LeVine, 1997: 231). 
With the mediation of the UN’s Secretary-General, the government and the FMLN held a 
series of negotiation sessions (De Soto, 1999: 362). At the meetings in Geneva and Caracas in 
April and May 1990, they agreed to establish ‘a two-phased process: negotiations first on 
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broad-ranging political issues, then on a ceasefire’ (Karl, 1992: no pagination). However, 
after the Sanjosé Agreement was signed on 26 July 1990, the talks became deadlocked from 
June 1990 to April 1991 over the issue of reform of the armed forces. 
 
Figure 4.4. Map of El Salvador 
 
Source. Nations Online Project 
http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/el_salvador_map.htm 
 
After several months’ stalemate the breakthrough came when the government yielded to 
demands to rewrite the constitution so as ‘to exclude the armed forces from internal security 
management and to place the military under civilian control’ (Hampson, 1996: 143). Both 
sides consented to the Mexico Agreement, which included the six central issues of ‘reforming 
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the armed forces; the judicial system; human rights; the electoral system; the forming of a 
Truth Commission which would investigate the most heinous crimes committed by both sides 
during the civil war; and, in a separate addendum, reforms to the country’s constitution’ 
(LeVine, 1997: 238). After extensive problems and conflicts among the political actors, the 
ARENA-dominated National Assembly amended the constitutional articles on 29 April 1991.  
Although a number of issues remained unresolved, the government and the FMLN signed the 
New York Accords on 31 December 1992. In these accords, most remaining critical issues, 
including the reduction of the armed forces, FMLN’s participation in the civilian police, the 
establishment of the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (Comision 
Nacional para la Consolidacion de la Paz, COPAZ), and the like, were addressed. 
Simultaneously, a ceasefire between the two parties was also proclaimed. 
During the implementation phase, ONUSAL played a key role. In particular, it successfully 
depoliticised the military groups (Negroponte, 2005: 334-5; Baranyi & North, 1996: 15). 
Moreover, the FMLN was officially recognised as a political party in April 1991. Finally, a 
presidential election was held in 1994. Although Rubel Zamora of the FMLN was defeated 
by Armando Calderón Sol of ARENA and there were many accusations of vote fraud, the 
FMLN accepted the result (Montgomery, 1995: 155-6).  
National Factions 
This section describes two national factions: the ARENA government, led by President 
Cristiani, and the FMLN, a coalition of five anti-government resistance groups. In line with 
the corresponding section for the Cambodian conflict, it focuses on a brief history of each 
faction, its fundamental goals during the negotiation, and material and non-material resources. 
This thesis considers the FMLN as a unified organisation because the five organisations that 
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comprised the FMLN coordinated their moves in the Salvadoran peace negotiation and 
demonstrated relatively strong unity (McClintock, 1998: 48). 
(A) The Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) 
From the end of military rule in 1979, the country was mainly governed by the Christian 
Democratic Party of El Salvador (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC) and ARENA. 
However, this section deals only with ARENA since it led the negotiation with the FMLN 
during the last phase of the Salvadoran conflict. 
ARENA was established in March 1981 by Roberto D’Aubuisson, a major in the National 
Guard (Guardia Nacional). D’Abuisson’s support largely came from the coffee elites (i.e., 
landowners and entrepreneurs), middle class groups (i.e., small businessmen, traders, and 
grocers), and military commanders (Paige, 1993: 10-1: Stanley, 1996: 232). As the role of the 
business group in the party grew during the 1980s, the party prioritised industrial interests 
(Munck, 1993: 79). 
After being defeated in the elections in 1984, the party appointed Alfredo Cristiani Burkard, a 
leading member of the progressive business group, as the party leader in order to improve its 
image. Cristiani’s policies, which pursued economic modernisation, currency liberalisation, 
trade tariff reduction, and reinvestment of industrial profits, as well as his personal 
commitment to donation to charitable causes, gained strong support from diverse social strata 
(Negroponte, 2005: 161-3). After a landslide victory in the local and congressional elections 
in 1988 (80 per cent of the votes in local elections and 31 seats in the National Assembly), 
Cristiani was elected president in June 1989. In his inauguration ceremony, he proclaimed 
peace as one of his main political priorities (LeVine, 1997: 229-30). 
Primary Negotiators – Obviously, it was President Cristiani who promoted enhanced 
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negotiation with the FMLN. However, he did not appear in person at the negotiating table 
until December 1991. Instead, the president left the details of the negotiation to Colonel 
Mauricio Ernesto Vargas, who was the Deputy Chief of Staff (Juhn, 1998: 66).51 
Resources – The government’s military and economic resources were considerable. Owing to 
its close ties with the US, the Salvadoran government possessed a ‘most formidable military 
force’ (Prisk, 1991: 109). In 1988, the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF) had 55,000 regular 
soldiers, and the members of paramilitary groups such as the Treasury Police and the 
National Guard groups totalled approximately 24,600. As a testament to its capacity to wage 
war, the government could afford to spend approximately $ 200 million for military purposes 
in 1990 alone (Harris, 2004: 186). Economically, however, the country relied on US aid 
because of the problems arising from its chronic civil conflict. Between 1980 and 1989, 
Salvadoran agricultural production fell by 32 per cent. Moreover, per capita food production 
also fell by 85 per cent (Byrne, 1996: 141). During the late 1980s, the average annual 
economic aid from the US was more than $ 400 million (Dunkerley, 1994: 145). 
With regard to non-material resources, President Cristiani was elected with relatively strong 
support from the people (winning 53.8 per cent of the votes). However, the military groups 
that Cristiani could not control hampered his internal power (Negroponte, 2005: 141; Munck, 
1993: 80). Internationally, the United States, a long-term supporter of the Salvadoran 
government, shifted from the position that it had held throughout most of the 1980s. 
Abandoning Reaganite policies, the new Bush administration openly called for a political 
settlement and encouraged Cristiani to promote negotiation. Moreover, its military aid to the 
government reduced significantly (from $ 196.6 million in 1984 to $ 81.3 million in 1989) 

51
 The official negotiating team consisted of six members: two ministers, the SAF Deputy Chief of Staff 
(including Vargas), and three civilians. 
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(Williams & Walter, 1997: 133). 
Fundamental Goals – When the negotiation began in El Salvador, the Cristiani government 
held a comparatively stronger position than the FMLN because it had relatively more 
abundant material and nonmaterial resources. Thus, the government approached the 
negotiations from a reasonably practical and conservative viewpoint. In general, the 
government did not proclaim a specific fundamental goal other than the ‘recovery of 
economic development by achieving stable ‘no war’ status’ (Byrne, 1996: 175). Nevertheless, 
its detailed proposals were conservative rather than concessionary. For instance, when the 
two parties exchanged their initial ideas on specific issues in 1990, the government insisted 
most issues should be settled ‘according to the government’s own rules’ (FMLN/GOES 
proposals, 22 June 1990). 
(B) The Farabundo Marti National Liberation (Farabundo Martí para la Liberación 
Nacional, FMLN) 
The FMLN was established in October 1980 as a coalition of the following five different but 
mutually-interconnected rebel organisations: the Communist Party of El Salvador (Partido 
Comunista de El Salvador: PCS, established in 1930), the Popular Liberation Forces 
"Farabundo Marti" (Fuerzas Populares de Liberación "Farabundo Mart”í: FPL, established 
in 1970), the Revolutionary Army of the People (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo: ERP, 
established in 1972), the National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional: RN, established in 1975), 
and the Workers’ Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores 
Centroamericanos: PRTC, established in 1976) (Grenier, 1991: 51-2). Most group leaders 
had middle-class backgrounds, were educated at the National University of El Salvador, and 
they espoused leftist or centre-leftist political ideology and liberal theology. Their main 
supporters were peasants, students, workers, and lay-followers of churches (Juhn, 1998: 1-2; 
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Berner, 2008: no pagination) (for details of the five revolutionary groups, see Appendix III). 
During most of the 1980s, the FMLN had controlled the northern and eastern areas of 
Salvadoran territory (see Figure 4.5). 
 
Figure 4.5. FMLN Areas of Control and Expansion in 1989 
 
Source. Montgomery (1992: 218).  
The FMLN effectively coordinated the actions of its member organisations through its 
relatively democratic structure. Since the FMLN had no single leader, key decisions were 
taken by consensus; the five commanders and their close associates gathered frequently, and 
‘a great deal of discussion and debate’ took place out when disagreement surfaced 
(McClintock 1998, 56). After the death of Salvador Cayetano Carpio, the charismatic but 
stubborn leader of the FPL, in April 1983, Schafik Handal of the PCS attained a ‘first among 
equals’ position and maintained a relatively strong internal unity (Berner, 2008: no 
pagination). The FMLN had connections with a number of domestic and international actors. 
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The Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) was its domestic partner. Although 
disagreements existed, the two groups cooperated relatively well during the 1980s and 1990s 
(McClintock, 1998: 52). In addition, Cuba and Nicaragua were close external allies that 
provided economic, military and diplomatic support. 
Primary Negotiators: The Diplomatic Commission (Comision Politica y Diplomatica), 
represented by Salvador Samayoa (the FPL’s second in command) and Ana Guadelupe 
Martinez Menendez (the ERP’s second in command), led the negotiation. This commission 
acted as both a negotiator and a think tank, and most of the commission members were skilful 
negotiators (Negroponte, 1996: 100) (for details of the Diplomatic Commission, see 
Appendix III). However, final decisions were made only after discussion with FMLN 
commanders (comandantes) (Pugh, 2009: 97).  
Resources - Although the situation changed according to the quantity of foreign aid that it 
received, the FMLN’s comparative scarcity of military resources continued until the late 
1980s (Montgomery, 1992: 116-7). The organisation possessed approximately 8,000 soldiers 
(less than 20 per cent of the government army’s strength) (Economist, 25 March 1989: 43; 
McClintock, 1998: 74) and about 50,000 committed supporters in 1989 (see Table 4.2) 
(LeMoyne, 1989: 114; Prisk, 1991: 88). However, a more serious problem was a severe 
shortage of arms; only approximately 15 per cent of the troops were provided with 
ammunition (McClintock, 1998: 61). Nor were the FMLN’s economic resources sufficient 
either. Its annual budget was estimated at less than $ 5 million, and the organisation was 
unable to pay proper salaries to its staff and soldiers (McClintock, 1998: 63).  
As for non-material resources, although its level of popular support during the civil war is 
difficult to calculate precisely, McClintock estimates that about 20-25 per cent of the 
population supported the FMLN during the 1980s (1998: 76-7). The FMLN made efforts to 
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develop close contact with the people in rural areas via organising frequent meetings with 
local people, mobilising grassroots organisations, and establishing local government 
(Thompson, 2004: 106). Regarding its international network, its strongest allies were the 
USSR, Cuba, and Nicaragua. They provided ‘weaponry, logistical support and training’, 
which were crucial for the FMLN (Negroponte, 1996: 34).  
Fundamental Goals – Founded on Marxist and Leninist principles, the FMLN believed that 
El Salvador should reject and insulate itself from US influence in order to halt the crimes 
against humanity committed by the US-backed authoritarian government. Therefore, during 
the 1980s, its fundamental goal was ‘to ransom sovereignty and national independence’ 
(Prisk, 1991: 121). However, when it became obvious in late 1989 that a military victory was 
impossible, the coalition demanded more realistic goals: the total dissolution of infantry 
battalions in the security corps, Treasury police, National Guard, and other death squads; 
restructuring of the National Police; dissolution of the National Directorate of Intelligence; 
and removal of the ESAF officer corps (FMLN/GOES proposals, 22 June 1990; Grenier, 
1991: 58). 
Table 4.2. Actors in the Salvadoran Conflict, 1989 
 The Government The FMLN 
Leaders Alfredo Cristiani Burkard Shafik Handal 
Eduardo Sancho 
Joaquín Villalobos 
Francisco Jovel 
Salvador Sánchez Cerén 
Core Negotiators Mauricio Ernesto Vargas Ana Guadalupe Martínez 
Salvador Samayoa 
Regional Supporters Guatemala 
Honduras 
(Cost Rica) 
Nicaragua 
Cuba 
Mexico 
Aligned External Powers The U.S. U.S.S.R 
Number of Soldiers 55,000 
(+24,600 paramilitary groups) 
8,000 
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External Interveners 
Regional Actors 
This section describes external interveners’ perception of the conflict and the peace 
negotiation in El Salvador. In the 1980s, Central America was divided into three groups. First, 
a group of countries that included Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica relied 
heavily on the support of the United States. Second, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and 
Panama took an anti-US diplomatic stance. Finally, Cuba and Nicaragua were targeted as 
enemies by the United States (Furthermore, among the three countries that led regional peace 
initiatives, that is, Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia, there were significant differences in 
their diplomatic priorities (Whitfield, 2007: 62-4).  
Regarding their interplay with the national factions, Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela 
demonstrated particularly dynamic interaction. Whereas Cuba played an especially important 
role during the early phase of the civil war as an advocate of the FMLN, the other two 
countries collaborated to establish the regional peace initiatives but demonstrated decidedly 
different viewpoints on the conflict in El Salvador. 
 (A) Cuba 
During the Salvadoran civil war, Cuba became the most important regional advocate of the 
FMLN (McSherry, 1994: no pagination). When the Nicaraguan revolution ended in success 
in 1979, the military and logistical support from Cuba to the FMLN increased greatly. For 
example, it trained thousands of Salvadoran guerrillas and supplied Eastern European-made 
weapons. Cuba also encouraged the Nicaraguan Sandinista government to support the FMLN 
(Bracamonte & Spencer, 1995: 3-4; Prisk, 1991: 21-5). From a diplomatic viewpoint, Cuba 
openly criticised the Salvadoran government and supported a number of important 
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resolutions on human rights abuse in El Salvador in the UN (McSherry, 1994: no pagination). 
Although other socialist states gradually changed their attitudes towards the El Salvadoran 
revolutionary movement in the mid-1980s, Cuba adhered to its original ‘strategic and military 
asset’ (Negroponte, 1996: 225). Thus, while material aid from the USSR and Eastern Europe 
decreased significantly in 1989, Cuba continued to support the FMLN. Because of this 
position, Cuba could not play a key role during the Salvadoran peace negotiation and 
functioned instead as a communication channel between the FMLN and other actors. 
 (B) Mexico 
Mexico had a long-term strategy of assistance to revolutionary movements in Central 
America and resistance to US intervention in the region. Thus, Mexico demonstrated its 
opposition to US involvement in the region by organising Central American peace initiatives 
such as the Contadora group, condemning American intervention in the region, and by 
providing material and diplomatic support to the anti-government movements in Nicaragua 
and El Salvador in the early 1980s (Purcell, 1987: 164).  
Mexico partially supported the FDR-FMLN resistance group until the mid-1980s. For 
example, Mexico provided the group with an operational base in its territory and withdrew its 
ambassador from El Salvador in 1979. Moreover, its constant criticism on the human rights 
violations in El Salvador was a major diplomatic headache for the Salvadoran government. 
For instance, a 1981 joint statement by Mexico and France acknowledged the FDR and the 
FMLN as representative political forces and called for the regional conflicts to be resolved by 
regional efforts (Karl, 1986: 275-80). 
However, Mexico changed its anti-US position in the late 1980s. Owing to a number of 
domestic factors and the transformation in the international structure, the Carlos Salinas de 
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Gortari government tried to promote reconciliation and normalisation of Mexico’s 
relationship with the US, placing economic development at the centre of the agenda 
(Whitfield, 2007: 63).  
 (C) Venezuela 
Although it opposed the interventionist attitude of the United States, the Venezuelan 
government’s regional policies did not favour the regional left-wing revolutionary 
movements. Identifying itself not as a revolutionary country but as a democratic state, 
Venezuela wished to spread democracy in the region. Moreover, Venezuela feared that the 
spread of such movements might lead to a resumption of the Marxist insurgency that had 
previously operated in the country (Karl, 1986: 280). 
As for the conflict in El Salvador, rather than supporting the FMLN, Venezuela’s peace 
intervention focused primarily on persuading the Salvadoran government to make more 
concessions. In fact, Venezuela did not believe that the FMLN would bring democracy to El 
Salvador. Thus, when Venezuela and Mexico joined the Contadora Group in 1983, which 
aimed at pursuing a comprehensive political settlement in Central America, their regional 
strategies differed (Molina Mejia, 1991: 7; Purcell, 1987: 161). For instance, Mexico’s call 
for negotiated power sharing in El Salvador was opposed by Venezuela’s desire for 
integration of the FMLN through the electoral process. Moreover, to secure regional stability, 
Venezuela dispatched its military advisers to El Salvador. It also organised a number of 
official and non-official meetings between the two Salvadoran parties during the late 1980s. 
Global Actors 
This section pays attention to two global actors that played critical roles in the Salvadoran 
peace negotiation process: the US and the USSR. The United States was the most influential 
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external actor, intervening militarily, economically, and diplomatically. Although the USSR 
did not prioritise the settlement of the Salvadoran conflict, its dramatic change in attitude 
towards the country in the mid-1990s became one of the most important factors in forcing the 
national factions to agree to negotiate.52 
 (A) The United States 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the US made determined efforts to counter Soviet-backed 
communism in the region (McClintock, 1998: 201). Hence, the US engaged in direct military 
intervention to defeat the insurgency until 1989 (see Figure 4.6) (Munck, 1993: 77-8; 
Hampson, 1996: 135). In addition to the training of Salvadoran military officers in its 
institutes, the US provided various military equipment, including helicopters and other 
aircraft. Moreover, the USA increased its financial aid to the Salvadoran government from 
$9.4 million in 1979 to $897.8 million by 1986 (Torres-Rivas, 1997: 222). Although the 
Central American countries established a number of regional peace initiatives including the 
Contadora group’s proposals, the Reagan administration ignored the initiatives until the late 
1980s. 
However, the US’s policies shifted significantly when President George H. W. Bush 
took office in 1989. Instead of blindly supporting the Salvadoran government, the 
Bush administration pressed it to negotiate with the FMLN (Hampson, 1996: 135). In 
addition, with the government army’s murder of respected Jesuit priests in 1989, the 
genuine improvement of Salvadoran democracy became an important concern for the 
US administration. This pressure from the US to negotiate and to improve human 
rights compelled the Cristiani government to work towards and promote a negotiated 

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 The UN is not dealt with in this section. Although the UN contributed greatly to the peace negotiation in El 
Salvador as a mediator, it did not exhibit any clear standpoints during the negotiation. Rather, it proposed a 
series of ideas to overcome the difficulties in the negotiation between 1990 and 1991. 
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peace (Munck & Kumar, 1995: 170). 
(B) The USSR 
Although the USSR welcomed the revolutions in Central America, it was somewhat reluctant 
to overtly support the revolutionary movements so as not to upset the US unduly. Hence, 
although it demonstrated sympathetic attitudes toward the FMLN, the influence of the USSR 
on the Salvadoran civil conflict was indirect and unofficial. For instance, when the FMLN 
leaders visited Moscow in 1980, the USSR did not acknowledge it as a potential government 
and instead helped the organisation secure military and financial aid from Eastern Europe 
rather than providing direct aid itself. Moreover, when it began to actively support the 
movement, all aid was sent via Cuba and Nicaragua (Negroponte, 2005: 219).  
As the USSR began its new diplomatic approach in the late 1980s, its regional strategy also 
changed. The Soviets wanted to stabilise the situation in Nicaragua even though this might 
involve sacrificing the FMLN (Prisk, 1991: 113). In 1989, Edward Shevardnadze, the Soviet 
Foreign Minister, warned the FMLN that Soviet economic assistance would be reorganised 
and encouraged the rebel group to establish and develop contacts in Western Europe in order 
to obtain financial investment (Negroponte, 2005: 235). In addition, in meetings with the 
United States, the USSR emphasised that it supported a negotiated settlement to the conflict 
in El Salvador. 
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Figure 4.6. Relation between the Major Actors in the Salvadoran Peace Negotiation 
 
 
Factors Contributing to the Negotiation between National Factions 
This section discusses the international and domestic factors that encouraged the Salvadoran 
national factions to consider peace negotiation more seriously. First, there were a number of 
long-term factors that contributed to the success of the peace negotiation in El Salvador: the 
Soviet Union’s changing attitudes toward the revolutionary movements in Central America, 
military stalemate, the implementation of regular elections, and decreasing popular support 
for the war. Second, a number of international and domestic events occurred in 1989 that also 
played key roles in bringing the national factions to the negotiating table, including the 
election of the George Bush administration in the US, the collapse of the Nicaraguan 
government, the murder of six Jesuits, and the failure of the FMLN’s 1989 campaign.  
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 Long-term Factors  
(A) International Factors – The Change in the USSR’s Regional Policies 
As the Soviet Union began to change its domestic and international policies from 1986, the 
conditions for the Salvadoran negotiation also changed. The USSR demonstrated diminished 
interest in the socialist movements in the region and persuaded Cuba and Nicaragua to 
reconsider their hostility to and confrontation with the US (Montgomery, 1992: 216; Munck 
& Kumar, 1995: 171). Moreover, aid from the USSR and other socialist states became erratic. 
In 1989, for instance, the USSR’s Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announced that the Soviet 
Union would reduce its economic aid and suspend the transfer of heavy armaments. In 
addition, the supply of ammunition and light arms was to be provided only ‘publicly’; thus, 
unofficial arms supply would be stopped (Negroponte, 1996: 235-6). As a prominent leader 
of the FMLN admitted, the announcement was a major blow to the organisation since the 
assistance was ‘the key factor in sustaining the insurgents’ (Prisk, 1991: 110). 
This transformation in Soviet policies changed the regional politics related to the Salvadoran 
peace negotiation. On the one hand, released from its commitment to challenge the perceived 
Soviet threat in what the US regarded as its own backyard, the Bush administration became 
more committed to pressurising the Salvadoran government to seek negotiation with the 
FMLN and to improve internal democracy. On the other hand, after losing their major donor, 
Cuba and Nicaragua reduced their aid to the FMLN. The FMLN had to reconsider the 
direction and ideological premise of their revolutionary campaign (Sullivan, 1994: 85). 
(B) Domestic Factor (1) - Military Stalemate 
Despite the Salvadoran government’s strenuous efforts to win the war during the mid-1980s, 
it became clear that the civil war would be a prolonged one. To bring about an end to the war, 
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the government increased the efficiency of its military campaigns by restructuring the army, 
providing more arms, and implementing more brutal strategies. However, the FMLN 
countered the government’s moves with a swift change in its operational style, replacing 
middle-sized regular combat tactics with small-scale guerrilla warfare (the so-called 
“Prolonged Popular War”). As a result, although the FMLN lost a few municipalities that it 
had previously controlled, it continued to wield its exclusive or dual administrative power 
over most of its original territories (Stein, 1988: 195-6). This failure to critically weaken the 
FMLN convinced the government that its counterpart was stronger than it had expected 
(Sullivan, 1994: 84). 
By 1988, the FMLN had also realised that military victory was not easily achievable. In this 
period, the coalition changed its strategy from that of a ‘Prolonged Popular War’ to that of a 
‘Strategic Counter-Offensive’, which focused on more vigorous attacks in urban centres 
(Bracamonte & Spencer, 1995: 13). However, the operations that it conducted throughout 
1988 ended in failure, which led the FMLN to change its military strategy again.  
(C) Domestic Factor (2) - Signs of Political Democratisation 
Periodic elections during the 1980s were another factor that encouraged the FMLN to be 
more receptive to diplomatic resolutions. The Salvadoran government had implemented 
regular elections for national office since the end of the military junta regime in 1979. 
Although electoral fraud was frequently reported or suspected, the Magaña administration 
and the Duarte government succeeded in reinforcing the democratic process as an essential 
element of Salvadoran politics (Pugh, 2009: 93).  
These regular elections changed the FMLN’s perception of the political arena. Since the 
organisation had believed that the real cause of Salvadoran problems lay in the US’s 
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influence over and use of the government’s army to advance its own regional interests, they 
had refused to join the election so long as the election was ‘controlled by the same genocidal 
and repressive armed forces’ (Prisk, 1991: 122). However, in 1989, the FMLN agreed to 
participate in the election and announced a short ceasefire for its duration (Prisk, 1991: 122-
3). Although it is unclear whether the coalition had a genuine desire to accept the result of the 
election, it was an important indicator of the change in the FMLN’s revolutionary strategies. 
(D) Domestic Factor (3) - Decreasing Popular Support for the Conflict 
In the late 1980s, both factions suffered from a decrease in popular support for the war. As 
the war dragged on, people became weary of the violence and angered by the increasing 
terrorism during the mid-1980s. Evident economic deterioration, the constant security threat, 
and the impossibility of managing daily life made people turn against the FMLN (Stein, 
1988: 196; Montgomery, 1992: 215). The loss of support had a direct and negative impact on 
the FMLN’s military operations. The organisation’s political propaganda failed to persuade 
the people to support their ongoing military campaign, and recruitment of new forces became 
more difficult (Bracamonte & Spencer, 1995: 10). As a result, the number of FMLN troops 
fell from 10,000 in 1985 to 4,000 in 1989 (Prisk, 1991: 110). For the Cristiani government, 
the people’s desire to end the war became a significant political asset, and a negotiated peace 
became central to the government’s agenda (Bracamonte & Spencer, 1995: 32-3). 
Short-term Factors 
(A) International Factors – Three Regional and International Events 
In 1989, a number of events occurred that provided both national factions with good 
opportunities to achieve their goals through negotiation. First, together with the change in the 
USSR’s policies, the political change in Europe was a clear signal of the emergence of an 
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external crisis. Beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, many socialist 
countries in Europe underwent radical ideological changes.  
In addition, the Sandinista government also lost in the Nicaraguan election. The FMLN 
leadership was left reeling by these changes and realised that embarking on a strategy of 
protracted conflict had become untenable (Negroponte, 1996: 241-2; LeVine, 1997: 231). 
Moreover, George H. W. Bush had been elected as the president of the US. In contrast with 
the Reagan administration that had maintained an ideological hostility against the 
revolutionary movements in Central America, the Bush administration demonstrated much 
greater flexibility and pragmatism (Pugh, 2009: 84; Munck, 1993: 79-80). For instance, 
Bernard Aronson, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, planned to 
reduce the US’s military aid to the Salvadoran government and to apply more pressure on it 
to enter negotiation with the FMLN. Moreover, the new government in the United States 
sought to be an ‘insider partial mediator’ (Negroponte, 1996: 54). 
(B) Domestic Factor (1) - Failure of 1989 Campaign 
Seeing the changes in international politics described above, the principal leaders of the 
FMLN (especially Shafik Handal) decided to launch a major military offensive against the 
government on 20 November 1989 in order to demonstrate its abiding resilience and to gain 
more support from the people (Negroponte, 1996: 238; Pugh, 2009: 88). Although the initial 
phase of the attack was successful, the FMLN was eventually defeated by the Cristiani 
government (Bracamonte & Spencer, 1995: 33-5). 
The failure provided critical momentum for both national factions to treat the issue of peace 
talks seriously. On the one hand, the FMLN was forced to abandon its baseless belief that it 
could prevail over the government once it had concentrated its entire forces. On the other 
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hand, the government realised that the FMLN’s offensive capability was much stronger that 
they had anticipated and that they did not have the capacity to prevent all attacks by the 
resistance group (Pugh, 2009: 88-9; LeVine, 1997: 231).  
(C) Domestic Factor (2) - The murder of Six Jesuits 
The killing of six Jesuit priests and their two co-workers by the governmental death squad 
known as the El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF) on 16 November 1989 galvanised the anger 
of both the domestic public and the international community. The killing was considered 
important because the priests were well known and respected figures in Salvadoran society, 
and the manner of their murder was particularly brutal (Betancur, Planchart, & Buergenthal, 
1993: no pagination). Since the US government had professed that its aid to the Salvadoran 
government would help to develop democracy and human rights in the country, the murder 
made the USA reconsider its Salvadoran policy (Bracamonte & Spencer, 1995: 34-5; Sullivan, 
1994: 84). In May 1990, the House of Representatives decided to halve military aid to El 
Salvador (Byrne, 1996: 183) Facing these difficulties, the Salvadoran government had to 
demonstrate its will to improve human rights in the country and to display a greater 
willingness to enter negotiation with the FMLN. 
All these long-term and short-term factors persuaded the Cristiani government and the FMLN 
to seek more actively a resolution to the Salvadoran conflict by peaceful means. By 
employing a two-track strategy that used both diplomatic negotiation and military strength, 
the FMLN demonstrated that it had accepted diplomatic tactics as a means of pursuing its 
goals. The organisation transformed the Diplomatic Commission, which had been its 
instrument of public relations, into the body for negotiation with the government (Negroponte, 
1996: 61). Moreover, it officially called for the involvement of the UN on 6 December 1989 
(Bracamonte & Spencer, 1995: 35). Under strong diplomatic pressure from the US 
 


government and in the absence of serious opposition from its military, the Cristiani 
government also more actively sought a negotiated settlement. Finally, both sides accepted 
the offer of UN mediation and discussed the detailed procedures of the negotiation in January 
1990. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided the background information of the two cases examined in this thesis, 
focusing on three issues: the historical backgrounds of the two conflicts, a brief description of 
the national factions and external interveners, and the long-term and short-term factors that 
promoted peace talks. It also briefly illustrated the initial moves taken by the actors to 
accommodate the peace negotiations, an issue that will be revisited in later chapters during 
the focus on interplay. 
Each of the two sections that dealt with the Cambodian and El Salvadoran cases began by 
explaining the history of the conflicts and negotiations in each country (this section is also 
supplemented by the chronologies in the Appendix I). The roots of the conflicts, the origin of 
the warring factions, the development of the conflicts, the negotiation processes, and the role 
of external actors were briefly described in the first part of each section. 
After this, the characteristics of the negotiating actors were discussed. With regard to the 
national factions, the primary negotiators, the material and non-material resources, and the 
fundamental goals of each faction were at the centre of the description. In the Cambodian 
case, the PRK government, led by Hun Sen, and the three resistance groups, FUNCINPEC, 
the PDK, and the KPNLF, were discussed. The internal unity of the coalition of resistance 
groups, the CGDK, was seen to be very weak, and the three groups were therefore considered 
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as separate entities. In the Salvadoran case, the Cristiani government and the FMLN were 
discussed. Here, however, the resistance coalition’s internal unity was relatively strong, and it 
was adjudged to be a unified organisation.  
This chapter also described the basic attitudes of the external interveners towards the 
conflicts in Cambodia and El Salvador. These attitudes were based on their fundamental goals 
in the conflicts and played a key role in determining the strategies and conduct of the national 
factions. The external actors that had strong interrelations with the national factions, that is, 
Vietnam, Thailand, China, Cuba, Mexico, the USSR, and the US, were discussed. 
Finally, the major long-term and short-term factors that convinced the national factions to 
come to the negotiating table were demonstrated. As observed above, there were a number of 
common long-term factors in both cases: the changes in world politics at the end of the Cold 
War, the domestic military stalemate, and decreasing material and nonmaterial resources. In 
addition, there were a number of short-term events that demonstrated the need for negotiated 
resolution of the conflicts. The combination of these factors promoted the initiation and 
progress of the negotiations in both countries. 
Based on this information, Chapters 5, 6, and 7 will analyse the processes of interplay 
between the national factions and external interveners that were used to achieve agreement on 
the establishment of the coalition resistance group, demobilisation of troops, and the 
composition of the transitional authority. In particular, the changes in the negotiating actors’ 
moves during their negotiation and the motivation behind the changes are at the centre of the 
analysis. As discussed in Chapter 3, the issue of the establishment of the coalition resistance 
group is different from the other two issues in terms of the time period, the purpose of 
negotiation, and the actors involved. However, it is selected as a study case because it shows 
the patterns of interaction between national factions and regional advocate countries during 
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the early period of the conflict. Considering the other two cases, although the negotiations on 
the two issues were closely interrelated, they are discussed in separate chapters in order to 
demonstrate two different aspects of the interaction: the interplay between national factions 
and international mediators whose approach to peace negotiation is based on Western 
concepts, and the interplay between national factions and global/regional powers that act as a 
regional actor having global power. 
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Chapter 5 
The Interplay between National Factions  
and Impartial Third Parties 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses the interplay between the national factions and the external interveners 
in the two case studies, or more specifically, the PRK’s interaction with the US in Cambodia 
and the FMLN’s interplay with the UN in El Salvador during their peace negotiation 
processes. At the centre of the analysis are two aims: (1) finding the characteristics of the 
national factions’ interplay with the impartial third parties53 that are distinct from their 
interaction with other external interveners, and (2) identifying and studying the obstacles 
generated by the ethnocentric cultural values of the third-party interveners in the peace 
negotiation. To clarify the actors’ strategic movements on these issues, the Cambodian part of 
this chapter is largely based on the author’s fieldwork conducted in 2009. 
First, this chapter reveals the patterns of interplay between the impartial third parties and the 
warring factions during the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador. More 
specifically, phase by phase, it tracks the changes in the strategies employed by impartial 
third parties to persuade the national factions to make progress in their peace negotiations and 
the warring factions’ responses towards the external actors’ efforts.  
In general, the patterns in the two case studies show that when the impartial third parties 
displayed stronger enthusiasm for the peace negotiations, this was more likely to promote 
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 As discussed in Chapter 3, an impartial third party in this thesis refers to third parties that pursue peaceful 
resolution of conflicts through negotiation between national factions and have little intention of seeking benefits 
for certain national factions. 
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serious and flexible attitudes among the national factions. However, it is also observed that 
while their relatively neutral but less enthusiastic actions provided good conditions for the 
national factions to promote their own peace initiatives, the impartial third parties did not 
play decisive roles in changing the fundamental attitudes of the warring factions towards the 
peace negotiations.  
In addition, through the juxtaposition of the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador, 
this chapter also analyses different patterns of this type of interplay. In short, the UN 
mediators and the FMLN leaders in El Salvador achieved better cooperation than the US and 
the PRK negotiators in Cambodia.   
Second, this chapter suggests that the role played by the negotiating actors’ disparate cultural 
backgrounds in the formation of their perceptions is an important factor that affects the 
effectiveness of third-party intervention. Many of the peace processes undertaken by the 
United Nations and other external states and organisations between the late 1980s and the 
mid-1990s were based on Western cultural values. Since the conceptions underpinning these 
projects differed from those of the local culture in which the projects were being carried out, 
many of the UN peacekeeping operations were only partially successful in gaining people’s 
support. Hence, the effectiveness of these peace processes tended to be hampered by the 
prosecution of policies that were based on cultural values alien to the local culture (Richmond, 
2006: 300). 
In this chapter, the two case studies reveal the role that cultural barriers can play in peace 
negotiations. The negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador encountered significantly 
different obstacles arising from the actors’ ethnocentric cultures. In Cambodia, since the 
international interveners did not consider the Cambodian people’s perceptual differences 
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important and relied heavily on their Western cultural values54 to interpret major negotiation 
issues, they failed to produce proposals that were persuasive to the Cambodian national 
factions. By contrast, as a result of its relatively close cultural ties and good communication 
with the Salvadoran factions, the UN succeeded in avoiding serious mutual 
misunderstandings when attempting to convince the FMLN to abide by the UN’s 
coordination and suggestions.   
This chapter looks at the negotiation processes with regard to the issues of demilitarisation 
and the interim authority. As explained in Chapter 3, demilitarisation was a highly 
controversial issue for most of the warring factions because the process might determine their 
future survival. The negotiations on this issue clearly reveal the dynamics of the interplay 
between the national factions, who were reluctant to make concessions, and the impartial 
third parties, who attempted to convince them to make compromises. In addition, El Salvador 
and Cambodia’s differing negotiation processes on the formation of a transitional authority 
and the reasons for these dissimilarities help to explain the contrasting effectiveness of the 
implementation processes in the cases.  
Each section begins with a brief description of the actors’ perceptions of negotiation, peace, 
and violence in order to contextualise their strategies during the peace negotiations. After this, 
the ways in which these perceptions affected their goals during the negotiations are discussed. 
Next, each section examines the phase-by-phase change in the interplay between the 
impartial third party and the national faction during the negotiation process. Finally, a 
summary and rough analysis of the patterns is presented. 
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 As indicated in Chapter 1, Western culture is not monolithic and comprises various sub-cultures with varied 
characteristics. In this chapter, however, the term ‘Western culture’ denotes some of the common cultural 
features of the countries that played the most important roles in the Cambodian peace negotiation, including the 
US and Australia. 
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CAMBODIA 
This case study examines the interplay between the United States and the PRK. The US 
played a prominent role in the Cambodian peace negotiations as a relatively impartial 
intervener that had modest economic and military influence over the Cambodian national 
factions. The USA also made great efforts to coordinate the moves of other international 
actors, including Indonesia, Japan, China, Vietnam, and the members of UN Security Council 
(Lizée, 1999: 61, Solomon, 1999: 314). The PRK, as the de facto government (but one that 
had lost most of its advocates (the USSR and Vietnam) by the end of the 1980s), sought to 
secure its political prominence in the forthcoming transitional authority.  
 
Differences in the Cultural Values of the Actors 
Although a variety of factors contributed to the different perceptions of the actors, many 
studies agree that three historical factors most strongly affected the Cambodian people’s 
attitudes to conflict and negotiation: indigenous culture, colonialism, and civil war. 
Cambodia’s indigenous culture, influenced by Brahmanism, Theravada Buddhism, ‘patron-
client communitarianism,’ and Cambodia’s long history of being a unified entity, provided a 
basis for the Cambodian people’s conceptions of conflict and negotiation, conceptions that 
are very different from those of Western societies (Peang-Meth, 1991: 445-6; Marlay & 
Neher, 1995:14; Bit, 1991:: 3-14; Lizée, 1999: 30).55 Moreover, although the relatively short 
and indirect period of French colonialism (1863-1953) had a significant impact on the ruling 
class of the country, it had little effect on local peasant societies (Bit, 1991: 13; Chandler, 
1998: no pagination). Finally, the sequence of violent events in recent Cambodian history, 
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 For details of Western notion of negotiation and its origins, see chapter 2. 
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beginning with the Vietnamese war (1959-1975), continuing through the disastrous Khmer 
Rouge regime (1975-1979), and culminating in the fourteen-year long civil war (1979-1993) 
transformed people’s ideas greatly (Bit, 1991: 77-84; Lizée, 1999: 30). 
The different approaches of the actors to the following issues were particularly serious 
obstacles to the development of mutual understanding between the national factions (the PRK 
and the CGDK) and the international intervener (the US) during the Cambodian peace 
negotiation. 
Negotiation 
Three distinct components of Western culture – individualism, egalitarianism, and low 
context communication – informed the international interveners’ conceptions of negotiation 
(Gellman, 2007: 25-6). Since individualism emphasises the importance of interests and 
tangible outcomes (Ting-Toomey, 1999: 210), Western societies prefer to use direct and 
verbal communication methods to produce concrete contracts (Kimmel, 1994: 180-1) rather 
than contextual or symbolic behaviour (Le Baron, 2003: no pagination). In addition, they 
generally believe that agreement can be forged by both sides making concessions and 
agreeing to compromise some of their interests. 
However, Cambodian culture is underpinned and guided by a collectivist ethic. Due to the 
prominence of hierarchical social structures and high-context communication systems in 
Cambodian collectivist culture, the Cambodian national factions’ viewpoints were clearly at 
variance with Western ideas. For them, negotiation was a process towards mutual and 
interdependent existence and resolution of root causes rather than quick fixes. The influence 
of Brahmanism, which assumes that ‘the god-king does not negotiate nor placate’, and 
Buddhism, which regards visible disputes as the expression of long accumulated anger, 
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prevented Cambodians from subscribing to a belief in conflict resolution through 
compromise (Bit, 1991: 15-6). Instead, the Cambodian factions considered negotiation ‘a 
means of circumventing pressures for more painful sacrifices’ (Bit, 1991: 15-6). Moreover, 
rapid compromises were uncommon in the Cambodian hierarchical social structure, and there 
are few examples in Cambodian history of leaders compromising with their opponents (Bit, 
1991: 33; Turner, 2004: 148; Peou, 2002: 511). 
This difference in the actors’ concepts of negotiation led the interveners and the national 
factions to set very different fundamental goals. Whereas the basic aim of the major 
interveners was the stabilisation of Indochina, the national factions’ goals were either total 
victory, removal of counterparts, or at least gaining political supremacy in the forthcoming 
political arena (Turner, 2004: 163) (details follow below). Although the interveners 
recognised that the Cambodian factions’ goals were very different from their own, they 
assumed that they could persuade the national factions to conform to their concepts of 
negotiation (Solomon, 2000: 34-5, 45-6). 
Cultural differences had a further impact on the Cambodian negotiations through the actors’ 
different assumptions about the duration of negotiation processes. Whereas the Western 
interveners regarded a written consensus as an expression of the end of negotiation, the 
Cambodian national factions believed that such contracts merely demonstrated progress in 
the negotiations and formed only a part of the process. Thus, this misunderstanding 
contributed to the many problems that occurred during the implementation phase of the Paris 
Peace Agreements (PPAs) (Heder, 1999: 115; Chhin Kim Thong, 2009: Author’s Interview). 
Peace 
In general, Western societies have a standardised concept of liberal peace. This concept 
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assumes that once good institutions and practices are established and sustained, peace will 
follow (Lizée, 1999: 83). These peaceful institutions comprise ‘democratisation, the rule of 
law, human rights, free and globalised markets, and neo-liberal development’ (Richmond, 
2006: 292). Incorporating an assumption of universality that justifies intervention, the 
Western institutional models of social, political, and economic organisation were transplanted 
wherever Western peace interventions in war-shattered regions occurred (Paris, 1997: 56; 
Mac Ginty, 2008: 146; Lizée, 1999: 23-4; Ignatieff, 2003: 17). 
Although the national leadership in both cases ostensibly consented to the principles of 
liberal peace, few actors truly intended to establish such institutions. Under the strong 
influence of Buddhism, which stresses that each individual’s internal tranquillity contributes 
to the realisation of social peace, and hierarchical fragmented societies that lacked a systemic 
social model of peace, Cambodians believed that peace equated to ‘factional 
balance/hegemony’ or ‘restored social harmony’ rather than a certain type of political entity 
(Peang-Meath 1999: 446-447; Lizée 1999: 36-43). Furthermore, although the Cambodian 
leaders understood Western notions of democracy and the market economy, the constituencies 
did not share such ideologies, because of the country’s short and turbulent experience of 
democracy (Peang-Meath, 1999, 451-2; Gottesman, 2004: 17-24). 
Such differences in their conceptions of peace affected the actors’ views on the nature and 
composition of a transitional authority. Western interveners’ fundamental goal of peace 
through democracy meant that they believed that the transitional authority would act as a 
neutral and legitimate power until a new government could be formed. However, the 
Cambodian factions doubted that a neutral transitional power able to withstand the existing 
confrontations could be formed (Peang-Meth, 1999: 453).  
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Violence 
Another factor that affected the interplay between the national factions and the international 
interveners was their different approaches to violence. Western societies have a strong idea of 
the nation state’s ‘responsibility to protect the individual from violence’ by its monopoly of 
domestic violence and share the conviction that peace can be achieved by ‘the absence of 
violence’ and ‘the reduction of conflict to political processes’ (Lizée, 1999: 19-21). Thus, 
international interveners assumed that ceasefire was a prerequisite for peace negotiations and 
an essential element that demonstrated the actors’ willingness to negotiate. 
However, Cambodia lacked such concepts and systems to protect constituencies, and violence 
was seen as contextual and as ‘part of the very nature of social aggregation’ (Lizée, 1999: 40). 
Although the French presence provided a sense of modern statehood to Cambodia, the 
concept of nation statehood remained ill-defined in Cambodia, and neither a strong 
bureaucracy to sustain the structure nor an agreed conception of the responsibilities of a state 
were established (Bit, 1991: 66). Thus, for Cambodians, violence was regarded as a method 
of negotiation that could be used by the state when necessary. 
These contrasting conceptualisations of state responsibility resulted in the different 
approaches of the international interveners and national factions to the violence that occurred 
during the negotiation. The international interveners continuously demanded ceasefire as an 
integral part of the peace negotiation, and they took the national factions’ violation of the 
ceasefire very seriously (Haas, 1991: 129). However, the Cambodian national factions shared 
the view that periodic demonstration of their military capability was a realistic way to attain a 
favourable position in the negotiation56, and, therefore, they remained unconvinced that their 
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 For instance, Lu Lay Sreng, a chief military commander and the first vice-president of FUNCINPEC, said 
‘Showing our strength was important. (…) Only after our victory in Datung in 1985, did the US begin to 
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opponents would continue to observe an agreed ceasefire.  
 
Aims of Actors 
Based on the different perceptions described above, the international interveners and the 
Cambodian factions set their own goals with regard to the transitional authority. First, the 
basic target of the major interveners, including the UN, the US, France, and Australia, was 
stabilisation of Indochina (Lizée, 1999: 54). Although each country had individual objectives, 
they generally agreed with the vision of liberal peace. In 1989, the United States set three 
main goals: Cambodia’s independence from Vietnam and the influence of the USSR, the 
establishment of democratic government through elections, and prevention of the PDK’s 
return as Cambodia’s central authority (Solomon, 2000: 35; Haas, 1991: 252).  
As a result, the UN proposals assumed that all existing military forces of the four military 
factions needed to be dissolved and depoliticised before the general election (Lizée, 1999: 77). 
With regard to the interim authority, the interveners’ main goal was building neutral political 
infrastructures that would promote a free election in Cambodia. Thus, the US thought that (1) 
the UN should take the lead in promoting a neutral political environment, imperative for a 
free and fair election; (2) in order to promote the Cambodian state’s sovereignty, a 
representative organisation of Cambodian people needed to play a symbolic and nominal role 
during the interim period; and (3) the PDK should be excluded from the future governance of 
Cambodia (Lizée, 1999: 62; Haas, 1991: 163). 
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provide economic and military support. (…) We also had to show how strong our solidarity and military power 
were to the PRK and the (sly) Khmer Rouge’ (Lu Lay Sreng, 2009, Author’s Interview). Moreover, Chhin Kim 
Thong, a former commander of the PDK, stated, ‘It was after the failure of Vietnam’s and Hun Sen’s biggest 
military campaigns that they became more cooperative.’ (Chhin Kim Thong, 2009, Author’s Interview).  
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The PRK’s fundamental goal was gaining and maintaining its superiority in the post-conflict 
Cambodian political arena (see Chapter 4). Hun Sen (as well as other Cambodian factional 
leaders) did not believe that a future election would be democratic or neutral. It was difficult 
for him to envisage the PRK’s counterparts being content to limit their interests and adhere to 
the agreed peace accords.57 Thus, Hun Sen considered that ensuring his supremacy in the 
interim authority was vital to securing the survival of his party.  
Therefore, the PRK wanted to retain as many military forces as possible until the new general 
elections. With regard to the transitional authority, its goal was maintaining its bureaucratic 
structure in the country. Hence, when the negotiations began, Hun Sen requested (1) the 
exclusion of the PDK from the forthcoming election, (2) minimal involvement by the 
international supervisory body, and (3) maintenance of the SOC bureaucracy (Brown & 
Zasloff, 1998: 31; Turner, 2004: 147).58  
 
Interplay between the Actors in the Negotiation Process 
This section tracks the changing dynamics of the strategic interplay between the US and the 
PRK/SOC to achieve their goals during the Cambodian negotiations. First, the United States 
tried to mediate the differences between the actors’ goals by providing economic and 
diplomatic incentives, coordinating other external actors’ moves, and suggesting 
comprehensive peace proposals. Second, the national factions attempted to nullify the 
interveners’ efforts that were disadvantageous to their interests and endeavoured to achieve 
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 Lu Lay Sreng, a former leader of FUNCINPEC recalls how, “Hun Sen, whose power was highly dependent on 
Vietnam’s military force, could not simply trust the words spoken in the negotiations because everyone knew the 
Khmer Rouge was smart, so smart” (Lu Lay Sreng, 2009: Author’s Interview). 
58
 These requests were in direct opposition to the CGDK’s goals that included (1) a UN-supervised election, (2) 
the dissolution of SOC organisations, and (3) inclusion of PDK in the negotiation process (Haas, 1991: 195; The 
CGDK Press Release, 1986: no pagination). 
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their goals by producing effective responses to the interveners’ pressure and suggestions. The 
negotiations had the following four distinct phases, and the characteristics of the pattern of 
interplay changed in each of these phases.  
Phase 1: 1987 – August 1989 
Recognising the long-term factors described in Chapter 4, the Cambodian national factions 
began to demonstrate a greater willingness to negotiate, and external interveners also began 
to facilitate the negotiations in this phase. However, because of the US’s lukewarm attitude 
and their simple focus on confidence building, no significant interplay between the third-
party intervener and domestic warring factions was evident. Eventually, the US failed to 
prompt the national factions to launch stronger initiatives.   
The efforts of international interveners in this period were limited to the provision of good 
offices. With regard to the suggestion of peace proposals, for instance, although the UN 
Secretary-General Xavier Perez de Cuellar’s four-point plan in June 1987 and the UN 
Undersecretary-General Rafeeuddin Ahmed’s working paper outlined the UN’s principles on 
the Cambodian issues, they were far from a comprehensive blueprint for the peace process 
(Haas, 1991: 129; Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 48). Furthermore, external interveners applied no 
new significant economic or diplomatic pressure on the factions nor provided them with fresh 
incentives to negotiate. During this period, the United States displayed little interest in the 
Cambodian issue. Although it favoured Vietnamese withdrawal and the prevention of the 
PDK’s return to power, the Bush administration simply expressed its support for the PCC 
initiatives of France and Indonesia (Solomon, 2000: 21). 
Despite the good offices, however, the Cambodian national factions failed to reach any 
agreements. In October 1987, Hun Sen called for a meeting with Sihanouk and tabled the 
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somewhat conciliatory PRK Five-Point Proposal (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 38-9). 
Furthermore, he proclaimed the party’s abandonment of socialism (the state’s name was 
subsequently changed to the State of Cambodia (SOC) in 1989) (Gottesman, 2004: 303). In 
return, Sihanouk also expressed his willingness to negotiate. The first bilateral meetings 
between Hun Sen and Sihanouk were held in December 1987 and January 1988 (Brown & 
Zasloff, 1998: 38-49). Thanks to the regional actors’ facilitation, the first round of the Jakarta 
Informal Meetings (JIM), which brought together the four Cambodian factions, took place 
from July 1988 onwards. In addition, the efforts of external interveners to promote the 
peaceful resolution of the Cambodian conflict resulted in the Paris Conference on Cambodia 
(PCC) in August 1989.  
However, the resistance groups were not ready to make real concessions under circumstances 
where the promise of Vietnam’s withdrawal might not actually be implemented. For them, the 
withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia was a non-negotiable prerequisite of the negotiation, 
and they regarded non-implementation of Vietnamese withdrawal as a grave threat that might 
enable the SOC to reverse the negotiated peace agreements (Lizée, 1999: 57). As Ieng Mouly, 
a top leader of the KPNLF stated: 
(In the initial period of the war,) we wanted to fight against Vietnam with 
our army. We wanted to push them out of our country, not negotiate with 
them. (…) Although we approved of the negotiations with Hun Sen, 
Vietnam had to be removed. The real aggressor was Vietnam, not Hun Sen. 
(Ieng Mouly, 2009: Author’s Interview).  
In a similar vein, a former PDK commander said: 
We decided to cooperate with Prince Sihanouk and Mr Son Sann because 
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fighting against Vietnam was more important than fighting against our 
former enemies. How could we abandon our demand for PAVN 
withdrawal? (Chhin Kim Thong, 2009: Author’s Interview). 
However, Vietnamese withdrawal meant that the SOC would lose much of its military 
strength, and it was desperate to ensure its security in the face of expected PDK aggression 
(Lizée, 1999: 57). Hence, despite calls by some reformists for a change in policy, hard-line 
leaders, including Chea Sim, criticised Hun Sen’s attempts to seek a diplomatic resolution to 
the conflict.59 Thus, although the talks produced a number of constructive proposals, the 
national factions nevertheless continued to reiterate their original positions during the talks 
(Haas, 1991: 203-5).  
Phase 2: September 1989 – late 1990 
In Phase 2, the interaction between the PRK and the US became much more dynamic. The 
US adopted stronger and more varied strategies, such as promoting the UN peace proposals 
and providing diplomatic and economic incentives, and the PRK became more flexible 
towards the demands of the external interveners. 
There were two reasons for the intensified involvement of the international actors. First, the 
series of efforts to provide good offices had resulted in failure. Second, the behaviour of the 
CGDK after Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodian territory had disappointed the 
international community. Rather than promoting enhanced peace talks, the resistance groups 
had undertaken nationwide military operations against a PRK army weakened by Vietnamese 
withdrawal (Haas, 1991: 213-4). This caused the interveners to believe that the Cambodian 
negotiations needed to be supported by stronger and more varied measures (Richardson, 
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 Put in terms of Putnam’s two-level game theory, Hun Sen’s efforts failed to gain domestic ratification. 
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2009: 147-8; Song, 1997: 68-9). 
Thus, while Indonesia, France, Japan, and China contributed to the Cambodian peace 
negotiations by providing good offices and applying diplomatic pressure on the national 
factions, Australia and the United States produced comprehensive peace proposals (Lizée, 
1999: 60). The USA employed three main methods to bring about a successful peace 
resolution. First, the country prepared detailed UN-centred peace proposals after the end of 
the PCC in August 1989 (Solomon, 2000: 34). Based on ideas suggested by Australia, the 
US’s peace proposals formed the UN Security Council’s peace initiatives, which comprised a 
‘Framework Document’ (August 1990) and an ‘Implementation Plan’ (November 1990). 
Second, the US made various diplomatic efforts to bring the parties to the negotiation table. 
The US demonstrated its strong support for the non-communist groups by appointing US 
congressmen to visit their refugee camps. In addition, the US made official calls urging the 
non-communist resistance groups to pursue negotiation more seriously (Haas, 1991: 254-5) 
and officially withdrew its support for the PDK (Solomon, 2000: 34; Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 
70; Richardson, 2009: 149). Third, the US applied economic pressure by restricting its aid to 
non-military support of the two non-communist resistance factions. In addition, American 
economic cooperation with Vietnam became more direct and active. For instance, 
approximately $11 million of US aid went to Vietnam through private organisations in 1990 
(Haas, 1991: 256-7). 
However, as the interplay between the Cambodian national factions and the international 
interveners intensified, tension between the two sides exacerbated. The Australian and UN 
peace proposals, which were based on a liberal peace model, failed to reflect the national 
factions’ fundamental interests. Both proposals aimed at producing a free and neutral political 
environment in which the Cambodian people’s will could be expressed. The UN Security 
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Council’s ‘Framework Document’ in August 1990, which the US supported with 
recommendations and coordination, is a good example of the interveners’ misreading of the 
national factions’ aims and interests. The document made four recommendations on the 
transitional authority issue: (1) UNTAC would control the processes of a national election;60 
(2) a Supreme National Council (SNC) would be established in order to represent Cambodian 
sovereignty; (3) the composition of the SNC would be decided by the national factions; and 
(4) although the bureaucratic structure of the SOC would remain, all military forces would be 
dissolved (UN Security Council, 1990a; Appendix, Section I, Article 1, 2, & 3; Lizée, 1999: 
68; Haas, 1991: 287).61 The document also declared that UNTAC would be the central 
governing body during the transitional period and that the SNC would play only a nominal 
role. Although its detailed suggestions differed, ‘Cambodia: An Australian Peace Proposal’, 
released in early 1990, and the UN’s follow-up ‘Implementation Plan’ of November 1990 
were based on the same liberal peace principle (Lizée, 1999: 64. 69; Haas, 1991: 217; UN 
Security Council, 1990b, Annex 1, Section I, Article 8 and 10). 
These recommendations were inconsistent with the fundamental assumption of the warring 
factions that the character and composition of the transitional authority would determine their 
political survival. However, the interveners did not try to reconcile these contradictions, 
convince the factions that a completely neutral authority could emerge, or formulate a 
concrete plan to enforce their ideas. Rather, the UN P-5, including the US, paid more 
attention to avoiding the controversies that the documents were anticipated to arouse within 
the Western community, such as their pronouncement on the inclusion of the PDK in the 
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 The idea UNTAC’s central role was developed in this period. Until the first Paris Conference on Cambodia in 
1989, it was widely accepted that the transitional government should consist of Cambodians. The controversial 
issue was whether it would be a quadripartite government that would grant the four factions an equal number of 
seats or a bipartite body that would give 50% of the seats to the PRK and the CGDK. 
61
 In fact, many ideas in the UN’s peace proposals for Cambodia were referenced from the peace process in 
Namibia (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 132; Heininger, 1994: 6). 
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transitional authority (Solomon, 1999: 307).  
In order to bring the SOC on board, the US began to provide economic and diplomatic 
incentives to Hun Sen. Diplomatically, the US officially withdrew its support for the CGDK’s 
representation of Cambodia in the UN and accepted direct talks with the Hun Sen 
government in July 1990 (Solomon, 2000: 45-6). Economically, in addition to the lifting of 
economic sanctions against the SOC, the US decided to provide approximately $10 million of 
humanitarian aid to the de facto Cambodian government (Haas, 1991: 237, 286; Richardson, 
2009: 149).  
Nevertheless, the SOC viewed the Framework Document’s proposals, especially the 
proposals on the transitional authority, as harmful to its goals. Although the preservation of its 
organisation was good news for the SOC, UNTAC’s control over electoral processes would 
remove the privileges that the SOC’s governmental status had afforded. Moreover, since the 
PDK’s guerrilla forces were more easily able to avoid UNTAC verification of their 
demobilisation, the dissolution of all military forces was likely to benefit the PDK. These 
views were reflected in their responses toward the US’s increased pressure. 
Despite the SOC’s reservations, the strengthened incentives and pressure from the US, 
together with the transformation in its advocate state’s diplomatic position62, convinced the 
SOC to adopt more a flexible attitude in the peace negotiations (Solomon, 1999: 311).  
Pointing to this, Son Soubert, a core leader of the KPNLF and a son of Son Sann, explains: 
The international community, especially the UN and the US, applied strong 
pressure on us (the four national factions) to accept their peace proposals. 

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 Vietnam, which had developed a closer relationship with China, withdrew its demands for a minimal role for 
UNTAC in this period. 
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However, their goals were different from ours. Nonetheless, for all of us, it 
was very difficult to escape their pressure. We saw Hun Sen announce that 
the SOC would accept most of the UN’s proposals, but we did not take the 
announcement as reflecting his true intention (Son Soubert, 2009: Author’s 
Interview). 
Accepting the SNC as an unavoidable reality, the SOC changed its main strategy from 
claiming legitimacy as the sole government to maximising its interest in the council. For 
example, two weeks after the announcement of the UN’s ‘Framework Document,’ the 
Cambodian national factions agreed to form a twelve-member Supreme National Council 
(Solomon, 2000: 73) and endorsed the Framework Document (Accord, 1998: 19; Doyle, 
1995: 17).  
Under pressure from the international community, the negotiations between the Cambodian 
national factions on the composition of the SNC progressed throughout 1990. The CGDK 
initially demanded that each faction should hold 25 per cent of the SNC membership, 
whereas the SOC insisted on a membership formula comprising a 50:50 distribution between 
the SOC and the CGDK (Haas, 1991: 203-5). The breakthrough came in April 1990, when 
Prince Sihanouk accepted a 6:6 distribution of seats between the SOC (Haas, 1991: 232). 
Two weeks later, in exchange of these developments, the SOC accepted the PDK as part of 
the authority. These proposals were reconfirmed when Sihanouk and Hun Sen met in Japan in 
June 1990 (Lizée, 1999: 66-67; Haas, 1991: 282). In short, Hun Sen gained a concession 
from the CGDK on the composition of the SNC’s membership while acquiescing to the 
inclusion of the PDK (Solomon, 1999: 312). 
The SOC continued to exhibit a relatively flexible attitude in the subsequent period. For 
instance, when the foreign ministers of the UN P-5 and the UN Secretary-General urged the 
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SOC to accept Sihanouk as the chairman of the SNC in September 1990, the faction revised 
its adamant adherence to the ‘no leader’ idea and proposed ‘some compromise formulae such 
as co-chairs and rotation patterns’ (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 77). As the PRK’s attitudes 
became more receptive, the internal confrontation on Hun Sen’s reformist ideas against 
traditional socialist stance exacerbated in mid 1990. The hardliners in the PRK/SOC pressed 
the prime minister to be tougher in the negotiation; nevertheless, Hun Sen continued its 
policies (Haas, 1991: 235-7). Ultimately, the Cambodian parties proclaimed the first ceasefire 
in April 1991 (Accord, 1998: 19). 
In short, the US and other third-party interveners succeeded in pressurising the PRK to 
consent to their core demands on demilitarisation and the transitional authority. However, the 
national factions’ collaboration on ending the conflict, based as it was on diplomatic and 
economic incentives and pressure from the US and other impartial interveners, would not last 
long. 
Phase 3: End of 1990 – October 1991 
During Phase 3, the PRK challenged the external intervention, while the international 
community, including the UN, exhibited much less enthusiasm in promoting the progress of 
the conflict resolution process in Cambodia. Thus, many of the UN proposals that had gained 
the agreement of the Cambodian national factions were reversed or significantly modified. 
Recognising that the international community had become less enthusiastic about 
involvement in the Cambodian peace process and acknowledging the increased Chinese 
support for more independent roles for the national factions (Lizée, 1999: 72)63, the SOC 
tried to exclude external actors from involvement in the Cambodian factions’ discussions on 
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 The details of Chinese policies on the Cambodian issue are discussed in Chapter 4. 
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the peace processes. The SOC’s first goal in this period was resisting the UNTAC 
arrangement (Solomon, 2000: 74). Since there was much less pressure being applied by the 
Western interveners, Hun Sen’s only de facto obstacle was the strong resistance of the PDK 
against any compromise. 
In pursuing his goals, Hun Sen used two strategies: developing a good relationship with 
China and convincing other CGDK leaders to agree to his proposals, with the aim of 
minimising the negotiating power of the PDK. First, he utilised China’s willingness to 
support the peace negotiation. For instance, when the PDK refused to accept the proposal on 
Sihanouk’s role as SNC chairman and the composition of the SNC (7:7), which the other 
factions had agreed at the meeting in Jakarta in early June 1991, Hun Sen ignored the 
opposition while securing continued PDK participation in the negotiations by taking 
advantage of the improving relationship between Vietnam and China to apply pressure on the 
PDK (Lizée, 1999: 73). As a result, this meeting became ‘the beginning of a major 
breakthrough’ in the negotiation process (Brown, 1992: 90).  
Second, he tried to gain unanimous agreement for his proposals from the other two CGDK 
groups. For example, when UNTAC’s proposed role was on the table in Pattaya in August 
1991, the SOC succeeded in reversing the decisions of the UN’s P-5 on the transitional 
authority. In the discussions, the SOC claimed that direct control by UNTAC merely 
amounted to further governance by a foreign power, and little more than a continuation of the 
one hundred-year long French colonisation, but the strong regional influence of the US was 
relatively successful in persuading the other factions to agree to UNTAC control.64 
Furthermore, it persuaded other Cambodian factions to reverse a number of international 
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64
 For instance, Lu Lay Sreng, the first vice-president of FUNCINPEC, said, “It was ridiculous that the PRK, the 
puppet of Vietnam, talked about Cambodians’ rule. However, although I didn’t trust the words much, we 
couldn’t say it was wrong that Cambodia should be ruled by Cambodians” (Lu Lay Sreng, 2009, Author’s 
Interview). 
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interveners’ decisions on the transitional authority.  
A number of important decisions related to the transitional authority were made in this period 
and included the following: (1) resolution of all disagreements within the SNC should occur 
through its internal conflict resolution mechanism rather than by simply complying with the 
decisions of UNTAC; (2) the SNC should assume greater legitimacy than a nominal 
representative of Cambodian sovereignty and should play an increased role in the peace 
process; (3) and each factions’ military capacity should be reduced by 70 per cent rather than 
undergoing complete dissolution (Final Communiqué of the Supreme National Council of 
Cambodia, 29 August 1991, U.N. document A/46/494 and S/23066, 24 September 1991; PCC 
Co-Chairs report, A/46/418 and S/23011, 4 September 1991).  
These decisions were clearly beneficial to the SOC’s pursuit of its interests and ran contrary 
to the proposals suggested by the UN. The first two decisions provided the SOC with grounds 
to intervene and refuse to accept UNTAC’s implementation policies. The last decision 
enabled the SOC to possess a military capability, which it considered essential in order to 
defend itself against possible attacks by the PDK. In short, the SOC was able to maintain its 
superior status in terms of administrative and military organisation during the transitional 
period. 
However, the decisions would make realisation of the UN P-5’s ideas very difficult, if not 
impossible. First, establishing a neutral political environment for the election by eliminating 
the existing political powers would be difficult because the UN had consented to the retention 
of the SOC’s administration in its ‘Framework Document’ of August 1990, and the SOC 
could exploit its position as the de facto government by drawing on the relatively autonomous 
power of the SNC. Second, although the SOC’s preservation of 30 per cent of its military 
forces was crucially important to the pursuit of its interests, this decision made UNTAC’s 
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verification of the demilitarisation process very difficult. Thus, the Cambodian national 
factions were able to keep military forces in reserve in order to resist UNTAC’s 
implementation with force if necessary. 
Nevertheless, the US did not pay sufficient attention to the issues that lay behind the 
Cambodian national factions’ modification of the UN’s proposals. The country in this period 
displayed an ambivalent posture. In early 1991, American domestic outrage against the PDK, 
boosted by mass media coverage of its disastrous rule (by ABC in particular), dampened the 
Bush administration’s enthusiasm for coordinating the Cambodian resistance groups’ 
behaviour (Solomon, 2000: 66-9). Therefore, the United States distanced itself from the PDK 
and began to establish a closer relationship with Vietnam and the SOC by enhancing 
economic cooperation and by opening talks on the return of American MIAs still held in 
Vietnam (Haas, 1991: 286). However, this strategy did not produce the expected outcomes 
because the PRK gradually tried to be more independent from Vietnam as the PRK believed 
Vietnam became more selfish (Ieng Mouly, 2009: Author’s Interview). Moreover, the Bush 
government became increasingly uncomfortable with the unpredictable and independent 
attitude of Sihanouk and considered supporting General Sak Sutsakhan as an alternative 
candidate to head a democratic government in Cambodia (Haas, 1991: 257).  
Hence, the US and other international interveners did not play an active role. Rather, they left 
the decisions on the detailed issues of the proposal to the factions themselves rather than 
making sustained efforts to develop a blueprint for the transitional authority (Brown & 
Zasloff, 1998: 92). For instance, although the US had chances to raise its concerns about the 
Pattaya agreements at the P-5 session on the last day of the Pattaya meeting, at a final SNC 
meeting convened by the P-5 in late September, and at the meeting between President Bush 
and Sihanouk in September, it failed to do so (Solomon, 2000: 76-7). 
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As a result, the second PCC in October 1991 produced four agreements. The transitional 
authorities consisted of three main organisations: UNTAC, a UN body supervising the 
implementation process; the SNC, a council representing Cambodian sovereignty; and the 
PRK government. Moreover, with regard to demilitarisation, at least 70 per cent of all 
existing factions were supposed to be demobilised (Political Settlement Agreement Annex 2 
Article V).  
The agreements were the hybrid of the UN P-5’s proposal and the national factions’ 
modifications. However, the hybrids were a simple mixture of the ideas that had been 
moulded by the actors’ differing perceptions rather than a compromise between them.65 First, 
some basic themes of liberal peace, such as free and fair elections and freedom from human 
rights abuse, were incorporated into the agreements. Furthermore, the agreements generally 
heeded the P-5’s call for UNTAC’s central role in administrative issues. The governmental 
sectors, particularly the ones dealing with foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public 
security, and information were to be directly controlled by UNTAC (Political Settlement 
Agreement, Part I, Section II, Article 2).  
Second, however, the SNC became a nationalist authority that would not permit a foreign 
power (UNTAC) to become the dominant force in Cambodia. The Paris agreements accepted 
that the SNC, a ‘unique legitimate body and source of authority’, ‘offers advice to UNTAC, 
which will comply with this advice’ (Political Settlement Agreement, Part I, Section III & 
Annex 1, Section A, Article 2-b). In fact, the power of the SNC expanded beyond the level 
that the UN had envisioned in its original proposal, which had limited the role of the SNC to 
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 In fact, the conference in Paris was a process to aggregate pre-consented agreements rather than another 
forum for discussion. 
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mere ‘consultation’ (Implementation Plan, November 1991, cited in Lizée, 1999: 92).66   
Moreover, the UN P-5’s decision to entrust administration to the SOC structure during the 
transitional period should have been reconsidered. Since the intention had been for the UN to 
wield absolute power during the transitional period, preservation of the SOC structure did not 
appear to be a serious problem. However, once the SNC was allowed to play a relatively 
independent role, and since the SOC controlled the majority of seats in the SNC, it should 
have been foreseen that the SOC would attempt to dominate the election process. However, 
believing that the SOC would ‘tolerate without giving away their preelection advantage’, 
international interveners simply accepted the UN’s proposal, a proposal that had been made 
under completely different assumptions of the role that the UN would take during the 
transitional period (Brown, 1992: 92; Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 102). 
In short, the reduced enthusiasm of the US and other external third parties allowed the PRK 
to renegotiate and modify the pre-agreed provisions in Phase 3. As the interveners simply 
adopted these changed ideas without considering their outcomes at the PCC, the final peace 
agreements became a poorly coordinated mixture of Western ideas of peace and the 
Cambodian national factions’ decision to resist the ideas. 
Phase 4: October 1991 – July 1993 
After the PPAs, the efforts of the Cambodian national factions to challenge the UN’s proposal 
became more evident. During this period, external actors did not pay much attention to the 
Cambodian peace processes, assuming that the negotiation process had ended and the 
remaining issues were solely about ‘implementation’ of the agreed processes. However, this 
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 What is more, the details of how to balance the administrative power of UNTAC and the legitimate power of 
the SNC remained unaddressed. Inevitably, disputes between the actors on how to interpret the agreements arose. 
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was another mistaken assumption underpinned by the external actors’ ethnocentric 
interpretation of negotiation, and the Cambodian national factions (except for the KPNLF) 
continued to try to renegotiate or redefine the details of the agreement in order to achieve 
their fundamental goals (Heder, 1999: 115).67 While the PDK tried to transform the 
unfavourable political situation by demonstrating its military power, the SOC tried to justify 
and expand its political dominance via political tactics.  
The SOC’s efforts chiefly consisted of the following strategies: alliance with Sihanouk in the 
SNC, marginalisation of UNTAC in the governing process, renegotiation with international 
actors, and refusal to accept the election results (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 91-161). First, 
during the initial phase of the implementation, Hun Sen tried to justify and expand the SOC’s 
power in the SNC through an alliance with FUNCINPEC. Consulting closely in a power-
sharing arrangement, Sihanouk and Hun Sen collaborated to exclude the PDK from playing a 
part in the implementation of the PPAs. For instance, on the evening of his arrival in Phnom 
Penh on 7 November 1991, Prince Sihanouk called for an international tribunal on the rule of 
the Khmer Rouge and its atrocities. In addition, Hun Sen allowed (if not organised) a violent 
attack by Cambodian mobs on the PDK representatives to take place in the same month 
(Gottesman, 2004: 345). Soon after, an alliance was forged between FUNCINPEC and the 
SOC for the forthcoming election (Heder, 1999: 136-8). 
Second, after gaining a firm powerbase in the SNC, Hun Sen made efforts to reduce 
UNTAC’s authority and to secure real administrative power for the SOC government from 
early 1992 onwards. The SOC’s efforts to hamper the effectiveness of UNTAC activities 
included ignoring orders from UNTAC, attacks on UNTAC contingents, and refusing to 
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 Although the former negotiators of FUNCINPEC, the SOC, and the KPNLF did not admit that they planned 
to renegotiate the Paris Peace Agreements, most of them insisted that ‘other factions’, especially the PDK and 
the SOC, were ready to ‘oppose’ or ‘redefine’ the agreements (Lu Lay Sreng; Son Soubert; three former 
assistants of factional leaders who do not want to reveal their names, Author’s Interview, 2009). 
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provide necessary facilities to the authority (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 103, 105-6, 110-1; Mu 
Sochua, 2009: Author’s Interview). As a result, UNTAC’s control was ‘never more than 
partial and begrudging’ (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 107; Peou, 2002: 516-7), and the national 
election processes were frequently disordered by the SOC.  
Third, the SOC tried to renegotiate the popular vote principle agreed upon at the PPAs. As the 
SOC and the PDK-orchestrated political violence became serious enough for international 
interveners to anticipate a return to civil war, international actors, including China and France, 
expressed the need to seek an alternative approach to forming a new government. Based on 
these prominent international actors’ concerns, in January 1993, the SNC decided to 
‘reconsider the peace agreement’ and to establish a government of national reconciliation 
(Lizée, 1999: 111-3). The intention was to form a government that would be headed by 
Sihanouk and include all the Cambodian factions so that the forthcoming election did not 
result in another military conflict. Although the SNC’s proposition failed to materialise 
because of strong opposition from the US, which insisted that any future government should 
reflect the people’s democratic will, the SOC did not abandon its desire to secure its 
prominence (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 146-61). 
The election result was released in June 1993, with the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP, the 
political party of the SOC) gaining 38 per cent of the votes and FUNCINPEC 45 per cent 
(Solomon, 2000: 90). Despite all its machinations, the SOC had failed to secure victory, and 
Hun Sen refused to accept the result and threatened to resume military operations (Brown & 
Zasloff, 1998: 167-8). However, after a period of resistance against the newly elected 
government, the CPP entered negotiations, and Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh (a son of 
Sihanouk and the leader of FUNCINPEC) assumed co-premiership (Ashley, 1998: 24). 
Therefore, although the election was supposed to reflect the democratic will of Cambodians, 
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the government was actually formed in accordance with the factional leaders’ objective of 
establishing a government of national reconciliation.  
During this period, external interveners, with the exception of the UN, did not play 
significant roles in the implementation of the Cambodian peace process. The international 
interveners regarded the PPAs as having concluded the negotiations and wanted to declare 
peace and withdraw from involvement in the Cambodian issue as soon as possible (Lizée, 
1999: 124). Rather than devising and employing additional strategies to persuade or coerce 
the Cambodian national factions to implement the peace agreements, the interveners paid 
most attention to technical issues related to the dispatch of UNTAC, which included 
mobilisation of resources, recruitment of staff and military forces, and logistics (Doyle, 2000: 
160-1, 164). Hence, when the national factions ‘violated’ the agreement and changed the 
conditions related to the election, international actors did nothing more than simply call for 
‘keeping the internationally consented agreement’ or accepting the changed situation as a 
reality (Lizée, 1999: 111-3). 
Moreover, the less enthusiastic involvement of external actors in the implementation issues 
caused the UNTAC implementation plan to be delayed. In fact, it was not until 15 March 
1992, six months after the Paris Conference, that UNTAC began to operate in Phnom Penh. 
Although a United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) was dispatched as a 
stopgap, UNAMIC’s limited mandate and resources prevented it from establishing effective 
control over the country in the transitional period (Doyle, 1997: 159; Lizée 1999: 99). During 
the period between the PPAs and the dispatch of UNTAC, the Cambodian national factions, 
especially the SOC, had a relatively long time in which to develop and employ political 
strategies that would ensure that conditions in the run up to the election favoured their faction 
(Heder, 1999: 117).  
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As a result, UNTAC’s mandate, which was ‘the first and largest of its kind in UN history’, 
achieved only partial success. In terms of supervising the national election and overseeing the 
transitional period, UNTAC succeeded in enabling 90 per cent of registered voters to exercise 
their franchise and in encouraging the Cambodian politicians to establish a new assembly and 
government. However, the UN’s more ambitious vision of establishing and maintaining a 
neutral political environment for the free and fair election of a new government based on a 
popular democratic mandate could not be realised (Solomon, 2000: 90; Heininger, 1994: 88-
90; Ashley, 1998: 24; Lizée, 1999: 128). In other words, through its incessant efforts to 
overcome the obstacles posed by the UN’s peace proposal, the PRK finally achieved its goal, 
gaining a prominent position in the new government. 
To summarise, there are two points that this section has intended to make. First, it presented 
the way in which the pattern of interplay between the two actors changed according to the 
phase of the negotiation. When the incentives and pressures from external interveners were 
strong, the PRK/SOC pretended to accept the suggested proposal. However, when it saw a 
possibility to pursue its objectives in the third phase of the negotiation, the PRK/SOC tried to 
change the UN proposal by excluding external actors from the national factions’ negotiation 
processes, by convincing other national leaders, and by using the power of regional states, 
including China and Vietnam. Furthermore, the international interveners simply accepted the 
modified proposals rather than considering their possible outcomes. As a result, the PPAs 
became a confused mix of incompatible ideas based on Western or Cambodian perceptions of 
violence, peace, and negotiation (Figure 5.1 summarises this pattern).  
During the implementation period, the PRK/SOC’s attempts to secure its own interests 
became more direct and obvious during the implementation phase. Although the interveners 
considered the negotiations concluded by the PPAs, the Cambodian national factions wanted 
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to continue their negotiation. Eventually, although UNTAC succeeded in realising a 
nationwide election, the shape of the Cambodian central power was decided mainly by the 
national factions’ negotiation. 
 
Figure 5.1. Dynamics of the Interplay between the PRK and the UN / the US 
 
Note: The lines indicating the strengths of the interveners’ enthusiasm and the PRK’s resistance do not have 
numerical values. 
 
Second, the ‘bounded awareness’ of actors due to their ethnocentric cultural values generated 
conceptions that created a number of perceptual barriers that hampered the effectiveness of 
the Cambodian peace negotiations. Specifically (as shown in Table 5.1), throughout the peace 
process, the US’s definition of what constituted the transitional period and its long-term 
vision of peace prevented it from producing more realistic peace proposals that reflected the 
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Cambodian factions’ fundamental interests. Moreover, especially during Phase 2, different 
understandings of violence and the withdrawal of the PAVN created significant obstacles to 
sound communication between the interveners and the PRK. In Phase 4, the differences 
between the Cambodian factions’ and third-party interveners’ understandings of negotiation 
played a particularly significant role as a barrier to the successful outcome of the peace 
process. 
 
Table 5.1. Major Perceptual Barriers in the Cambodian Negotiation 
Phase I - 
Fundamental Goals 
Definition of Transitional Period 
Phase II Understanding of Violence / Withdrawal of PAVN 
Phase III - 
Phase IV Understanding of Negotiation 
 
 
EL SALVADOR 
This section focuses on the interplay between the United Nations and the FMLN in the 
Salvadoran peace negotiation. The purpose of the narrative section is to help illustrate the 
inter-party interaction and how the parties reacted to each other’s moves. As described in 
Chapter 2, the UN became involved in many civil wars as an impartial mediator between the 
late 1980s and the mid-1990s, including those in Namibia, El Salvador, and Haiti. In 
particular, the UN Secretariat’s active role was one of the most important factors in 
promoting the relative success of the Salvadoran peace negotiation. The FMLN, a coalition of 
five revolutionary military movements, was the counterpart of the Cristiani government in the 
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Salvadoran peace negotiations. The FMLN’s transformation provides a good example of how 
an armed rebel group can become a legal political party through peaceful negotiation. 
As for the intervening actor, it needs to be noted that while the UN Security Council was at 
the forefront of the UN’s intervention in Cambodia, the UN Secretary-General and his 
representatives played the main roles in the Salvadoran mediation. Moreover, while the 
Security Council tried to exert pressure on the Cambodian national factions to accept its own 
peace proposals, in El Salvador, the Secretary-General paid most attention to sustaining the 
negotiations, leaving the conclusions open. 
 
Cultural Values of Actors 
In contrast to the Cambodian case, the actors’ cultural traits did not seriously hamper the 
development of a mutual understanding between the FMLN and the UN since the Salvadoran 
rebel group shared similar ideas about negotiation and peace, and they maintained constant 
and regular communication. 
A number of factors shaped the Salvadoran negotiators’ perceptions of negotiation, peace, 
and violence. First, direct Spanish colonialism, which lasted for approximately 300 years, had 
insulated Central American people (in particular, social elites) from their indigenous cultures 
and formed a new political culture (Prisk, 1991: 118). Secondly, as Christian priests had led 
anti-authoritarian movements since the 1940s, and the core leaders of the FMLN were highly 
educated intellectuals, the military insurgents were well aware of Western themes such as 
human rights, and democracy (Negroponte, 2005: 101-4; McClintock, 1998: 253-6). Thirdly, 
since the Salvadoran government had conducted a series of regular and (relatively) fair 
elections during the 1980s, Salvadoran people understood what democracy was about 
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(Grenier, 1991: 57-9). Finally, Marxism-Leninism, which formed the FMLN’s ideological 
background, provided its main framework for viewing the world (Grenier, 1991: 51-55). 
Thus, the FMLN’s understanding of some of the core issues related to the peace negotiations 
was similar to that of the Western interveners. As regards the FMLN’s concept of negotiation, 
although the FMLN’s approach to negotiation was quite different from the Western (and 
North American) interveners’ time-honoured problem-solving concept (Prisk, 1991: 118), the 
faction’s leaders, who had been educated at the National University, managed the ‘give-and-
take’ mutual concessions well during the Salvadoran peace process based on their conception 
of negotiation as a political task whose aim is to convince other actors to agree with their 
ideas (Juhn, 1998: 93). With regard to liberal peace, through their experience of regular 
elections and socialist ideas, both the Cristiani government and the FMLN were in agreement 
with the UN’s ideas on ‘peace through [a] democratic political process’ and the Western idea 
of ‘the domestic and international legitimacy’ of a political authority (Sullivan, 1994: 84; 
Juhn, 1998: 46, 55). In terms of their attitudes to violence, the FMLN’s Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy considered military action an indispensable part of popular revolution and not 
incompatible with democracy (Grenier, 1991: 62-3). Additionally, the faction assumed that 
continued demonstration of its military power was essential in order to prevent the 
government attempting a military solution (Villalobos, 1989, cited in Grenier, 1991: 56-7, 63). 
Thus, despite strong criticism from many internal and external actors, the FMLN 
recommenced its military campaign against the government during the negotiation process 
(Americas Watch Report, 1990). Nevertheless, as it maintained effective communication 
routes with the UN, the FMLN was able to make assurances that its use of violence aimed to 
strengthen its position in the negotiations and not to spoil the negotiations themselves (Juhn, 
1998: 72). 
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The Aims of Actors 
Until the mid-1980s, the FMLN’s fundamental goal was the ‘triumph of the democratic 
revolution, anti-oligarchic and anti-imperialistic’ through ‘defeat of the counterinsurgency 
project’, or in short, a military victory (FDR-FMLN, ‘Pacto politico’ (March 1987) cited in 
Grenier, 1991: 53).  
By 1989, however, the FMLN had realised that it had lost its chance to achieve its objective, 
and it therefore set more realistic goals. First, in terms of demilitarisation, it sought total 
dissolution of the government’s military force, the Armed Forces of El Salvador (Armada de 
El Salvador, ESAF), and the death squads, including the rapid action battalions (Brigada 
Infantria Reaccionmente Immediamente, BIRIs) in the security corps, the Treasury Police, the 
National Guard68, and the National Directorate of Intelligence (Direccion Nacional de 
Inteligencia; DNI) (FMLN/GOES proposals, 22 June 1990; Juhn, 1998: 62). Disbanding the 
army was critically important for the FMLN since the ESAF leadership had been in de facto 
control of the country for decades (Mouritsen, 2003: 65) and many of its former members had 
joined the FMLN because of their abhorrence towards the ESAF’s human rights abuses.  
Second, in terms of the transitional authority (and in contrast to the Cambodian resistance 
actors, who denied the legitimacy of the PRK), the FMLN accepted the Cristiani 
administration as the legitimate government in the late 1980s. Although it had originally 
demanded a provisional government in which it could share power with the government, the 
FMLN decided to accept the existing political system and to participate in the forthcoming 
elections as a legitimate political party (Prisk, 1991: 119; Juhn, 1998: 47; Grenier, 1991: 
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 The death squads are believed to have been responsible for many civilian deaths, which “peaked at about 800 
a month in the early 1980s.” In particular, the National Guard and Treasury Police were notorious as the most 
brutal ones (Mouritsen, 2003: 66-7). 
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58).69 In addition, it also requested the integration of demobilised FMLN soldiers into the 
ESAF or, alternatively, the formation of a new national army (Karl, 1992: no pagination).  
During the negotiations, the FMLN employed the following main strategies to pressure the 
Cristiani government into accepting its demands. Firstly, due to its strong suspicion about the 
government’s potential for duplicity and its fear that the government would renege on any 
agreements, the military group invited and used the UN as an external mediator. Secondly, it 
frequently conducted military offensives immediately prior to its meetings with the 
government in order to demonstrate its military power. Thirdly, in the later phase of the 
negotiations, it used popular demonstrations and the media to influence other domestic actors 
and external interveners. 
Although the UN did not present specific blueprints for the resolution of El Salvador’s 
conflict, its main goal was ‘to end the armed conflict by political means as speedily as 
possible, promote the democratization of the country, guarantee unrestricted respect for 
human rights and reunify Salvadorian society’ (Geneva Accord (April, 1990) cited in De Soto, 
1999: 362; Munck, 1993: 90). In particular, in keeping with liberal peace ideas, the UN saw 
the establishment of a democratic political system that respected human rights as one of its 
primary goals, regarding it as indispensable for guaranteeing a sustainable peace in El 
Salvador’s (Whitfield, 2001: 36). 
Assuming a neutral mediatory role, the UN made concerted efforts to produce compromise 
peace proposals by using the following strategies. First, the UN consistently demonstrated its 
neutral position in the negotiations by demonstrating that it considered the FMLN an official 
negotiation actor and by treating the Cristiani government and the FMLN as equal contenders 
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 The FMLN also called for changes in the socioeconomic structure of society and investigation into and 
punishment of human rights abuses. However, this thesis excludes these issues from the analysis in order to 
make this section more focused. 
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(Negroponte, 2005: 726, 782-3). Second, the UN Secretariat made efforts to gain support for 
their mediation from other intervening actors, including the US, the USSR, and Cuba (De 
Soto, 1999, 365). Moreover, the UN formed a diplomatic support group in 1989 called the 
Friends of the UN Secretary-General (the Friends) consisting of Spain, Mexico, Venezuela, 
and Colombia (Whitfield, 2007). Third, despite mutual mistrust between the two national 
factions, the UN’s demonstration during the negotiation process of its firm resolve to ensure 
implementation of the agreements convinced the FMLN to remain at the negotiating table 
(Montgomery, 1995).  Fourth, to make the negotiations between the two factions progress 
more smoothly, the UN used a number of major negotiation skills: proposal suggestion, 
shuttle diplomacy before and between talks, changing the issues to be discussed, and using 
deadlines. 
 
Interplay between the Actors in the Negotiation Process 
Phase 1: June 1989 – May 1990 
Phase 1 began in June 1989, when Alfredo Cristiani was elected as president, and ended in 
May 1990 when the two national factions held their first direct meetings. The negotiations in 
this phase focused on confidence building and technical issues related to the future plans and 
agenda items to be discussed (De Soto, 1999: 362). Moreover, a constant pattern of interplay 
between the UN and the FMLN was established in this period: the UN’s neutral but 
empathetic stance towards the FMLN and the FMLN’s compliance with the UN’s mediation.  
Since the two mutually suspicious factions had had no previous interaction, the UN’s 
mediation focused on facilitating meetings. First, the UN began shuttle diplomacy to 
exchange ideas between the national factions before beginning the actual talks (Negroponte, 
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2005: 278; De Soto, 1999: 361). Second, the UN produced a number of provisional draft 
agreements that would provide the foundations for the negotiations. These drafts were 
particularly important at the Mexico City meeting in March 1990 and the Geneva Accords in 
April as a starting point for the negotiations (Sullivan, 1994: 83; Juhn, 1998: 54). Third, at the 
meetings in Geneva (in April) and in Caracas (in May), the UN’s role as a negotiation 
moderator was prominent. It supervised and contributed to the meeting by presenting 
proposals, leading separate discussions with the national factions, and revising the proposals 
(De Soto, 1999: 359-60; Negroponte, 2005: 134). 
Throughout its mediation, the UN’s strong commitment to treating the two warring factions 
as equal negotiators was particularly important in encouraging the FMLN to remain at the 
negotiating table. Despite continuous requests by the San Salvador government and the US to 
regard the incumbent administration as El Salvador’s legitimate government and the FMLN 
as an inferior (or illegal) military group, the UN made it clear that it respected both sides 
equally (Negroponte, 2005: 283). 
The FMLN generally complied with the UN’s mediation in this period. In fact, it was the 
FMLN that requested the UN’s intervention in December 1989. Since the faction was not 
happy with the existing regional peace mediators (under the Esquipulas initiative), a more 
neutral and impartial alternative third-party intervener was necessary (Negroponte, 2005: 
287-8). Initially, the faction had suspicions that the UN was unduly influenced by the United 
States (Negroponte, 2005: 284, 290; Sullivan, 1994: 85). As the UN’s neutral and impartial 
role in the negotiations became clearer, however, the FMLN made use of the UN’s presence 
in the negotiations.  
Before the bilateral talks, the FMLN relied heavily on the UN envoys’ transmission of 
information because it had no direct route through which to contact Cristiani (De Soto, 1999: 
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360). Moreover, in consultation with the UN, the FMLN demonstrated its willingness to 
negotiate by tabling a number of unilateral plans for negotiation or suspension of hostilities 
with conditions favourable to the government (Juhn, 1998: 55, 57). 
After the bilateral negotiations began, the FMLN demonstrated its willingness to make 
concessions on topics under discussion that were critically important to the faction. For 
instance, when the principles and procedural issues were discussed in Geneva in April, the 
rebel group abandoned its request for power sharing in exchange for the government 
consenting to the FMLN’s full integration into civil society (De Soto, 1999: 360). Moreover, 
it also succeeded in engineering a mutual compromise at the Caracas meeting on the agenda 
and rough timetable of future negotiations (Sullivan, 1994: 89; De Soto, 1999: 362-3).  
To summarise, the UN’s neutral but limited coordination succeeded in encouraging the 
FMLN to participate more actively in the peace negotiation. The two important agreements in 
Geneva and Caracas were arrived at without serious difficulty. However, the relatively 
successful start in Phase 1 was also partly because the negotiations did not deal with 
contentious issues and the government did not take the talks seriously (De Soto, 1999: 362). 
Phase 2: May 1990 – December 1990  
Phase 2 marks the period between late May and the end of 1990 in which the negotiations 
experienced a series of deadlocks. Each national faction moulded their demands on the 
disputed issues into specific proposals, which resulted in serious resistance from their 
counterparts. Both employed tactical intransigence in the negotiations in order to improve 
their bargaining positions. In response, the UN intensified its mediating role, but its tactics 
failed to achieve a breakthrough. 
Recognising the deadlock in Phase 2, the UN tried to strengthen its mediation. However, as 
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tension between the two national factions exacerbated, the UN’s coordination of the 
negotiations’ procedural and technical issues did not work. For instance, when serious friction 
between the Salvadoran government and the FMLN on demilitarisation emerged in June at 
the Oaxtepec meeting in Mexico, the UN tried to drive the negotiations forward by setting the 
issue aside. As the two sides called for the UN’s help, Alvaro de Soto, a representative of the 
UN Secretary General, proposed that the focus of the negotiations should be on human rights 
and that the issue of demilitarisation could be dealt with later (Negroponte, 2005: 135). 
Nevertheless, the FMLN ignored the suggestion and revised its demands, submitting more 
radical ones at the San José meeting in Costa Rica and conducting military attacks against the 
government in August.  
Sensing the prospect of a long-term deadlock, the UN took more direct action: submission of 
its own peace proposals (Juhn, 1998: 71, 76; De Soto, 1999: 374). In so doing, it abandoned 
its traditional position as a simple mediator that managed procedural issues and confidence 
building only. However, the two negotiating sides were not persuaded by these proposals and 
were unable to reach an agreement.  
Nevertheless, the UN Secretariat did not exert strong diplomatic or material pressure on the 
FMLN, worrying that this may have a negative effect (Juhn, 1998: 72). Instead, Alvaro de 
Soto continued to have secret meetings with the two factions until the end of the year 
(Montgomery, 1992: 221). 
The FMLN maintained its stubborn attitude towards the UN proposals. Believing that 
concessions would weaken its negotiating position and might help ARENA achieve victory in 
the forthcoming election in March 1991 (Juhn, 1998: 74), the military faction relied on the 
following two strategies. 
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First, the FMLN continually increased its demands at each new meeting. For example, 
although it had simply called for the removal of the ESAF from its domestic policing role at 
the June meeting in Oaxtepec, Mexico (Juhn, 1998: 61), it demanded the complete 
dissolution of the ESAF and the creation of a new civilian police at subsequent meetings 
(Sullivan, 1994: 90; Montgomery, 1992: 221).70 
Second, the FMLN began to conduct military operations and employ them as a negotiation 
strategy, marking the beginning of a pattern of behaviour by the FMLN: submission of a 
proposal accompanied by a demonstration of its military power. For instance, a day before the 
San José meeting in August 1990, the FMLN made an attack on the Presidential Palace in 
San Salvador. In the belief that such a display of its military muscle would strengthen its 
position, it did not abandon this strategy until the end of the negotiations, despite strong 
criticism from external interveners (Juhn, 1998: 70-3). 
In short, although the UN changed its role from ‘a passive mediator’ to ‘an active player’ in 
Phase 2 (Montgomery, 1992: 221), its new type of involvement did not produce the expected 
responses from the FMLN. Thus, the meetings held in Oaxtepec (June), in San José 
(July/August), and in Mexico City (October/November) ended without significant progress 
having been made on demilitarisation and reintegration.  
One important agreement, however, was made in June: an agreement to launch the UN 
Human Rights Monitoring Mission (Sullivan, 1994: 89). Although it was relatively easy for 
the two national factions to agree on a proposal to set up a human rights monitoring authority, 
it eventually resulted in the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (la Oficina de las Naciones 
Unidas en El Salvador, ONUSAL), a UN body that supervised the implementation of the 
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 The only exception was the FMLN’s agreement to talk about the human rights issue in June. However, this 
acceptance caused a strong internal dispute as some conmandates condemned this agreement (Negroponte, 
1996: 133-5). 
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peace accords in Phase 4. 
Phase 3: December 1990 – January 1992 
Phase 3 occurred from December 1990, when the FMLN began to display a more flexible 
attitude, to January 1992, when the Chapultepec Accord was signed. All actors, including the 
UN and the two national factions, were under strong pressure to secure a peace agreement. 
Throughout the intense but difficult process, the UN applied more proactive mediating 
methods, while the FMLN became much more responsive to the UN’s supervision. 
In this period, the UN faced three notable challenges: continuous US pressure on the UN to 
make more aggressive moves; the national factions’ lack of enthusiasm for compromise; and 
other domestic actors’ attempts to participate in the negotiations (Juhn, 1998: 86-98). Given 
these circumstances, therefore, the UN applied the following strategies in order to effect a 
more fruitful outcome to the negotiation.  
First, the UN’s traditional shuttle diplomacy with its own proposals achieved more success. 
For instance, the UN’s formula on the National Civil Police (PNC) broke the two-month long 
stalemate between the two national factions (Juhn, 1998: 107; Sullivan, 1994: 96). To secure 
both sides’ agreement to this proposal, UN negotiators made numerous visits to the factions 
between October and December 1991 (Juhn, 1998: 110-1). 
Second, the UN Secretariat succeeded in increasing other actors’ pressure on the negotiating 
parties. Most significantly, it organised the Friends, which consisted of Mexico, Venezuela, 
Colombia, and Spain, in December 1989. Using their cultural and political affinity with the 
national factions, impartiality as a third party, international influence, and personal 
connection with the leaders in El Salvador, the group’s negotiators supported the UN’s efforts 
(Montgomery, 1995: 145; Whitfield, 2007).  
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In addition, after the failure of its initial efforts, the UN succeeded in persuading the US to 
support its efforts in August 1991 (De Soto, 1999: 374-5; Montgomery, 1995: 144-5). 
Moving away from its support of the Cristiani government, the US became more proactive in 
pressing the government not to obstruct or withdraw from the negotiations and in assuring the 
FMLN that it would respect the UN’s efforts (Sullivan, 1994: 88; Juhn, 1998: 116). 
Third, as more domestic actors began to express their viewpoints on the negotiations, the UN 
tried to discourage these new actors from hampering the process for their partisan interests. 
For instance, when the PDC, together with other political parties, presented their own 
proposals on constitutional reform, the UN did not take them on board, insisting that the 
negotiator should be the government that was elected by the Salvadoran people (De Soto, 
1999: 90-1). 
Fourth, the last significant strategy of the UN was demonstrating its determination to 
implement the agreements. A striking example was the launch of the UN Observer Mission in 
El Salvador (ONUSAL) in July 1990 while military conflict was still ongoing. By conducting 
balanced verification projects on both sides in the war, ONUSAL succeeded in reducing the 
level of human rights violations, building confidence in the implementation process, and 
gaining trust as an impartial actor (Negroponte, 2005: 302-3; Whitfield, 2001: 36). 
The increasing internal demands (e.g. constituencies’ increasing criticism of the prolonged 
conflict) and external pressures (e.g., Nicaragua’s suspension of logistic support) to end 
hostilities and achieve a successful outcome to the negotiations (Juhn, 1998: 79, 106; 
Negroponte, 2005: 325; Sullivan, 1994: 86) encouraged the FMLN not to boycott or sabotage 
the negotiation. Besides, the group had developed a more positive outlook towards the 
negotiations after the New York Agreement in September (Juhn, 1998: 109). Thus, the FMLN 
demonstrated its adoption of a strategically more flexible stance by reducing its demands, 
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actively cooperating with external actors’ mediation, and reducing its military threat.71 In so 
doing, it was clear that its dependence on the UN’s role was growing (Juhn, 1998: 103; 
Montgomery, 1992: 222). 
First, after requesting an intensification of the UN’s mediation in December 1990 
(Montgomery, 1992: 222), the FMLN began to make concessions, the most striking examples 
of which began in April 1991. First, the faction dropped its original demand that Constitution 
Article 248 be changed. Since this article requires that all constitutional changes need to be 
approved by two consecutive assemblies, all negotiations on the Salvadoran constitutions had 
to be completed before the new assembly began its term in April. Moreover, in discussions 
about the reform of the constitution in relation to demilitarisation, it abandoned its long-time 
demand for the inclusion of demilitarised FMLN soldiers in the ranks of the military, in 
exchange for absorbing FMLN soldiers into the National Civil Police (PNC) (Pugh, 2009: 97-
8). 
Second, concerned about the slow pace of the negotiations, the FMLN also proposed changes 
to their format. Abandoning its original demand for open-ended negotiations, it called for a 
remodelling of the talks from their two-stage format into a compressed format in which the 
negotiators would discuss all issues before the proposed ceasefire came into force in June 
(Sullivan, 1994: 92-5).  
Third, after painstaking negotiations in mid-1991, the FMLN also made unilateral 
concessions on some critical issues. For instance, recognising that mutual dissolution of both 
sides was unacceptable to the government, the rebel group decided to change its demand 
from a ‘dissolution’ of the government forces to their ‘profound reform’, including 
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 Immediately after the meetings in September, Handal, a core leader of the FMLN, confirmed this 
transformation by saying, “We don’t want to lose one more person; we’re all going into politics. We don’t want 
to make shows of force. Let’s not screw up two months of work” (Juhn, 1998: 109-10). 
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fundamental changes to the doctrines and training system of the ESAF and the PNC (Juhn, 
1998: 102-3). 
Fourth, in the final period of the negotiations (October - December), the FMLN began to 
make efforts to change the circumstances that limited President Cristiani’s negotiating power. 
For instance, the FMLN undertook a unilateral ceasefire on November 16th in order to 
weaken the resistance of the ESAF against its dissolution (Juhn, 1998: 109-15). Moreover, 
when the government organised a popular march that called for a tougher approach against 
the FMLN in the negotiations, the FMLN also called a mass demonstration against the army 
and appealed to the media to exert pressure on the government to continue the negotiations in 
December (Juhn, 1998: 117). 
As a result, the Cristiani government and the FMLN produced some important peace 
agreements, although each of them required intense and painstaking negotiation. The Mexico 
City Accord of April 1991 was particularly notable because both sides arrived at a principle-
level agreement on demilitarisation and the UN Truth Commission (Negroponte, 2005: 313-
4; Sullivan, 1994: 91-2). The New York Accord in September made further important 
progress on the issues of demilitarisation and human rights (Montgomery, 1992: 224; 
Sullivan, 1994: 94-5). Finally, the Chapultepec Peace Accord, signed on 16 January 1992, 
ended the decades-long civil war in El Salvador. This accord redefined the role and size of 
the ESAF, announced the demobilisation of other military groups, extended the role of 
ONUSAL, and introduced socioeconomic reforms.  
Although the FMLN made significant concessions on its demands during the negotiation 
process, it achieved relative success in defending three of its fundamental goals. Firstly, with 
regard to the complete disbanding of the government’s military machine, the FMLN gained 
the government’s agreement on depoliticisation of the ESAF, reduction in the size of the 
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armed forces, and dissolution of other security forces, including the National Guards, the 
Treasury Police and the BIRIs (Chapultepec Peace Accord, Chapter 1, para 4, 8, 9 & 12).  
Secondly, as regards the integration of FMLN soldiers into the national army, the FMLN 
withdrew its original demands and agreed instead to participation in a new national police 
force (Chapultepec Peace Accord, Chapter 2, para 7). This integration was essential for the 
FMLN’s successful demilitarisation since it provided demobilised soldiers with a future and 
curbed any potential aggression against former FMLN members by the security forces. 
Thirdly, in regards to its participation in Salvadoran politics, the Mexico City Accord and the 
New York Accord, via their endorsement of the establishment of ONUSAL and COPAZ, 
paved the way for equal opportunities for political participation. As a result, the 
implementation of the peace accords was to be controlled by a triangular authority 
comprising the Cristiani government, a Salvadoran multiparty organisation, COPAZ, which 
included the FMLN’s representatives, and ONUSAL of the UN.  
Phase 4: January 1992 – September 1993 
Phase 4 began in January 1992 with the Chapultepec Accord and ended in September 1993 
with the completion of ONUSAL’s missions.72 In this phase, the pattern of interplay between 
the UN and the FMLN did not change much. While ONUSAL displayed a neutral but 
empathetic attitude towards the FMLN, the FMLN cooperated with the recommendations and 
verification of the UN body, although there were some delays and instances of minor 
resistance. 
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 Although a number of UN agencies, including UNDP, UNHCR, and UNICEF, had contributed to the post-
conflict recovery projects in El Salvador, ONUSAL was the most prominent actor and managed to achieve close 
cooperation with the Secretariat (Montgomery, 1995: 146-7). ONUSAL’s main mandates were (1) 
demobilisation of the FMLN and the Salvadoran armed forces, (2) establishment of a new national police force, 
(3) human rights monitoring, (4) election monitoring, and (4) implementing the judicial and socio-economic 
conditions requested in the accord (Montgomery, 1995: 150; Montgomery, 2000: 144). 
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In general, the UN’s determination to accomplish the implementation mission and its neutral 
stance and skilful negotiation skills helped the national factions to complete the agreed tasks. 
In particular, it used the following strategies to encourage the FMLN to abide by the 
Chapultepec Accord: renegotiating the target dates for completion and applying pressure on 
the national factions.  
These points are clearly observed in the UN’s responses to the FMLN’s sabotage of the 
demilitarisation process, which resulted from their concerns about the lack of security 
guarantees for their leaders and constituencies as well as their paucity of resources for 
supporting their demobilised soldiers (Negroponte, 2005: 334-5; Baranyi & North, 1996: 15). 
First, ONUSAL and the UN Secretariat relaxed some of the specific conditions of the 
implementation process, such as its timetable and the forms of demilitarisation. For instance, 
the date set for demobilisation of troops (25 June), as the first step of demilitarisation, was 
rejected by the FMLN as unrealistic, and the UN recommended that the timetable be revised 
and a more realistic date for demobilisation be set (Baranyi & North, 1996: 15; McCormick, 
1997: 286; Montgomery, 1995: 151).  
Second, at the same time, the UN assured the FMLN that the implementation of the 
government forces’ demilitarisation would be completed by taking a tough stance with 
President Cristiani. When the FMLN delayed its disarmament process because of the 
government’s objection to the punishment of some core military leaders who had committed 
human rights abuses in October 1992, the UN envoys had extensive meetings with Cristiani 
and made him promise to implement the demilitarisation process (Baranyi & North, 1996: 
17). During these meetings, the UN, backed by the US, threatened the government that it 
would call for greater pressure from the international community and would release the 
names of the military leaders who had committed human rights abuses (Negroponte, 2005: 
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346-7). These two strategies were repeatedly used until the completion of the UN mission. 
During the initial phase of the implementation, the FMLN was seriously concerned about the 
possibility of government attacks on its supporters and its lack of resources to support its 
demobilised soldiers (Negroponte, 2005: 339). It therefore made very cautious and 
considered moves. Nevertheless, the FMLN overcame these obstacles to its successful 
demilitarisation by renegotiating with the government with help from the UN rather than 
refusing to demilitarise. For instance, when the UN put forward a new proposal in June 1992 
that allowed both ESAF members and the FMLN solders to join the PNC in order to resolve 
the confrontation between the Cristiani government and the FMLN, the rebel group accepted 
this swiftly and completed its concentration project that pursued gathering all military troops 
at certain places as a process of demobilisation (Negroponte, 2005: 339). 
Once mutual demilitarisation was carried out and the FMLN became aware of the extent of 
the internal resistance within the government to President Cristiani, the FMLN became much 
more flexible towards and supportive of the president’s peace initiatives. For instance, 
although the government failed to meet the UN’s recommendations, the FMLN accepted the 
president’s decision to decrease the pace at which the military was to be disbanded (US 
Embassy San Salvador cable #00639, cited in Negroponte, 2005: 346). 
Although some problems persisted, such as ONUSAL’s inadequate verification process and a 
breakdown in the FMLN’s internal unity (McCormick, 1997: 297; Baranyi & North, 1996: 
18; Whitfield, 2001: 37-8), the implementation of the Chapultepec Accord was relatively 
successful.  By the end of 1992, the FMLN’s forces had been demobilised and the size of the 
government’s army reduced by half. Other military agencies, including the BIRIs, the 
Treasury Police, and the PNC, had been completely disbanded or replaced by new 
organisations (Montgomery, 1995: 158; Call, 2003: 394-5).  
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As regards the actors’ goals, the FMLN succeeded in achieving its two main objectives: the 
disbanding of the ESAF and other governmental military agencies and the FMLN’s 
integration into Salvadoran society. The provisions in the Chapultepec Accord that 
guaranteed the depoliticisation of the ESAF, the disbanding of other military agencies, the 
reintegration of FMLN soldiers into civilian life, and the remodelling of the FMLN as a 
political party (see Phase 3) were eventually carried out, although there were some delays and 
minor modifications to the provisions (Whitfield, 2001: 34-5). The FMLN was recognised as 
a legitimate political party and participated in the election in 1994 (Negroponte, 2005: 343). 
Even though the FMLN failed to gain a majority of the vote and rumours of electoral fraud 
spread, the FMLN leaders accepted the result.  
The UN also achieved relative success in the pursuit of their goals: the establishment of a 
democratic political system, and in particular, an improvement in Salvadoran social 
conditions. For instance, ONUSAL improved human rights conditions significantly and 
managed to oversee a relatively free and fair electoral process. In addition, it also reformed 
various social institutions, including restructuring the national assembly, launching new 
human rights organisations within the government, and reforming the army (Montgomery, 
1995: 156-7; Whitfield, 2001: 34-5). Noting this, the UN stated that ONUSAL’s activities 
opened-up ‘political space for democratic participation’ (UN, 1997: no pagination). 
 
In summary, two points need to be discussed. First, the UN constantly maintained a neutral 
and non-threatening mediation with both national negotiators by using diplomatic 
coordination and negotiation skills throughout the whole negotiation period. The FMLN 
cooperated with the UN because it required the UN’s mediation in order to achieve its goals. 
To demonstrate the dynamics more specifically, figure 5.2 summarises the change in the two 
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sides’ interplay phase by phase. In Phase 1, the two actors readily established a good 
relationship because the negotiations were not taken seriously. In Phase 2, however, the 
FMLN continually refused to countenance the UN’s calls for compromise. As external and 
internal pressure intensified and the UN intervention became more proactive, the FMLN 
gradually complied with the UN’s supervision and agreed to the final peace accord in Phase 3. 
Finally, during the implementation phase, the two actors cooperated more closely. 
 
Figure 5.2. Dynamics of the Interplay between the FMLN and the UN 
 
 
Second, with regard to the effect of the actors’ cultures on the negotiation, misunderstanding 
due to ethnocentric culture did not play a prominent role in the Salvadoran negotiation. The 
FMLN leaders and UN representatives shared similar conceptions of negotiation and peace. 
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Since the leading mediator from the UN, Alvaro de Soto, was a Peruvian, miscommunication 
due to differences in culture was minimised.73 Second, although the FMLN’s understanding 
of violence was significantly different from that of many external interveners, it successfully 
avoided misunderstanding of the intention behind its continuous military operation by 
demonstrating that its use of violence was to gain a better bargaining position in the 
negotiations. The organisation’s effective use of mass media and political movements meant 
that the FMLN avoided any serious misunderstandings with the UN as to its intentions. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has studied the interplay between the national factions and the impartial third-
party mediators in Cambodia and El Salvador. The preceding analysis shows a number of the 
features of the interplay. In general, the two cases shared a number of similar characteristics: 
the interveners’ diplomatic efforts were met with a wide range of responses by national 
factions. The US, in the Cambodian case, and the UN, in the Salvadoran negotiation, made 
constant efforts to promote peaceful resolution of the conflicts. Although there were some 
changes in their level of enthusiasm, their basic stance did not change during the negotiation 
periods.  
Furthermore, both impartial third parties relied heavily on diplomatic incentives and pressure, 
pressure that usually resulted from their legitimate, moral, diplomatic, and, from time to time, 
personal influence. Their main methods of intervention were diplomatic, such as presenting 
peace proposals and controlling procedural issues. As regards the types of interplay, the 
impartial interveners’ interplay with the national factions in both cases took the form of either 
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 In fact, de Soto recalls that many of the US’s complaints about the UN mediation were made due to its 
misunderstanding of cultural issues, something that he could avoid (De Soto, 1999: 373). 
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normative or ideational interplay.74 Most efforts that the UN made during the Salvadoran 
peace negotiations, such as its calls for the Salvadoran national factions to display a stronger 
political will to achieve a peaceful resolution of the war, its frequent criticism of the 
Salvadoran government’s reluctant cooperation with the UN, and its diplomatic pressure 
through the Friends of the UN Secretary General are examples of their normative interplay. 
The international conferences that were organised by third-party actors, including the 
International Conference on Kampuchea in 1981 and the Paris Peace Conference on 
Cambodia in 1989, are examples of their ideational interplay. 
In response to the external interveners’ efforts, the PRK in Cambodia and the FMLN in El 
Salvador took a wide range of actions, from complete refusal to conditional acceptance. More 
specifically, their responses included refusing to accept the suggested proposals, presenting 
alternative proposals, accepting the proposals but with conditions attached, and applying 
counter-pressure through their advocate states. 
More importantly, the patterns of interplay in Cambodia and El Salvador demonstrate that the 
stronger and more substantial intervention in the later periods of the peace processes 
promoted more flexible and committed attitudes on the part of the national factions. Just like 
the US’s heightened pressure in Phase 2 succeeded in forcing the PRK to accept the UN’s 
peace proposals, the UN managed to persuade the FMLN to abide by its procedural 
coordination and provisional proposals in Phases 3 and 4. Although further research is needed 
for generalisation of this finding, it indicates that the external interveners’ enthusiasm was an 
important factor in changing the national factions’ attitudes towards the peace negotiations in 

74
 Stokke proposes three types of interplay: utilitarian interplay, normative interplay, and ideational interplay. 
The actors in utilitarian interplay consider costs and benefits important. Normative interplay is generally 
determined by the norms that are expected to be commonly respected by the actors in a certain community. 
Ideational interplay indicates a focus on the institutional learning process, from which an actor can learn how to 
behave (see Chapter 2 for details).  
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Cambodia and El Salvador.  
However, the case studies also show that the impartial parties did not decisively influence the 
national factions’ behaviour. In fact, the PRK and the FMLN tried to exploit the mediators’ 
contribution to achieve their own goals, and they demonstrated little willingness to alter their 
fundamental attitudes to comply with the mediators’ requests. Although the PRK showed 
ostensible compliance with the UN proposals when US pressure was strong, it made 
continuous efforts to nullify the expected negative effects of the proposals on its de facto 
governing power in the following periods. Moreover, in the absence of other external actors 
to aid the UN’s diplomatic efforts, the UN’s strong desire for success in the Salvadoran peace 
negotiations failed to convince the FMLN to compromise during Phase 2. 
Additionally, this chapter has illustrated that differences between actors’ ethnocentric cultures 
might hamper the effectiveness of third-party intervention. Assuming that the Western peace 
process model was universally applicable, international interveners in Cambodia, including 
the United States, France, and Australia, pushed the Cambodian warring factions to accept 
their peace proposals without understanding how the proposals would be perceived by the 
national actors. As a result, many resolutions were formed by incorporating the contradictory 
ideas of the international and national actors; as a result, these resolutions failed to facilitate 
effective post-conflict peace processes. Although the Paris Peace Agreement ostensibly as 
appeared to be a good mixture of Western ideas and Cambodian cultural values, liberal peace 
principles completely failed to materialise during the implementation phase. By contrast, the 
FMLN’s good understanding of Western ideas on peace and negotiation and the leading UN 
negotiators’ cultural closeness with El Salvador helped the national rebel group and the UN to 
avoid serious mutual misunderstandings. 
The significance of these findings will be made clearer by their comparison and contrast with 
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the interplay between the national factions and their advocate states in the following chapter. 
Chapter 6 studies the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador by focusing on the 
relationships between the PDK (Khmer Rouge) and China in the Cambodian case and 
between the Cristiani government and the US in the Salvadoran negotiation. The studies in 
Chapter 6 will demonstrate that the methods of external intervention and the national 
factions’ responses are strikingly different from those displayed this chapter. However, the 
general patterns of interplay appear to be similar; in other words, the enthusiasm of the 
advocate states is expected to result in national factions exhibiting more flexible attitudes. In 
addition, Chapter 6 also points to a number of requirements for successful peace negotiations 
that the national factions’ interplay with the impartial third parties does not reveal. 
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Chapter 6 
The Interplay between National Factions and Advocate States 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Although this chapter also examines the changes in the strategic moves of the national 
factions and international interveners in Cambodia and El Salvador by focusing on the pattern 
of interplay and the role of perception, the research focus is different from that in Chapter 5 
in two respects. In terms of actors, whereas Chapter 5 considered the interplay between a 
faction and an impartial external intervener with relatively few strong interests in the conflict, 
the actors studied in this chapter are national factions and their advocate countries: the Party 
of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK, the official name of the Khmer Rouge) and China in the 
Cambodian case, and the Cristiani government and the US in the Salvadoran case. Moreover, 
while the main source of the actors’ interpretations of various issues under negotiation (e.g. 
the actors’ understanding of the war itself, their main goals, external actors’ intentions and the 
like) in Chapter 5 was the interveners’ ethnocentric cultural values, this chapter focuses on 
the national factions’ limited facility and intention to comprehend their circumstances.   
First, the dynamics of the national factions’ interaction with their advocate states is at the 
centre of the analysis. The two case studies show that the general pattern of interplay between 
factions and advocates was similar to the pattern presented in Chapter 5: the stronger the 
engagement of the advocate states, the more significant the changes in the national factions’ 
negotiating attitudes. However, the important difference between the subjects of analysis in 
this chapter and those in Chapter 5 is their impartiality: the ways in which China and the US 
behaved differed significantly from the behaviour of international actors who had no serious 
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political or economic interests in the conflict (i.e. the UN in El Salvador). An advocate’s 
negotiating position is not impartial since it normally has strong interests in the conflict and 
desires to lead the war in a direction that favours these interests. By contrast, impartial third-
party interveners without strong interests in the conflicts maintain relatively constant 
relationships with each national faction.  
Furthermore, with regard to influence, an advocate state may have a stronger influence on the 
national faction that it supports. Whereas impartial interveners need to apply new incentives 
or pressures on the faction, an advocate state possesses an existing military, economic, or 
diplomatic relationship with the faction that it can use as a source for its response rules. The 
study below shows that the strong pressure from China and the US succeeded in bringing 
about a dramatic transformation of the resistant attitudes of the PDK and the Cristiani 
government, respectively. 
In addition, the divergent patterns of the interplay in the later periods of the two negotiation 
processes and their outcomes show that the constant attention of advocate states and close 
mutual communication were key to successful intervention. Whereas the abrupt 
discontinuation of Chinese economic and military aid to the PDK, based on China’s 
miscalculation of the national faction’s intentions, resulted in the PDK rescinding its consent 
to the Paris Peace Accords, the US’s incessant use of pressure and incentives on the ESAF 
enabled President Cristiani to complete the mandate set out in the Chapultepec Accord.  
Second, this chapter pays attention to the limitations in the national factions’ communication 
institutions, which acted as an obstacle hampering the effectiveness of external actors’ 
intervention. If Chapter 5 demonstrated that the actors’ ethnocentric cultural values hampered 
their development of mutual understanding, this chapter studies the misunderstandings that 
arose between national factions and external interveners that understood each others’ cultural 
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features. When the US transformed its approach towards critical interests, the Cristiani 
government responded swiftly to the changes, whereas when China did the same in the 
Cambodian case, the PDK did not perceive the significance of these changes until the end of 
the negotiation. Furthermore, while China failed to recognise and meet the needs of the PDK 
during the implementation period, the US successfully managed to supply what President 
Cristiani lacked in order to complete the peace accords. This chapter demonstrates that one of 
the most important reasons for this difference was their distinctive internal and external 
communication systems.  
The actors chosen as the study targets for analysis are the PDK in Cambodia and the Cristiani 
government in El Salvador. Since they were both less enthusiastic about negotiation than the 
other national factions, they effectively illustrate the role that advocate states can play in 
changing national factions’ attitudes. 
Each case study begins with a short description of the actors’ fundamental and mid-term 
goals. Then, after dividing the negotiation periods into a number of phases, the changes in the 
pattern of interplay between the national faction and its external supporter throughout the 
negotiation phases are described. In the Cambodian case, significant perceptual issues that 
affected the behaviour of the actors in each phase are also presented. The chapter concludes 
with some findings and a brief summary. 
 
CAMBODIA 
This section focuses on the mutual exchanges in the negotiation strategies of China and the 
PDK. Throughout the entire duration of the Cambodian civil war, China played one of the 
most critical roles as the advocate state of the CGDK and of the PDK in particular. Although 
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China partially supported the PDK’s military campaigns by providing diplomatic, economic, 
and military aid until the mid-1980s, it contributed to the progress of the negotiation as a 
relatively impartial negotiation facilitator in the later period. The PDK was the most stubborn 
Cambodian actor in the peace negotiation. As a result of its self-delusions, the faction 
continuously refused to negotiate with the PRK regime until the last phase of the negotiation. 
 
The PDK’s Self-Perception and its Sources 
As explained in Chapter 1, many negotiators had a bounded awareness that prevented them 
from seeing and evaluating information in accurate ways. The PDK also failed to develop 
effective negotiation strategies because its decisions were based on many misconceptions 
during the Cambodian peace negotiation process. There are three reasons for its lack of self-
awareness. 
First, the PDK lacked a sound communication system that linked the top leadership and the 
combatants on the frontline. From early 1960, when Pol Pot was elected as the leader of the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK, the predecessor of PDK), the faction had been led by 
a small number of French-educated leaders, but the majority of its soldiers were very young 
and uneducated (Peou, 2000: 102). Moreover, although the CPK had ousted Lon Nol’s 
Khmer Republic and had established Democratic Kampuchea in 1975, the party leadership 
had failed to develop an effective administrative structure. Thus, during its four-year rule, 
Cambodia was run by a poorly functioning military structure (Chandler, 1992: 112). In this 
period, communication meant ‘orders and education from the Angka (party)’ rather than 
mutual conversations between ‘the party and the people, between the internal organisations, 
and between the leadership and normal members’ (Men Sourn, 2009: Author’s Interview). 
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Although there were many informers, they only reported information to party leaders. In 
many cases, the information frequently failed to be transmitted beyond the regional division 
that were operating independently. Externally, although ‘the PDK had representatives and 
ambassadors in France, Switzerland, and other communist countries,’ the agencies ‘did not 
play active roles in communicating with’ the figures that were involved in the Cambodian 
peace negotiation (Chhin Kim Thong, 2009: Author’s Interview). Thus, when the Cambodian 
civil war occurred, the PDK did not have any system capable of transmitting and receiving 
good information.  
Second, the rivalry and tensions between the small groups within the leadership prevented 
them from assessing their situation correctly. The PDK leadership consisted of a number of 
separate groups whose relationships were characterised by serious mutual mistrust, and 
power struggles between them were common (Quinn, 1982, cited in Peou, 2000: 103; 
Etcheson, 1984: 164). In particular, the rivalry between the divisions in the Eastern Zone 
(pro-Chinese) and the groups in the Western zone (pro-Vietnam) was significant (Peou, 2000: 
103). Moreover, although meetings of the PDK leaders were held regularly, the leaders rarely 
shared what they experienced with other groups.75 Thus, internal and external information 
was not aggregated effectively. What is worse, when certain problems emerged, accurate 
assessment of the issues related to the problems proved difficult because the leaders tended to 
blame other groups. 
Third, most members of the leadership were strongly reliant either on Vietnamese 
revolutionary doctrine or Chinese Maoist ideology. Since the origins of the PDK lay in the 
Indochinese Communist Party, which had been led by Vietnamese communists, many of the 

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 Chhin Kim Thong, a former commander of the PDK, says, “I know these issues because I worked for the 
intelligence service for many years. Normally, commanders do not know what happened with other troops or 
what other leaders thought” (Chhin Kim Thong, 2009: Author’s Interview). 
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PDK’s political goals and strategies were heavily affected by Vietnamese communist ideas 
(Raszelenberg, 1999: 64-5). Although the PDK broke away from Vietnam in 1960, and its 
resistance against the country became more vigorous from 1975, the PDK remained heavily 
reliant on Vietnamese ideology during the Cambodian civil war, especially the ‘people’s war’ 
doctrine (Heder, 1999: 25-8). In addition, the core leadership of the PDK, including Pol Pot 
and Ieng Sary, were inspired by Maoist notions such as ‘autonomous revolution, voluntarism, 
and continuous class struggle’ and copied Chinese slogans, including ‘storming attacks,’ 
‘leaps forward’, and ‘independence mastery’ (Chandler, 1992: 3-6). The PDK’s policies 
tended to be based on these doctrines regardless of whether they reflected reality or not.    
These three limitations prevented the PDK from having adequate information about its true 
situation, and this resulted in two self-delusions that affected the party’s strategies throughout 
the Cambodian peace negotiations. The first delusion concerned its domestic resources. When 
the civil war began, the PDK was convinced that it could rely on the people’s strong support 
(Heder, 1999:70). However, from the time of its establishment in the 1950s, the PDK had 
never received genuinely strong support (Peou, 2000: 101), and the people’s ostensible 
backing was largely because of the PDK’s strong enforcement of its rule in areas under its 
control (Frieson, 1993: 30-50). Although there were many pointers to its obvious 
unpopularity, such as the highly reluctant cooperation of villages during the civil war (Heder, 
1999: 91-3), the PDK did not recognise or accept that it was profoundly unpopular. Instead, 
the leaders of the PDK repeated the same propaganda and claimed that the people’s support 
was not visible owing to severe PRK repression (Heder, 1999: 96).  
The second misguided perception was the PDK’s blind belief that China would continue to 
support the party until its victory. However, although China’s goal of limiting the influence of 
the USSR and Vietnam reflected its regional interests in Southeast Asia, it did not want the 
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return of the PDK as the principal Cambodian power because this was not beneficial to its 
national interests (Haas, 1991: 247-8). Although China radically transformed its major 
policies towards the Cambodian civil war, the PDK appeared not to notice this change. Hence, 
the distance between the Chinese and the PDK’s positions grew wider. Whereas China 
engaged more eagerly in the peace negotiations and adopted a more neutral demeanour, the 
PDK continued to adhere to its initial ideas. 
 
Actors’ Aims 
China played a critical role in the Cambodian peace negotiations as a supporting actor of the 
CGDK. The country pursued three fundamental goals: (1) reduction of the Soviet Union’s 
influence in Southeast Asia, (2) withdrawal of Vietnamese military forces from Cambodia, 
and (3) removal of the PRK/SOC regime (Ross, 1991: 1170; Hood, 1990). Moreover, when 
the establishment of a transitional authority and demilitarisation came to top the agenda, 
China set two aims. First, the size of military forces of all four Cambodian factions needed to 
be frozen and needed to refrain from politics. Second, the PDK needed to be guaranteed that 
it would be involved in the future Cambodian political arena (Hood, 1990; Haas, 1991: 249).  
China employed five main strategies to achieve its goals: (1) modifying other external 
interveners’ proposals, (2) coordinating the moves of the three resistance groups, (3) 
consistently maintaining its economic and military aid to the PDK, (4) negotiating with the 
supporters of the PRK/SOC (the USSR and Vietnam), and (5) supervising the meetings 
between the Cambodian national factions. Nevertheless, the strategies’ priorities changed 
according to the transforming circumstances of the negotiation. 
The PDK, the only de facto resistance group with sufficiently strong military forces to 
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challenge the PRK/SOC, consistently pursued one fundamental goal: winning the war. 
Strongly influenced by Marxist-Leninist traditions and the Vietnamese doctrine of ‘people’s 
war’, in which political strength derived from peasant support, the PDK believed that it could 
regain its position as Cambodia’s central power with the support of the rural poor (Heder, 
1999: 20-3; Ashley, 1992: 42). In the CGDK’s press releases, the PDK’s fundamental goal 
was reworded to encompass four aims related to the transitional authority and 
demilitarisation: (1) a UN-supervised election, (2) the dissolution of SOC organisations, (3) 
the establishment of a quadripartite government that included the PDK, and (4) 
demobilisation of all four factions’ armies (Haas, 1991: 195; Turner, 2004: 143-5; Heder, 
1999: 73).  
However, the PDK had little intention of achieving its goals through negotiation with the 
PRK/SOC. For the faction, political settlement was merely a tactical means of ‘remedying 
[its] chronic political weakness’ and of legitimising itself ‘with de facto avoidance of painful 
sacrifices’ rather than ‘necessitating major sacrifices’ (Turner, 2004: 148, 158). Thus, the 
PDK’s strategies during the Cambodian peace negotiations were neither consistent nor 
effective (details follow below).   
 
Interplay between Actors in the Negotiation Process 
Phase 1: Mid-1980s – May 1988 
The attitudes of both China and the PDK towards the peace negotiations were consistently 
negative until mid-1988. In this period, China and the PDK shared two critical goals, which 
were the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and the removal of the PRK/SOC 
regime. Moreover, although the two actors also had some different aims (China – reducing 
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the influence of the USSR, the PDK – winning the people’s war), their positions and aims 
were not considered contradictory to each other in this period (Richardson, 2009: 122). 
Thus, China enthusiastically supported the PDK’s resistance movement during Phase 1. 
Specifically, China pursued ‘containment’ and ‘roll-back’ policies against Vietnam and the 
USSR and protected the PDK by employing military confrontation, applying diplomatic 
pressure, and providing direct aid to the CGDK (McGregor, 1990: 267-76). After its invasion 
of Vietnam in 1979 to ‘teach [it] a lesson’, China retained a significant number of forces near 
the border with Vietnam and maintained economic sanctions against the PRK and Vietnam 
(Richardson, 2009: 153). Moreover, China’s military and economic aid, transferred through 
Thailand, enabled the PDK to continue its military operations (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 22).  
Diplomatically, China doubted the usefulness of negotiation with Vietnam. Thus, the 
Cambodian factions’ initiation of peace negotiations in 1987 and 1988 was discouraged by 
China. When Sihanouk’s first meeting with Hun Sen took place in December 1987, China 
intervened in the efforts by expressing its objection to the commencement of any negotiation 
before a PAVN withdrawal from Cambodian territory, applying pressure on Sihanouk, and by 
conducting a military operation against Vietnam, thus breaking a long-standing peace (Hood, 
1991: 981; Haas, 1991: 127). As a result, Sihanouk decided to resign from his presidency of 
the CGDK to demonstrate his unhappiness with the situation. 
China’s diplomatic moves in this period, as the only de facto advocate, were more focused on 
providing support for the PDK’s demands rather than intervening to alter its plans. 
Confirming this, Ieng Mouly, a former leader of the KPNLF says, 
For many years, China’s position was simple: approving the decisions of 
the CGDK. We normally had our own meetings first and met with Chinese 
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delegates later to explain what we had decided. The Khmer Rouge was 
strongest in expressing opinions, and China usually accepted the opinions 
(Ieng Mouly, 2009: Author’s Interview). 
The PDK’s reluctance to compromise its goals and its indifference to a negotiated peace arose 
for two reasons. Most importantly, the PDK’s delusion about its level of popular domestic 
support led it to believe that it could defeat the PRK-Vietnamese alliance. Its core leadership, 
including Pol Pot and Ta Mok, insisted that they still possessed (or could rebuild) the support 
of the Cambodian peasantry necessary to achieve victory in the people’s war. Moreover, the 
PDK thought that pursuing settlement of the conflict while Vietnam remained on its territory 
might lead to further Vietnamese deception (Heder, 1999: 33; A former PDK leader who 
requested anonymity, 2009: Author’s Interview).  
Thus, the PDK consistently called for the dissolution of the PRK and the four parties’ 
participation in a new transitional government with equal status (Turner, 2004: 159). In 
addition, the faction repeatedly demanded that Sihanouk made no further moves to effect 
negotiations, which it felt could lead to concessions on the CGDK’s part that would favour 
the PRK. Although it signed up to some of the CGDK’s peace proposals, such as the 1986 
‘Eight-point Proposal on Resolving the Cambodian Problem’, the purpose behind the 
participation was to gain enough time to strengthen its resources and international support in 
order to defeat the PRK militarily or through political manipulation (Turner, 2004: 160). 
Phase 2: May 1988 – August 1990 
Phase 2 indicates the period from May 1988, when Vietnam expressed its willingness to 
withdraw 50,000 People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) troops from Cambodia (Hood, 1990: 
981), to August 1990, when the UN Security Council released its ‘Framework Documents’ 
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for the settlement of the Cambodian conflict.  
Tension emerged between China and the PDK in this period as the importance of their 
common goals decreased and the importance of their different goals increased. Most 
importantly, the significance of the two common goals, the withdrawal of the PAVN and the 
dissolution of the PRK, diminished because the USSR and Vietnam began to make significant 
efforts to normalise their relations with China (Haas, 1991: 156-7). In particular, as Vietnam 
withdrew PAVN troops from Cambodia in 1989, China’s fear of Soviet and Vietnamese 
influence in Indochina abated (Ross, 1991: 1180). Moreover, Vietnam’s efforts towards 
diplomatic normalisation with China also reduced its anxiety about the PRK, a suspected 
puppet regime of Vietnam.  
In addition, China regarded the regional stability of Indochina as increasingly important 
because it could benefit from increased economic cooperation with Vietnam and an improved 
relationship with the USSR (Haas, 1991: 158). China’s consideration of a new goal – regional 
stability – produced new strategies that were contradictory to the PDK’s pursuit of its 
fundamental goal: complete victory in the people’s war. 
A Chinese domestic issue was another factor that convinced China to distance itself from the 
PDK’s position. After the Tiananmen Incident in April 1989, China needed to demonstrate 
greater flexibility in its negotiation with Western countries in order to rehabilitate its 
relationship with them (Richardson, 2009: 146). 
Thus, China pursued an early settlement of the Cambodian conflict and began to oppose the 
PDK’s goal of returning to power. It employed two strategies. First, China gradually 
transformed its attitudes from exclusive defence of its (and the PDK’s) interests to a 
somewhat more flexible concessionary posture in its negotiation with other external 
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interveners. In the early period of Phase 2, China still tried to use negotiation as a means of 
justifying and securing its goals rather than as an opportunity to engineer mutual concessions 
(Ross, 1991: 1180). For instance, during the negotiations on the normalisation of its 
relationship with the USSR and Vietnam, it stubbornly requested the withdrawal of the PAVN 
from Cambodia as a prerequisite for normalisation (Qian, 2005: 23; Haas, 1991: 205; 
Richardson, 2009: 142, 143). The same demand was reiterated by Chinese diplomats in 
subsequent meetings until 1989 (Qian, 2005: 41; McGregor, 1990: 280-1; Acharya, Lizée, & 
Peou, 1991: 138-9).  
However, the Chinese attitude became more flexible during a series of UN P-5 meetings in 
1990, where it modified its former hard-line position and began to make concessions. During 
this period, the composition of the Supreme National Council (SNC) was a highly 
controversial issue. While China consistently advocated the PDK’s participation in the peace 
negotiations and the forthcoming transitional authority (Ross, 1991: 1179), it accepted the 
UN’s stewardship of the transitional period and the inclusion of the PRK/SOC in order to 
convince the Soviet Union to agree to the final proposal (Richardson, 2009: 148; Haas, 1991: 
223). Through this, China succeeded in reflecting its main interests in the UN P-5’s final 
proposal of August 1990 (Hood, 1991: 988). 
Second, in dealing with the Cambodian national factions, China made two main efforts: 
coordinating the moves of the three resistance groups and applying pressure on the PDK to 
join the peace negotiations (Hood, 1990: 977). First, China’s efforts focused on the 
coordination of the CGDK’s movements in the early phase of the negotiation. For instance, 
when two CGDK members, FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF, criticised the PDK’s past policies 
and worked towards preventing the PDK’s return to power at JIM I in July 1988, China tried 
to reduce the tensions between the factions. On the one hand, China made it clear that 
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although it did not support the PDK’s return to power, neither did it support the PDK’s 
exclusion from the forthcoming authority (Hood, 1990: 982-3). It also announced that the 
PDK would play a minor role in the interim government (Haas, 1991: 144). On the other 
hand, it persuaded the PDK to express its willingness to reduce the size of its army to match 
those of the other two factions and to accept the deployment of an international peacekeeping 
force. However, these efforts did not produce the expected results. The PDK rejected China’s 
requests and boycotted the following meetings in October and November, and Sihanouk did 
not desist from his criticism of the PDK (Haas, 1991: 144-5). 
When it became evident that its coordination efforts were not working, China applied 
stronger and more direct pressure and succeeded in persuading Sihanouk to remain part of the 
CGDK formula. For example, when Sihanouk announced his ‘Five-Point Peace Plan’ in 
November 1988 without having secured the agreement of the PDK, China applied stronger 
pressure: it threatened to stop its aid. From the end of 1988, China repeated its readiness to 
withdraw its aid to both FUNCINPEC and the PDK (Hood, 1990: 985). Although these 
threats did not materialise at the time, they generated an instant response from FUNCINPEC. 
From the second JIM in February 1989 onwards, Sihanouk toned down his criticism of the 
PDK and China and displayed a more flexible attitude towards their demands (Hood, 1990: 
985). 
However, as described below, China’s continuous efforts during Phase 2 to force the PDK to 
commit more strongly to negotiation with the PRK/SOC failed. Moreover, China’s enhanced 
involvement in efforts to secure a negotiated settlement was interrupted by the Tiananmen 
Incident in May 1989. While the Chinese leadership concentrated on the domestic political 
crisis, Cambodian issues were disregarded. Thus, the internal negotiation between the three 
resistance groups was left to Cambodians until the first PCC in July 1989 (Richardson, 2009: 
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145-6). 
Despite the changed international circumstances and the enhanced pressure from China, the 
PDK consistently refused to compromise its original position (Richardson, 2009: 142). Lying 
behind the PDK’s stubborn attitude were three delusions: its domestic popularity, China’s 
never-ending support, and Vietnamese pretence of PAVN withdrawal. The first two issues 
provided the PDK with misplaced confidence in its resources. The PDK was convinced of its 
domestic popularity, blindly believing that it had the unconditional support of Cambodian 
peasants even though its political projects to establish village-level political organisations had 
not achieved much success due to people’s reluctance to cooperate (Heder, 1999: 96). In 
addition, the gradual transformation of China’s regional priorities was not well understood by 
the PDK. Hence, the PDK believed that it possessed enough domestic and international 
support to win ‘the people’s war’.76  
The third misunderstanding was related to a goal: the withdrawal of Vietnam. The PDK had 
insisted that any negotiation could not be considered meaningful as long as ‘Vietnamese 
imperialists’ remained in Cambodia. However, when Vietnam announced the withdrawal of 
PAVN forces in 1989, the PDK regarded the announcement as a straightforward lie. It insisted 
that a large number of Vietnamese troops had simply changed their uniforms and had stayed 
in Cambodia to support the PRK (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 59; Chhin Kim Thong, 2009: 
Author’s Interview).77  
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 Although they had chances to see the reality in mid-1990, the reports on ‘the failures of the domestic 
revolutionary movements’ were ignored or distorted. In particular, some hardliners, including Ta Mok, insisted 
that such reports were ‘exaggerated’ by their rivals within the party (such as Son Sen) (A former PDK leader 
who requested anonymity, 2009: Author’s Interview; Heder, 1999: 98). 
77
 It is not clear whether the PDK did not realise that the PAVN’s withdrawal had actually been implemented or 
simply refused to accept it. Since the PDK simply assumed that it would defeat the PRK forces with ease once 
the PAVN withdrew from Cambodia (Haas, 1991: 144-5), the PRK’s strong resistance after the alleged 
withdrawal was difficult for them to comprehend. For many of them, it was natural to assume that there were 
still many PAVN soldiers in the PRK military forces. 
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As a result of these delusions, the PDK ignored China’s diplomatic efforts and continued to 
conduct a nationwide military campaign and to sabotage the negotiation. First, the PDK had 
concentrated on local-level military offensives in Phase 2. The focus of the campaigns in this 
period was on ‘liberating’ villages and sub-districts and building political organisations that 
could support the PDK’s future political campaigns (Voice of PDK, February 1988, cited in 
Heder, 1999: 81). Notably, however, after the failure of JIM I in 1988 and Vietnam’s 
announcement of the PAVN’s withdrawal, the faction conducted one of the biggest military 
campaigns of the Cambodian civil war in late 1989 and seized a number of regions, including 
Pailin (Haas, 1991: 214-5). Despite its scale, China was not informed or consulted prior to the 
launching of this important military operation (Richardson, 2009: 147-8). 
Second, in many cases, the PDK frequently refused China’s recommendation to seek a 
political solution. For example, even after JIM I revealed the unanimous animosity of the 
other Cambodian factions towards the PDK, Chinese pressure frequently failed to force the 
PDK leadership to join the follow-up meetings (Hood, 1990: 984). Even when it joined 
negotiation processes, it never stepped back from its original position. Although it realised 
the importance of a diplomatic solution from early 1990 (Son Sen, 1990, cited in Heder, 
1999: 97), the PDK failed to escape from its old tendency to persist with its propaganda.  
Thus, when it found that some resolutions suggested by other international actors might prove 
beneficial in its pursuit of power, the PDK simply concentrated on and demanded the 
implementation of proposals that were advantageous to it, with little intention of making 
concessions. For example, when ‘An Australian Peace Proposal’ was presented in early 1990, 
the PDK paid most attention to the immediate realisation of the quadripartite interim 
administration outlined in the proposal while ignoring other factions’ demands (Heder, 1999: 
94; Haas, 1991: 231). Moreover, when the UN P-5 presented the idea of UN supervision of 
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the election process, the PDK, believing that this role for the UN would help nullify the 
power of the PRK, continuously demanded that the PRK accept the proposal (Brown & 
Zasloff, 1998: 68; Heder, 1999: 100-1).  
In short, the attitudes of China and the PDK towards the peace negotiations diverged in Phase 
2. China recognised that its interests were best served by a negotiated peace and made efforts 
to compel the PDK to commit to negotiation with the PRK and Vietnam. Nevertheless, due to 
its misinformed evaluation of its resources and the reality of other factions’ movements and 
external support, the PDK ignored most of these efforts and refused to change its posture. As 
a result, the PDK gradually moved beyond China’s control (Richardson, 2009: 148). 
Phase 3: August 1990 – June 1992 
Phase 3 occurred between August 1990, when the UN P-5 released the Framework 
Documents, and June 1992, when the PDK discontinued its collaboration with UNTAC over 
the implementation of the Paris Peace Agreements. In this period, China applied greater 
pressure on the PDK to remain part of the negotiation; moreover, it gradually assumed a 
stronger and more neutral role in mediating the negotiated peace in Cambodia. The PDK’s 
astonishment at China’s withdrawal of military and economic aid and disappointment at the 
failure of its political projects in Cambodian villages finally led it to begin displaying a more 
serious attitude towards negotiation with the PRK and Vietnam.  
Since China had succeeded in reaching agreements with Vietnam and the USSR on the major 
issues related to the resolution of the Cambodian conflict (Ross, 1991: 1181; Osborne, 1994: 
256; Richardson, 2009: 150), its efforts in this period were concentrated mostly on 
facilitating the four Cambodian factions’ negotiation.  
First, while Western interveners became more ambivalent and less enthusiastic about the 
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Cambodian negotiations, China played a prominent role as a mediator, accommodating most 
of the meetings between Cambodian factions from mid-1990 to the second PCC in August 
1991. For instance, at the meeting between the Cambodian factions in Pattaya in June 1991, 
China expressed its recognition of the value of the PRK’s proposals while pressing the PDK 
not to leave the negotiation table (Ross, 1991: 1182). Moreover, China invited Hun Sen to 
Beijing for the first time to convene a follow-up SNC meeting in July. At the two meetings, in 
exchange for the PRK concessions on the PDK’s role in the forthcoming political arena, 
China recognised the PRK/SOC’s role as the de facto ruling party (Ross, 1991: 1183; 
Richardson, 2009: 152). 
Second, China began to apply more substantial pressure on the PDK. The pivotal decision 
was its cessation of military support to the PDK in late 1990. Although from 1988 China had 
repeatedly proclaimed that it would discontinue its military aid to the faction, this pledge had 
not been carried out. This continued assistance was a reason for the PDK’s strong but 
misguided belief that it had China’s unwavering support. Pointing to this, a former PDK 
leader who requested anonymity stated: 
No. We did not imagine that China would turn away from us. What China 
said was not important. No matter what they had said, they had never 
stopped military support. I didn’t experience any lack of arms during the 
war. We thought China an ally (A former PDK leader who requested 
anonymity, 2009: Author’s Interview). 
Nevertheless, after significant reductions in aid during 1990 (Pear, 1990: no pagination), 
Chinese military assistance ended in late 1990.78 
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 It remains a matter of dispute whether China stopped its military aid completely in 1990. However, it appears 
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Diplomatically, China began to make open expressions of its unhappiness with the PDK’s 
policies and its desire for PDK participation in the negotiation. For instance, China made an 
open request to the PDK to join the Pattaya meeting of June 1991 (FBIS, DR/CHI, June 4, 
1991: 9) and called for the PDK to work towards a political solution in front of other 
Cambodian leaders in July (Richardson, 2009: 149). In addition, China’s recognition of the 
PRK/SOC as a prominent actor in the Cambodian negotiation served to increase its 
diplomatic pressure on the PDK (Ross, 1991: 1183-4). A former KPNLF negotiator confirms 
this change by saying: 
Once they lost interest in our war, the Chinese began to push us to end it. 
Although they grew closer to Vietnam and Hun Sen, Prince Sihanouk and 
the Khmer Rouge could not escape Chinese influence. But we knew that 
China was changing (Son Soubert, 2009: Author’s Interview).  
Even after the Paris Peace Agreements were agreed in August 1991, China kept its distance from 
the PDK. Formal or informal meetings between China and the PDK were rare, and even when 
they took place, China simply repeated its commitment to supporting the implementation of the 
PPAs.79 China also made it clear that it would not provide material support to the PDK in 1992 
(Richardson, 2009: 163). In addition, despite the PDK’s backlash against the implementation, 
China repeatedly confirmed its commitment to the PPAs (Richardson, 2009: 158-9) and 
provided unconditional economic assistance (approximately $150 million in 1992) to the post-
war reconstruction projects in Cambodia (Richardson, 2009: 157, 160).  
China’s obvious withdrawal of its advocacy of the PDK in this period proved telling. Since its 
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to be the case that the amount of military aid post 1990, if any, was significantly less than previously (Chhin 
Kim Thong and a former PDK leader who requested anonymity, 2009: Author’s Interview).  
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 Pointing out this, a former PDK leader who requested anonymity says ‘China changed its face when we agreed 
with the Paris Agreement’ (2009: Author’s Interview). 
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fear of losing Chinese support was considerable (Chandler, 1994: no pagination), the PDK 
began to take international diplomatic pressure seriously and to seek a settlement of the 
Cambodian conflict through negotiation (Haas, 1991: 220).  
Moreover, for the PDK, the UN P-5’s Framework Document presented in Phase 2 seemed to 
favour its core interests. First, the PDK thought that it would prevent the PRK’s dominance of 
future Cambodian politics by virtue of the CGDK’s significant proportion of SNC seats. 
Second, with regard to the transitional authority, the PDK expected UNTAC’s dominant role 
during the transitional period to limit the PRK/SOC’s advantages as a government and to 
provide the PDK with greater opportunities to direct its political campaigns. Third, in terms 
of demilitarisation, the PDK also anticipated that complete dissolution of all factions’ military 
forces would enable it to use the available extra manpower to rebuild its political units (Heder, 
1999: 100-1, 103-5). Thus, Pol Pot thought that the proposals were the PDK’s ‘best bet for 
regaining power’ and achieving victory (Heder, 1999: 105).80 However, these expectations 
were merely more misconceptions founded on its self-centred interpretation of the UN’s 
proposals (details will be discussed in Phase 4). 
Hence, the PDK decided to conduct a diplomatic struggle from late 1990 (Richardson, 2009: 
149). Although its intention to negotiate was consistent throughout Phase 3, the PDK’s 
negotiation strategies were transformed in June 1991. Before June, the two strategies that the 
PDK used in the negotiation process were still very much in keeping with its old behaviour 
pattern. First, the PDK persisted with its first demand – full acceptance of the UN Framework 
Document and Implementation Plan with no modification – rather than adopting a 
concessionary posture. After proclaiming its ‘full support’ for the proposals in September 
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 The domestic dynamics in the PDK’s two-level game partly caused these misunderstandings. The hardliners in 
the leadership, such as Ieng Sary, were excluded from major decision making in this period, and the reformists’ 
ideas dominated the internal discussions. However, just like the hard-liners’ arguments, the new ideas were a 
result of their ‘bounded awareness’ and were based on very limited information (Heder, 1999: 109-15).  
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1990, the PDK leadership reaffirmed its position at every meeting until June 1990 (Heder, 
1999: 100, 103-4). Second, the PDK continued its military operations against the PRK in 
order to reinforce its demands. As mentioned in the previous chapter, violence was regarded 
as a method of negotiation by many Cambodians, including the PDK leadership. Thus, under 
a new slogan of ‘Cambodia’s sole legitimate body: there is no other state organ apart from the 
SNC’ (Heder, 1999: 104), the PDK tried to force the PRK/SOC to accept its demands by 
demonstrating its still robust military capability.  
Nevertheless, by June 1991, these two strategies were revealed to have failed to achieve what 
the PDK had expected. First of all, its demands were ignored by all the other national factions. 
Since China had assumed a neutral mediating role and no longer directly intervened in 
Cambodian matters, the other three Cambodian factions did not take the PDK’s stubborn attitude 
seriously (Haas, 1991: 220, 283-4). In addition, the military situation in Cambodia began to 
favour the PRK/SOC rather than the PDK. From May 1991, the PRK/SOC succeeded in 
recovering most of its lost territories and began to pressurise the stronghold of Pailin, the de 
facto PDK capital (Heder, 1999, 114-5). Furthermore, the military offensive caused the other 
actors to misunderstand the intentions of the PDK. Since many external actors considered the 
cessation of violence as an expression of an actor’s will to negotiate, the PDK’s aggressive 
strategy was interpreted as confirmation of its insincerity (Heder, 1991: 112-5; Haas, 1991: 230-
1). 
Henceforth, the PDK’s approach underwent a profound transformation in June 1991. 
Abandoning its previous approach of merely reiterating the same propaganda, the PDK began to 
accept other factions’ proposals if they were not fundamentally inconsistent with its long-term 
survival. For instance, at the second Pattaya meeting in August 1991, the PDK consented to the 
ceasefire, the discontinuation of military aid from external actors, demilitarisation, and 
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cooperation between the SNC and UNTAC. Many of the points agreed to by the factions in 
Pattaya were different from the PDK’s initial demands (Brown, 1992: 90; Brown & Zasloff, 
1998: 82-3). Furthermore, the PDK did not undertake any major military operations until the 
second PCC in August 1991.  
The PDK’s changed attitude was an important contributory factor to the success of the PPAs in 
August 1991 (Lizée 1999: 95). In fact, the party thought the PPAs provided similar 
opportunities to regain its power as the UN P-5’s Framework Document. Although the 
specific contents were significantly different, the PDK thought the PPAs contained similar 
core proposals to those in the Framework Document, such as a dominant role for UNTAC, 
the CGDK’s possession of at least half of the SNC’s seats, and the dissolution of a significant 
proportion of all factions’ military forces.    
Hence, the PDK cooperated with the UN’s implementation processes until mid-1992. For 
instance, when it was requested to provide information about its military forces to the UN as part 
of the demilitarisation process and establishment of a civil police force in November 1991, the 
PDK submitted fairly comprehensive information (Heder, 1999: 122). Moreover, during the 
demilitarisation process, the PDK voluntarily began to disarm its army and forced some resistant 
commanders to join the process. All its military leaders were compelled to announce their 
endorsement of the reduction in troop numbers to 30 per cent of their original complement 
(Heder, 1999: 124-5).  
In short, as China abandoned its advocacy of the PDK and applied substantial pressure on the 
faction, the PDK finally decided to participate in the negotiations with the PRK/SOC. After 
realising that the negotiation strategies based on its own concepts of negotiation had 
produced no fruitful results in the early period, the PDK demonstrated much more flexible 
behaviour in the later period (from June 1990). However, its changed attitude was grounded 
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in its own distinctive interpretation of the PPAs, which was significantly different from that 
of international interveners and other Cambodian factions. 
Phase 4: June 1992 – June 1993 
Phase 4 marks the period in which the PDK refused to comply with UNTAC’s supervision of the 
implementation of the peace process. The PDK’s perception of the function of negotiation, the 
methods by which to achieve its goals in negotiation, and the lack of Chinese efforts to 
control the problems caused by this perception hampered the effectiveness of the peace 
negotiation process. 
The PDK decided to transform its strategy for two main reasons: its expectations had failed to 
materialise and China had increasingly distanced itself from the PDK.81 Firstly, the party 
realised that its expectation that the PPAs would provide opportunities to gain political power 
had proved to be unrealistic. Since the PPAs allowed the CGDK (including Sihanouk) to take 
half of the SNC seats, the PDK anticipated that this provision would prevent the PRK from 
dominating domestic politics. However, Sihanouk and Son Sann, the leaders of the other two 
members of the CGDK, were preparing political campaigns against the PDK, thus fracturing 
the CGDK bloc.82 Moreover, since the PDK leaders were entitled to stay in Phnom Penh as 
SNC delegates, the PDK planned to organise anti-PRK/SOC movements in the capital (Heder, 
1999: 115).  

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 Although it is not directly related with the main research topic of this thesis, this finding provides an 
explanation of the PDK’s sudden change of its attitudes between August 1991 and 1992. In fact, the question 
why the PDK that agreed to sign the PPAs abruptly declared not to cooperate with UNTAC after a few months 
was left as “a puzzle” and “anybody’s guess” (Wang, 1996; Peou, 1997). This case study suggests that it is 
because the national faction realised that its expectation from the PPAs was a self-delusion. In this sense, this 
finding supports Heder’s research (Heder, 1999). 
82
 In November 1991, on the day that he returned to Phnom Penh from exile, Sihanouk condemned the PDK 
leaders as “Hitlerites” and denounced the PDK’s role in the SNC. In addition, after announcing his support for 
maintaining the PRK/SOC regime as a “de facto government” (AFP, Phnom Penh, 16 November 1991 cited in 
Heder, 1999: 137), Sihanouk built an FUNCINPEC-CPP (Cambodian People’s Party: a political party of the 
PRK/SOC) alliance on 25 November. 
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Furthermore, the PDK had expected that UNTAC’s central role during the interim period would 
provide a neutral and democratic political environment in which the PDK could build its 
political organisations. Thus, the PDK thought it could establish political structures that would 
replace the PRK/SOC’s provincial and local administrations if UNTAC was deployed early 
enough (Heder, 1999: 115). However, it took more than six months before UNTAC was 
deployed in March 1992. Moreover, the PDK felt that UNTAC simply demanded the PDK’s full 
collaboration with the PPAs without serious consideration of the PDK’s security concerns (Peou, 
1997: 270-4; Heder, 1999: 263). From the PDK’s point of view, this enabled the PRK/SOC to 
seize upon this opportunity to attack PDK agents in the villages and nullify the efforts of the 
PDK from the beginning of the implementation phase (Gottesman, 2004: 345). As a former 
PDK leader insisted: 
The implementation process was not impartial. Although there were four 
groups – the KPNLF, the SOC, the Khmer Rouge, and FUNCINPEC – 
UNTAC targeted only us. So, we thought, ‘what about the other groups?’ 
The military action in Siem Reap occurred when UNTAC requested the 
disarmament of the Khmer Rouge only. They didn’t listen to our concerns 
about this unilateral disarmament. If you were a part of the Khmer Rouge, 
would you accept that? (Chhin Kim Thong, 2009: Author’s Interview). 
In addition, the PDK anticipated that the dissolution of 70 per cent of each faction’s military 
forces under a permanent ceasefire would enable it to use more human resources for political 
purposes. As it had struggled with a lack of political cadres, the PDK felt that its demilitarised 
soldiers might prove to be a significant resource that could propel its political projects more 
quickly and more effectively (Heder, 1999: 120). However, the PDK’s expectations belied the 
population’s reluctance to cooperate with it (Heder, 1999: 91-3). Realising that attempting to 
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rally popular support by invoking the image of Pol Pot or Khieu Samphan would be 
counterproductive, it instead tried to establish village-level councils in the name of Sihanouk 
(Heder, 1999: 105-6). However, except in Kampot province, the faction was unable to sustain 
many councils.  
Secondly, China’s lukewarm attitudes towards the PDK led it to abandon hope of reclaiming 
China’s support, one of the few remaining viable methods by which it could attain a political 
solution. Bilateral informal communication between the PDK and China stopped, and China 
tried to send its messages to the PDK through open remarks, including official announcements 
made by the Chinese government (Richardson, 2009: 161-4). Moreover, China reconfirmed its 
termination of military aid in early 1992. Combined with other international actors’ antagonistic 
stance towards the PDK, China’s changed attitudes left the faction feeling completely isolated. 
The PDK therefore announced that it would not collaborate with UNTAC and would 
continue the fight against the remaining Vietnamese and the other national factions in June 
1992 (Heder, 1999: 277-8). In fact, the PDK had carried out a series of small military operations 
when other actors were not amenable to its interests (Heder, 1999: 239; Richardson, 2009: 163) 
even before this announcement. However, if the intermittent military operations before June 
represented a PDK strategy to attain a position of strength in the negotiation, the PDK deviated 
from its previous approach and made its first priority the preservation and expansion of its 
military power. Since UNTAC endorsed the PRK/SOC’s right to self-defence against the PDK, 
the hostilities in Cambodia became much more widespread and acute from June 1992. 
As the military action intensified, China tried to resume its diplomatic engagement with the 
PDK over the summer of 1992. For example, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Xu Dunxin met 
Khieu Samphan and asked him to abide by the PPAs in August 1992 (Richardson, 2009: 164). 
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In September, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, also announced China’s hope that the 
PDK would return to the peace process and accept UNTAC supervision. Following this, a series 
of meetings between China and the PDK took place in Beijing, continuing into November.  
Externally, it also stressed to other external actors the importance of the inclusion of the PDK in 
the peace process and in the future political arena to ensure a stable peace in Cambodia. 
Moreover, China pressed Thailand not to support the PDK economically. According to a 
Chinese diplomat, it did ‘everything it could to keep the Khmer Rouge involved’ (Richardson, 
2009: 164). 
However, the PDK completely ignored China’s recommendations. The PDK leaders in Phnom 
Penh stopped attending most meetings, including the international conference on Cambodia’s 
rehabilitation and the SNC meetings. Furthermore, after withdrawing their delegates, the PDK 
officially closed its office in Phnom Penh in early 1993 (Richardson, 2009: 164-5; Heder, 1999: 
284). The PDK’s resistance against UNTAC’s demilitarisation project and armed attacks against 
the PRK/SOC continued until the election in June 1993.  
As a result, UNTAC’s goal of ‘establishing a neutral political environment before the electoral 
period’ could not be achieved (Lizée, 1999: 115). The only options for Akashi in May 1993 
were either ‘to proceed with the best possible election under imperfect conditions’ or ‘to 
declare that the basic acceptable conditions for free and fair elections [did] not exist in 
Cambodia’ and abandon the election (Lizée, 1999: 118). Ultimately, he resolved to proceed 
with the election. Although the election took place without serious incident, the PDK 
eventually refused to join it.  
So far, this chapter has presented two aspects of the interplay between China and the PDK 
during the Cambodian peace negotiations. First, the pattern of the interplay was described. 
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Since the two actors had common interests in Phase 1, China intervened in the Cambodian 
civil war as an advocate of the PDK. Both actors consistently refused negotiation with the 
PRK/SOC and Vietnam. In Phase 2, the two core common interests, the withdrawal of 
Vietnam and the dissolution of the PRK/SOC regime, became significantly less important for 
China. In addition, China became more interested in what it could gain from regional stability 
(See Figure 6.1). Thus, China began to alter its posture and applied moderate pressure on the 
PDK in an effort to persuade it to be more serious about negotiation with the PRK/SOC. The 
PDK’s response to this pressure was to flatly ignore it.  
 
Figure 6.1. Change of Common Interests of China and the PDK 
 
Note:  (A) Withdrawal of PAVN from Cambodia 
 (B) Dissolution of the Heng Samrin – Hun Sen Regime 
 (C) PDK’s Return as Cambodia’s Central Power 
 (D) Reduction of USSR’s Influence on Indochina 
 (E) Regional Stability  
 
China’s intensified pressure in Phase 3 had a particularly strong influence on the PDK. The 
withdrawal of China’s diplomatic and material support was a major shock to the PDK 
leadership and caused its changed attitudes towards negotiation with the PRK/SOC and 
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Vietnam (see Figure 6.2). However, China’s continued distance from the PDK led the faction 
to feel that it had been deserted and not to expect further support. Ironically, the former 
advocate state lost its leverage over the PDK in Phase 4. Although China changed its attitudes 
and resumed its engagement with the PDK, it had already lost its most valuable means of 
providing incentives or exerting pressures on the PDK. As a result, the PDK continued its 
military operations until the election period. In recognition of this, some Chinese leaders 
regretted that China had not endeavoured further to secure the PDK’s position in the SNC 
(Richardson, 2009: 165). 
  
Figure 6.2. Dynamics of the Interplay between PDK and China 
 
Second, this chapter also showed that the PDK’s self-delusion was a crucial barrier in the 
Cambodian negotiation. As summarised in Table 6.1, the PDK’s blind optimism about its 
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popularity and China’s advocacy, and its own understanding of negotiation, played a 
significant role throughout the negotiation process. The PDK’s confidence that it had the 
Cambodian people’s support was the main reason why the PDK continued to pursue a 
complete military victory until the last phase of the Cambodian negotiation. Furthermore, the 
PDK failed to understand the changing negotiation circumstances and blindly believed that 
China would provide unwavering support. In addition, the PDK also failed to consider that 
the Vietnamese withdrawal might be genuine and, therefore, failed to respond appropriately. 
This failure was a major factor in bringing about the PDK’s continuous refusal to deal 
seriously with the PRK/Vietnam during the negotiations in Phase 2. In Phase 3, the faction 
also misinterpreted the UN’s peace proposals and conceived its future campaigns without 
knowing what other actors really planned. In addition, the PDK’s military operations that 
were conducted as part of its negotiation strategies generated misunderstandings among 
external actors, who interpreted the violence as an expression of its disinterest or insincerity 
in negotiation. All these self-delusions prevented the faction from devising and exploiting 
more effective strategies to achieve gains (See Chapter 7 for details). 
 
Table 6.1. Perceptual Limitations That Shaped the PDK’s Strategies 
Phase I - Self-confidence in Its Popularity 
Its Understanding of Negotiation 
Blind Belief in the Certainty of 
Chinese Support 
Phase II Misjudgment of the Withdrawal of PAVN 
Phase III Perception of the UN’s Proposals 
Phase IV - 
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EL SALVADOR 
This section discusses the interaction between the Cristiani government and its advocate state, 
the United States of America, during the Salvadoran peace negotiations. Since the Salvadoran 
government had relied heavily on material and diplomatic aid from the US during the civil 
war period (McClintock, 1998: 221), the change in the USA’s attitude towards the Salvadoran 
negotiations had a critical impact on their progress. 
The pattern of the interplay between the two actors in the Salvadoran case was distinct from 
the interplay of the PDK with China in the following ways. First, as internal resistance from 
the military leadership was very strong, the Salvadoran government’s negotiation strategies 
were focused on  managing a two-level game involving US pressure and the resistance of the 
El Salvador Armed Forces (ESAF).83 Second, perceptual differences between San Salvador 
and Washington did not play a significant role, since President Cristiani maintained relatively 
close communication with its advocate, something that the PDK lacked.  
 
The Aims of Actors 
Both the US and the Cristiani government had similar attitudes towards two issues that this 
thesis focuses on. As regards demilitarisation, both actors considered the realisation of 
democracy in the country as the most important goal and saw fundamental reform, if not 
disbanding, of the Salvadoran military forces as an indispensable condition for it (Palmer, 
2006: 9; Negroponte, 2005: 164; Juhn, 1998: 126-7). As regards the interim authority, the two 
allies wholeheartedly advocated the legitimacy of the Cristiani government’s domestic 
authority, mandated as it was via a democratic election (Negroponte, 2005: 726, 782-3), 

83
 For a definition of a ‘two-level game’ and further theoretical discussion on the concept, see Chapter 1. 
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asserting that no other transitional authority needed to be established.  
Specifically, the newly elected President Cristiani pursued two fundamental goals: ‘to end the 
armed confrontation and to demobilize the FMLN’ (De Soto, 1999: 351). Cristiani, a member 
of the business elite, wanted to promote economic development by stabilising the conflict 
(Byrne, 1996: 174-5).  
Nevertheless, he understood that the FMLN would not accept unilateral demobilisation. He 
therefore proposed that the government’s armed forces and agencies would also be 
demobilised, ‘according to the government’s own rules’ (Juhn, 1998: 62). Specifically, with 
regard to demilitarisation, he suggested the following in June 1990: (1) a significant scaling 
down of the ESAF and (2) a change in the ministries to which the police were accountable – 
The Treasury Police would be controlled by the Ministry of the Treasury, absorbing the 
Customs police; The National Police would come under the control of the Interior Ministry; 
infantry battalions would be removed from the Security Corps; The National Guard would 
remain, but it would become the Rural and Border Police (FMLN/GOES proposals, 22 June 
1990). In fact, the government’s proposals faced strong objections from both the FMLN, 
which demanded that the armies and agencies be completely disbanded, and the army’s High 
Command, which refused to accept measures that would result in a significant reduction in its 
power.  
Nonetheless, the US’s strong pressure supported and forced the Cristiani government to move 
the negotiations with the FMLN forward. The government therefore had to find a middle way 
that would placate the two hard-line (internal and external) parties while protecting its own 
interests. The government used the following strategies to achieve its main goals. First, in 
order to defend its interests from the strong pressure of the FMLN (and the UN) to make 
major concessions, the government called for the Bush government’s diplomatic support. 
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Second, it also tried to maximise the US’s direct pressure on the leadership of the Salvadoran 
army (details follow below). 
In the Cold War environment, the USA pursued a policy of ensuring the Salvadoran 
government’s non-engagement with the FMLN’s revolutionary movement and did not 
support a peaceful resolution to the Salvadoran conflict until the end of 1989 (McClintock: 
223). Freed from its Cold War rivalry, the Bush administration began to adopt a more 
pragmatic approach to managing its relationship with El Salvador and began to emphasise the 
importance of the country’s domestic democracy and peaceful resolution of the civil war 
(Palmer, 2006: 22-3). 
The United States used three main strategies to achieve this goal. First, it applied various 
material and non-material pressure on the Cristiani government and the ESAF High 
Command to persuade them to become more flexible. Second, the US initiated direct talks 
with the FMLN in order to improve the circumstances surrounding the negotiations. Third, 
the superpower also began to cooperate more closely with the UN and other regional 
supporting countries (Negroponte, 2005: 275, 297-8, 305-6). 
 
Interplay between the US and the Cristiani Government 
Phase 1: June 1989 – the End of 1989 
During Phase 1, despite the change of leaderships in the US and El Salvador, no dramatic 
transformation of their relationship took place during 1989. Whereas the new Bush 
administration maintained its partial advocacy of the Salvadoran government, the Cristiani 
government, constrained by the election in March 1991 and strong resistance from the ESAF, 
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did not take serious action to encourage a negotiated settlement of the conflict (Byrne, 1996: 
177; Montgomery, 1995: 214).  
During Phase 1, the Bush administration did not support the UN-supervised Salvadoran peace 
negotiations and continued in its efforts to protect the legitimacy of the Cristiani government. 
Despite El Salvador’s changed external and internal circumstances (see Chapter 4), the new 
US administration continued to follow the policies of the Reagan administration. First, the 
US government maintained its economic and military aid to the Salvadoran government and 
military forces (Mouritsen, 2003: 30-9). Second, it continued its diplomatic advocacy of the 
Cristiani government and its stance against FMLN aggression, declaring that ‘if something 
were to happen to Cristiani, all the might and weight of the United States would fall on this 
country’ (Escobar, 1995, cited in Juhn, 1998: 50). Third, the United States did not cooperate 
with the UN’s peace facilitation efforts in this period. Rather, it criticised the UN’s mediation 
efforts as insufficient and partial (Negroponte, 2005: 726, 782-3).  
In addition, most of the communication between the two governments on controlling and 
maintaining these strategies was multilayered. The US Embassy in San Salvador had been the 
main communication agency since the 1930s. Government officials of both countries 
exchanged frequent messages, and the US administration wielded a strong influence over a 
wide range of Salvadoran political, economic, and military policies (Mouritsen, 2003: 6-7, 
32-9). The presidents of the two countries maintained regular contact with each other. For 
instance, George Bush made a personal telephone call to then president-elect Cristiani to 
ensure him that the US’s support for the Salvadoran government would continue unabated 
(Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater, 1989: no pagination). In addition, the US also 
maintained connections with the Salvadoran civil societies by supporting the US NGO’s 
activities in El Salvador (Solís & Martin, 1992: 104-6).  
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The USA’s ambivalent, if not negative, attitude towards the bilateral talks in El Salvador 
prevented the Cristiani government from taking proactive action to advance the peace 
negotiations. In fact, the Cristiani government’s initial diplomatic efforts were markedly more 
positive that those of the previous government. First, President Cristiani’s proposal of 
negotiations was unconditional. Considering that previous government leaders had demanded 
the surrender of the FMLN as a prerequisite for further negotiation, this was taken as 
evidence that Cristiani was serious about negotiating an end to the conflict (Juhn, 1998: 50). 
Second, the government appealed for a form of negotiation that could produce substantive 
agreement. In view of the fact that previous negotiation efforts had merely been occasional 
events used as opportunities to express the parties’ own demands, President Cristiani instead 
suggested making the negotiations ‘continuous, uninterrupted, secret, and substantive’ (Juhn, 
1998: 50). 
The Salvadoran military force did not offer serious resistance to President Cristiani’s new 
initiative since it did not consider the initiative serious (Juhn, 1998: 47-50). Nevertheless, as 
the military had formed the government between 1932-1979 and retained a significant 
influence over Salvadoran politics even after the return to civilian rule (Mouritsen, 2003: 65), 
it was impossible for Cristiani to make significant progress in the negotiations without the 
support of the US government.  
As a result, despite President Cristiani’s continuous assertion of his desire for talks, the 
government took no important action and made no substantial progress towards negotiation in 
Phase 1. In fact, it was the FMLN that made practical progress towards setting up 
negotiations in this phase (see Chapter 5).  
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Phase 2: Early 1990 – End of 1990 
In this phase, a somewhat different pattern of interplay between the US and the Salvadoran 
government emerged as the US administration and congress became increasingly critical of 
the ESAF’s human rights violations, in particular, the killing of six Jesuit priests in 1989. As 
the US began to adopt a tougher stance towards the Salvadoran military leaders, President 
Cristiani played a more active role in advancing negotiations with the FMLN. 
The Salvadoran governmental death squad’s infamous killing of six respected Jesuit priests in 
November 1989 marked a turning point in US policy. The Democrat-led Congress reacted 
strongly to this human rights violation, and the Bush administration was compelled to 
pressurise the Salvadoran government to investigate the incident and to improve domestic 
human rights (McClintock, 1998: 154; Byrne, 1996: 179-80; Levine, 1997: 231). In addition, 
early 1990 saw a change in the USA’s policies on the Salvadoran peace negotiations ‘from a 
rigid ideological stance toward more pragmatic positions’ (Munck, 1993: 79-80). 
Most strikingly, in October 1990, the US Congress voted to cut its assistance to the 
Salvadoran forces by half from 1991 in order to press for the reform of the ESAF and the 
transparent investigation of the murder of the Jesuit priests (McClintock, 1998: 154). In 
addition, Washington continuously expressed its unhappiness with the ESAF. For instance, 
Bernard Aronson, then Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and William 
Walker, then US Ambassador to San Salvador, conveyed direct and indirect messages to the 
Salvadoran government and military leaders of their desire for a reduction in the size and for 
reform of the ESAF and other military agencies (De Soto, 1999: 372; Juhn, 1998: 60). 
Moreover, President Bush invited Cristiani to the US and expressed his desire for the 
improvement of human rights in El Salvador and the restructuring of the ESAF (LA Times, 
30 January, 1990). 
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Nevertheless, the US government did not make strong efforts to ensure the success of the 
negotiations because of the following reasons. First, in this period, the first priority of US 
diplomatic pressure was reform of the Salvadoran military groups. Nor was the US ready to 
support the peace negotiation processes led by the UN. Thus, although the US diplomats 
applied strong pressure on El Salvador’s military leaders, the focus was not about the 
military’s stubborn attitude towards the Salvadoran peace negotiations but about its human 
rights abuses and its resistance to democratisation (Juhn, 1998, 45; De Soto, 1999: 371; 
Negroponte, 2005: 258-9). Second, the diplomatic pressure from the US government and 
Congress resulted in a sudden transformation of the country’s policies towards El Salvador. 
However, the Bush administration maintained its military aid to and diplomatic support for 
the Salvadoran government until the end of 1990, and therefore, the changed US position did 
not significantly alter the Salvadoran government’s attitude towards the negotiations.  
For the Salvadoran government, while President Cristiani’s US diplomacy focused on 
minimising the outcomes of the Jesuit priests’ murders, the High Command took efforts to 
undermine the negotiations by exaggerating the FMLN’s recent offences. As US pressure 
gradually increased throughout late 1990, the military leaders began to make it known that 
there existed the possibility of a coup if the ESAF became isolated from the government’s 
political decisions (Juhn, 1998: 68, 77; Montgomery, 1992: 222).  
The strategy of Cristiani’s negotiation team in this period was simply to repeat the following 
courses of action. First, the government flatly refused all FMLN demands on the purging or 
disbanding of military forces, and, therefore, the same confrontations over demilitarisation 
reoccurred between the two sides in most meetings. This intransigence was compounded by 
the approach of the legislative election planned for the following March, and the government 
adopted a tougher line in the negotiations after October 1990 (Juhn, 1998: 71-8). 
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Second, President Cristiani presented its own proposals to avoid the breakdown of the 
negotiations and to respond to the increasing pressure from the US. For instance, the Cristiani 
negotiation team suggested a 33-point proposal at the July 1990 meeting in San José. 
However, these suggestions failed to attract the FMLN (which also displayed its own 
stubborn refusal to compromise at this meeting) because they were based on the 
government’s own perception of the military issues (UN memo, 18 September 1990; Juhn, 
1998: 71-2) 
Third, the government tried to avoid discussion on a range of controversial issues, 
demilitarisation in particular. Since the government had accepted the UN’s suggestion to 
leave aside the issues relating to the armed forces and to prioritise the discussion of human 
rights in July 1990, the government kept refusing to undertake serious negotiation on the 
issue of demilitarisation until the end of Phase 2 (Juhn, 1998: 70-1). 
As a result, after producing initial agreements in Geneva (in April) and Caracas (in May), 
which the government viewed as informal talks prior to the beginning of the real negotiations, 
the bilateral talks remained deadlocked until the end of the year (Sullivan, 1994: 89; De Soto, 
1999: 360-2). Demilitarisation remained a particular sticking point, with neither side showing 
any sign of concession on the issues of purging or restructuring the Salvadoran military 
forces. Pedro Nikken, then advisor to the UN Secretary-General for the Salvadoran peace 
process, describes the negotiations in this period as a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ (Juhn, 1998: 70). 
However, in terms of the issues surrounding the establishment of a transitional authority, the 
Cristiani team agreed with the launching of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in 
June 1990 to verify the army’s human rights abuses (Sullivan, 1994: 89), and the two 
Salvadoran warring factions agreed to enlarge the role of the UN during and after the civil 
conflict. Moreover, the formation of ONUSAL, an important part of the transitional authority, 
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was eventually called for by both sides (Negroponte, 2005: 302).  
Phase 3: End 1990 – January 1992 
In Phase 3, both the US and President Cristiani became more eager to reach a final peace 
agreement. As the US’s efforts to pressurise the Salvadoran government to make significant 
progress in the negotiations became more direct and forceful, the US and the Salvadoran 
government cooperated more closely and actively to compel the ESAF to abide by the 
expected demilitarisation.  
The Bush government made a variety of efforts to advocate President Cristiani and to 
minimise the resistance of the military leaders (US Department of State cable #216340 cited 
in Negroponte, 2005: 311). In addition to the reduction in its military assistance, the US also 
made various diplomatic efforts. First, with regard to its pressure on the ESAF, the US 
government instructed its representatives and envoys to make direct contact with the 
leadership of the High Command to make it explicitly clear that the US supported the peace 
negotiations. For example, General George Joulwan, then head of the US Southern Command 
in Panama, met with the High Command to emphasise the US’s firm support for President 
Cristiani’s diplomatic efforts (Negroponte, 2005: 312). Moreover, when the government flatly 
refused most of the FMLN’s demands in April 1991, Colin Powell, the then Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited El Salvador and made a strong statement calling for the end of 
the war (Juhn, 1998: 90). 
Second, the US officials’ direct contact with the FMLN was another important signal to the 
ESAF that its former advocate no longer supported military conflict. After several months of 
indirect talks, US officials began to make direct visits to the FMLN in January 1991 (Sullivan, 
1994: 87; De Soto, 1999: 376). From August 1991, the US government engaged with the 
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FMLN more closely by facilitating bilateral talks with the Salvadoran government, 
explaining Cristiani’s intentions, and presenting mediating proposals (Juhn, 1998: 105; 
Sullivan, 1994: 87-8). 
Third, the Bush administration cooperated with the UN’s diplomatic coordination of the 
negotiations, assuming an ‘activist, low-key, behind-the-scenes’ role (Sullivan, 1994: 86). At 
the end of 1990, the US government expressed its conviction that the UN’s involvement was 
critical to the success of the Salvadoran negotiations, and from then on, the US backed most 
of the UN initiatives (Sullivan, 1994: 98; Juhn, 1998: 101-4). Nevertheless, it continued to 
keep its diplomatic efforts low-profile because the Bush administration did not wish to raise 
concern among other Central American states about too strong an involvement of the US in 
their regional issues (Negroponte, 2005: 317). 
Fourth, in the final phase of the negotiations, the US’s skills at the negotiation table played a 
particularly important role. In December, when progress towards a final agreement remained 
deadlocked on the issue of demilitarisation, US officials persuaded President Cristiani to 
come to New York with the intention of achieving a breakthrough (Sullivan, 1994: 42-6, 96; 
Montgomery, 1995: 144). Moreover, the US also presented an offer of political and financial 
aid in exchange for the Cristiani government’s concession on a reduction in military forces 
(Juhn, 1998: 119). 
The US’s new pressures, which were stronger, employed a greater diversity of strategic 
methods, and increased the number of participating individuals, are considered one of the 
most important pushing-and-pulling factors behind the Cristiani government’s willingness to 
sign the final peace agreement (LeVine, 1997: 248).  
By making use of the stronger US pressure, the Cristiani government achieved significant 
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success in its two-level negotiation – persuading the FMLN to compromise its demands and 
convincing the military leadership to abide by the government’s decisions (Juhn, 1998: 84-5) 
– and demonstrated a far more flexible attitude from August 1991, when the US embarked on 
a series of much more proactive moves (Juhn, 1998: 99-100). 
Under pressure both from external actors (i.e. heightened diplomatic criticism from the UN 
and the US) and internal actors (i.e. popular demonstrations against the negotiations 
organised by right wing groups, including the High Command), the Cristiani government’s 
negotiation behaviour took on a recurring pattern. In each round of negotiation, the 
government negotiation team’s initial resistance to any compromises on military issues 
gradually weakened under increased pressure from the US (Juhn, 1998: 117; Negroponte, 
2005: 319-25).  
Responding to the external pressure, President Cristiani made significant concessions on the 
demilitarisation issues. For instance, after the US’s intensive diplomatic lobbying in August, 
the Cristiani government’s original resistance gave way to its acceptance of the need to 
reform the ESAF (UN/PDC notes, 15 August 1991; Juhn, 1998: 102-4), and after a 
painstaking New York meeting in September 1991, the Cristiani government agreed to 
establish a new National Civil Police (PNC) and to dissolve the Directorate of National 
Intelligence (DNI) (Negroponte, 2005: 321). Similar patterns were repeated in the October 
and December meetings (Juhn, 1998: 112-4). 
He also made a great deal of effort not to upset the military leaders too much. Most 
significantly, the government refused to disband the ESAF completely until the end of the 
negotiations, as it was concerned about the desperate High Command’s uncontrollable 
behaviour. In addition, when it agreed to the New York Accord in September, it demanded 
that the agreements on the creation of a PNC were not released, as they might galvanise the 
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anger of the military leaders (Negroponte, 2005: 321).  In many cases, the Cristiani 
negotiation team simply tried to avoid making decisions on the ESAF issue when possible. 
Nevertheless, this pattern of behaviour could not be used in the final round of the negotiations 
in December 1991. Since all unsettled issues needed to be addressed, President Cristiani 
himself had to join the meeting in New York. Facing a 31 December 1991 deadline (the end 
of Pérez de Cuéllar’s term) and with all external mediators’ participating, President Cristiani 
needed to make final decisions. Finally, he agreed with the FMLN on all the major issues, 
despite the expected resistance of the High Command, on the day of the deadline (Sullivan, 
1994: 96; Montgomery, 1992: 225; Negroponte, 2005: 326-8; Juhn, 1998: 120-1). 
As a result, the government had to make great concessions (Bracamonte & Spencer, 1995: 
36). With regard to the demilitarisation of the governmental armed forces, although the core 
leadership of the national army would be granted the opportunity to remain in place, the 
military and political power of the ESAF would be significantly reduced (Chapultepec Peace 
Accord, Chapter 1, para 1, 4, 9, and 12). In addition, all other major military agencies, 
including the Rapid Deployment Infantry Battalions (BIRIs), the DNI, and the national police 
were to be disbanded or completely reformed (ibid, para 7 and 8; Chapter 2, para 1 and 2). 
Thus, although President Cristiani, who had a business elite background and had liberal ideas 
on military power, agreed with the proposals, serious resistance was expected from the army 
leadership. 
Major decisions on the interim authority were made with relative ease. Although there was no 
systemic definition of the new transitional authority, a tripartite cooperative arrangement was 
established for its implementation. First, the Cristiani government was retained as the 
authority externally representing El Salvador’s sovereignty and controlling all administrative 
power. Second, the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ) was 
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established to deal with the restructuring of major social institutions (including the electoral 
system). It consisted of representatives from the government, the FMLN, and other political 
parties. Third, ONUSAL, an external actor representing the UN, was charged with 
investigating various issues related to the peace process and to present its recommendations 
to President Cristiani. 
Phase 4: January 1992 – September 1993 
In the implementation phase, the involvement of ONUSAL produced a new form of the two-
level game in the Salvadoran peace process. While ONUSAL played an active role as a 
legitimate authority in planning and verifying the implementation of the Chapultepec Peace 
Agreement and in pressurising the Cristiani government, the US government supported 
ONUSAL’s efforts. Facing pressure (or using the pressure) from both ONUSAL and the US 
government, President Cristiani gradually carried out the demilitarisation. 
Because of the national army’s strong resistance to the issue of demilitarisation, its 
implementation proved to be particularly troublesome, and the US’s diplomatic and material 
pressure became focused on persuading the top military leaders to abide by the Accord.84 
First, the US provided incentives to secure the implementation of demilitarisation, 
announcing to the Cristiani government that it would provide resources such as funds for 
demobilisation, facilities for training new military organisations, and other support that 
Cristiani needed (US Embassy San Salvador cable #10412, October 6, 1992 cited in 
Negroponte, 2005: 357).  
Second, in order to increase its diplomatic pressure, the US also held direct meetings with the 

84
 The Clinton administration took office in January 1993 and inherited and strengthened its predecessor’s two 
principles: support for democratic institutions and for rebuilding market-oriented economies. Based on an 
approach of ‘pragmatism and partnership’, the new US government gave stronger and more substantial support 
to the peace implementation in El Salvador (Palmer, 2006: 22-3). 
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ESAF leadership to persuade them to abide by the peace process. For instance, when the 
retirement of top ESAF figures was repeatedly delayed, the then Assistant Secretary, Bernard 
Aronson, met with the ESAF leaders in September 1992 and asserted the US’s determination 
to complete the work (Negroponte, 2005: 352).  
Third, the US’s military and economic support was linked to the progress of the 
implementation of the peace agreement. For instance, the then Secretary of State, Warren 
Christopher, warned San Salvador in February 1993 that military assistance and funds for the 
Department of Justice would be withheld unless the Salvadoran government demonstrated its 
resolve to implement the agreement (Baranyi & North, 1996: 18).  
Fourth, after the decisive peace agreement was reached on 31 December 1991, USA officials 
met continuously with the FMLN leaders and expressed their strong support for the peace 
accords. These meetings with the FMLN convinced the ESAF that the US no longer 
supported it (Sullivan, 1994: 88). 
Combined with the activities of ONUSAL, the US’s tougher stance and consistent strategies 
forced the Salvadoran government to complete the demilitarisation programmes set out in the 
Chapultepec Agreement. However, the initial response of the government to these pressures 
was ambivalent, if not reluctant. Because of the ESAF leadership’s strong resistance to 
demilitarisation, the Cristiani administration could not easily ensure its implementation. For 
example, during the early stages of demilitarising the National Guard, the BIRIs, and the 
death squads in February and March 1992, the military leaders sabotaged the process, and 
fake implementation caused a serious delay in the overall process (US Embassy San Salvador 
cable #04523, 24 April 1992 cited in Negroponte, 2005: 334). Moreover, the Cristiani 
government’s political will to overcome the resistance was not taken seriously by the US 
(Whitfield, 2001: 37). 
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Nevertheless, the combined effects of ONUSAL’s diplomatic efforts towards the Cristiani 
government and other external actors as well as the US government’s repeated promise of 
financial support for the implementation process and continuous assertion of its 
determination to complete the demilitarisation succeeded in changing President Cristiani’s 
attitudes (Baranyi & North, 1996: 15-6; Whitfield, 2001: 37).  
A good example of this pattern is observed in the retirement of core military officers who had 
perpetrated human rights abuses against the Salvadoran people. Although the UN Ad Hoc 
Commission recommended the immediate dismissal of approximately 100 officers in 
September 1992 (Montgomery, 1995: 151), the Cristiani government was unable to take swift 
action because the removal of 15 top leaders was a particularly sensitive issue for the EASF. 
Thus, there was little sign of implementation until February 1993. Nevertheless, as the 
Clinton government made it clear in February that no more military support would be given 
until the military leaders accused of human rights abuse were dismissed, the government was 
able to overrule the ESAF resistance. Between March and April 1993, all the military leaders 
listed in the Ad Hoc Commission’s report were forced to retire. Moreover, the government 
announced a revised target date for the completion of the Commission’s recommendations: 
30 June 1993 (The New York Times 16 March 16, 1993, cited in Baranyi & North, 1996: 18; 
Negroponte, 2005: 350). 
As a result, although the process extended beyond the originally proposed deadline, all 
missions of ONUSAL were declared complete in September 1993 (Baranyi & North, 1996: 
3). Moreover, as Licenciado Rodriguez, who took the lead in the demilitarisation as the Ad 
Hoc Commission’s Chairman, stated, only the US had the effective power to enforce the 
Commission’s recommendations, and its pressure was the most important (and, in reality, the 
only) factor in compelling the Salvadoran military leaders to cooperate with the 
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demilitarisation process (Negroponte, 2005: 350). 
 
Throughout the negotiation period, two distinctive characteristics of the interplay between the 
US and the Cristiani government are observed. First, the two-level game played by President 
Cristiani is particularly important in understanding the interplay between the Cristiani 
government and the United States. As Figure 6.3 shows, the actors had no significant 
difference in goals that could hamper their cooperation in Phase 2. Nevertheless, dealing with 
the strong pressure from the US to achieve progress in the peace negotiations and the 
stubborn resistance of the military leadership was a critically important yet difficult task 
during the peace negotiation processes for both actors. In Phase 1, since the US 
administration, bound by Cold War rivalry, maintained its partial support of the Salvadoran 
government (and its military forces), President Cristiani’s new peace initiatives did not 
produce fruitful results. Although the US changed its attitude towards the Salvadoran peace 
negotiations in Phase 2, the advocate country’s material and diplomatic pressure did not have 
an immediate effect. Thus, the Cristiani government refused to make any significant 
concessions on the demilitarisation issue. From Phase 3 to the end of the implementation 
phase, the consistently strong enthusiasm of the US government for a peaceful resolution of 
the Salvadoran conflict, together with other external actors’ pressure, forced the Cristiani 
government to be tougher with the ESAF. 
 
 


Figure 6.3. Dynamics of the Interplay between the US, the Cristiani Government, and the 
ESAF 
 
 
Second, the relatively close interaction between the governments of the United States and El 
Salvador was a significant feature of the negotiations (Sullivan, 1994: 87). Since the US 
government had a good understanding of the influence of the Salvadoran army in Salvadoran 
politics (Mouritsen, 2003: 65), no significant issues related to bounded awareness were 
observed. The US’s policies were focused on protecting the Cristiani government from the 
threat of the ESAF and acquiring greater influence over the Salvadoran military forces in 
order to support President Cristiani’s initiatives. In order to achieve these ends, and in 
contrast to China’s relationship with the PDK, it remained in constant contact with the 
Salvadoran government and the ESAF leaders. Hence, mutual misunderstandings that might 
affect the decision-making process were minimised, and the effectiveness of US pressure on 
the Salvadoran military leadership was increased. 
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter has analysed the changing pattern of the interplay between two national factions 
in the civil wars in Cambodia and El Salvador (the PDK and the Cristiani Government) and 
their advocate states (China and the US) during their peace negotiation processes. In general, 
similar to the pattern of interplay studied in Chapter 5, when the external actors showed 
greater enthusiasm towards the negotiation, the negotiations achieved better progress. When 
the pressure or incentives from the external interveners became stronger, the national factions 
tended to demonstrate more cooperative and less belligerent attitudes in their negotiation. A 
closer analysis reveals the following points. 
First, the attitudes of the advocate states in the two cases changed significantly over time. In 
the initial periods of the civil wars in Cambodia and El Salvador, both China and the US 
behaved like spoilers rather than mediators in the early phases of the negotiations in 
Cambodia and El Salvador, respectively. However, as their core regional interests changed 
with the end of the Cold War system, both advocates redefined their roles in the negotiations 
from partial supporter of certain national actors to neutral mediators. Accordingly, their 
relationship with the national factions that they supported changed significantly during the 
negotiation processes. Close cooperation between the national factions and the advocates was 
hampered, and tensions emerged from the mid part of the negotiations as their core goals 
diverged. 
Second, from a short-term viewpoint, the impact of the advocate states on the national 
factions’ changes in attitudes towards their negotiations is considered more critical than the 
impact of third-party mediators. In addition to the diplomatic tactics that were used by the 
impartial third-parties, China and the US applied stronger and more material incentives and 
pressures. Using the classification of types of interplay suggested by Stokke (see Chapter 2), 
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the intervention of the two advocates can be categorised as utilitarian interplay, which is 
usually determined by costs and benefits. Although they also facilitated the peace 
negotiations by engaging in normative and ideational interplay with the national factions, the 
diplomatic, economic, and military tactics employed by the US and China were intended to 
persuade their clients to engage more actively in the peace negotiations and to treat them 
more seriously by increasing the costs of continuing the conflict and the benefits of peace 
negotiation.  
Moreover, national factions made more sensitive responses towards their advocate states’ 
changed attitudes. Compared to their responses to the impartial interveners’ recommendations, 
the factions tended to be more favourably disposed towards the demands of their advocates. 
For instance, the significant decrease in the military and economic support from China and 
the US shocked the PDK and the Cristiani government (or, more specifically, the military 
leaders), respectively, and succeeded in forcing them to take their negotiations more seriously. 
Third, close communication between an advocate state and a national faction might play an 
important role in the success of a peace negotiation. Although China was the only de facto 
military and economic supporter of the PDK, the misunderstandings between the two actors 
prevented China from being able to apply effective pressure on the PDK. In fact, being 
trapped by its communist ideas and self-affirming internal discussion culture, the PDK 
developed many assumptions about the conflict and the negotiations without attempting to 
find out the reality of the situation. In not reflecting these assumptions in its policies or 
conveying its intentions correctly to the PDK, China’s new policies towards the Cambodian 
peace process failed to gain the support of and cooperation from the national faction. By 
contrast, through its use of multi-layered communication routes with various Salvadoran 
governmental bureaucracies, the US government maintained effective channels for the 
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transmission of information by both sides. These channels minimised the potential problems 
of bounded awareness for both the US and the Cristiani government during the negotiation. 
The US leaders’ good understanding of President Cristiani’s intentions and the circumstances 
that he faced in the negotiation periods helped the advocate state to use its power in effective 
ways. 
Fourth, the cases studies also demonstrate that the constant attention of the advocate states 
was important to the success of the negotiations. As seen in the Cambodian negotiations, 
although China’s cessation of its substantial aid to the PDK succeeded in forcing the faction 
to participate in the negotiations, the abrupt abandonment of its advocacy both removed 
China’s leverage over the PDK and engendered a deep feeling of betrayal among the PDK 
leadership. Therefore, China was unable to influence the PDK’s behaviour during the 
implementation phase. By contrast, the US government paid consistently close attention to 
the restructuring of the ESAF, and the combination of incentives and pressure during the 
implementation phase was one of the biggest push-and-pull factors behind the Cristiani 
government being able to complete its mandates. 
The following chapter will present a number of theoretical and practical implications that can 
be derived from the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6. First, a more systematic analysis of the 
patterns of interplay between national factions and external interveners will be undertaken. In 
more closely observing and indentifying the similarities and differences between the four 
cases of interplay, Chapter 7 will uncover both a number of general patterns common to most 
cases and each case’s unique features. Second, the chapter will study the theoretical 
implications of the findings. The features of the cases studied will provide evidence to 
confirm some existing theoretical discourses related to international negotiation or conflict 
resolution, such as the dilemma of impartiality and enthusiasm of third-party interveners, the 
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two-level game of negotiation, and the role of culture in international negotiation. Finally, the 
following chapter will also present a number of practical implications of the findings for 
future peace negotiations. In particular, the chapter will propose a number of suggestions that 
might be useful in answering the questions of how interveners convince warring factions to 
choose peace negotiation over military solutions and, once a ceasefire is in effect, how the 
third-parties’ power can be effectively used to convert the temporary ceasefire into a 
sustained peace. 
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Chapter 7 
Analysis of the Case Studies 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The previous two chapters studied the national factions’ changing patterns of interaction with 
two types of third-party interveners (impartial third parties and advocating states) in the peace 
negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador. In general, it is observed that stronger response 
rules from international interveners are likely to result in national factions demonstrating 
greater flexibility towards the peace negotiation in the short-term.  
However, the case studies also showed that the national actors eventually refused to 
cooperate with proposals that they deemed harmful to the chances of achieving their 
fundamental goals, regardless of the strength of the intervention methods employed. 
Moreover, the chapters displayed the distinctive behaviour of the impartial third parties and 
advocate states during their interventions and the dissimilar responses of the national factions 
to the external incentives and pressures. They also revealed two factors that prevented the 
actors from developing good mutual understanding: ethnocentric cultural values and 
limitations in the organisations’ communication systems.  
This chapter attempts to provide a more systematic analysis of these findings by asking what 
answers the previous case studies provide to the main questions. It examines both the 
descriptive and explanatory aspects of the findings in Chapters 5 and 6 that are relevant to the 
question of ‘what does the interplay between national factions and external interveners in 
peace negotiation tell us about their chances of achieving their goals?’ In addition, this 
chapter also discusses some significant implications that these findings have for a number of 
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the theoretical perspectives employed in conventional studies, such as the role of culture in 
negotiation, the utility of coercive interaction, two-level games, and bounded awareness. 
The first section of this chapter illustrates the descriptive achievements of this thesis by 
providing answers to the first subordinate question: ‘what strategies do national and external 
actors use to achieve their goals?’ As regards the interveners’ strategies, it presents the 
different types of intervention methods used by the impartial third parties and advocate states. 
With regard to the responses of the national factions to the external intervention, it re-
examines the national factions’ changing attitudes during their peace negotiations by applying 
the case studies’ findings to the typology of national factions’ reactions that was 
conceptualised in Chapter 3. In general, the decisions of the national actors in the cases 
studies conform with those in the typology. After this, the two-level games in the national 
factions’ decision making are examined. It is observed that most military factions in civil 
conflicts play two-level games when they make decisions, and, moreover, the internal 
negotiations in their two-level games are normally conducted between the leaders of rival 
subordinate units. 
The final two sections provide answers to the two remaining subordinate questions presented 
in Chapter 1. In section two, the comparative effectiveness of the methods of intervention is 
explored. By examining the usefulness of the different types of third-party peace intervention, 
however, this section concludes that there is no specific type of intervention that is more 
useful than others. The third section addresses the following question: what are the major 
perceptual obstacles preventing effective third-party intervention. It discusses the 
contribution of the third-parties’ ethnocentric cultural values to their perceptual limitations 
and points to how the national factions’ limited communication capabilities prevented them 
from making the most of their strategies in the negotiations.  
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QEUSTION I:  
What strategies do national and external actors use to achieve their goals?  
In order to answer this question on the strategic moves of external third parties and national 
factions, this section sets out to describe the features of the interplay between the negotiating 
actors in civil war peace negotiations and to present some theoretical implications of these 
features. It consists of three parts, which deal with the behaviour of the external third parties, 
the responses of the national factions, and the consequences of the interplay, respectively. 
 
The Intervention of the Third Parties 
This section presents a number of the differences between the intervening behaviour of 
impartial third parties and that of advocate states. In short, while the impartial third parties 
paid most attention to process control and content control, the advocate states used a wider 
range of strategies. It was also observed that although the advocate states’ intervention 
appeared to have stronger short-term effects, its long-term influence varied by case. 
Chapter 3 proposed two categories for interveners’ strategic moves. The first category 
consists of three forms of intervention: process control, content control, and motivation 
control. The second category deals with the strength of intervention and distinguishes 
between light methods and heavy methods. The case studies’ findings in respect to these 
criteria reveal two notable features. 
The advocate states in the case studies used more diverse methods than the impartial 
interveners. The impartial third parties tended to rely on diplomatic incentives and pressures 
that were founded on their legitimate moral and diplomatic influence as impartial 
 


international actors. The UN in El Salvador used the most limited range of methods, which 
were procedural coordination, indirect organisation of other interveners’ pressures, and its 
own diplomatic pressures on the national factions. In addition to its diplomatic and mediating 
roles, the United States in the Cambodian case applied more direct diplomatic and economic 
pressure, including official condemnation of the national factions’ behaviour and linking their 
economic cooperation to concessionary moves by Vietnam and the People’s Republic of 
Kampuchea (PRK)/the State of Cambodia (SOC: successor of the PRK).  
By contrast, as the advocate states had provided economic and/or military support to the 
national factions before the civil wars, they had more varied resources with which to 
influence their client national factions. In Cambodia, China utilised its personal connections 
with the CGDK’s leaders, diplomatic advocacy at the international level, and economic and 
military aid, together with most of the methods that were applied by the impartial interveners. 
The US in El Salvador used the most diverse intervening strategies of the interveners 
examined in this thesis, adding the following methods: using its influence over the leaders of 
Salvadoran social or political groups, promising future incentives, and using El Salvador’s 
domestic media. 
 
The Responses of the National Factions 
This section discusses the issues related to the pattern of the factions’ responses towards the 
interveners’ proposals and pressure. First, after a brief description of the national factions’ 
behaviour presented in Chapters 5 and 6, it examines the usefulness of the typology of 
national factions’ decision making suggested in Chapter 3. The national actors in the case 
studies are observed to have generally conformed with the assumptions presented in that 
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chapter. Additionally, it discusses the two-level games found in the peace negotiations in 
Cambodia and El Salvador. 
As presented in Chapter 3, the strategic moves of national factions can be categorised into the 
following five actions: (1) rejection of the suggested proposal; (2) dragging out the 
procedure; (3) devious consent; (4) conditional consent; and (5) full acceptance. Chapters 5 
and 6 demonstrated that the primary methods that the national factions used to respond to the 
third-parties’ intervention changed in each phase of the negotiations.  
The Cambodian national actors generally responded negatively to the interveners’ efforts. For 
instance, the PDK demonstrated its stubborn attitudes in the initial phase of its negotiations 
by rejecting talks with its enemies. Although it participated in the negotiations from 1989, it 
was not until late 1990 that the faction displayed a receptive attitude. However, its 
cooperation with the peace negotiation process ended in its overt refusal to cooperate with 
UNTAC’s demilitarisation process. 
In addition, the PRK/SOC used two less obvious tactics to resist the proposals during the 
negotiation period: dragging out the process and devious consent. When the third parties were 
paying serious attention to the Cambodian issues (between late 1989 and the end of 1990), it 
pretended to agree to the UN’s proposals but made efforts to drag out the negotiation 
procedures. Moreover, when the international attention on Cambodia waned at the end of 
1989, it quickly persuaded other national factions to change the proposals, despite continually 
confirming its official position of support for the UN’s proposals. The PRK/SOC’s resistance 
became more explicit during the implementation phase, when it obstructed the United 
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)’s activities and rejected the election 
results. 
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Compared to the Cambodian factions, the Salvadoran military factions displayed more 
positive attitudes towards the external actors’ intervention. The Farabundo Marti National 
Liberation (FMLN) maintained a relatively good relationship with the UN largely because the 
international body adopted an impartial attitude towards both negotiating parties. Although 
the FMLN rejected the UN’s appeals for renewed negotiation between the middle and the end 
of 1990, the military faction responded relatively positively to the UN’s coordination of the 
implementation phase by fully accepting or conditionally consenting to the implementation 
processes. 
The Cristiani government’s responses to the external pressure for negotiation were somewhat 
more reluctant because of the strong internal resistance from the military leaders of the 
government forces. After its ambivalent and rather negative stance against any real 
concessions ended in March 1991, the government moved the negotiation forward slowly 
while seeking a middle path that would appease both the ESAF leaders and the US 
government. Thus, its normal response to pressure from the US was to drag out the procedure 
or offer conditional consent.  
Pattern of National Factions’ Responses 
This section argues that the behaviour of the national factions studied in Chapters 5 and 6 
generally supports the assumptions and typology that appeared in Chapter 3. Table 7.1, which 
has already appeared in Chapter 3 (p. 78), summarises the typology. This typology is based 
on the assumption that an actor’s decisions on its future actions in negotiation are strongly 
affected by its assessment of the combination of three questions. First, are the proposals 
critically harmful to the actor’s fundamental goals? Second, are the pressures or incentives 
from external interveners strong? Third, does the national faction have sufficient domestic 
resources to resist the pressure from international interveners?   
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Table 7.1. The Typology of National Factions’ Choices 
Type A B C D E F G H 
Goals P P P P N N N N 
Resource P N P N P P N N 
Response 
Rules P P N N P N P N 
Decision 
Of Actors 
Consent 
(Initiator) 
Consent 
(Follower) 
Consent 
(Initiator) 
Consent 
(Follower) 
Pretend 
Consent 
(In Spoiler) 
Refuse 
(Out  Spoiler) 
Refuse 
(Inside or 
Outside 
Spoiler) 
Pretend 
Consent 
(Follower) 
Refuse 
(Loner) 
Refuse 
Implemen- 
tation 
Highly 
Probable Uncertain 
Probable 
But Slow Uncertain 
Highly 
Unlikely 
Highly 
Unlikely Uncertain 
No 
Progress 
1. Proposal Contents: P – proposal is favourable or neutral to the faction’s fundamental goals 
       N – proposal is contrary to pursuance of the faction’s fundamental goals 
2. Resource:      P – resources of the faction are relatively abundant 
            N – resources of the faction are relatively few  
3. Response Rules: P – response rules from external interveners are forceful 
        N – response rules from external interveners are not forceful 
 
The case studies reveal that the national factions’ behaviour was generally consistent with 
these assumptions. Moreover, their actions changed phase by phase because the conditions of 
their domestic resources and the response rules from external interveners varied according to 
the phase. First, in Cambodia, the PRK/SOC’s response to the UN’s peace proposals in Phase 
2 was relatively positive when all international interveners applied strong diplomatic and 
economic pressure and incentives (Type E in the Table 7.1). However, as the international 
communities’ focus on the peace negotiation waned in Phase 3, the de facto government 
made efforts to reverse or renegotiate the proposals that it had agreed to in Phase 2 (F, Inside 
Spoiler). This intention became more explicit during the implementation phase; more 
seriously, it flatly refused to accept the result of the first Cambodian post-war general election, 
which was unfavourable to its goals (F, Outside Spoiler) (Ashley, 1998: 24).  
Second, the PDK constantly rejected negotiations with the PRK/SOC until Phase 2 because 
Chinese economic and military aid continued, and the faction was largely unconcerned about 
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the diplomatic pressure from other external interveners as its legitimacy or military power did 
not rely on them (F). However, under much stronger pressure from China (discontinuation of 
its military aid) and sensing in the UN’s proposals a chance to achieve their goals, the faction 
showed much greater flexibility towards the negotiations. Although it had some natural 
resources, including diamond mines in Pailin region, the faction feared that the 
discontinuance of Chinese aid would critically hamper its capabilities (B).  In Phase 3, 
realising that it was unlikely to achieve its goals and finding that China had little interest in 
supporting it, the PDK returned to hostilities, refusing to collaborate with UNTAC in Phase 4 
(F, Outside Spoiler).   
Third, as regards the Cristiani government in El Salvador, it could not initially promote peace 
negotiation vigorously because negotiation was not a US interest, and the government did not 
have sufficient resources to challenge the ESAF (H). As the US changed its policies from 
partial advocacy of the ESAF to support for a negotiated peace in El Salvador, the goals of 
the Cristiani government and the US began to converge. From this time on, the pressure from 
external interveners, particularly the US, became one of the Cristiani government’s primary 
resources in overcoming ESAF resistance. Thus, from Phase 2, the behaviour of the 
government changed from D (Follower) to A (Initiator) (in Phase 3 and 4). 
Finally, the FMLN did not identify any particular aspect of the UN’s proposals that might 
fundamentally prevent it from achieving its goals in Phase 1 (C). However, when the faction 
adopted a tougher approach towards the Cristiani government in Phase 2, the UN’s relatively 
neutral but weak intervention could not deter the factions from behaviour that was 
detrimental to the peace negotiation (F). However, the stronger pressure from the UN and 
other international actors in Phases 3 and 4 convinced the faction to return to the negotiating 
table and make significant concessions. Moreover, the FMLN gradually encountered more 
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opportunities to achieve its goals as both sides made more concessions from the latter period 
of Phase 3 (E→A, Initiator).  
 
Table 7.2.  The Patterns of National Factions’ Behaviour and the Consequences85 
Case Actor Change of Behaviour Final Reaction Outcomes of Implementation 
Cambodia 
The 
PRK/SOC E→F→F Internal Resistance Partial Success 
The PDK F→B→F Flat Refuse 
El Salvador The Gov’t H→D→A Slow Consent Success The FMLN C→F→E→A Slow Consent 
 
 
As summarised in Table 7.2, the pattern of behaviour of the national factions in Cambodia 
and El Salvador follows the assumptions presented in Chapter 3. Moreover, it is observed that 
the final reactions of the national factions to the peace agreements strongly affected the 
outcomes of the peace implementation. In this sense, as far as the case studies in this thesis 
are concerned, the typology presented above is useful. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the case studies also demonstrate that the goals of the 
actors are not always clearly evident. In some cases (e.g. the FMLN and the PRK/SOC), 
although the actors’ goals were stable, their behaviour towards the interveners’ proposals 
followed a change in their mid-term or provisional goals. For instance, although the UN 
proposals were not inconsistent with the FMLN’s fundamental goals (the dissolution of the 
ESAF and the integration of the FMLN into Salvadoran politics), the military faction’s 
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 As discussed in Chapter 3, this thesis regards a peace process as a success when the process achieves four 
goals: (a) the fighting comes to an end, (b) demobilisation of forces is complete, (c) key provisions of the 
accords provide for a restructuring of the armed forces and police, and (d) free and fair elections are held. The 
cases in which some of these goals are not achieved are regarded as partial successes. 
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response to them was negative when the FMLN decided to adopt a tough stance towards the 
government in order to improve its negotiating position.86 In these cases, as the goals were 
not presented clearly, the usefulness of this typology is reduced. 
Two-level Games in Peace Negotiation 
Another noteworthy aspect of the national factions’ behaviour is that the party leaders’ 
decision making involved playing two-level games. It has been shown that most warring 
parties are involved in two-level games even during their military phase of operations; 
moreover, internal negotiation mainly occurs with other leaders within the same party. Since 
its introduction by Robert Putnam in 1988, two-level game theory has been widely used to 
analyse negotiations. However, the two-level game played by national warring factions 
during civil conflicts has attracted much less attention in the academic community (See 
Chapter 2 for details). The case studies display a number of two-level game characteristics.  
First, it is apparent that most of the national factions played two-level games during their 
military campaigns. Although the power of internal actors’ influence varied, few factional 
leaders in Cambodia and El Salvador made decisions without facing internal resistance. Even 
while they were conducting military campaigns against opponents or even when the 
communications between the scattered units were extremely difficult, the rebel groups, 
including the People’s Democratic Kampuchea (PDK: the Khmer Rouge), the Khmer 
People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), and the FMLN, continued their internal debates 
(Heder, 1999; Ieng Mouly, 2009: Author’s Interview; Prisk, 1991). Although they had the 
outward appearance of a solid faction, the negotiators for each faction had to negotiate with 
external counterparts while convincing internal hardliners. 
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 In addition, although not discussed in detail in the cases studies, the goals of a faction were from time to time 
not based on unanimous consensus within the organisations. In many cases, the factional leaders faced strong 
opposition from internal constituencies or other leaders within the groups. 
 


Second, in contrast to the models in previous research focusing on democratic countries 
(Putnam, 1988; Smit, 2006), the intra-factional negotiations in the civil war peace 
negotiations related more to the rifts between internal factions than to their constituencies’ 
opinions. In fact, except for the Cristiani government, which had a popular mandate and 
received the results of popularity surveys, most national factions had little opportunity to 
learn how their constituencies thought and felt.87 Instead, they paid more attention to carrying 
out political campaigns to spread their propaganda to the people. 
Third, the case studies confirm that the factions with stronger internal rivalries tended to 
regard the negotiation at the internal level more important (see Figure 7.1). For instance, 
Prince Sihanouk, who had enjoyed strong normative and popular support as a god-king and 
the representative of the state, decided upon most important matters without having close 
internal discussions. In contrast, the Cristiani government, which faced strong opposition to 
the president’s peace initiatives from its own military leaders, was keen to carry out a 
successful two-level game. As the High Command of the ESAF had controlled the country 
for decades, the success of President Cristiani’s peace negotiation largely depended on 
whether he could  persuade the military leaders to abide by the agreed peace proposals (Juhn, 
1998: 70). 
 
Figure 7.1. National Factions’ Vulnerability to Internal Rivalry 
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 Although the KPNLF in Cambodia tried to gather the opinions of the people in its refugee camps and reflect 
them in their policies, as Ieng Mouly recalls, such efforts were ultimately futile (Ieng Mouly, 2009: Author’s 
Interview). 
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Moreover, the degree to which other four factions (the PDK, the PRK/SOC, the KPNLF, and 
the FMLN) relied on two-level games generally depended on the factions’ leadership style. 
The leaders of the two socialist organisations (the PRK/SOC and the PDK) generally ruled 
out opposition from other leaders by positioning their closest allies in core posts in the 
leadership (Heder, 1999; Haas, 1991: 138-41, 232-7). However, the KPNLF and the FMLN, 
which both had a relatively democratic internal decision-making process, had more two-level 
games than the former two factions. Shafik Handal of the FMLN and Son Sann of the 
KPNLF occasionally retreated from their original positions due to internal opposition (Ieng 
Mouly & Son Soubert, 2009, Author’s Interview; Juhn, 1998: 70).88 
To summarise, although further research is necessary to allow for generalisation, three 
theoretical findings related to two-level games are offered based on the case studies in 
Chapters 5 and 6. First, two-level games were found in most national factions’ decision- 
making processes. Second, the warring factions’ two-level games are mainly related to the 
rivalry among the internal factions. Third, the factions’ dependency on two-level games was 
closely associated with the seriousness of the internal rivalry and its leadership style. 
 
Consequences of the Interplay 
Although both the peace negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador succeeded in producing 
final agreements on demilitarisation and transitional authorities, the two cases exhibit 
contrasting implementation processes. Whereas the implementation process in El Salvador is 
considered in much research a success, the Cambodian peace process achieved only partial 
success (Hampson, 1996; Walter, 1999; Doyle, Johnstone, & Orr, 1997). 
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 In addition, Putnam argues that domestic constraints might provide better negotiating positions to negotiators 
in international negotiations as they can use the domestic hard-liners’ opinions to make external counterparts 
more receptive to their demands (1988: 451-2). However, the case studies did not provide sufficient evidence to 
decide whether this argument can be applied to peace negotiations. 
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Demilitarisation 
Demilitarisation was one of the most critical issues for all warring factions in both cases since 
retaining (or losing) their military forces could determine their future survival (see Chapters 3, 
5, and 6 for details). Hence, the negotiation process on this issue was the most painstaking in 
both cases. The two negotiations produced very different agreements, and the  
implementation outcomes also differed.  
In the Cambodian case, the Paris Peace Agreements dictated that 70 per cent of all military 
forces were to be dissolved before the election was held. This stipulation was a result of the 
Cambodian national factions’ resistance to the external interveners’ proposals. The UN’s 
original proposal on demilitarisation in the Framework Document was complete 
demobilisation of all military forces (Lizée, 1999: 68; Haas, 1991: 287), and the PRK/SOC 
and the CGDK agreed to this in late 1991.89 However, the national factions wished to retain 
some military forces to protect themselves from the possibility of their counterpart’s 
deception. Thus, after a series of independent meetings between the national factions in 1991, 
the four factions instead agreed to a 70 per cent reduction in each faction’s military forces.  
Nevertheless, this was risky a decision because it was appreciated that verifying proportional 
reductions in the factions’ military forces, which included various guerrilla fighters and 
political agencies, would prove difficult. Moreover, due to the factions’ mutual suspicion, 
fake cooperation with the implementation was also highly likely. However, the interveners, 
which included the US and France, simply accepted this idea without considering the 
potential risk of the decision or providing specific procedural supplements to make it work. 
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 Considering the national factions’ original positions, the members of the CGDK including the PDK demanded 
that each faction reduce its total military manpower and retain a fixed number of soldiers so as to eradicate the 
gap between the military forces of the PRK/SOC and the CGDK (Haas, 1991: 195). However, concerned about 
potential deception by the CGDK, the PRK/SOC insisted on proportional reductions instead (Brown & Zasloff, 
1998: 31; Turner, 2004: 147). 
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They assumed that the detailed decisions agreed by the national factions had to be respected 
as long as they did not contradict the basic principles in the UN Framework documents 
(Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 92). In this sense, the failure was partly due to the peace agreement 
itself.  
During the implementation period, UNTAC failed to wield substantial power because the 
PRK/SOC attempted to prevent the UN body from undermining the PRK/SOC’s supremacy 
in Cambodia and because the PDK refused to collaborate with it, claiming that UNTAC was 
partial and treated it unfavourably (Peou, 1997: 270-4; Heder, 1999: 263). Accordingly, the 
PRK/SOC halted its demilitarisation process in order to defend itself from the PDK’s attack. 
By contrast, the outcome of the Salvadoran negotiations on demilitarisation was relatively 
successful. The FMLN’s demand for the complete demobilisation of all military forces and 
agencies, including the ESAF, was not accepted by the government for a long time. Under 
strong pressure from the international community, the FMLN finally abandoned its demands 
of the disbanding of the ESAF in late 1991. Moreover, the final negotiation in December 
1991 took place in close consultation with other external actors such as the UN, the US, 
Mexico, Venezuela, and Spain (Sullivan, 1994: 96; Montgomery, 1992: 225; Negroponte, 
2005: 326-8). Hence, in contrast to Cambodia, both the Salvadoran government and the 
FMLN tried to produce specific provisions for implementation in order to prevent the other’s 
deception, rather than preserving their own military forces to prepare for potential problems 
(Call, 2002: 413). 
As a result, the Chapultepec Accords specified the number of soldiers that the ESAF had to 
demobilise, ordered the complete disbanding of paramilitary groups, including the DNI and 
BIRIs, and the complete dissolution of the FMLN army. The accords also presented detailed 
plans for implementation (Chapultepec Peace Accord, Chapter 1, para 4, 8, 9 & 12). Although 
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many procedural problems and the limited ability of ONUSAL were revealed, the 
demilitarisation was declared complete in December 1992. 
Transitional Authorities 
The transitional authorities in Cambodia and El Salvador exhibit ostensible similarities in 
composition but striking difference in the effectiveness of their functions. The authorities in 
both cases consisted of three main bodies that represented the UN (UNTAC and ONUSAL), 
the wills of all national factions (the SNC and COPAZ), and the de facto governments (the 
PRK/SOC and the Cristiani government). However, the power structures between the bodies 
and the effectiveness of each body’s activities in Cambodia and El Salvador were 
significantly different (see Figure 7.2). This is partly because the national factions in the two 
cases had different ideas about the transitional authority.  
 
Figure 7.2. The Composition of the Transitional Authorities in Cambodia and El Salvador 
 
 
In Cambodia, UNTAC was the central authority for supervising the implementation of the 
Paris Peace Agreements. The SNC, which consisted of representatives of all the Cambodian 
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factions and thus represented Cambodian sovereignty, was supposed to advise UNTAC. In 
addition, the PRK/SOC was allowed to retain its administrative structures and to perform 
limited administrative roles to supplement UNTAC’s implementation.  
However, the three authorities did not work as the PPAs had intended. As the international 
interveners’ focus of attention shifted away from Cambodia, the PRK/SOC strengthened its 
efforts to take control of the implementation processes because it faced continuous PDK 
efforts to undermine its administrative structure and feared that UNTAC might ignore its 
status as the de facto government. As a result, UNTAC’s supreme authority could be applied 
only through the PRK/SOC’s administrative agencies, and the SNC became a nominal 
consultative council with little actual power.   
In El Salvador, the Cristiani government took a leading role, while ONUSAL supplemented 
the government by issuing reports to President Cristiani containing the results of its 
investigations on issues related to the implementation and suggestions. Moreover, COPAZ, 
which consisted of representatives of all the major political parties and the FMLN, dealt with 
legislative issues. 
ONUSAL, with assistance from the external interveners, the US in particular, played a 
constructive and effective role in helping and coercing both the government and the FMLN to 
carry out their duties. In particular, the UN’s mediatory role in resolving the stalemates on 
demilitarisation caused by the factions’ mutual mistrust was considered a great success 
(Baranyi & North, 1996: 40-1).  
In short, in Cambodia, UNTAC was given strong authority to supervise the overall 
implementation of the Paris Peace Accords, but it failed to overcome the resistance of the 
Cambodian national factions and to wield its power effectively. However, ONUSAL, which 
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was granted much more limited and supplementary power, was successful in completing its 
mandates. In the early phase of the implementation (until December 1992), the UN’s roles 
included the coordination of the two national factions implementation procedures, which was 
beyond its designated mandate (Baranyi & North, 1996: 41).  
 
QUESTION II: 
Which methods of intervention are more effective? 
Of the various strategies that external third parties employed in Cambodia and El Salvador, 
did some prove more useful than others? This thesis examines this question by using the 
traditional discourse on the usefulness of impartiality and strength of intervention. By means 
of a comparative analysis of the case studies, this thesis concludes that the usefulness of a 
particular method cannot be generalised, because the utility of an intervention is determined 
by the context in which the intervention is applied. Moreover, it stresses the importance of the 
actors’ mutual understanding as a factor for improving the effectiveness of intervention. 
As shown earlier, the intervention methods that the impartial third parties adopted aimed at 
removing the barriers to good communication between the warring parties (i.e. process 
control), presenting more feasible and creative proposals (i.e. content control), and providing 
legitimate or diplomatic incentives (i.e. light intervention of motivation control). In contrast, 
the main methods that the advocate states used in their interventions were largely based on 
their coercive powers. They commonly applied economic pressure, threatened to withdraw 
military aid, and promised new economic support. However, the outcomes of the peace 
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interventions were not decided by the types of methods that they employed.90 
First, in terms of strength, there was no evidence that heavy intervention was more useful 
than light intervention. This finding appears to contradict the widely accepted belief that the 
success of an intervention is dependent upon the intervener’s ability and willingness to apply 
sufficiently strong pressure on the warring factions (Touval and Zartman, 1985:14-5; Mitchell 
and Webb, 1988: 43-7; van der Merwe, 1989). The case studies suggest that it is doubtful 
whether an intervener’s strength of intervention is really that useful in persuading national 
factions to accept their peace proposals.  
As for the usefulness of light intervention by impartial third-parties, their use of procedural 
coordination, message conveyance between the national factions, and consultation are useful 
in facilitating conditions conducive for negotiation. However, the role that light intervention 
plays in changing the national factions’ negotiating behaviour is insignificant.  
The UN’s mediation process in El Salvador demonstrates this point well. Since it had been 
invited to act as a neutral external mediator by both the Cristiani government and the FMLN, 
the UN made considerable efforts to maintain an impartial attitude towards both factions 
(Munck & Kumar, 1995: 179-80; see the Salvadoran section of Chapter 5). The faith in UN 
impartiality that the factions gained through these efforts helped the UN in facilitating the 
bilateral peace talks between the Salvadoran national factions and in coordinating the 
procedural issues in the negotiations, which involved it conveying messages between the 
Cambodian factions and suggesting its own proposals.91 Nevertheless, when the Salvadoran 
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 In this sense, by using Stokke’s terms, most interactions that the impartial interveners had with the warring 
national factions in both cases can be regarded as either normative interplay or ideational interplay, whereas the 
interactions of advocate states with their client national factions were generally characterised by utilitarian 
interplay. 
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 Although not often discussed, the UN also received similar trust from the Salvadoran government (de Soto, 
 


factions decided to adopt tougher approaches to their counterparts, such trust did not 
contribute to changing their attitudes. Despite the international organisation’s varied efforts 
(e.g. sorting out the negotiation contents, more frequent meetings with the Salvadoran 
factional leaders), neither actor listened to the UN.  
Moreover, on many occasions, the national factions used the impartial actors’ engagement to 
justify their demands in the negotiations. For instance, the PRK/SOC used the issues of 
human rights and democracy, which the US highlighted as two of its main concerns, to justify 
their call for the exclusion of the PDK from the SNC and their demand that Prince Sihanouk 
be denied a privileged status in the future government. Furthermore, the FMLN tried to 
maximise the UN’s presence at the negotiations so as to be able to convey its messages to the 
government. 
With regard to the usefulness of heavy intervention, although the coercive intervention in 
Cambodia and El Salvador proved to be useful in encouraging the national factions to remain 
at the negotiating table, it failed to force them to abide by the peace proposals that they 
considered harmful to their fundamental goals. The reactions of the PRK/SOC to US (and 
UN) pressure and the PDK’s behaviour in response to China’s pressure are good examples of 
this.  
From a short-term viewpoint, the advocate states’ coercive methods were relatively 
successful in changing the national factions’ behaviour (Turner, 2004: 201-2). Once these 
advocate states made it clear that their clients should join the negotiations, the national 
factions rarely expressed open rejection of negotiation proposals. In both Cambodia and El 
Salvador, the advocate states decisions to end their military aid to the national factions proved 
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decisive in motivating the warring factions to take the negotiations more seriously and to try 
to reach an agreement. The ESAF’s acquiescence to the Chapultepec Accords, which had set 
out the terms for the fundamental restructuring of its forces, is a good example of the success 
of advocate states’ coercive methods. Moreover, the PDK, which had ignored the Chinese 
messages encouraging its participation in the early phase of the Cambodian peace 
negotiations, changed its fundamental attitudes and joined the negotiations. 
However, although both Cambodian client factions became more receptive to the peace 
negotiations when the pressure from the external interveners was strong, the PDK refused to 
abide by the peace agreements, and the PRK/SOC obstructed UNTAC’s implementation of 
the peace agreements so as to preserve its privileges (Peou, 2002: 516-7; Solomon, 1999: 
311; Turner, 2004: 246).  
Moreover, the failure of China’s strong coercive pressure on the PDK shows that the use of 
sudden and powerful pressure without proper consideration of a national faction’s situation 
may produce an unintended and counterproductive outcome. Although the complete 
withdrawal of Chinese military support for the PDK succeeded in pressurising the faction to 
regard the peace negotiations more favourably, China’s continued application of pressure 
without any attempts to reflect the faction’s interests led to the PDK’s flat refusal to accept 
the implementation of the peace process (see the Phase 4 of the Cambodian case in Chapter 
6). These findings support the argument that coercive methods are useful in facilitating the 
initial talks between warring factions, but coercion alone will not make a negotiation 
successful (Peou, 1997: 298; Fisher, 2001: 19) (see Chapter 2 for details).  
In short, although the differentiation of light intervention and heavy intervention was useful 
in ascertaining the differences in the intervening methods used, the usefulness of such 
methods in the peace processes is revealed to have been limited. 
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Second, Chapter 3 proposed three forms of intervention: process control, content control, and 
motivation control. Again, it was observed that no particular form was more useful than 
others. Rather, the case studies show that these three forms are complementary and the 
usefulness of each method is maximised when they are effectively coordinated with other 
methods. 
Process control or content control alone is not likely to induce national factions to regard a 
peace negotiation as an alternative means of achieving their goals. For example, when the 
UN’s intervention, which relied on process control and content control, faced strong 
resistance from the Salvadoran national factions in 1990, it was only after international 
pressure was heightened and the national election (which was important to both national 
factors) was over that the negotiations produced significant agreements. 
Nor can motivation control alone ensure the national factions’ long-term cooperation. For 
instance, although the interveners’ strong motivation control methods in Cambodia forced the 
PRK to announce its acceptance of the UN P-5’s Framework Document, the interveners’ 
failure to reflect the fundamental interests of the PRK in content control and process control 
resulted in the national factions’ resistance to the implementation of the agreement.  
Third, more importantly, the case studies suggest that the effectiveness of third-party 
intervention is determined more by the context in which the methods are applied than by the 
types of methods used. In other words, the utility of a particular intervention method can vary 
depending on the context in which it is employed. Although there might be various factors 
influencing the context, the impact of ‘mutual understanding’ was highlighted in this thesis. 
The case studies demonstrate that a third-party intervention is more likely to be successful 
when it is used in a way that is comprehensible to national factions and receives the 
consistently strong attention of external interveners.  
 


As regards process control, the UN in El Salvador succeeded in sustaining the negotiation 
between the two national factions by mitigating the procedural demands of the opposing 
groups. The negotiation form was changed from a two-stage negotiation (which discusses the 
conditions for ceasefire first and resolves other issues after the ceasefire comes into effect) 
into a compressed negotiation (which considers all issues simultaneously) as a result of the 
UN’s careful consideration of the national factions’ demands. Although not discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6, ASEAN also played an important role in sustaining the peace negotiations 
between the Cambodian parties. When their mutual mistrust was at its peak, Indonesia 
promoted their continued negotiation by arranging separate bilateral meetings in Jakarta 
between Prince Sihanouk and other factional leaders in an attempt to overcome the obstacles 
by using the prince’s legitimate domestic power. 
Accurately reflecting national factions’ core interests is critical to producing successful 
content control methods (Turner, 2004: 221, 247-9). The contrasting performances of the US 
in Cambodia and the UN in El Salvador presented in Chapter 5 highlights this issue (details 
will be analysed below). The recognition of national factions’ needs and interests is an 
important factor in improving the usefulness of motivation control as well. For example, 
although Western interveners’ constant refusal to recognise it as a legitimate government had 
been a constant pressure on the PRK, their threat to withdraw diplomatic support for the 
CGDK in the UN did nothing to transform the PDK’s attitudes in the late phase of the 
Cambodian negotiation.  
In sum, in answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section, this section argues 
that no one type of intervention method is universally more useful than others. Moreover, the 
usefulness of a method is largely dependent on the context in which it is applied, and more 
specifically, the reflection of national factions’ core interests is a key factor in determining the 
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effectiveness of a particular method.  
 
QUESTION III: 
What are the perceptual barriers that prevent effective third-party intervention? 
The third (and the second explanatory) question concerns the perceptual barriers to successful 
peace negotiation. Although choosing the right types of intervention is critically important for 
achieving successful third-party intervention, making sure that the intervention is correctly 
understood by national factions is also very important. The case studies show that the 
interveners in Cambodia achieved much less success than the third parties in El Salvador in 
this respect and, more importantly, that this contributed to the contrasting outcomes of the 
peace negotiations in the two countries. In the case studies, it was observed that a number of 
perceptual obstacles prevented the actors from developing and employing more effective 
strategies. 
This section explores the issue of perceptual barriers by using ‘bounded awareness’ theory 
(see Chapter 2 for details). First, it demonstrates that the ethnocentric cultural values of 
Western interveners in Cambodia seriously hampered their ability to analyse the 
circumstances of the negotiations and limited the scope of their intervening strategies. Second, 
it also shows that national factions in Cambodia failed to recognise the interveners’ changing 
attitudes in the last phase of the negotiations and missed the opportunity to pursue their goals 
because the faction lacked effective communication institutes. 
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The Role of Ethnocentric Culture (Liberal Peace) 
This section argues that the outcomes of the negotiations on demilitarisation and the 
transitional authorities in the case studies reveal how external interveners’ ethnocentric 
cultures can hamper the effectiveness of peace interventions. From a theoretical perspective, 
it deals with the issues related to liberal peace and the role of ethnocentric cultures. By 
demonstrating that the different outcomes of the negotiations in the case studies were partly 
caused by the external interveners’ ethnocentric cultural values, it criticises the liberal peace 
idea that the establishment of a democratic political system is the best way to bring sustained 
peace to war-torn societies. It argues that the utility of a certain idea or proposal largely 
depends on how the national actors perceive it. 
The final peace agreements in both cases (the Paris Peace Agreements and the Chapultepec 
Peace Accords) pursued the realisation of liberal peace in the countries. In pursuit of this goal, 
the agreements set out the core post-conflict recovery projects, which included the 
establishment of a new politically neutral national army, election of a new government in free 
and fair elections, creation of democratic state institutions, and respect for human rights. 
Nevertheless, the outcomes of the implementation processes in the two cases are strikingly 
different. 
In El Salvador, the transition to a democratic society founded on the people’s will was 
relatively successful. After the demobilisation and restructuring of the armed forces, the 
transitional authorities succeeded in reducing human rights abuses, running a democratic 
election, and implementing institutional reforms of the national police and judicial system 
(Doyle, Johnstone, & Orr, 1997: 372-3; Call, 2002: 393-412). As Sullivan asserts, the 
constant application of the ‘fundamental principles of democracy and the rule of law’ was one 
of the biggest reasons behind the relative success of the Salvadoran peace negotiations 
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(Sullivan, 1994: 83). 
In Cambodia, however, despite the success of the repatriation of refugees and the 
implementation of a general election, the UN’s initial goals in attempting to build democratic 
political systems, such as maintaining the ceasefire, accepting of the election results, and 
establishing a democratic governmental structure, were not achieved. Moreover, during the 
transitional period, the UN failed to preserve the democratic political and social systems that 
had been established because the UN was unable to control the implementation processes 
(Doyle, Johnstone, & Orr, 1997: 370-2; Peou, 2002: 508-10, 516-7). 
Many previous studies have attributed these different outcomes to the UN’s implementation 
strategies. For instance, Lee Kim and Metrikas point out the lack of advanced planning, 
bureaucratic issues in the UN, and communication problems between New York and Phnom 
Penh as major reasons for the failure (Lee Kim & Metrikas, 1997:126-9). Although the 
specific reasons that are given for the failure differ, the previous studies only focus their 
attention on the procedural problems and therefore tacitly accept the liberal peace ideas 
embedded in the peace agreements as ideal goals. 
However, with a specific analytical focus on the issues of demilitarisation and the transitional 
authority in Cambodia and El Salvador, it is observed that the different outcomes are partly 
due to the peace agreements themselves, which largely reflected the interveners’ liberal peace 
concepts. More specifically, the outcomes were partly dependent on whether the ethnocentric 
cultural values of the third-party interveners that were reflected in the peace agreements were 
accepted by (or acceptable to) the national factions. 
The case studies on the Cambodian peace processes reveal what might happen when the 
interveners’ ideas are incompatible with those of the warring factions. For example, the UN’s 
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proposals on the transitional authority in Cambodia called for the establishment of a new 
government by conducting a fair and free election under the supervision of international 
interveners. However, all the Cambodian actors set fundamental goals that relied heavily on 
their ethnocentric cultural values. Since Cambodia has high-context communication systems, 
hierarchical social systems, and had experienced long-term civil war, the national factions 
doubted that compromise and conflict resolution could be achieved through negotiation. 
Hence, while Western interveners pursued stabilisation of the regions via peace negotiations, 
the national factions pursued ‘total victory’ or ‘political dominance in a future political 
environment’ (see Chapter 5 for details). Since control of the election process would likely 
determine the winner, all national factions tried to have as much influence over the 
implementation process as possible, and the PRK/SOC made great efforts to preserve its 
supremacy in Cambodian politics during the transitional period.  
Thus, although the interveners’ strong pressure forced the PRK/SOC to abide by the peace 
agreement for a short time, it employed varied tactics to retain its dominant position during 
the implementation phases (for details, see Chapter 5). In the end, the interveners’ 
fundamental goals failed to be implemented. UNTAC’s supreme authority was seriously 
hampered, the election process was affected by the PRK/SOC’s self-serving strategies, and 
the new government that was formed was a coalition of FUNCINPEC and the PRK/SOC, 
regardless of the popular will.  
By contrast, both Salvadoran national factions agreed that the establishment of (Western) 
democratic systems was the best way to achieve peace. Although the focuses of their 
emphasis were significantly different, reflecting the social, political, and economic cleavages 
in Salvadoran society, both factions pointed to the lack of democracy as the root cause of El 
Salvador’s problems (FMLN memo, 5 February 1990 cited in Juhn, 1998: 55; Sullivan, 1994: 
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84, 97). Moreover, since elections had been held on a regular basis for approximately a 
decade, the Salvadoran people had a good understanding of what elections entailed. Since the 
FMLN had achieved and maintained a close relationship with the people in the regions 
formerly under its control, it had confidence that it could compete strongly in the forthcoming 
elections (Negroponte, 2005: 105, 114).  
Thus, both the Salvadoran national factions and most external interveners already agreed that 
the next government should come to power through a free and fair election; the controversial 
issues were about how to make the forthcoming election more politically neutral and 
democratic. Additionally, although the FMLN criticised issues surrounding the elections, it 
did not deny the Cristiani government’s legitimacy, and, therefore, there was little 
disagreement about the Salvadoran government’s leading role in the implementation of the 
peace agreements (see the Salvadoran part of Chapter 6 for details). 
Despite a number of instances of sabotage and fake implementation due to mutual suspicions 
about the sincerity of counterpart’s actions, the three transitional authority members played 
constructive roles. Whereas ONUSAL played a very active role in investigating human rights 
abuses, suggesting plans for implementation, and verifying the government’s implementation 
processes, COPAZ succeeded in reflecting the interests of various domestic actors by 
moderating the contents of new legislation (Baranyi & North, 1996: 8; Horst, 2010: 157).  
Although the government frequently showed its reluctance to take action on controversial 
issues, it had no intention of revising or reversing the provisions agreed at Chapultepec in 
January 1992 (Juhn, 1998: 126-9; Baranyi & North, 1996).  As a result, all the national 
factions accepted the outcome of the election in March 1994 and Armando Calderón Sol of 
ARENA assumed a new presidency. 
These examples from the case studies show that although liberal peace ideas (i.e. democratic 
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elections, transparent governance, and a market economy) might contribute to sustained 
peace in war-torn societies once they are well embedded, liberal peace ideas in themselves do 
not promote successful peace negotiations or post-war recovery. Rather, the case studies 
suggest that the degree of success that is achieved in the initial stages of democratisation in 
post-war societies depends more on whether the national actors are ready to accept the ideas  
of  liberal peace than on how democratic the planned processes are. In this sense, the findings 
support the argument that the failure of many peace negotiation (and implementation) 
processes in the 1990s, such as those in Angola, Sierra Leone, and Sudan, is partly due to the 
interveners’ too hasty attempts to force the national actors to accept liberal peace ideas.92     
 
 Lack of Institutions for Communication 
Although the author could find few previous theoretical or practical studies on this issue, this 
thesis has considered the lack of good communication institutions an important factor in 
causing serious misunderstandings between actors. The different performances of China (in 
Cambodia) and the US (in El Salvador) in establishing and maintaining communication with 
their client national factions (the PDK and the Cristiani government, respectively) as well as 
the markedly contrasting outcomes of their interventions demonstrate the significance of this 
factor. 
As observed in Chapter 6, the PDK’s institutions for exchanging information and establishing 
internal consensus were very weak. It did not have constant external contact points that could 
manage close relationships with international third-parties. The information collected by local 
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of democratic ideals and the institutions of democratic competition should be viewed more as part of long-term 
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agencies in domestic areas was frequently transmitted no further than the area level. 
Moreover, when assessing the information and deciding on the next strategic move, internal 
discussion within the leadership was dominated by the opinions of a handful of leaders and 
was led by the party’s ideological convictions. Accordingly, the PDK failed in making an 
accurate evaluation of its own domestic resources and external circumstances.  
This lack of an effective communication system resulted in its critical misinterpretation of 
China’s changing attitudes towards the Cambodian civil war and the PDK itself. Despite its 
long and heavy reliance on Chinese economic and military support, the PDK’s 
communication with China was infrequent and superficial. Thus, although China’s policy 
priority gradually changed from supporting the PDK’s revolutionary movement to ending the 
civil war and promoting regional stability, the PDK fervently believed that China would not 
turn its back on the party and took all the signs of the transformation in Chinese attitudes to 
be rhetorical gestures.93  
By contrast, the relatively constant and multi-layered communication between the Cristiani 
government and the US, the external advocate of the government, enabled President Cristiani 
and the ESAF leaders to interpret the transformation in American policies correctly. Due to a 
long and extensive collaboration with the US, Salvadoran governments had established a 
variety of routes for communication (formal and informal, direct and indirect, from top 
leaders to local constituencies). By using these routes, the US clearly conveyed its intentions 
to President Cristiani and the supreme leaders of the ESAF. For instance, when the Bush 
administration decided in 1990 to support the peace negotiations, this intention was 
repeatedly transmitted to both President Cristiani and the military leaders through the US 
embassy in San Salvador and through visits by US politicians and military leaders. As a result, 
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the Salvadoran national factions avoided seriously misinterpreting the intentions and 
behaviour of its advocate state.  
Moreover, the performance of the US in the Salvadoran case demonstrates that a faction’s 
internal communication may be facilitated by external third-parties. As the mistrust between 
the Cristiani administration and the ESAF leaders grew in the latter phases of the peace 
negotiation, direct talks between the two sides became rare. The US therefore acted as a route 
for transmitting Cristiani’s messages and incentives to the ESAF. 
Taking these points into consideration, the conclusive answer to the third question is that the 
ethnocentric cultures of negotiating actors and the actors’ underdeveloped institutions for 
communication are two important barriers to good communication between actors. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Chapter 7 has provided the answers to the central questions of this thesis through systemic 
and theoretical examinations of the findings of the case studies. The first section described 
the dynamics of the negotiating actors’ moves in their peace negotiation processes and the 
outcomes of their interplay. First, with regard to the external actors’ intervention, this chapter 
confirmed that the advocate states used partial but stronger intervention in order to change the 
national factions’ negotiation attitudes whereas the impartial third-parties applied  moderate 
diplomatic pressure.  
Second, the patterns of the national factions’ responses towards the external intervention were 
reconsidered. The strategic moves of the four national factions studied in Chapters 5 and 6 
were seen to have generally followed the assumptions and typology presented in Chapter 3. 
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Furthermore, it was observed that most of the national factions were committed to two-level 
games, even during the military conflicts, and, moreover, the influence of the two-level 
games on the national factions’ decision making was largely determined by the severity of 
their internal rifts.  
Third, the outcomes of the negotiations were considered. The provisions of the peace accords 
and the implementation processes in the two cases were strikingly different. Whereas the 
Salvadoran transitional authorities managed to achieve and sustain a relatively successful 
collaboration for the implementation of the provisions of the Chapultepec Accords, the 
Cambodian interim authorities failed to conduct effective implementation projects. 
Based on these descriptions, the second section examined the utilities of intervention methods. 
After reviewing the usefulness of separating the methods into different categories, this 
section argued that there no particular type of intervening method is measurably more useful 
than others. Although the suggested categories based on strength and form of intervention 
were useful in distinguishing the changes in the interveners’ strategies, it was not possible to 
generalise the contribution of the methods by the categories that they belong to. It was also 
argued that the usefulness of a certain method is determined not by its type but by the context 
in which the method is applied. More specifically, it was stressed that the intervening 
methods should reflect national factions’ core interests. Regardless of the types of intervening 
methods that were employed, no national factions collaborated with the interveners’ 
suggestions that seemed inconsistent with their fundamental goals. 
The last section of this chapter discussed the perceptual barriers in peace negotiations that 
hamper communication between the negotiating parties, focusing on ethnocentric cultures 
and inadequate institutions for communication. First, it argued that the external interveners’ 
ethnocentric values prevented them from possessing a good understanding of the national 
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factions. From a theoretical viewpoint, this chapter also cautioned that the utility of liberal 
peace ideas in promoting the success of peace processes should not be exaggerated. The case 
studies showed that the success of a peace process is likely to be determined not by how 
much democracy the peace plan intends to achieve but by how much the plan can be accepted 
by the national factions. Second, it also demonstrated that the national factions’ limited 
institutions for communication proved to be a major obstacle to obtaining and assessing 
accurate information for some of the national factions and that the ‘imperfect’ information 
that they did have led to their serious misinterpretation of it.  
This chapter is followed by the conclusion of this thesis. In the conclusion, the following two 
arguments are reconfirmed. First, peace negotiations can be better analysed through the 
concept of interplay between actors. Second, external interventions without an understanding 
of the national factions’ approach to the civil war and peace negotiations are not likely to 
result in successful third-party intervention. 
 


Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the UN’s engagement in international and civil conflicts has become more extensive in 
the post-Cold War period, the attention paid by scholars and practitioners to the factors that 
determine the effectiveness of third-party intervention has also increased. Accordingly, a 
large number of studies containing suggestions on ways to improve third-party intervention 
have been produced. Despite the great achievements of these studies, they display a number 
of weaknesses that have thus far remained unaddressed. First, many conventional studies tend 
to neglect the dynamics of the interplay between the negotiating actors. Second, the studies 
that look at the actors’ behaviour in peace negotiations have usually paid most attention to 
third-party interveners, leaving national warring parties unexplored. Third, while other 
periods of the civil conflicts, including the pre-war conditions that led to the conflicts and the 
post-war recovery process, have been extensively investigated, the peace negotiation process 
itself is a much less studied topic. 
This thesis has attempted to remedy these shortcomings by analysing the dynamics of the 
interplay between the national factions and the external interveners in the peace negotiations 
in Cambodia and El Salvador. By paying balanced attention to both national parties and 
external interveners, it has aimed to track the changing patterns of interplay between the 
actors. Moreover, based on the examination of this interplay, it has also tried to identify a 
number of the key features of and requirements for successful third-party peace intervention.  
This chapter summarises the degree to which these attempts have succeeded and concludes 
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this thesis by presenting a number of practical suggestions for improving third-party peace 
intervention and by acknowledging the remaining issues that need to be explored in future 
research. First, this chapter reconfirms the findings of this research. After presenting the 
dynamics of the changing strategies of the third-party interveners and the national military 
factions during the negotiation processes, it summarises the notable features of the interplay. 
It also makes clear that the utility of an intervention method is determined not by the type that 
is used, but by the context in which it is applied. Accordingly, it is argued that a peace 
negotiation is a process of mutual interaction between actors and that mutual understanding 
between national factions and external interveners is a key requirement for successful third-
party peace intervention. In addition, two barriers to the negotiating parties’ mutual 
understanding – ethnocentric cultures and insufficient communication institutions – are 
presented.  
Second, this thesis proposes three practical ways to improve the effectiveness of third-party 
intervention. The first, and most important, recommendation is for external third parties to 
establish and maintain close communication with national factions. This is one of the most 
effective and efficient ways to avoid mutual misunderstandings. Second, since building close 
relationships with national warring groups is not always feasible, it is argued that interveners 
need to provide a minimum security guarantee in order to reduce national factions’ fear about 
their future survival. Although many conventional studies have emphasised the importance of 
providing a security guarantee, this thesis goes further by arguing that the security guarantee 
should be based on an understanding of the national factions’ minimum goals and that third 
parties need to build mutual trust with national factions so that there is faith in the guarantee. 
Finally, this thesis stresses the importance of timing. Supplementing the previous research 
that focuses on the best timing for the start of intervention, this thesis demonstrates  that 
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figuring out the right timing for the withdrawal of intervention is also crucial to a successful 
peace intervention. 
Third, the contributions that this research makes to the academic discourse in this field and its 
weaknesses that need to be addressed in future research are presented. The central analytical 
concept of ‘interplay between actors’ employed in this thesis is useful in unveiling the factors 
that contribute to a successful peace process but have not been identified in previous studies, 
which have generally paid most attention either to the external conditions of wars and peace 
processes or to the role of third-party interveners. Moreover, this research makes theoretical 
contributions by providing empirical evidence related to the role of culture, warring national 
factions’ two-level games, and the influence of military factions’ institutional communication 
systems, factors that have not been systemically debated in previous conflict studies. 
Three weaknesses of this research are also noted and addressed. First, because this research 
lacks field research in El Salvador, the arguments related to the case study had to rely entirely 
on written materials. Hence, the hidden factors that might be found from fieldwork could not 
be reflected in this research, although the abundance and quality of previous studies on the 
Salvadoran civil conflict and peace process partially compensated for this weakness. Second, 
since the findings of this research are based on only two cases, the peace negotiations in 
Cambodia and El Salvador, more cases need to be investigated in order to confirm whether 
the findings reflect the general characteristics of civil war peace negotiations. Third, although 
the actors’ preferences were conceived as unchanging, stable, and evident as a core 
assumption of this research, there were a few cases where this assumption was not applicable. 
Thus, the dynamics of peace negotiation in cases where the actors’ preferences are uncertain 
or unknown need to be studied in the future. 
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SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
This thesis has examined the interplay between the actors in civil war peace negotiations in 
search of answers to the question, “what does the interplay between national factions and 
external interveners in peace negotiation tell us about their chances of achieving their goals?” 
In so doing, it has explored three subordinate questions by using descriptive and explanatory 
approaches. 
The first subordinate question concerned the characteristics of the strategies that national 
factions and third-party interveners employ to achieve their goals. The cases studies in 
Chapters 5 and 6 revealed two features. First, the impartial third parties generally used 
limited intervention methods (chiefly process control and content control), while the advocate 
states enjoyed a wider range of options. Moreover, of the motivation control methods 
employed, the impartial third parties generally used more non-coercive and impartial methods, 
whereas the advocates of certain national factions tended to use stronger and direct means of 
intervention. Second, it was observed that the types of methods that an intervener preferred to 
use changed according to the changes in the national factions’ responses. As interveners 
became more resistant to the external interveners’ strategies, the external interveners 
increased their pressures.   
In considering the responses of the national factions to the interveners’ moves, the case 
studies demonstrated that national factions’ behaviour tends to be affected by the strength of 
interveners’ response rules. The stronger and tougher the intervention becomes, the more that 
national factions’ provisional strategies are inclined to be receptive towards the intervention. 
Nevertheless, it was observed that the national factions rarely fully accepted proposals that 
they deemed harmful to the achievement of their fundamental goals.  
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Second, the descriptive analysis presented above leads to the second question with which this 
research is concerned: “which strategies are most effective in ensuring that an intervention is 
successful?” In fact, the case studies do not provide any evidence to confirm which methods 
are more useful. Although this research has distinguished between heavy intervention and 
light intervention according to the strength of the methods used, heavy intervention was 
revealed to be no more useful than light intervention in convincing the national factions to 
cooperate with the external third-parties’ intervention, at least from a long-term viewpoint. 
Moreover, it was also observed that the usefulness of the three forms of intervention, that is, 
process control, content control, and motivation control, cannot be examined separately and 
that they are more effective when they mutually supplement each other.  
Moreover, it was observed that the effectiveness of a particular intervention is dependent on 
the context in which it is applied. More specifically, an intervention is more likely to be 
effective when it is used in a way that national factions can understand and when it receives 
the consistently strong attention of external interveners. For example, although previous 
studies have pointed to impartiality and strength as important factors in successful peace 
intervention, neither impartial nor strong strategies helped the interveners to achieve their 
goals when they were employed without reflecting the national factions’ fundamental goals. 
Thus, this research’s first conclusion is that there is no one particular type of intervention 
method that is universally more useful than others; moreover, good mutual understanding 
between the actors is a crucial element in successful third-party peace intervention. 
Third, the previous conclusion leads to this study’s third question: what prevents the actors 
from having a better understanding of each other? In seeking the factors that affect the actors’ 
mutual understanding, this thesis has paid particular attention to two perceptual barriers: 
ethnocentric cultures and limited communication capabilities. 
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Chapter 5 explored the perceptual limitations and barriers to communication that result from 
the actors’ ethnocentric cultural values. More specifically, the chapter tracked how Western 
perceptions of peace, conflict/violence, and negotiation reduced the effectiveness of the 
international third-parties' efforts to promote successful peace negotiations. First, it was seen 
that interveners’ ethnocentric cultures may reduce their ability to appreciate the actual 
conditions of a negotiation when the cultural differences between them and warring countries 
are significant. The case studies showed that the US and other Western interveners in the 
Cambodian peace negotiation process were unable to perform an accurate analysis of the 
national warring factions' fundamental concerns about the civil war and peace negotiation; by 
contrast, the UN in El Salvador was more successful in avoiding such problems because of 
the perceptual similarities between the representatives of the UN Secretariat and the FMLN. 
Second, when seeking methods to improve the situation, the interveners' cultural traits limited 
the scope of their strategies. The Western interveners in the Cambodian negotiation set their 
proposals and response rules according to their own concepts of conflict and negotiation and 
their own sets of skills: as a result, their strategies were largely unsuccessful. However, 
although there is no indication that the interveners in El Salvador were more creative in 
setting strategies, the UN’s intentions and intervention methods were acknowledged and 
understood by the Salvadoran national factions.  
Chapter 6 addressed the national factions’ misunderstandings about the interventions and 
showed how their limited communication systems and skills may influence the effectiveness 
of third-party intervention. In Cambodia, the PDK did not have sound systems for acquiring 
and exchanging information or for appropriate discussion. Thus, it made a number of critical 
errors in interpreting the intentions of China and the Western interveners. It also had 
misconceptions about its resources and capabilities. Accordingly, the PDK failed to apply 
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good/timely strategies that would maximise its chances to achieve its goals during the last 
phase of the negotiations. By contrast, in the Salvadoran case, the US continuously reassured 
the Cristiani government of its intentions by utilising the existing multi-layered 
communication routes between the two sides. 
In sum, this thesis concludes that misunderstandings between actors frequently occur in civil 
war peace negotiations, and such misinterpretations may critically hamper the effectiveness 
of third-party intervention. Moreover, actors’ ethnocentric perceptions of the core concepts of 
conflict and negotiation and their underdeveloped communication systems are some of the 
common causes of the misunderstandings. Based on these findings, the second main 
conclusion of this thesis is that minimising misunderstandings between external interveners 
and national military factions is a key requirement for successful third-party peace 
intervention. 
 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
This section draws on the findings of the case studies to present three practical suggestions 
for improving the effectiveness of third-party interventions: establishing good mutual 
communication, providing a security guarantee, and determining appropriate timing. The first 
two are practical suggestions for avoiding the negative effects of the perceptual 
misunderstandings between negotiating actors. Whereas good mutual communication is 
proposed as a fundamental and maximalist solution to the problem of such misunderstanding, 
provision of a minimal security guarantee is a more realistic and minimalist suggestion for 
reducing the risk of complete failure. The matter of choosing the right timing for withdrawal 
is an additional issue that emerged from the case studies. Although the suggestions regard 
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different aspects of the intervention, they all point to the importance of interveners’ efforts to 
reflect the national factions’ fundamental goals.  
 
Good Mutual Communication 
This section argues that maintaining good communication between international interveners and 
national factions is an important factor in accomplishing an effective intervention because it 
prevents mutual misunderstandings from emerging and developing. There are a range of 
obstacles that contribute to poor mutual understandings, including different cultural values and 
the negotiating parties’ limited communication capabilities. Furthermore, one misunderstanding 
is likely to lead to further misinterpretation of the actors’ behaviour, leading to a vicious cycle of 
misunderstandings and further misinterpretations during the negotiation process. Hence, 
interveners need to make serious efforts to maintain close communication with national factions. 
The case studies highlight this point in two respects. First, the case studies reveal that 
understanding the intention of the national factions’ behaviour and the circumstances 
surrounding the actors is essential if an external intervener is to establish an effective strategy. 
For instance, although both the FMLN and the PDK conducted military campaigns during their 
negotiations, the external interveners’ responses towards the violence were different.  
In El Salvador, despite the FMLN’s repeated military attacks on government forces and agencies, 
the organisation sent clear messages to the Cristiani government and other external interveners 
from September 1990 that these operations were a political manoeuvre to gain a better 
bargaining position in the peace negotiations (Juhn, 1998: 72). In particular, the UN had many 
opportunities to learn the intention behind the military faction’s violence through its numerous 
visits to the FMLN headquarters and informal personal meetings with the faction’s negotiators 
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(de Soto, 1999: 359-65). Thus, despite their calls for the suspension of military action, the 
international interveners did not apply serious pressure on the FMLN to cease military 
operations (Sullivan, 1994: 86). In fact, the UN officials considered it unrealistic to demand 
that the FMLN, a warring party, abandon military pressure (de Soto, 1999: 381, and, therefore, 
the repeated use of violence by the FMLN did not critically hamper the negotiation processes in 
Phase 3. 
However, the reaction of the international interveners to the PDK’s military action was strikingly 
different. The UN and the US had very little direct contact with the PDK during the peace 
negotiation process. Their communications were conveyed either through China or by public 
statements. Hence, although the purpose of the PDK’s military operations changed from outright 
victory over the PRK/Vietnam to securing a better negotiating position in Phase 3, the external 
interveners did not recognise this. Moreover, as Western countries had been shocked by the 
media reports of the PDK’s systematic killing of approximately 1.5 million people, the PDK’s 
repeated military campaigns exacerbated its international image as an evil clique and generated 
an even colder response from the international community (Solomon, 1999: 305-7).  
Second, the case studies show that conveying accurate messages to national factions is also a 
critical factor in the success of an external intervener’s mediation. For example, China’s failure 
to articulate clearly to the PDK its change in direction on Cambodia from August 1990 was an 
important reason why the PDK flatly refused to cooperate with the implementation of the Paris 
Peace Agreements. Although China had formal and informal communication routes with the 
PDK leadership, its continued economic and military aid, regardless of its revised diplomatic 
stance, led the Cambodian faction to believe that China would not withdraw its advocacy. 
Moreover, China failed to clearly express to the PDK the fundamental nature of its policy 
changes in 1991 (see the Cambodia part of Chapter 6 for details). Hence, when there was finally 
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a dramatic reduction in Chinese material assistance (if not a complete withdrawal of aid) in 1992, 
the PDK regarded this change as an unexpected betrayal and felt that it had lost its external ally. 
This misunderstanding was an important factor in convincing the PDK to return to military 
action (Peschoux, 1992: 226-32 cited in Heder, 1999: 88). 
China’s behaviour contrasts strikingly with the communication between the US and the Cristiani 
government in El Salvador. The Bush administration made various efforts to maintain its 
existing communication routes despite the transformation in its policies towards El Salvador 
from 1989. From the bilateral meetings between the presidents of the two countries, to the 
interplay between the US’s non-governmental organisations and the Salvadoran political 
associations, the range and diversity of connections between the two countries enabled the US to 
maintain multi-level communication with Cristiani (see the Salvadoran part of Chapter 6 for 
details). Thus, based on the understanding that the ESAF resistance was the biggest obstacle to 
implementation of the peace agreements, US pressure on El Salvador targeted two actors: 
President Cristiani, and the High Command of the ESAF. Moreover, in conveying its messages 
during 1992, the US made repeated personal visits to both actors to confirm its resolve to press 
ahead with the demilitarisation process and to notify them of the possible incentives and 
pressures that the country could employ. Hence, despite continuous rumours about the potential 
for a coup d’état, the ESAF leaders maintained an ambivalent stance towards the process until 
demilitarisation was completed in December 1992.  
To summarise, the avoidance of mutual misunderstanding between external third parties and 
national factions through good communication is critically important to successful intervention.  
Interveners need to have a good understanding of national factions’ behaviour and have to 
transmit their intentions to national factions correctly. 
 
 


Security Guarantee 
In a sense, uncertainty is a part of peace negotiation (Stedman, 2003: 107), and maintaining 
good communication with warring national factions is very challenging for a third-party 
intervener. Thus, this thesis argues that although external interveners need to pursue good 
communication as a maximalist goal, they should also consider providing minimum security 
guarantees to all meaningful national factions as a minimalist requirement of the peace 
negotiation process (Walter, 2002; Regan, 2000).94 Most national factions in civil war peace 
negotiations pursue political survival in the forthcoming political arena as their most 
fundamental goal (Sorpong Peou, 2009: Author’s Interview; Zamora Rivas & Handal, 1987: 
484-5). Hence, external interveners who wish to keep national factions at the negotiating 
table should guarantee that the negotiations will secure the survival of the factional leaders 
and the grounds for their political activities.95  
Moreover, this thesis argues that interveners need to demonstrate two things to the national 
factions: (1) their consistent will and (2) that they have strong enough capabilities to 
guarantee the minimum security of the national factions. Chapter 6 supports this argument by 
displaying how the dissimilar attitudes of the US (in El Salvador) and China towards their 
client national factions resulted in contrasting outcomes to the peace processes. 
The US succeeded in providing security assurances to both President Cristiani and the FMLN 
leaders. In regards to the government, the US continued to guarantee the president’s status. It 
goes without saying that as the US supported the Salvadoran government during the initial 
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 The term ‘meaningful actor’ indicates those actors who have the power to ‘spoil’ the negotiation process. 
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 Defining what constitutes a ‘minimum security guarantee’ is a controversial matter. However, the former 
Cambodian factional leaders who were interviewed by the author generally agreed with three requirements: (1) a 
clear indication that factional leaders would not be executed or punished as if they had lost the conflict; (2) a 
clear message that fair opportunities should exist for the factions’ political activities and that they should not be 
hampered by the factions’ rivals; and (3) an acknowledgement that the fundamental rationales for the factions’ 
military movements were to be respected (Chhin Kim Thong, Ieng Mouly, and a former PDK commander who 
requested anonymity, 2009: Author’s Interview). 
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phase of the negotiations (Juhn, 1998: 50), it made continuous efforts to protect President 
Cristiani from potential threats. For instance, when the president encountered strong 
resistance from the High Command from the end of 1990, the US government repeatedly 
confirmed that it supported his presidency (Negroponte, 2005: 311-2). This guarantee was 
repeated in the implementation phase. 
Moreover, the US government also tried to relieve the FMLN’s security concerns. The US 
maintained direct contact with the leaders of the different military factions that made up the 
FMLN  and made public statements about its impartial role in the negotiation process and its 
trustworthiness. One major issue that the US had to deal with in these direct meetings 
concerned the provision of security assurances for these leaders (Sullivan, 1994: 88, 98). 
Moreover, when the FMLN’s demilitarisation was delayed because of the faction’s 
scepticism about the government’s willingness to abide by the Chapultepec Accords, the US 
convinced the faction to proceed with the process by reassuring it of its strong desire for 
demilitarisation of both the FMLN and other military agencies (Sullivan, 1994: 88; 
Negroponte, 2005: 352; Baranyi & North, 1996: 18). 
Although not described explicitly in this thesis, the UN’s (and the US’s) attitudes towards the 
PDK in Phase 3 (end of 1990 – October 1991) and Phase 4 (October 1991 – July 1993) are in 
sharp contrast to those adopted in El Salvador. During the negotiation period, the 
international interveners, including the UN P-5 and the US, did not show willingness to 
provide the PDK leaders with a minimum safety guarantee. In the latter phase of the peace 
negotiation (from mid-1990), when the PDK began to display greater receptivity to the peace 
process, US domestic anger against the Khmer Rouge led to the United States renouncing its 
former connection with the PDK and condemning the faction’s earlier human rights abuses 
(Solomon, 1999: 305-7). Moreover, when the PRK/SOC’s demanded an international tribunal 
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targeting the PDK leaders (including Pol Pot and Ieng Sary), no international interveners 
(except for China) demonstrated the intention of securing the faction’s leadership. In fact, the 
interveners’ moral judgement on the PDK’s previous behaviour prevented them from playing 
a more effective mediating role when the mutual mistrust between the national factions 
became clearly evident in the last period of the negotiation (Haas, 1991: 206). 
Moreover, in the implementation phase, UNTAC showed an inability and a lack of 
willingness to deter PRK/SOC aggression against the PDK. In fact, UNTAC’s top leaders 
(including Yasushi Akashi, the head of the UN body) held a similar moral judgement of the 
PDK as the PRK/SOC (Sorpong Peou, 2009: Author’s Interview). Thus, despite repeated 
calls from the PDK for more active and strong action by UNTAC to secure the safety of its 
representatives in Phnom Penh and to nullify the PRK/SOC’s attempts to dominate the 
implementation process, UNTAC responded to this request by instructing the PDK to adopt a 
more cooperative demeanour (Peou, 1997: 270-4; Heder, 1999: 263).96   
In short, it is important for third-party interveners to demonstrate their constant will and 
sufficient strength to guarantee the political survival of the national factions in the peace 
negotiations. First, interveners need to establish the national factions’ absolute trust in their 
promise to protect them.97 Second, the interveners should ensure that they possess sufficiently 
strong resources to respect and act upon the promise. This security guarantee is the first step 
to convincing the national factions to agree to mutual demilitarisation during the negotiation 
period and to abide by the implementation of the agreement. 
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96
 It should be noted that this paragraph does not intend to argue whether the UN officials’ moral judgment was 
right or wrong. The argument is that the policies that were based on this judgment were not useful in convincing 
the PDK to remain part of UNTAC’s peace process. 
97
 This lesson is evident in the UN’s relatively impartial supervision of the implementation processes in Namibia 
and Nicaragua (Peou, 1997: 295-6). 
 


Timing 
As discussed in Chapter 3, many previous studies have argued that the timing for intervention 
is critically important. Although the detailed arguments vary, most discussions agree that 
finding a ‘ripe-moment’ is critical to the success of a peace negotiation. The existence of a 
‘mutually hurting stalemate’ (in Zartman’s terms) might signal an appropriate time to begin 
third-party intervention for peace negotiation (Zartman, 2003: 19; Mitchell, 2003: 79-81). 
However, the case studies in this thesis demonstrate that the best timing for the withdrawal of 
the intervention, which is also critically important for the success of third-party intervention, 
was not overtly apparent.  
During the Cambodian peace negotiations, the international interveners failed to prevent the 
PRK/SOC’s resistance to the PPAs partly because of their misperception of the ripe moment 
(Solomon, 1999: 314). The first misjudgement of the ripe moment was made in September 
1990. When the PRK/SOC proclaimed that it supported the newly released UN Framework 
Document, the US and other Western interveners considered that the ripe moment for the 
peace agreement had come. Thus, in the following negotiation processes, the interveners 
allowed (if not encouraged) the Cambodian factions to discuss the details of the peace 
agreements by themselves (Brown & Zasloff, 1998: 92). 
Nevertheless, the PRK/SOC saw little chance of maintaining its political supremacy within 
the framework of the UN’s proposals and attempted to reverse some of the framework’s 
important recommendations, such as the ultimate authority of UNTAC and complete 
dissolution of all military forces, in meetings that excluded external actors. In fact, the 
PRK/SOC’s decisions were not so much about the detailed proposals in the UN’s framework 
as about presenting a silent challenge to the framework itself (details were discussed in Phase 
3, the Cambodia Section, Chapter 5). As a result, the final agreement became an awkward 
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hybrid of the interveners’ ideas and the Cambodian parties’ amendments rather than a 
coordinated and complex combination of the two. 
The second misjudgement came at the Paris Conference in Cambodia in October 1991. When 
the agreement was signed, the international interveners believed that the negotiations were at 
an end. For them, the transitional period between the ceasefire and the forthcoming election 
was simply about implementing the agreed provisions in the PPAs. Thus, they turned their 
attention away from Cambodia, leaving all the remaining issues to UNTAC. 
However, the PRK/SOC and the PDK still tried to renegotiate or change the contents of the 
PPAs when they found new reasons to do so. Hence, while the PRK/SOC continuously tried 
to expand its influence over the implementation projects, the PDK threatened that it might 
resume military operations if UNTAC did not listen to its demands. However, with the 
international community’s attention elsewhere and UNTAC’s inadequate material and human 
resources, these actors were in effect allowed to conduct their strategies in pursuit of their 
goals (see the discussion in Phase 4, the Cambodia part, Chapter 5 & 6). 
In summary, Western interveners missed many good opportunities to encourage the 
PRK/SOC to consent to their peace proposals because they misunderstood the intention of the 
Cambodian faction. Based on their assumption of the ripe moment for the termination of the 
conflict, they concluded that the peace negotiations had been successful, and they lost their 
enthusiasm for intervention when further pressure or attention was necessary. This 
demonstrates that although a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ is a good opportunity to begin 
peace negotiations, there remain multiple crucial moments in a peace process when the 
earnest attention of third-party interveners is necessary.98 Thus, it is very important for 
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 Although the detailed contexts are different, the interveners’ misjudgement of the ripe moment can also be 
found in the cases of Northern Ireland and Angola (Stedman, 2003: 105).  
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interveners to make an accurate judgment about the timing for intervention withdrawal. 
 
THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS RESEARCH AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
This chapter concludes by noting a number of the contributions that this research makes and 
the weaknesses of this project. Besides the practical suggestions presented above, this 
research also offers several conceptual and theoretical implications that contribute to future 
research and supplement the general literature on peace and conflict studies. First of all, this 
research has demonstrated that ‘interplay between actors’ is a useful concept for analysing the 
processes and the outcomes of peace negotiations. By paying attention to the dynamics of 
interplay between national factions and third-party interveners, this thesis has demonstrated a 
number of aspects of peace negotiation that have not been  discussed in depth in previous 
research.  
For instance, as discussed in Chapter 1, many previous studies seeking the factors that bring 
about successful peace intervention have focused their attention on the external conditions of 
wars or negotiations (i.e., the duration of the wars, the human costs, and per-capita income); 
hence, although being useful in describing the correlation between the factors and outcomes 
of peace negotiations, they have generally not explained how they are related. However, 
although the external conditions may roughly delineate the scope of actors’ behaviour, it is 
the negotiators’ wills that determine the success of a peace negotiation. By adopting some of 
the external conditions as a part of the variables that affect actors’ moves, this research has 
shown how actors change their attitudes towards core issues in consideration of the variables.  
In addition, much of the previous research looking at the actors’ roles has tended to pay sole 
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attention to how to improve the effectiveness of third-party intervention and has neglected the 
role played by national factions, under the assumption that national factions behave as 
reactive actors (see Chapter 1 for details). However, by using the concept of ‘interplay’, this 
thesis has revealed that the procedures and the outcomes of peace negotiations are the result 
of the mutual influence between the two sides. Moreover, in Cambodia and El Salvador at 
least, it was the national factions who finally decided the outcomes of the peace negotiations. 
No external interveners succeeded in compelling the national factions to accept proposals that 
the domestic actors considered critically harmful to their long-term goals. 
The Angolan peace negotiation that led to the Bicesse Accords (1990-91) is an example 
showing that the ‘interplay’ concept can be useful in other cases. The patterns of interplay 
between the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the UN and 
between the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the US are 
quite similar to the patterns described in this thesis. Moreover, despite the extensive 
intervention of the UN and the Troika (the US, the USSR, and Portugal), the external actors 
failed to convince the national factions to abide by the Bicesse Accords, a settlement that 
reflected the interveners’ liberal peace ideas. Although both national factions pretended to 
consent to the accords, UNITA simply refused to accept the outcome of the 1992 election 
(Lee, 2011). 
Second, this research also provides a number of theoretical contributions. For example, this 
thesis fills a gap in the previous research on the role of culture in conflict studies. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, whereas the impact of cultural issues during the pre-conflict period 
(as causes of the conflicts) and during the post-conflict period (focusing on the reconstruction 
of the war-torn societies) has attracted much academic attention, the effect of cultural issues 
during the conflicts themselves has received much less attention. This thesis has addressed 
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this by providing a large number of empirical observations on the role of cultural values in 
civil war peace negotiations. Specifically, it argued that the third-party interveners’ 
ethnocentric cultures reduce the effectiveness of their intervention by preventing them from 
having a good understanding of national factions and by limiting the scope of their strategies. 
Moreover, the findings on two-level games in peace negotiation as well as the influence of 
national factions’ institutional communication systems on peace negotiations may contribute 
to future research. Although discussion of these issues can be found in previous research 
related to game theories and bounded awareness, respectively, these discussions have tended 
to take place at the theoretical level, with little empirical evidence (see Chapter 2). This thesis 
has shown, however, that some of the features of warring factions’ two-level games in peace 
negotiations and the national factions’ self-conceptions are caused by a lack of good 
communication institutions. These observations, therefore, can provide a foundation on 
which further research is developed.    
Nevertheless, it is also important to note the weaknesses of this project and suggest possible 
directions for future research in order to address them. First, as discussed in Chapter 3, this 
research lacks field research from El Salvador. As this thesis presents negotiating actors’ 
perceptions as an important factor that determined the processes and outcomes of the peace 
negotiations in Cambodia and El Salvador, interviews with core actors in the Salvadoran 
peace negotiations to confirm how they perceived various issues related to the negotiation 
would have been desirable. However, due to limited time and funds, the author had to 
conduct field research only in Cambodia; moreover, the arguments related to the Salvadoran 
case had to rely entirely on written materials. Fortunately, as a relatively large number of 
studies based on interviews with the core negotiators in the Salvadoran peace negotiations 
have been published (particularly in the US), this weakness, although important, does not 
 


critically affect the findings of this research as the wealth of published material in part 
addresses this weakness. Nevertheless, in order to develop a more comprehensive 
understanding of the Salvadoran peace negotiations, field research in El Salvador is necessary. 
Second, further case studies are required in order to generalise the findings of this research. 
As Chapter 3 stated, a comparative study focusing on a small number of cases has strengths 
in investigating the dynamics of actors’ interaction and in discerning the unique 
characteristics of the cases from the common features of peace negotiations. By utilising 
these strengths, the case studies of Cambodia and El Salvador have indicated some of the 
various features of civil war peace negotiations. Nevertheless, this in-depth case study has a 
weakness in that it was not designed to observe the universal patterns of dynamics across 
many cases at once. In other words, it is necessary to apply the findings to a wider range of 
cases in order to confirm them as general characteristics of peace negotiations. However, a 
Large-N study relying on statistical methods is not likely to achieve this goal because the 
dynamics of interplay between actors cannot be observed through such a methodology. Hence, 
in-depth analysis of more case studies is recommended. 
The third challenge that this thesis faces is related to an assumption embedded in the research 
framework. The assumption of ‘unchanging, stable, and revealed preference,’ a fundamental 
assumption of game theory, is employed as the backbone of the research framework. In other 
words, the research framework was established based on the assumption that all actors have 
clear goals (preferences), that they are aware of the goals, and that the goals are stable. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 7, the case studies demonstrate that actors sometimes have 
multiple goals that are frequently contradictory and that the actors may not know which of 
the goals are their priorities. In addition, it was observed that the goals of external interveners 
may change in response to changes in the situation surrounding the peace negotiation and the 
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civil conflicts. In these instances, this research framework was of limited use in examining 
the actors’ strategic movements. Accordingly, the dynamics of interplay between negotiating 
actors who have uncertain preferences remains a subject to be explored in the future. 
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 Appendix I 
Chronology 
 
CAMBODIA 
 
1975 Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge topples the US-backed Khmer Republic, led by Lon 
Nol, in the wake of the Vietnam War 
 
1978 Vietnam invades Cambodia, overthrows the Khmer Rouge regime, and 
installs a surrogate regime led by Heng Samrin and Hun Sen 
1987 
December  First meeting between Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen 
 
1989 
July First Jakarta informal meeting (JIM) between the CGDK parties and the PRK 
August Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia, co-chaired by France and Indonesia 
September  Vietnam announces completion of full troop withdrawal 
October  The release of the Evans plan by Australia  
 
1990 
January – August UN Security Council Permanent Five consultations produce a framework 
agreement 
August   The UN’s Framework Document released 
September  Jakarta Informal Meeting – the formation of the SNC decided 
November The UN’s Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the 
Cambodia Conflict produced 
 
1990 – 1991  Secret Sino-Vietnamese negotiations on normalising relations 
 
1991 
October Dispatch of UN Advanced Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) 
October Paris Peace Agreements reached at reconvened Paris Conference 
 
1992 
March UN implementation force – UNTAC – arrives in Cambodia to oversee 
transition to elections and administer the government 
May    Free and fair elections won by Prince Sihanouk’s party, FUNCINPEC 
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EL SALVADOR 
 
1981   Final offensive of the FMLN 
 
1984   President Napoleón Duarte proposes peace talks 
 
1986 
November  UN-OAS joint diplomatic initiative to negotiate peace in El Salvador 
 
1987 
August   Esquipulas Declaration adopted 
 
1989 
June   President Cristiani proposes dialogue with the FMLN 
September Alvaro de Soto appointed UN Secretary-General’s personal representative for 
Central American “peace processes” 
November  The FMLN launches its largest offensive of the war 
December  Informal and indirect talks begin with representatives of the UN Secretary-
General 
 
1990 
January Pérez de Cuéllar agrees to assist El Salvador negotiations; de Soto begins 
shuttle diplomacy. 
April Geneva Agreement formulates basic rules and framework for the negotiations 
May Caracas Agreement sets general agenda and timetable for the negotiations 
July    San José Agreement on human rights is reached 
 
1991 
January   The Preparatory Office for ONUSAL is set up in San Salvador 
April Mexico agreements on constitutional reforms, legal matters, and a truth 
commission reached 
May  The UN Security Council passes Resolution 693, authorising the 
establishment of ONUSAL to verify compliance on all agreements reached 
July ONUSAL begins verification of the San José Agreement on Human Rights 
September New York agreements on a National Commission for the Consolidation of 
Peace and on the Compressed Agenda reached 
December  New York Act I finalises the substantive peace accords 
 
1992 
January  New York Act II completes the remaining items and implementation calendar 
January   Peace agreement signed at Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City 
 
 
Note. These chronologies are partly cited from Brown & Zasloff (1998, xv-xvi), Crocker, Hampson, 
& Aall (1999: 276-7, 346), and Baranyi & North (1996: 4-5). 
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Appendix II 
Historical Development of International Intervention 
It is necessary to understand the characteristics of intervention in the current era from a 
broader historical viewpoint. Hence, this appendix presents a brief discussion on the 
historical development of third -party intervention. The traits of international third-party 
intervention have changed in accordance with the distinctive characteristics of the era. 
Likewise, the characteristics of the world in the post-Cold War period are reflected in the 
interventions in the Cambodian and El Salvadoran cases. 
The modern concept of peace support operations by the international community emerged in 
the 19th century, the era of the ‘balance of power’. Besides signing and entering into treaties 
of mutual cooperation, European states established common security codification, institutions, 
trade regimes, discouraged slavery, tackled piracy at sea to control their waterways, and 
promoted postal and telecommunications services. Moreover, as seen in the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire and the division of Kosovo, some European countries participated in forms 
of external humanitarian intervention, although their chief aim was the order and stability of 
the international system (Pugh, 2005: 42). World War I was the first case of major 
international military intervention. In its aftermath, the establishment of the League of 
Nations in 1919 extended the scope of cooperation in the international community.  
After World War II, another significant example of intervention, a diverse range of 
international interventions began. The establishment of the United Nations, which was 
authorised to conduct military operations in cases that threatened international peace and 
security, signalled the opening of a new era. The UN Charter, which was adopted in 1945, 
sets out the UN’s role in matters of security. For example, Chapter VI states that the UN is 
entitled to use ‘a set of techniques which it can use in order to secure the peaceful settlement 
of disputes, including fact-finding, good offices, conciliation, mediation and negotiation’ 
(Miall et al, 2007: 34), while Chapter VII indicates its power to use coercion and armed force 
‘if necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security’ (Miall et al, 1999: 34). 
The Korean War (1950-53), in which armies from 16 nations participated, was a striking 
example of the UN’s role in collective security. In a further development, the first formal UN 
peacekeeping mission, UNEF I, was deployed to Sinai to help defuse the Suez Crisis of 1956. 
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The UN’s intervention was not very active or aggressive during the Cold War. Since the 
Security Council decisions were mainly based on bipolar bloc coalitions, the Security 
Council rarely achieved consensus on military issues. In this period, however, military 
intervention in certain security matters became widely adopted by the United Nations (and 
the superpowers). ‘Although the UN Charter specifies that issues “essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction” of a state should not be of concern to the UN and, thus, not 
internationalized, they were. The Charter provision was often only barring the UN itself from 
involvement where a host of other actors were heavily engaged’ (Wallensteen, 2007: 122). 
The principal methods used in such military interventions were of three types: peacekeeping-
type activities (the Balkans, the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent), peace enforcement 
actions (Korea and Congo), and the management of transition (Congo and Dutch West New 
Guinea) (Bellamy et al 2004: 71). The intervention of the UN (and other international 
organisations) could be implemented only with the consent of the conflicting parties.  
Moreover, many countries, regarding the UN as an agency of the United States, did not 
believe it to be a neutral mediator. Because of the limitations on the UN’s role in civil wars, 
the scope of its intervention in peace negotiations was also limited. Before and during 
negotiation processes, the UN frequently failed to lead the negotiations, instead employing 
very limited, ‘neutral and impartial’ methods such as offering good offices. The UN’s lack of 
intervention in peace negotiations was accompanied by a similar lack of intervention by 
powerful states under the rigid international bi-polar system. 
As to the UN’s conflict mediation, Secretary-Generals such as Dag Hammarskjöld and U 
Thant continued using ‘quiet diplomacy.’ Although it bridged conflicting parties in conflicts 
such as the Cyprus conflicts (1967 and 1974), the UN’s role as a mediator attracted limited 
attention from the two global rivals (the US and the USSR) as a means of resolving the 
conflicts. However, Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar promoted the UN as a 
relatively active mediator. In conflicts such as the war between Iraq and Iran, the withdrawal 
of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, and the independence of Namibia, the UN played key 
roles (Bercovitch, 1995: 82). 
In this period, other types of intervention also appeared or were revitalised. The activities of 
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the Contadora Group99 in Central America and the intervention of the Western Contact 
Group100 in the Namibian Civil War are representative examples of the so-called ‘post-
Napoleonic’ form. While collective actions under the name of the UN were largely limited 
because of the tensions between the two global camps, individual states such as the US and 
the UK played various roles in international conflicts in this period.  
In addition, regional organisations began to become involved in regional conflicts. For 
example, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), which was established in 1963, played 
pivotal roles in various conflicts in Africa in both positive and negative ways. The OAU 
provided military aid to some rebel groups (e.g. to independence movements against 
colonialism and anti-apartheid groups in South Africa). In addition, it also actively promoted 
a number of projects helping refugees of conflicts and natural disasters. Nevertheless, its 
failure to gain unanimous consent from member states to intervene in warring states 
hampered its ability to mediate in internal conflicts in the region. This lack of unanimity is 
evidenced by the fact that although the OAU Charter recommended the establishment of a 
Commission of Mediation, Reconciliation, and Arbitration, the commission never 
materialised (Murrey, 2004: 5).     
In a number of cases, high-profile individuals contributed to the peaceful resolution of 
conflicts. Some of these figures include Tanzanian President Nyerere in the civil war in 
Burundi, Jimmy Carter in the conflicts in the Middle East, and the Emperor of Ethiopia in the 
Sudanese Civil War. Another example is political pressure applied by The Commonwealth 
Eminent Persons’ Group on the South African government regarding its policy of apartheid. 
The collapse of the Cold War system brought enormous changes to the international security 
arena. The radical changes in the international intervention atmosphere, however, were not 
due only to the change in the system itself. Crocker, Hampson and Aall have pointed to four 
new characteristics: the disappearance of bipolar constraints (new system), the emergence of 
NGOs as players (new actors), renewed interest in mediation (new motive), and international 
norms recognising the need for international intervention (new norms) (Crocker, Hampson, & 
Aall, 1999: 6-7). Due to these changes, third-party interventions significantly expanded 
quantitatively, qualitatively, and normatively in the early 1990s.  
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99
 The Contadora Group consisted of Mexico, Colombia, Panama and Venezuela and played significant 
intermediary roles in conflicts in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala in the 1980s. 
100
 The Western Contact Group was launched by Canada, France, Germany (West), the UK, and the US in 1977. 
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In terms of the number of interventions after the collapse of the Cold War system, the UN 
conducted more peacekeeping operations during the five years between 1989-1994 than it 
had in the previous forty years. By the mid-1990s, the number of countries contributing to 
peacekeeping missions had almost tripled, from twenty-six in the late 1980s. In addition, after 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali became the Secretary-General, the UN began to play a more active 
role as a mediator than before. Using assets such as its moral standing as an impartial actor, 
its position in the international arena as the sole organisation that embraces global entities, 
and its extensive diplomatic network, the UN made efforts to provide good conditions for 
negotiation as a direct or indirect mediator in many conflicts, including the Israeli and 
Egyptian conflict (Bercovitch, 1995: 83). 
In the post-Cold War period, the evidence suggests that the number of civil war cases brought 
to an end through negotiation has increased. The percentage of negotiated resolutions among 
all war-termination cases post-1945 is believed to be less than 25 per cent. For example, 
Mason and Fett insist that of the 56 civil wars that ended between 1945-92, 13 cases ended in 
peace agreements (23 per cent). In a study covering the period 1945-93, Licklider claims that 
14 conflicts out of a total of 84 ended via negotiations, a mere 17 per cent. Stedman states 
that for the period 1900-89, ‘there were solutions through negotiations in 15 per cent of the 
civil wars in that century’ (Wallensteen, 2007: 125-6). However, according to Wallensteen, 39 
percent of armed conflicts have been ended through peace negotiations in the post-Cold War 
period (Wallensteen 2007: 77); moreover, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program indicates that 
61 per cent of conflicts that ended between 1989-2006 (74 out of 122) have been resolved by 
peace agreements (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2009: no pagination).  
This significant increase is partly due to the increased efforts of international interveners, 
including the UN, to promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The Agenda for Peace, 
which was announced by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, insisted that UN intervention needed to 
change its direction. After acknowledging ‘the increasing ethnic, religious, social and cultural 
tensions within state boundaries, the problems of population growth, trade barriers, debt 
burdens and the disparity between the rich and the poor as potential sources of regional 
instability’, the report concluded that the UN needed to extend the breadth of its concerns and 
expand the methods it employed (Rupesinghe, 1998: 17).  
In terms of the qualitative aspects of post-Cold War international intervention, the collapse of 
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the Cold War system widened the scope for cooperation among the major powers. They were 
able to enjoy greater opportunities for ‘negotiations, talks, dialogue, non-violent change, 
rewards and promises of economic assistance’ (Wallensteen, 2007: 216). The Gulf War in 
1991, in which the UN’s collective security force was utilised, was a notable example of this 
increased cooperation. In the process of building consent for a military solution to Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait, the Soviet Union supported the US-backed resolution authorising the use 
of force against Iraq. In addition, under the leadership of Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN 
played much a bigger role in many civil war peace negotiations in Latin America and 
Southern Africa. 
At the same time, the composition of post-Cold War peacekeeping operations became more 
diverse and complex: peacekeepers were drawn from a wider variety of sources (military, 
civilian police, and diplomatic quarters), nations, and cultures (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 134). 
The military interventions were supplemented by a range of projects such as humanitarian aid, 
state-building programmes, local peacemaking, and elements of peace enforcement. In 
normative terms, the concept of liberal-democratic peace was widely accepted as the standard 
of the post-Cold War system (Carment & Rowlands, 1998: 573). 
In recognition of such changes, the concepts of first, second, and third generation UN 
Peacekeeping have emerged. First generation peacekeeping is the common form that early 
intervention takes. The operations in this category are conducted by unarmed or lightly armed 
UN forces, and their main purposes are monitoring truces and troop withdrawal or creating a 
buffer zone while political negotiations proceed (Doyle, 1996: 484). Second generation 
operations are engaged in ‘various police and civilian tasks, the goal of which is a long-term 
settlement of the underlying conflict’ (Doyle, 1996: 484). The peacekeeping operations in the 
Balkans and Africa in the 1990s are representative examples. Third generation peacekeeping 
operations are also called ‘peace enforcing’ because their scope is extended ‘from low-level 
military operations to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the enforcement of 
cease-fires and, when necessary, assistance in the rebuilding of so-called failed states’ (Doyle, 
1996: 484). Third generation operations are generally conducted under a Chapter 7 mandate 
but occasionally are undertaken without the consent of the UN (Doyle, 1996: 484).  
With regard to the actors involved in post-Cold War intervention, the number of participants 
has increased and the characteristics of the actors have become more complex. In recent years, 
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‘more than a hundred different nations [have contributed] forces to UN peacekeeping 
missions’ (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 134). In addition to powerful states (such as the US, the 
UK and France) and small, neutral developed countries (including Canada, the Republic of 
Ireland and the Scandinavian nations), there are many countries in ‘Asia (Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, India) and Africa (Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana) that make the major contribution to 
current missions’ (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 134). In addition, since ideological tensions 
between the superpowers no longer exist, powerful countries have begun to cooperate in 
promoting more effective peace processes.  
Regional organisations such as the African Union (AU, the successor of OAU), the 
Organisation of American States (OAS), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
have played more prominent roles in conflict intervention in the post-Cold War environment. 
In Africa, after the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution 
(1993) failed to achieve its goal, the OAU was disbanded and replaced by the AU. In addition 
to peacekeeping operations in Burundi and Sudan, the AU has made great efforts to mediate 
between parties in conflict by sending envoys to countries like the Central African Republic 
(2003) and Zimbabwe (2005) (Murithi, 2007: no pagination).  
The OAS also began to play an active role in conflict mediation. When severe political 
tensions emerged in 1990 among national leaders in various Latin American countries, the 
OAS not only applied diplomatic pressure but also imposed economic sanctions in order to 
encourage a peaceful resolution of the conflict (McDougall, 1999: 389-94). Since then, the 
OAS has intervened in several civil wars in the region, including those in Ecuador, El 
Salvador, and Paraguay, as a direct or indirect mediator. Most recently, it made efforts to 
prevent war through mediation between rival leaders in Bolivia in 2008.  
In Europe, while NATO has played significant roles in various military operations, from 
peacekeeping (e.g. its operations in the former Yugoslavia in 1994) to direct military action 
(e.g. the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995), the EU’s activities have focused on preventive 
diplomacy and post-war assistance. In particular, the EU’s civilian operations have mainly 
focused on post-war recovery: for example, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the EUPOL Proxima operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM), and the EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia. However, since the establishment of 
the post of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU has 
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begun to place more emphasis on the mediation role (Väyrynen, 2006: 224). 
The role played by small or middle-sized countries in conflict resolution has also gradually 
increased. The activities of the Nordic countries are good examples. Sweden, Finland, and 
Norway, which had been known as ‘neutral’ polities, have begun to play larger roles in many 
domestic conflicts in Europe and other regions of the world. While the efforts of Sweden and 
Finland are focused on dispatching individual representatives to mediate between warring 
parties, Norway adopts somewhat more active and diversified roles. For instance, in 
Palestine-Israel (1990s) and Sri Lanka (2001), the Norwegian government contributed to the 
negotiations as a good office provider, secret messenger, negotiation facilitator, and new 
proposal producer (Väyrynen, 2006: 228-33). 
As international circumstances have changed since the end of the Cold War period, the timing 
of intervention has also changed. Until the end of the 1980s, most intervention by 
international actors began after negotiations between conflicting parties had been set up. 
During the Cold War era, the main role of intervention was to create a buffer zone in which 
the peace processes could proceed. However, in the 1990s, ‘missions have been undertaken 
either in the midst of war or prior to the outbreak of violence’ (Carment & Rowlands, 1998: 
573). This is because the changed relations between powerful countries opened greater 
opportunities for international intervention in civil wars. Hence, intervention to promote 
dialogue between adversarial parties became more frequent than before, and more 
interventions emphasised ‘negotiation’. 
Despite the enlarged efforts of the international community in civil war pacification, third-
party interventions have confronted various obstacles. In particular, the failure of a number of 
peacekeeping operations in the mid-1990s, including those in Rwanda and Somalia, triggered 
a new momentum to reconsider its effectiveness, efficiency, and morality. Scholars began to 
seek new approaches that reflected the demands of the changed international security arena 
and the limit of the will and capabilities of the interveners. For example, in relation to the UN, 
then Secretary-General Kofi Annan modified the direction of UN intervention and adopted 
new agendas in the Millennium Report, We The Peoples: The Roles of the United Nations in 
the Twenty-First Century (Ramsbotham, 2005: 147). 
Finally, the battle against terrorism is one of the most significant issues in this period. After 
the terrorist attack on September 11 2001, shared fear ‘brought the EU, NATO and the other 
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major powers on to the same side’; furthermore, the war on terrorism became a new norm in 
the international security arena. Even China and Russia have given very strong support on the 
issue (Wallensteen 2007: 218). Nevertheless, subsequent wars have posed new challenges to 
intervention: questions about lack of legitimacy and morality are now part of the discussion. 
In recent interventions and wars, the US and some European states have conducted military 
operations without the consent of the United Nations. Although supporters have claimed that 
the operations are related to the ‘responsibility to protect’ and the ‘war against terrorism’, the 
lack of procedural legitimacy has been harshly criticised. According to Chandler, ‘while there 
is little barrier to the assertion of US power around the world, there is, as yet, no framework 
which can legitimize and give moral authority to new, more direct forms of Western 
regulation’ (Chandler, 2007: 75). 
In addition, as the cultural issues involved in the intervention attract more attention, new 
types of interventions are also considered important. Interactive conflict resolution is a 
prominent example, which means ‘small group, problem-solving discussions between 
unofficial representatives of identity groups or states engaged in destructive conflict that are 
facilitated by an impartial third party of social scientist-practitioners’ (Fisher, 1997: 239). 
However, these types of negotiations have not been at the centre of international peace 
processes. 
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Appendix III 
 
The Internal Factions of the FMLN 
1. The Communist Party of El Salvador (Partido Comunista de El Salvador, PCS) 
The PCS, which was officially established by Miguel Mármol in 1930, was the birthplace and 
breeding ground for many other anti-government movements. Although it was the only 
significant Marxist faction in the country and had close relations with the Soviet Communist 
Party, the PCS did not follow a traditional revolutionary path. Rather, it opposed armed 
struggle and attempting to expand its popularity through legal elections and trade unions until 
1970 (Berner, 1998: no pagination; Negroponte, 1996: 104). 
When Cayetano Carpio, one of its leading figures and an advocate of armed revolutionary 
struggle, left the party and established the FPL (See below), Schafik Handal sustained the 
party’s non-militaristic popular movement, focusing primarily on strikes and demonstrations 
during the 1970s. The PCS allied with the PDC, a mainstream political party, in 1971 and ran 
for the elections in 1972 and 1977 alongside it (McClintock, 1998: 50; Negroponte, 1996: 
105). 
 
2. Popular Liberation Forces "Farabundo Marti" (Fuerzas Populares de Liberación 
"Farabundo Mart”í: FPL) 
The FPL came into being when Cayetano Carpio, the only working-class member of the then 
leaders of the FMLN, seceded from the PCS, arguing that the PCS’s strategies were too 
focused on electoral participation and political engagement. The FPL was committed to 
armed struggle against the military dictatorship and soon became the largest resistance group. 
Its operations usually targeted policemen and members of the security forces. Moreover, 
understanding the importance of building close relationships with local people, it promoted 
political mobilisation by guaranteeing people’s everyday needs and supporting local 
communities (Negroponte, 1996: 107). Before long, its system of Local Popular Groups 
(poder popular local) became one of the most reliable political foundations of the 
organisation (Lungo Ucles, 1996: 140). When the FPL forged an alliance with the 
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Revolutionary Popular Bloc (Bloque Popular Revolucionario, BPR), ‘a popular organization 
that included many unionized teachers, students, and peasants among its members’ 
(McClintock, 1998: 50-1), the military and political influence of the organisation increased 
further.  
 
3. The Revolutionary Army of the People (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo: ERP) 
The ERP was an organisation that concentrated solely on military operations. It was 
established in 1972 by disaffected former members of the PDC and the PCS and was led by 
Joaquín Villalobos. In contrast to the other left-wing factions, which were Marxist-Leninist in 
nature, the leadership of the organisation did not adopt a clear ideological position (Berner, 
1998: no pagination). Its focus on military operations and its opposition to negotiation 
convinced the government to regard it as the most radical faction. Its intransigent posture (it 
viewed any non-military engagement with the government as collaborationist) continued 
under Ana Guadalupe Martinez, its second commander. It did not form any strong alliances 
other than with the Popular Leagues - 28th of February (Ligas Populares – 28 de Febrero, LP-
28) until it joined the FMLN. Its extreme militarism created a split within its ranks that 
eventually led to the formation of the RN (Negroponte, 1996: 107-8). 
  
4. The National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional: RN) 
When the ERP assassinated Roque Dalton, a popular Salvadoran poet, internal friction about 
the direction that the movement was taking resulted in a split within the faction. A disaffected 
group led by Eduardo Sandho Castañeda formed the RN, which focused greater attention on 
political campaigning. The RN mobilised popular militias and conducted a range of projects 
targeting local people. For its military operations, the RN formed an armed sub-organisation 
called the Armed Forces of National Resistance (Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional, 
FARN) to conduct guerrilla warfare, in the belief that guerrilla tactics would cause fewer 
deaths but have a greater impact on society (Negroponte, 1996: 109).  
 
5. The Workers’ Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores 
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Centroamericanos: PRTC) 
The PRTC was distinctive in that it pursued regional-level revolution due to its connection 
with regional trade unions. The PRTC in El Salvador was formed and supported by its parent 
organisation in Costa Rica. Under the leadership of Francisco Jovel, a number of students at 
the National University of El Salvador were instrumental in its founding. Later, some of those 
disaffected with the PCS and the ERP joined it (Berner, 1998: no pagination). The PRTC was 
characterised by its flexible attitude in its dealings with other rebel groups and played a 
mediating role among rebel parties. It later dissociated itself from its external advocate in 
Costa Rica to join the FMLN (McClintock, 1998: 51). 
 
Table III.1. Main Organisations of the FMLN 
 
Political-
Military 
Organisation 
Popular Organisationa Armed Forces 
FPL (1970) Popular Revolutionary Bloc (Bloque 
Popular Revolucionario, BPR-1975) 
FPL 
RN (1975) United Popular Action Front (Frente de 
Acción Popular Unificada, FAPU-1974) 
Armed Forces of National Resistance  
(Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional, 
FARN-1975) 
ERP (1972) 28th of February Popular Leagues (Ligas 
Populares 28 de Febrero, LP-28-1978) 
ERP 
PCS (1930) Nationalist Democratic Union (Unión 
Democrática Nacionalista, UDN-1967) 
Armed Forces of Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas 
de Liberación, FAL-1979) 
PRTC (1976) Popular Liberation Movement 
(Movimiento de Liberación Popular, MLP-
1979) 
PRTC 
Note: Years cited are the dates of founding. 
aThe Popular organisations had ceased to exist by late 1980. 
The table is cited in (Montgomery, 1992: 102) and modified by the author. 
 
* The FMLN’s main negotiators - The names of the main participants are as follows: Ana Guadalupe Martínez 
(senior commander), Salvador Samayoa (senior negotiator), Dagoberto Gutiérrez (senior commander), María 
Marta Valladares “Nidia Diaz” (senior commander), Roberto Cañas (senior commander), and members of the 
General Command, including Shafik Handal, Eduardo Sancho, Joaquín Villalobos, Francisco Jovel, and 
Salvador Sánchez Cerén (Buchanan & Chávez 2008, Annex 2). 
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Appendix IV 
Interview Questionnaires 
 
As the author conducted semi-structured interviews during the field research, the questions 
varied according to the interviewees’ responses. However, the following questions were 
commonly asked. 
 
To interviewees involved with the PDK (Khmer Rouge) 
- Did you respect Prince Sihanouk before, during, and after the Cambodian civil conflict? 
- Did you understand what ‘election’ meant when the Paris Peace Agreements were signed? 
Did you expect to win the election? 
- When you conducted the dry season campaign in 1985, how many troops did you have? 
How did you recruit new soldiers? 
- Did you see any significant changes in the military or economic aid from China between 
1989 and 1991? If so, did the leadership give any explanation for/about these changes? 
-  How did you manage/achieve/maintain communication with China? Did you have any 
constant contact point with the country? Was there any change in terms of the frequency or 
methods of communication?  
- Pol Pot announced that the Khmer Rouge had abandoned the communist ideology in the 
early 1980s. What happened within the party after the announcement? Do you think it 
changed the leadership’s attitudes towards the civil war or the negotiations? 
- After the Vietnamese army occupied Phnom Penh in 1979, how did you maintain 
relationships with the Cambodian people? 
- In the late 1980s, did you know that peace negotiations with the PRK and Vietnam were 
taking place? If so, did you expect the negotiations with the two enemies to achieve a 
productive outcome?  
- What were the main institutions for internal communication or discussion? Did you have 
regular meetings within the leadership? 
 
To interviewees involved with the PRK/SOC 
- Why did Hun Sen initiate the talks with Prince Sihanouk in 1987? Many people argue that 
the lack of resources and the desire for international recognition as the legitimate government 
were the biggest motivation. Do you think these arguments are right? 
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- For many people (at least your supporters), the civil conflict was ‘a war to liberate people 
from the human rights abusing Khmer Rouge.’ However, you accepted the PDK as a political 
entity in the last phase of the negotiations. How did you understand this decision? 
- In 1991, or more specifically from the meeting in Japan, the PDK boycotted the peace talks. 
However, you continued negotiations with the other factions. Did you believe that it would be 
possible/feasible to arrive at an agreement without the PDK’s participation/consent? If this is 
the case, why did you think in that way? 
- Some sources say that Vietnam supported the peace negotiations from the late 1980s. Is this 
correct? If so, could you elaborate on some details of this? Did you receive any verbal 
messages from Vietnam? Was Vietnam involved in coordinating the details of the 
negotiations? 
- When you signed the Paris Peace Agreements, did you expect the PDK to comply with the 
agreements? 
 - We you aware of the change in China’s attitudes towards the peace negotiations? If so, 
when did you perceive the change? Did you have any direct contact with China in this 
period? How did Mr Hun Sen communicate with the Chinese leaders? 
- If you were to nominate a critical event/moment that led to the negotiations, which would it 
be? Do you think that the failure of the dry season campaign in 1985/1986 provided the 
momentum for you to reconsider your war strategy? If so, how did you change the direction 
of your military and diplomatic principles? 
- Did you have any direct contact with the UN or the US? If so, in which way did you 
communicate with them? 
- What were the main institutions for internal communication or discussion? Did you have 
regular meetings within the leadership? 
 
To interviewees involved with the KPNLF 
- The KPNLF strongly opposed coalition with the Khmer Rouge. However, you changed your 
initial position later. What convinced you to change it? 
- Do you think that Khmer cultural values influenced the direction or outcomes of the peace 
negotiations a lot? If so, can you give some examples? 
- Did you have regular meetings within the leadership? How did you manage the discussions? 
- What do you think about Mr Son Sann’s leadership? 
- What do you think was the critical event/moment that persuaded the KPNLF to negotiate 
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with Vietnam (rather than continuing military operations)? 
 - You set three main goals in the initial phase (liberating the people from the Khmer Rouge, 
removal of the Vietnamese imperialist, and the establishment of a democratic country). 
Which do you think was the most important goal? 
- What do you think the role of China was? Did you have direct contact with the country? 
- How frequently did you meet with the delegates from Western donors/supporters, including 
France and the US? What did they say in the last phase of the negotiations? 
- What was the role of regional actors (ASEAN in particular)?  
- Did you believe that you had strong popular support? Did you believe that you would win 
many seats in the assembly in the first general election? 
  
To interviewees involved with FUNCINPEC 
- Many people argue that FUNCINPEC was an organisation that relied heavily on the 
charismatic leadership of Prince Sihanouk. What do you think about this?  
- How did you manage internal discussions? Are you aware of any case where the prince’s 
decision was reversed due to internal discussions? In particular, when Prince Sihanouk 
decided to collaborate with the Khmer Rouge, did you have any internal disagreements? If so, 
how did you manage the disagreements? 
- What was the most important goal of FUNCINPEC when it was first established? 
- On which issue do you feel that gaining the consent of other members of the CGDK proved 
the most difficult? 
- How was your relationship with China? Did you meet with Chinese delegates? When you 
had disagreements with the Khmer Rouge, did you ask for Chinese help? 
- Why do you think that the PRK wanted to have talks with Prince Sihanouk? 
- What was the role of the US in the negotiations? How frequently did the American 
delegates visit you? Were there any occasions when the US gave specific suggestions about 
the negotiations?  
-Were there significant changes in American economic and military support during the final 
phase of the negotiations? 
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P A R T I C I P A N T  /  V O L U N T E E R  I N F O R M A T I O N  S H E E T  
 
 
Survey of Perceptual and Cultural Factors Affecting the Peace Negotiation Processes in 
the Cambodian Civil War 
 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
Purpose of the Research 
This field research intends to discover the effects of non-material factors, such as the 
perceptions of negotiators, popular support, and cultural practices, on the direction and 
progress of negotiation. In particular, the interview (and survey) that you have kindly agreed 
to participate in is to ascertain how Cambodian people perceived the civil conflict and peace 
negotiation process when the negotiation process was taking place.  
 
Anonymity, Privacy & Confidentiality 
The researcher will ensure anonymity in the writing up and publication of the final study.  
When any data directly related to your personal identity is used, your consent will be 
obtained in advance. 
The researcher will ensure privacy during each of the data collection sessions.  Data collected 
will be handled only by the researcher and supervisor and will be stored securely.   
Future use of the data for scholarly purposes through archiving or the destruction of the data 
will be carried out as agreed in the ‘Volunteer Consent Form’. 
 
 
Withdrawal 
Please remember that you are free to withdraw from the study at any time.  Should you do so, 
all data relating to you will be destroyed.   
 
Questions 
If you have any questions, please feel free to ask the researcher to answer them. 
 
Contact Details  
Researcher(s) Name 
Sung Yong Lee 
Tel: +44 7923 538 366 
E-mail: syl23@st-andrews.ac.uk 
Supervisor’s Name 
Dr Roger Mac Ginty 
Tel: +44 1334 461 923 
E-mail: hrm21@st-andrews.ac.uk 
Appendix V (English) 
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
GñkcUlrYm   GñksµRKcitþ snøwkBt’man 


karsÞg;cMeNHdwg nig karCH\T§§iBlénktþavb,Fm’eTAelIdMeNIrkarEsVgrksnþiPaB 
kñúgsRgÁamsIuvilRbeTskm<úCa 
 
 
sUmGrKuNsMrab;karcUlrYmrbs;Gñk. 
 
eKalbMNgénkarRsavRCavMMM  
karRsavRCavvis½yenH KWbMNgedIm,IEsVgrkRbsiT§iPaBénktþaminEmnsMPar³ dUcCa cMeNHdwgénGñkcrca karKaMRTRbkbedayRbCaRbiy_ nig 
TM;lab;tamvb,Fm’ eTAelIkarbgðajpøÚv nig karvivDÆn_énkic©crca. CaBiess karsMPasn_ nigsÞg;mti EdlGñk)ancUlrYm 
edIm,IeFVIeGayR)akdeLIgnUvrebobEdlRbCaCnkm<úCa)andwgGMBICMelaHsIuvil nig dMeNIrkarcrca snþiPaB enAeBldMeNIrkarcrca)ankMBugTTYl. 
 
GnamikPiii aB PaBÉkCn nig PaBsm¶at;i ¶ ;i ¶ ;i ¶ ; 
GñkRsavRCav nwgFana GnamikPaBkñúgkarsresr nigkare)aHBum< énkarsikSa cugeRkay. 
enAeBlEdlTinñn½yBak;B½n§nwgGtþsBaØaNpÞal;rbs;GñktMrUveGaybgðaj enaHkaryl;RBmrbs; GñknwgRtUv)aneRCIserIsya:gsMxan;bMput. 
GñkRsavRCavnwgFanaPaBÉkCn kñúgkMLúgeBlsm½yRbCMuRbmUlpþúMTinñn½ynImYy². Tinñn½yEdl  
)anRbmUlnwgRtUv)ancat;EcgedayGñkRsavRCav nig GñkENnaMEtb:ueNÑaH ehIynwgRtUv)an rkSaTukya:gmansuvtßiPaB. 
kareRbIR)as;enAeBlGnaKt nUvTinñn½y sMrab;eKalbMngEdlmanxøwmsar tamry³kartMkl;Ca Éksar rWk¾karbMpøajecal 
énTinñn½ynwgRtUv)anGnuvtþdUcEdl)anRBmeRBogkñúg “?TMrg;yl; RBmGñkrbs;sµRKcitþ“? . 
 
kardkxøÜøÜ øÜøÜn 
sUmcgcaMfa GñkmanesrIPaBedIm,IdkxøÜnBIkarsikSaenAeBlNak¾)an. RbsinebIGñk eFVIdUecñH RKb; Tinñn½yTaMgGs;nwgRtUv)anbMpøaj. 
sMnYrM YM YM Y  
RbsinebIGñkmansMnYr sUmsYrBYkeKedayesrIedIm,IRsavRCav. 
 
TMnak;TMnglMGitM ; M M iM ; M M iM ; M M i  
eQ µµ µµaH Gññ ññkRsavRCav                     eQ µµ µµaH Gññ ññkENnaMM MM 
Sung Yong Lee      Roger Mac Ginty 
Tel: +44 7923 538 366    Tel: +44 1334 461 923 
E-mail: syl23@st-andrews.ac.uk   E-mail: hrm21@st-andrews.ac.uk 
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
School of International Relations 
University of St Andrews 


D E B R I E F I N G  F O R M  
 
Project Title 
Survey of Perceptual and Cultural Factors Affecting the Peace Negotiation Processes in the 
Cambodian Civil War 
 
 
Researcher(s) Name 
Sung Yong Lee 
Tel: +44 7923 538 366 
E-mail: syl23@st-andrews.ac.uk 
Supervisor’s Name 
Dr Roger Mac Ginty 
Tel: +44 1334 461 923 
E-mail: hrm21@st-andrews.ac.uk 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this survey. 
 
This survey intends to discover the effects of non-material factors, such as the perceptions of 
negotiators, popular support, and cultural practices, on the direction and progress of 
negotiation. As a part of research data, the contents of your interview will be analysed in the 
researcher’s thesis to ascertain which negotiation factors proved crucial in promoting and 
inhibiting the progress of the negotiations. 
 
For your data protection, the following will be respected. 
1. Your personal details will not be released in any way without your consent.  
2. The data contained in your interview will not be modified or distorted.  
3. In cases where your interview needs to be directly quoted, your consent will first be asked. 
 
Appendix VI (English) 
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School of International Relations 
University of St Andrews 

TMrg;karsYrykkarN_ 
 
 
eQµaHKMeragµ Mµ Mµ M  
karsÞg;mti nUvcMeNHdwg nig karCH\T§iBlénktþavb,Fm’ eTAelIdMeNIrkarcrca snþiPaB 
kñúgsRgÁamsIuvilRbeTskm<úCa.
 
 
eQ µµ µµaH GññññkRsavRCav                                    eQ µµ µµaH GññññkENnaMMMM 
Sung Yong Lee        Roger Mac Ginty 
Tel: +44 7923 538 366 
E-mail: syl23@st-andrews.ac.uk 
Tel: +44 1334 461 923 
E-mail: hrm21@st-andrews.ac.uk 
  
 
sUmGrKuNsMrab;karcUlrYmrbs;GñkkñúgkarRsavRCavenH. 
 
karRsavRCavenH KWbMNgedIm,IEsVgrkRbsiT§iPaBénktþaminEmnsMPar³ dUcCacMeNHdwg énGñkcrca karKaMRTRbkbedayRbCaRbiy_ 
nig TM;lab;tamvb,Fm’ eTAelIkarbgðajpøÚv nig karvivDÆn_énkic©crca. dUcEpñkmYyénTinñn½yRsavRCav GVI²EdlmanenAkñúgkic©sMPasn_rbs;Gñk 
nwgRtUv)anviPaKenAkñúgniekçbbTrbs;GñkRsav- RCav edIm,IeGaydwgR)akd nUvktþakarcrcacaM)ac; Edlktþakarcrca)anbgðajPaBsMxan; 
kñúgkareFVIeGayRbesIreLIg nigktþararaMg karvivDÆn_énkic©crca. 
 
sMrab;kic©karBarTinñn½yrbs;Gñk dUcteTAenH nwgRtUv)aneKarB. 
1>Bt’manlMGitpÞal;rbs;GñknwgminRtUv)anbeBa©jkñúgkrNINak¾eday edayKµankar 
yl;RBmrbs;Gñk. 
2>Tinñn½yEdl)anpÞúkkñúgbTsMPasn_rbs;GñknwgminRtUv)anEkERb rWeFIVeGayxusPaB edImeLIy. 
3>kñúgkrNIEdlbTsMPasn_tRmUv edIm,IRtUv)andkRsg;edaypÞal; enaHkaryl;RBm rbs;nwgRtUv)anesñI. 


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PA R T I C I PA N T  /  V O L U N T E E R  
C O N S E N T  F O R M  
 
Project Title 
Survey of Perceptual and Cultural Factors Affecting the Peace Negotiation Processes 
in the Cambodian Civil War 
 
 
Researcher(s) Name 
Sung Yong Lee 
Tel: +44 7923 538 366 
E-mail: syl23@st-andrews.ac.uk 
Supervisor’s Name 
Dr Roger Mac Ginty 
Tel: +44 1334 461 923 
E-mail: hrm21@st-andrews.ac.uk 
 
Consent 
The purpose of this form is to ensure that you are willing to take part in this study and to help 
you to understand what it entails. Signing this form does not commit you to anything you do 
not wish to do, and you are free to withdraw at any stage. 
 
Have you read and understood the Participant / Volunteer Information 
Sheet? 
 Yes   No 
Have you had the opportunity to ask questions and discuss the study?  Yes  No 
Have you received satisfactory answers to your questions?  Yes  No 
Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the study: 
• At any time 
• Without having to give a reason for withdrawing 
 Yes  No 
Do you agree to take part in the study?  Yes  No 
Name  
Signature  
Date  
Appendix VII (English) 
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GñkcUlrYm   GñksµRKcitþ 
TMrg;karyl;RBm 
 
eQµaHKMeragµ Mµ Mµ M  
karsÞg;mti nUvcMeNHdwg nig karCH\T§iBlénktþavb,Fm’ eTAelIdMeNIrkarcrcasnþiPaB 
kñúgsRgÁamsIuvilRbeTskm<úCa.
 
eQ µµ µµaH GññññkRsavRCav                                     eQ µµ µµaH GññññkENnaMMMM 
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